

# THE THEORY OF REVELATION

I. I.

BY

Rev. Joseph J. Baleri

S. T. D.


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**THE THEORY OF REVELATION.**





# The Theory of Revelation.

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Part I.

The Speculative Foundation of Revelation.

Section I.

The Natural Presuppositions of Revelation.

By

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## ABBREVIATIONS.

- AER. *American Ecclesiastical Review*. Philadelphia, Pa.
- CE. *The Catholic Encyclopedia*. N. Y. 1907 f.
- DAFC. *Dictionnaire apologétique de la foi catholique*, ed. A. D'Alès. Paris, 1911 f.
- DB. Denzinger-Bannwart, *Enchiridion symbolorum, definitionum et declarationum de rebus fidei et morum*. Friburgi Brisgoviae. 1922 (14.—15. ed.).
- DCD. *Dogmatic Canons and Decrees*. Authorized Translation of the Dogmatic Decree of the Council of Trent etc. N. Y. 1912 (Devin-Adair Co.).
- DRG. *Darstellungen aus dem Gebiete der nichtchristlichen Religionsgeschichte*. Münster i. W. 1890 f.
- DTC. *Dictionnaire de theologie catholique*, ed. A. Vacant et F. Mangenot. Paris, 1903 f.
- ERE. *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*, ed. James Hastings. N. Y. & Edinburg. 1913 f.
- HDB. *A Dictionary of the Bible*, ed. James Hastings. N. Y. 1899 f. Extra vol. 1912.
- LHR. *Lectures on the History of Religions* (Catholic Truth Society). London & St. Louis, Mo. 1910 f.
- LRG. *Lehrbuch der Religionsgeschichte*, begründet von Chantepie de la Saussaye, hrsg. von A. Bertholet u. E. Lehmann. Tübingen. 1925 (4. ed.).
- RCK. Esser-Mausbach, *Religion, Christentum und Kirche*. Kempten. 1923 (5. ed.).
- SHERK. *The New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge*, ed. Samuel Macauley Jackson. N. Y. & London. 1911 f.
- ST. St. Thomas, *Summa Theologica*. Also Literal English Translation by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. London & N. Y. 1911 f.
- SCG. St. Thomas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*. Also Literal English Translation by the Dominican Fathers from the latest Leonine Edition. N. Y. 1924 f.



## PREFACE.

Apologetics — the science which demonstrates the credibility of Catholic Christianity as the divinely revealed Religion for mankind<sup>1)</sup> — opens up many problems of fundamental and far-reaching significance. Unfortunately, in our crowded seminary curriculum it is impossible to do justice either to the amplitude of the subject matter or to the vital importance of the questions involved. The progressive student must strive, therefore, by a thoughtful reading of the standard works, to broaden and deepen the knowledge he has acquired in the lecture-room and by the study of the text-book. A splendid and extensive apologetical literature has appeared in Latin, English, German, French, and other languages in recent years. The primary purpose of this volume on the "Theory of Revelation" is to make the student acquainted with the more important of these modern contributions to the defence of the groundwork of our faith. Germany especially has been the scene of persistent and radical attacks against the foundations of Religion, Christianity and the Church. Many distinguished scholars have entered the lists on behalf of the claims of the Church of the ages and, in consequence, an excellent apologetical literature has come into being, although a great portion of this has not yet been translated into English. Non-Catholic English literature, on the other hand, possesses good versions of the standard German Protestant and Liberal apologetical works, which are only too often subversive of the precious heritage of historic Christianity and of the very basis of Natural Religion. We have drawn quite freely from the works of German Catholic apologists in order to enable students, who may not be familiar with German, to share in the contributions of these scholars to the defence of the common cause. The literature referred to in the copious foot-notes as well as in the Appendix of Selected Readings, at the

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<sup>1)</sup> Jos. Mausbach, *Grundzüge der katholischen Apologetik*. Münster i. W. 1921 (3.—4. ed.), p. 1.

end of this volume, should stimulate the student to further inquiry.

Apologetics is "the comprehensive, scientific vindication of the grounds of Christian, Catholic belief". "Its aim is to give a scientific presentation of the claims which Christ's revealed religion has on the assent of every rational mind; it seeks to lead the inquirer after truth to recognize, first, the reasonableness and trustworthiness of the Christian revelation as realized in the Catholic Church, and secondly, the corresponding obligation of accepting it".<sup>2)</sup> Consequently its proper object is the evident credibility of Catholic Christianity.<sup>3)</sup>

To understand the *method* employed by this science it is necessary, first of all, to obtain a clear concept of *Faith* as understood by the Catholic. This may be considered both objectively and subjectively. In the objective sense, faith "stands for the sum of truths revealed by God in Scripture and tradition, and which the Church presents to us in a brief form in her creeds". In other words, it is objective Divine Revelation. "Subjectively, faith stands for the habit or virtue by which we assent to those truths".<sup>4)</sup> Now it is the function of apologetics to scientifically vindicate the Christian Catholic Faith both in the objective and in the subjective sense.

Apologetics (understood in the purely objective and theoretical sense) lays a reasonable foundation for Divine Revelation (*i. e.* faith in the *objective* sense), by the scientific demonstration of the *Fact* of the Christian revelation. In its method of argumentation our science operates only with the light of reason and with the arms of pure science, not with the light of faith; hence it is not Theology. It leads reason to the portals of faith inasmuch as it makes this judgment inevitable for a reasonable man: "The Catholic Church and her teachings are of divine origin; they are evidently credible (*judicium*

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<sup>2)</sup> Chas. Aiken, art. "*Apologetics*", in CE. I, p. 618.

<sup>3)</sup> P. Gardeil, O. P.; *La Crédibilité et l'Apologétique*. Paris. 1912 (2. ed.), p. 210; cf. also X. M. Le Bachelet, S. J.; art. "*Apologétique, Apologie*", in DAFC. fasc. I, p. 225 sq.

<sup>4)</sup> Hugh Pope, O. P.; art. "*Faith*", in CE. V, p. 753.



*credibilitatis*) and there is a moral obligation of assenting to them by faith (*judicium credentitatis*)".<sup>5)</sup>

The virtue or the act of faith (*i. e.* faith in the *subjective* sense) has also its reasonable foundation, its rational pre-suppositions and, therefore, also its apologetics. In the *subjective* and *practical* sense — and in its full purpose it must be so conceived — apologetics offers a scientific vindication of the virtue or the *Act* of faith. It is the scientific demonstration of the presuppositions of the act of faith and of all the motives, which are apt to beget the pious wish to believe (*pious credulitatis affectus*) and to actually effect and confirm the reasonable assent of faith (*judicium credibilitatis*).<sup>6)</sup>

The act of faith is the personal appropriation of the truths of Divine Revelation. It is an act not merely of knowledge, but of the whole man inasmuch as he is assisted and enlightened by the grace of God. In opposition to the modern conception, which defines faith in a one-sided manner, either as an act of the reason, or of the will, or of the religious sense, or as an experience of grace, or as trust in God, or as a belief in authority, the Catholic concept of faith joins the rational, ethical, mystical, historical and authoritative elements of faith into a living unity.<sup>7)</sup>

*Faith in general*, according to the common usage of the term as well as the explanation of St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas,<sup>8)</sup> signifies the acceptance of and the adherence to truth by *reason*, not indeed because of a sensible or an intellectual insight into truth, but rather *because of a*

<sup>5)</sup> Anton Gisler, *Der Modernismus*. Einsiedeln. 1913 (4. ed.), pp. 225, 226, 241. <sup>6)</sup> Gisler, *ibid.* pp. 226, 242.

<sup>7)</sup> Mausbach, *ibid.* pp. 151, 152; cf. IDEM, in RCK. I, pp. 12—99, for an account of the more recent concepts of faith in the light of modern philosophical and religious thought.

<sup>8)</sup> St. Augustine says: "Credere non potest nisi volens" (*In Joan. Ev.* tr. 26, n. 2); "Ipsium credere nihil aliud est quam cum assensione (scl. voluntatis) cogitare" (*De praed. sanct.* n. 5); "Consensio autem utique voluntatis est; profecto fides in potestate est" (*De spir. et litt.* n. 54). According to St. Thomas "inchoatio fidei est in affectione, inquantum voluntas determinat intellectum ad assentiendum his quae sunt fidei" (*De verit.* q. 14, a. 2 ad 10); "Credere actus est intellectus determinati ad unum ex imperio voluntatis" (*ST.* II, II, q. 4, a. 1).

*direction and an activity on the part of the will.*<sup>9)</sup> We assent to a statement only for one of two reasons: either because that statement is immediately or mediately evident in itself — e. g. a first principle of reason (*videre, intelligere*) or a conclusion from premises (*rationcinari, scire* in the more restricted sense) — or because the will moves the intellect to do so. The former order of knowledge is based on intrinsic evidence. This spiritual insight into the truth, into the essence of things and their relations, compels the intellect to assent; the will cannot control the assent. The latter order of knowledge, on the other hand, rests upon extrinsic evidence and is termed "faith" in contradistinction to science. "Extrinsic evidence of course comes into play when intrinsic evidence is wanting, but though it would be absurd, without weighty evidence in its support, to assent to a truth which we do not grasp, yet no amount of such evidence can make us assent, it could only show that the statement in question is credible, our ultimate actual assent could only be due to the intrinsic evidence which the statement itself offered, or, failing that, due to the will".<sup>10)</sup> Therefore the assent in an act of faith differs from that which is given to a truth of science. In faith the will lifts up the intellect and joins it to the truth. Thus faith has its root in the will, but its consummation in the intellect. The *psychology* of mankind shows abundantly to what great extent the judgments of men, even the subjectively certain and deeply rooted ones, rest, not upon reasons and calm deliberation, but, in great part, upon the interests of the will, upon noble and ignoble considerations and passions.<sup>11)</sup>

However, if faith is to be a *moral* act, the motion of the will underlying the act of faith must be legitimate and ethically grounded; the will itself must be determined by pure and worthy *motives*. For the ground and support of genuine faith are not ignoble, egotistical, but only noble motives, such as, for instance, the striving after higher truth and moral stability, the vital interests of society, the strong probability

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<sup>9)</sup> Mausbach, *Grundzüge etc.*; p. 152. <sup>10)</sup> Hugh Pope, *ibid.* p. 756.

<sup>11)</sup> Mausbach, *Katholische Moralthologie*. Münster i. W. 1921 (2.—4. ed.), II, p. 11.

of the thing believed etc. In other words, *conscience*, practical reason, must precede the act of the will and recommend faith as the necessary and salutary way to truth, to spiritual and moral perfection.<sup>12)</sup> Thus when certain fundamental truths of life are assailed, the will can sometimes raise those truths above all doubt because the whole nature of man calls for, and demands, them. Most truths, however, which are further removed from us and which are unessential, the will, if it would not act arbitrarily, can command us to believe, only when they are *witnessed to by those who know*. In this case, the legitimate motive of faith is *confidence in the knowledge and veracity of the witness*. This confidence deepens into *reverence and obedience*, if the witness is an *authority*, that is, a person who by reason of his spiritual superiority and moral power commands us to hear and to accept his message. Thus we arrive at the second common and somewhat more restricted concept of faith. It is the acceptance of a truth not evident in itself *upon the testimony or authority of another*.<sup>13)</sup> This faith, the faith of authority, is the regular way in which we embrace the truth, particularly when there is question of facts and truths, that transcend our own powers of thought.<sup>14)</sup>

The Vatican Council gives us a formal declaration of the essence of *Christian Catholic faith* in these words: "Man being wholly dependent upon God, as upon his Creator and Lord, and created reason being absolutely subject to uncreated truth, we are bound to yield to God, by faith in His revelation, the full obedience of our intelligence and will. And the Catholic Church teaches that this faith, which is the beginning of man's salvation, is a supernatural virtue, whereby, inspired and assisted by the grace of God, we believe that the things

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<sup>12)</sup> Mausbach, *Grundzüge etc.*, p. 152; IDEM, *Kath. Moralthologie*, II, p. 11. St. Thomas writes: "Voluntas intellectum ad aliquid quod neque per se videtur neque ad ea, quae per se videntur, resolvi potest, determinat ex hoc, quod dignum reputat illis esse adhaerendum propter aliquam rationem, qua bonum videtur ei, illi rei adhaerere . . . Et hoc assentire proprie vocatur credere" (*In Sent.* III dist. 23, q. 2. a. 2).

<sup>13)</sup> Mausbach, *Grundzüge etc.*, p. 152.

<sup>14)</sup> Mausbach, *Kath. Moralthologie*, II, p. 11. St. Augustine says: "Quod scimus, debemus rationi; quod credimus, auctoritati" (*Retr.* I, c. 14, n. 3).



which He has revealed are true; not because the intrinsic truth of the things is plainly perceived by the natural light of reason, but because of the authority of God Himself, Who reveals them, and Who can neither be deceived nor deceive". Therefore, "if anyone shall say that divine faith is not distinguished from natural knowledge of God and of moral truths, and therefore that it is not requisite for divine faith that revealed truth be believed because of the authority of God Who reveals it; let him be anathema".<sup>15)</sup>

Therefore faith is 1. a kind of *spiritual perception of the truth*, an intellectual assent to the truths of revelation, not a tendency, a feeling, or an experience. At the same time, however, this assent to truth is *essentially different from science*, from logical rational insight into the truth. Faith is not science, neither can the contents of faith be resolved into science, as rationalism supposes. Consequently the Council denies, on the one hand, that the assent of faith "is necessarily produced by the arguments of human reason", and, on the other hand, that faith "is a blind action of the mind".<sup>16)</sup> The obedience of our faith is in perfect harmony with reason (*obsequium rationi consentaneum*) and "right reason demonstrates the foundations of faith", that is, the arguments and signs of revelation.<sup>17)</sup> These arguments are certain external "divine facts", especially "miracles and prophecies", as well as the living, perpetual miracle of the Church itself, while internal experience and personal motives may also play a part in this demonstration.<sup>18)</sup>

Thus *faith presupposes the natural activity of reason*; science, or the moral conscience, goes ahead of the act of faith and makes it a legitimate and salutary act.<sup>19)</sup> In other words,

<sup>15)</sup> *Dogmatic Constitution on the Catholic Faith* (III Sess. 3 chap.) DB. n. 1789, 1811; DCD. pp. 223, 224, 235.

<sup>16)</sup> DB. n. 1814, 1791; DCD. pp. 236, 225.

<sup>17)</sup> DB. n. 1799, 1812; DCD. pp. 231, 235, 236.

<sup>18)</sup> DB. n. 1790, 1794, 1812; DCD. pp. 224, 226, 227, 235, 236.

<sup>19)</sup> Mausbach, *Kath. Moralthologie*, II, p. 23. St. Thomas teaches: "The believer has sufficient motive for believing, for he is moved by the authority of Divine teaching confirmed by miracles, and, what is more, by the inward instinct of the Divine invitation: hence he does not believe lightly. He has not, however, sufficient reason for scientific knowledge,

"before the acceptance of the truths of revelation reason can prepare the way for faith, or the assent to faith, remotely and proximately: remotely, inasmuch as reason, when properly exercised in developing the first principles of knowledge, and in arranging the preambula fidei, lays the foundation for a reasonable acceptance of revelation; proximately, when, moved by the motives of credibility, the intellect assents to the credibility of revealed truths".<sup>20)</sup> Thus the Catholic theory of faith holds the golden mean between rationalism and a mystical or ethical irrationalism.<sup>21)</sup>

The *certitude*, which this demonstration begets, is *not* indeed the *compelling evidence* of a logical, mathematical and experimental proof. The reason for this is not, of course, that the grounds of faith are uncertain, but rather because of the exalted, comprehensive and abstract *character* of the intellectual data involved in metaphysical and apologetical thought and which most men find difficult to understand and retain. Then too, the sensual tendency of the soul and of the emotions oftentimes thwarts the calm penetration into the truth by manifold obstacles. Hence for a proper appreciation of the grounds of faith a certain *moral receptivity*, an *earnest desire of the will and the heart*, for the highest truth and goodness are necessary prerequisites or conditions. This postulate does not, however, decrease the scientific character of metaphysics and apologetics; for other sciences too, such as history, ethics, and sociology, concede that a congenial disposition and sympathy on the part of the investigator are necessary, if he is to attain to a supreme and comprehensive possession of the truths which they offer.<sup>22)</sup>

2. This faith is a *virtue*, and hence a moral disposition begotten and sustained by a good will and a moral conscience. For in the act of faith the will, yielding moral obedience to the

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hence he does not lose the merit" (ST. II, II, q. 2, a. 9, ad 3; cf. *De verit.* q. 14, a. 9, ad 8).

<sup>20)</sup> P. P. McKenna, O. P.; *The Theology of Faith*. N. Y. 1913, p. 41.

<sup>21)</sup> Mausbach, *ibid.* II, p. 23.

<sup>22)</sup> Mausbach, *Grundzüge etc.*, p. 154; IDEM, *Kath. Moralthéologie*, II, p. 25; cf. L. Ollé-Laprune, *De la certitude morale*. Paris. 1880.

judgment of conscience concerning the credibility of revealed truths, surrenders itself, with the help of grace, trustingly and reverently to God (*pious credulitatis affectus*) and commands reason to accept firmly Divine Revelation (both as regards the fact and the contents).<sup>23)</sup> "In every act of faith this unhesitating assent of the intellect is due to the motion of the will as its efficient cause, and the same must be said of the theological virtue of faith when we consider it as a habit or as a moral virtue, for, as St. Thomas insists (I, II, q. lvi, 3), there is no virtue, properly so-called, in the intellect except in so far as it is subject to the will. Thus the habitual promptitude of the will in moving the intellect to assent to the truths of faith, is not only the efficient cause of the intellect's assent, but it is precisely what gives to this assent its virtuous, and consequently meritorious character". Therefore faith, as a purely intellectual habit, is dry and barren, but faith resident, indeed, in the intellect, but motivated by charity or love of God, Who is our beginning, our ultimate end, and our supernatural reward, becomes a "living" faith, or in theological language "*fides formata*", since it is "informed", or vivified, by charity, or the love of God. Hence, if "charity be dead —, if, in other words, a man be in mortal sin and so without the habitual sanctifying grace of God, which alone gives to his will that due tendency to God as his supernatural end which is requisite for supernatural and meritorious acts — it is evident that there is no longer in the will that power by which it can, from supernatural motives, move the intellect to assent to supernatural truths. The intellectual and Divinely infused habit of faith remains, however, and when charity returns this habit acquires anew the character of 'living' and meritorious faith".<sup>24)</sup>

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<sup>23)</sup> Mausbach, *ibid.* p. 156; IDEM, *ibid.* II, p. 12.

<sup>24)</sup> Hugh Pope, O. P.; *ibid.* p. 757. St. Augustine declares: "Every true motion of the will proceeds from true love" (*De Civit. Dei*, XIV, ix); "What, then, is to believe in God? — It is to love Him by believing, to go to Him by believing, and to be incorporated in His members. This, then, is the faith which God demands of us; and He does not find what He demands except where He has given what He has found" (*Tract.* xxix, in *Joannem*, 6, cited by Pope *ibid.*).



3. Christian Catholic Faith is essentially a *faith based upon testimony, an authoritative faith*, "inasmuch as God, the All-knowing and the All-truthful, reveals the contents of faith and, as the highest authority, as 'Creator and Lord', commands the act of faith".<sup>25)</sup> God, the fulness of being, the absolute, objective truth (*summa veritas in essendo*), is not only the essential content (*objectum materiale*) of faith; but He is also "the *intrinsic motive* (*objectum formale*) of faith", inasmuch as He is the highest wisdom, omniscience, and absolute veracity (*summa veritas in cognoscendo et in dicendo*). "God is the *formal viewpoint* and the *sustaining power*" of our assent.<sup>26)</sup> Hence Christian Catholic faith is a *Divine faith*, that is, "it *rests immediately upon God*, as 'uncreated truth' and veracity. Moreover, revelation discloses to us a deeper *insight* into the essence of God".<sup>27)</sup> It is evident, therefore, that "the *certitude* of faith must correspond to the veracity of the *Divine testimony*; in other words, faith is an *absolute, unreserved assent to the truth of revelation*". Since, however, faith is not intuitive knowledge, but rather a firm adherence to truth on indirect, moral grounds, especially because of the insight of another; and since the truths of Christian faith are, in part, impenetrable mysteries, "the certitude of faith cannot be a *certitudo speculationis*, but only a *certitudo inhaesionis*".<sup>28)</sup>

4. "Faith is a *supernatural virtue*. The grace of God operates within man by 'inspiration and assistance', " in order to lead the soul to divine truth, to disclose it and to enable the soul to adhere firmly to the truth.<sup>29)</sup> Hence faith is not produced by the human intellect and will alone; "it is the work of illuminating grace; it is the beginning of supernatural life". The supernatural character of faith consists essentially in the *participation of the grace of the Holy Spirit*, which co-operates in the act of faith by illumination and strengthening assistance, and dwells permanently in the soul as an habitual light, "the light of faith" (*habitus, virtus fidei*). Thus faith is

<sup>25)</sup> Mausbach, *Kath. Moraltheologie*, II, pp. 12. 13.    <sup>26)</sup> *ibid.* p. 19.

<sup>27)</sup> *ibid.* p. 13.    <sup>28)</sup> Mausbach, *Grundzüge etc.*, p. 157.

<sup>29)</sup> Mausbach, *Kath. Moraltheologie*, II, p. 13.

"the gift of God";<sup>30)</sup> it is indeed "our act because of the freedom of the will", but it is, at the same time, given to us gratuitously by the Spirit of faith and of love.<sup>31)</sup> The history of conversions and of the Christian life discloses to us, in many ways, here the marvellous, there the hidden rule of grace, the power of prayer, in short, the mystic, mysterious element in the psychology of faith.<sup>32)</sup>

To sum up: the *act* of faith may be defined as "the assent of the intellect to a truth which is beyond its comprehension, but which it accepts under the influence of the will moved by grace"; the *virtue* of faith is "a supernatural habit by which we firmly believe those things to be true which God has revealed".<sup>33)</sup> From this analysis it follows that the Catholic apologist may not construct the act of faith upon the will and the heart alone; he must also, indeed primarily, build the act of faith "upon the rock of truth, of logic, of metaphysics, of history: these are the incontrovertible witnesses for the divinity of revelation". There is a great deal of truth in the dictum of Pascal: "Le coeur a ses raisons que la raison ne connait point". Hence the Catholic apologist ought not to neglect the psychological, artistic, social, and moral side of Christianity. Indeed nothing would be more absurd than to assume that reason can be led to accept a dogma in the same way that it accepts a mathematical proposition. The same didactic method does not obtain for mathematics and religion, because mathematics addresses itself to the understanding only, whereas faith appeals also to the will and the heart. Therefore in faith the affective element is of immense importance, especially in our day, when men rely so much upon

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<sup>30)</sup> Eph. ii, 8.

<sup>31)</sup> St. Augustine, *De praed.* SS. n. 7; cf. also the declarations of the Councils of Trent and the Vatican, DB. n. 798, 1791; DCD. pp. 27, 28, 225.

<sup>32)</sup> Mausbach, *Grundzüge etc.*, p. 157. — For a more detailed account of the theology of faith cf. the bibliography appended to Hugh Pope's art. "*Faith*", CE. V, p. 759; also J. V. Bainvel, art. "*Foi, Fidélisme*", in DAFc. fasc. VII, pp. 18—94.

<sup>33)</sup> Hugh Pope, O. P.; *ibid.* p. 757.

sentiment and expressly stress the primacy of the will.<sup>34)</sup> Nevertheless, "Catholicism is essentially much more than a mere sentiment; it is a definite faith, a doctrine, a system of dogmas, of revealed, supernatural truths; it is an organism of definite supernatural means of grace; it is a very definite supernatural, hierarchical, social institution".<sup>35)</sup> Religion is above all else *truth*. After all truth is and remains, in the end, the foundation of all that happens, the inmost countenance of all spiritual phenomena, the bond that unites this life with the life beyond, the strongest pinion of all human activity. Therefore, if the apologist wishes to construct a logically coherent, unassailable preparation and foundation for the faith, which is objectively convincing for all men and for all ages, which can also be grasped subjectively with sufficient certitude and which is adequately suited to beget the pious wish to believe, he must join the voluntaristic with the *intellectualistic*, the absolutely valid, unequivocal element. That has been the classical, traditional apologetics of the Church ever since the time of the Fathers, and whoever wishes to remain loyal to the teachings of the Vatican Council and to a great tradition may not deviate from this method.<sup>36)</sup> The so-called Reformers of the sixteenth century were the first to abandon the beaten path of traditional apologetics, when they asserted that the rational grounds of faith were wholly useless. From that time to our own the subjective, voluntaristic, immanentistic method has been characteristic of non-Catholic apologetics. "Modern Protestants measure Christianity according to purely subjective standards, purely historical considerations and, therefore, never get beyond religious relativism. Even believing Protestants declare that philosophy is bankrupt in regard to religious matters and

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<sup>34)</sup> Gisler, *ibid.* pp. 295, 293, 290, 291.

<sup>35)</sup> *ibid.* p. 292.

<sup>36)</sup> Gisler, *ibid.* pp. 293, 295. — For a brief resume of the history of the traditional method of apologetics cf. P. Fr. Reg. Garrigou-Lagrange. O. P., *Theologia fundamentalis secundum S. Thomae doctrinam*. Romae et Parisiis. 1918, I, p. 94 sq.; cf. also DB. n. 1790, 1812; DCD. pp. 224. 235, 236.



deny to it every influence upon the genesis of the Christian faith of our contemporaries".<sup>37)</sup>

The mentality of the modern age, then, is radically different from that of the past. The old landmarks have been levelled by the revolutionary upheaval of the Reformation, by the rapid advance of the natural sciences and by the momentous changes in philosophical thought. The Catholic apologist cannot afford to ignore these patent facts. He must know the present tendencies of thought, and the needs, both intellectual and spiritual, which seem most marked today, and to which he must appeal, if he is to have any hope of success.<sup>38)</sup> He must strive "to set the Church and her faith before the modern mind in terms understood by the modern mind"; to interpret or explain his creed "in terms of modern thought". We say advisedly "interpret", not modify; for modern liberalism re-states divinely revealed dogmas, but this re-statement is not interpretation, but rather transformation of dogmas. Liberalism or modernism "separates not merely human explanations from divinely revealed dogmas, but the dogmas themselves from a spiritual experience supposed to be enshrined therein". "It does not seek to show the harmony between dogma and the true elements of modern thought, but, on the contrary, takes the main principles of modern thought as complete and infallible, and cuts down the dogma into conformity with these". Now "re-statement of this sort is an interpretation which denies the greater part of that which it professes to interpret, and is therefore no interpretation at all". The Catholic apologist, while seeking "to understand the thought, the feelings and the needs of this new paganized world", will, at the same time, explain "in terms comprehensible to the average modern man the significance of his dogmas, of his theological terms"; "the relation his faith bears to modern thought, where it agrees with the results of modern

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<sup>37)</sup> Gisler, *ibid.* pp. 245, 246; cf. IDEM, pp. 246—297, for the method of P. Hecker, H. Schell, the "New Apologetics" of the Frenchmen, Blondel, Brunetière, etc.; also Garrigou-Lagrange, *ibid.* I, pp. 125—132.

<sup>38)</sup> Edward Ingram Watkin, *Some Thoughts on Catholic Apologetics*, (The Catholic Library — 17). London & St. Louis, Mo. 1915, p. 2.

thinkers, and where it corrects them".<sup>39)</sup> We have endeavored to apply these principles to the problems treated in this work.

Finally, the modern mind lays great stress upon the *history of religions*. The historical manifestations of the religious consciousness of mankind are usually discussed in the first general part of apologetics, which is commonly termed the "Theory of Religion". In many places, however, this section is joined with the philosophical course, under the tractates of Natural Theology, Psychology, and Ethics, and the strictly historical side of religion is oftentimes given scanty consideration. We have, therefore, presented a survey of the principal pagan religions of the primitive and cultured peoples of antiquity in connection with the chapter on the Necessity of Divine Revelation. The student will find there material, which is spread over many special works, briefly synthesized and made available for ready reference.

The plan of this volume, therefore, differs in many respects from that of the ordinary works on apologetics and, while making no claim to original and exhaustive inquiry, will, nevertheless, make the average student acquainted with Catholic thought crystallized in many separate works and, it is hoped, will also serve to stimulate him to further personal research.

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<sup>39)</sup> *ibid.* pp. 9, 11, 12, 14, 15.





## INTRODUCTION.

1. The Catholic Church claims to be the absolute religion which has been revealed by God for all men. This claim involves a twofold relation to all non-revealed religions: first, a relation of opposition, for the Church asserts that she is religion in a more perfect sense than they; secondly, a relation of harmony, for she insists that she is, at the same time, religion in the same sense as non-revealed religions. The religion, which human consciousness, by its own native powers, is able to attain, is found in the Catholic Church;<sup>1)</sup> indeed, natural religion is the basis upon which the Church, as a supernatural religion, rests, just as grace is grounded upon nature. Hence apologetics rightly begins its defence of the Church's claims by presenting the evidence for the unity of the religious nature of the Church and of natural religion. The starting point is the *concept of religion* which is common to both.<sup>2)</sup>

The Catholic  
Church and  
natural reli-  
gion.

Broadly speaking, religion signifies a relationship of man to the Deity. Consequently before it is possible to determine more exactly what religion is, it is first of all necessary to establish clearly what God is and what man is. The first general part of apologetics, which is commonly termed the "*Theory of Religion*", or the "*Religious Demonstration*", treats of *God*, as the object of religion, of *Man*, as the subject of religion, and of *Religion*, as the connecting moral bond between God and man. It explains and defends by means of reason and history the fundamental truths of natural religion and morality. Thereby religion is shown to be the most fundamental and central power in the life of mankind. Religion has appeared in a variety of forms in many places and at different epochs of the world's history. One of these manifestations is Christianity; indeed, in Christianity religion

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<sup>1)</sup> cf. St. Paul's discourse in the Areopagus (Acts of Apostles, xvii, 24 sq.).

<sup>2)</sup> Simon Weber, *Christliche Apologetik*. Freiburg i. B. 1907, p. 19.

appears in its most genuine form. The Christian religion is, indeed, the most perfect religion.<sup>3)</sup> Such, briefly, is the subject matter of the Theory of Religion.

Presupposing this demonstration,<sup>4)</sup> we are now more directly concerned with the scientific defence of Christianity as a religion specifically higher than and essentially different from all purely natural religion. For Christianity claims to be a *supernatural* religion, which has become manifest to us by a special *Divine Revelation*.

Man's super-  
natural destiny.  
Supernatural  
religion.

2. According to the Christian Catholic viewpoint God has called man to a *supernatural* destiny, *i. e.*, to an end, that is raised high above the claims of human nature and whose attainment lies beyond the native powers of all mankind. This supernatural end does not, indeed, contradict man's natural end; on the contrary, it includes it, only it is essentially higher than the purely natural end. Both the natural and the supernatural end of man consist in the union of man with God through knowledge and love. But nature itself can advance only to a *mediate* knowledge of God; for it knows Him only through the medium of created things. In the supernatural order, on the other hand, man is destined to enjoy an *immediate* vision of God. Man's natural faculties are, indeed, no match for this sublime end. Hence God, in His goodness and mercy, has deigned to come to man's assistance by communicating to him a special *supernatural revelation*. He has manifested to man both the higher end and the way that leads to it. He has also opened up for man a precious treasure of *supernatural graces*, which enable the powers of man's spirit to accomplish life's difficult task.<sup>5)</sup>

Modern  
denials of the  
Supernatural.

3. The "modern" mind rejects these claims of Catholic Christianity as unwarranted; nay more, it denies in principle

<sup>3)</sup> Schill-Straubinger, *Theologische Prinzipienlehre*. Paderborn. 1923 (5. ed.), pp. 20, 181. — The third general part of apologetics, namely the "*Theory of the Church*", or the "*Catholic Demonstration*", shows the identity of the Catholic Church with historic Christianity.

<sup>4)</sup> For pertinent literature cf. "Selected Readings", in Appendix, at the end of our volume.

<sup>5)</sup> Franz Sawicki, *Die Wahrheit des Christentums*. Paderborn 1920. (4. ed.), p. 245; cf. also the Vatican Council, "*Dogmatic Constitution on the Catholic Faith*" (III Sess. 2 chap.), DB. n. 1786; DCD. pp. 220, 221.

all supernatural religion. It regards a belief in a supernatural revelation as childish and naive, as an ancient oriental peculiarity.<sup>6)</sup> It proceeds to empty revelation of its supermundane content and to resolve revealed religion into a mere progressive evolution of reason or of the natural religious sense. In a word, the dictum of Renan — "Il n'y a pas de surnaturel" — is emblazoned on the standards of the modern age.<sup>7)</sup>

4. In the face of these radical attacks the supreme need of a scientific vindication of the credibility of the claims of Catholic Christianity is self-evident. Apologetics fulfils this task by demonstrating that Christianity is a divinely revealed religion. Thus apologetics, in its second general division, becomes now the "*Theory of Revelation*", or the "*Christian Demonstration*". In this process of investigation and demonstration our science must remain faithful to its formal principle; hence it may employ only natural means, that is, reason (philosophy) and history. It starts out with the fundamental principle that the natural and the supernatural orders have the same Author, God, the same subject, man, and the same moral bond uniting God and man, namely religion. Therefore these two orders may not be opposed to each other; on the contrary, they must have many points in common, many connecting ideas. In the next place, apologetics centers its attention upon the order of natural religion and inquires whether natural religion contains the necessary ground and points of contact for a higher, a supernatural religion. This investigation results in the conclusion that a supernatural religion is possible. But, if a supernatural religion is to become a reality, it must not only start from and build upon natural religion, but it must also be naturally accessible to man, so that man by accepting it may be able to perform a reasonable act, an act that is really worthy of human nature.

Theory of  
Revelation.

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<sup>6)</sup> Fr. Delitzsch, *Zur Weiterbildung der Religion*. Stuttgart. 1908. p. 53.

<sup>7)</sup> Jos. Pohle, *Natur u. Übernatur*, in RCK. I, p. 378.



The Theory of Revelation, therefore, establishes the *speculative groundwork or foundations of revelation* (Part I) by demonstrating a) the *natural presuppositions of revelation* (Section I) and b) the *natural knowability of revelation* (Section II).

Apologetics then, views revelation no longer as an abstract possibility, but rather as a concrete reality, as a divine fact. As a fact it is a part of history and is connected with and takes place in the sphere of the universal world process. Consequently its existence must be authenticated just as every other historical event. However, on the other hand, in its origin and permanence revelation is accompanied by circumstances which raise it above the ordinary course of events and make it appear as an immediate divine work.

Therefore apologetics presents the evidence for the *historical groundwork or foundation of revelation* (Part II) by demonstrating that revelation is a *fact*, which a) is *authenticated by the testimony of history* (Section I) and b) is *due to the immediate causality of God Himself* (Section II).<sup>8)</sup>

Value of a  
philosophical  
defence of the  
concept of  
revelation.

5. Strictly speaking, the claims of Christianity are sufficiently vindicated by a demonstration of the *fact* of a supernatural revelation. For there can be no bickering with cold reality; there is no argument against a fact. Furthermore, if the Christian religion is really of divine origin, there arises at once the moral obligation of submitting to its authority, no matter how difficult that obedience may appear to be in an individual instance. Nevertheless, it is most useful to defend the concept of a supernatural revelation also upon *intrinsic grounds*, as we propose to do in this volume. For the proof that a supernatural revelation accords perfectly with the deepest needs of human nature; that it not only humiliates, but also exalts; must be productive of salutary results. For in that case revelation appears no longer as a heavy cross beneath which man must bow simply because there is no escape, but it shines forth as a precious treasure, which man will embrace joyfully, if only he can discover it. The apologetical proofs for revelation presuppose precisely just such a disposition of soul, in order that they may become fruitful. Just as the act by which man decides for God or against God, is not only a matter of the intellect, but is an affair of the whole interior man; so also is man's attitude towards Christianity. For even though it can be shown that the Christian faith is capable of a rational demon-

<sup>8)</sup> Schill-Straubinger, *ibid.* pp. 181, 182.

stration, still it is impossible to prove that with mathematical precision and cogency. Whoever, therefore, regards the concept of supernatural revelation with an unsympathetic mind, nay more, with full antipathy, will always seek for and find doubts to challenge the claims of Christ's revelation. Only a soul that has an understanding of the value of revelation and a real longing for it, will give glad and ready access to the reasons that plead for a revelation.<sup>9)</sup>

## Chapter I.

### NATURE AND THE SUPERNATURAL.

1. As the Protestant ecclesiastical historian Troeltsch has pointed out, the Reformers, Luther, Zwingli, and Calvin, in their revolutionary activity in the sixteenth century did not completely divest themselves of the egg-shells of the Catholic Middle Ages, since they permitted the Supernatural to persist in unmitigated vigor. Indeed, in general the churches of the Reformation, in their symbolic books, remained faithful to a belief in the Supernatural down to the period of Illuminism. It was only through the disintegrating agency of rationalistic Socinianism, which, in the "Catechism of Racow" (1609), had created for itself a popular medium for blasting the old faith of the Reformation, that the soil was prepared upon which the gradual aversion from the Supernatural was to be effected. Not the Reformation, says Troeltsch, but rather "Illuminism" gave birth to "Modern Protestantism" and stamped upon it its own characteristic impress.<sup>1)</sup> It is not our intention to question in any way or to depreciate the religious motive power and Christian piety,

Historical  
retrospect.

<sup>9)</sup> Sawicki, *ibid.* p. 246.

<sup>1)</sup> *Protestantisches Kircentum und Kirche in der Neuzeit*, in "Kultur der Gegenwart", ed. Paul Hinneberg. Berlin & Leipzig. 1907, I, 4, p. 253 sq.; cf. IDEM, *Protestantism and Progress*, N. Y. 1912. Adolf Harnack (*History of Dogma*. Transl. from the third German edition by William M. Gilchrist, B. D. London (Williams & Norgate) & N. Y. 1899, VII, pp. 230 sq.) enumerates the Catholic elements retained by Luther after his defection from the ancient Church. Similar views are expressed in certain Protestant circles in our own country; cf. Erret Gates, *The Development of Modern Christianity*, in *A Guide to the Study of the Christian Religion*, ed. G. B. Smith, Chicago, Ill. (Second Impression), 1917, pp. 429—482.

which continue to act powerfully and vitally, especially in orthodox Lutheranism. Nevertheless, the patent fact cannot be gainsaid, that in the Protestant world a revolution has been going on for years and, in part, has already been effected, which is tantamount to a complete surrender not only of the ancient Christian faith, but likewise of the fundamental tenets of the Reformation itself. The watchword of the present time is: Remove the Supernatural from the Bible, the Church, and life! Indeed there is hardly anything more repellant to the "modern man" than the mention of the Supernatural. The crucial question of our day around which the battle wages is the Supernatural, in its concept and its right to exist. Upon this basic concept depend Revelation, Miracle, Prophecy, Church, Sacraments, Holy Mass, Heaven and Hell. It is self-evident, therefore, that the Christian Catholic apologist must devote his most earnest consideration to this problem.<sup>2)</sup>

We may not be accused of a vicious circle or a *petitio principii*, if we presuppose the existence of the Supernatural instead of first demonstrating it. For, in point of fact, the Supernatural (Christ, the Church etc.) really exists in the world and proclaims its presence with such insistence and obtrusiveness, that all the efforts of infidelity are directed solely towards freeing itself, once for all, from this fact so uncomfortable to itself. One does not wage war against a phantom, a castle in the air; at most one ignores it. Hence the problem at issue is not so much the *existence* of the Supernatural as rather its *rights* before the forum of reason and history.<sup>3)</sup>

Before establishing the genuine concept of the Supernatural, we shall briefly review the more common notions concerning Nature and the Supernatural current in recent times.

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<sup>2)</sup> Pohle, *Natur und Übernatur*, in RCK. I, pp. 377, 378.

<sup>3)</sup> Ibid. p. 389. The Theory of the Supernatural will receive its proper development and will be described in all its amplitude in dogmatic theology. However, many theologians rightly believe that it is not only useful, but even indispensable, to indicate the principal elements of the supernatural order in apologetics, since Revelation has no other aim than to make the Supernatural known. cf. L. Maisonneuve, art. "*Apologétique*", in DTC. I, p. 1523.



2. There is great indistinctness and ambiguity in the "modern mind" in reference to these fundamental concepts; hence it is not surprising to find these terms employed in a bewildering variety of senses.

Faulty  
concepts.

The Natural is sometimes said to be the *sensible* as opposed to the supersensuous. While this opposition does not necessarily involve a denial of the Supernatural, it does according to the doctrine of materialism whose basic assertion is that there is nothing in the universe except matter. For materialists, therefore, the Supernatural can have no meaning. The same must be said of positivism, which is really a variety of materialism. "By the natural, the positivistic theory understands the physical world only. This lies within the scope of sense-perception, our only source of knowledge. The supernatural, therefore, has no meaning and conveys no story any other than the product of childish or irrational fancy".<sup>4</sup>) The fundamental error of positivism is its false doctrine concerning the scope and limits of human knowledge, as is shown in detail in philosophy.<sup>5</sup>) Its second assertion, namely that "what is termed absolute and suprasensible is merely the product of the fancy", is also untenable. "There is a striking resemblance", so Comte assures us, "between the childhood of the individual and of the race. Then the imagination holds complete sway; fable, not cold historic truth, is attractive and the world is peopled with childish wonder". The man of science considers these beings of fancy (God, angel, soul) good for children, but they should have no place with full-grown men. However, "it is false to teach that the early history of nations can be compared to infancy in the sense that the contents of our beliefs are the mere creations of fancy, and possess no objective validity and give way to maturer reflections of sober years. Historical research has shown that pure and noble truths were in the possession of mankind far back at the very dawn of time. Darkness of the understanding and weakness of the will may have obscured these truths for a time. They shine forth again with renewed splendor and are confirmed by the most laborious and exact scientific research".<sup>6</sup>)

Sensible —  
supersensible.

Naturalistic rationalism likewise either does not admit the Supernatural at all, or at most understands it in the sense of the *supersensuous*, transcendent, *i. e.*, not comprehensible by the senses. In modern Protestant theology the term Supernatural occurs scarcely at all, or is used according to the rationalistic

<sup>4</sup>) J. T. Driscoll, *Christian Philosophy*. God. N. Y. 1900, p. 326.

<sup>5</sup>) cf. Leslie J. Walker, S. J.; *Theories of Knowledge* (Stonyhurst Philosophical Series). London & N. Y. 1911, *passim*.

<sup>6</sup>) Driscoll, *ibid.* pp. 323, 325, 326. cf. Mgr. A. Le Roy, *La religion des Primitifs*. Paris. 1909. English transl. *The Religion of the Primitives*, by Newton Thompson. N. Y. 1922.

interpretation. The reason for this is not difficult to understand; for Protestantism does not admit the Catholic concept of *grace* as a *real* supernatural gift of God, but is content with a purely *theoretical* concept of God's gracious judgments, as dogmatic theology shows.<sup>7)</sup> This confusion of the Supernatural with the supersensible is quite common in recent religious writings. Thus Pfleiderer reckons without further ado all religions which do not adore stones or animals, but pay honor to supersensible things, among supernatural religions.<sup>8)</sup> Frequently the phenomena of hypnotism, occultism, and spiritism, are qualified as supernatural.<sup>9)</sup> In our own country the modern sect called "The New Revelation", which is in direct contradiction to the dogmas of Christianity, does not hesitate to dub certain phenomena, which are ostensibly of diabolic origin, supernatural revelations.<sup>10)</sup> It is, of course, true that the Supernatural is also supersensible; but not everything supersensible is, therefore, also supernatural. For "the immaterial, spiritual soul belongs to man's natural substance, and spiritual and moral perfection to his natural destiny and obligation. Even religion, the turning of his mind to God, is not in itself anything supernatural, but the necessary completion of the spiritual life of man. As the life of the spirit is immortal, its natural, final end is conceivable as being in the world to come; and man, if he were limited to his own inner development and to the natural providence of God, would have to strive for this end and seek to attain it. It would be happiness realized in the knowledge and love of God acquired through His creatures and imperishable".<sup>11)</sup>

Pantheism.

According to pantheism there is no distinction between nature and God. "The world about us is the emanation from or a manifestation of the one divine substance. Whether the one reality be termed *substance* with Spinoza, or the *ego* with Fichte, or the *absolute* with Spinoza, or the *idea* with Hegel, is of little practical moment. These are only different forms of presenting the same teaching."<sup>12)</sup> Nature is exalted into a monistic idol; God and spirit no longer stand in opposition to each other, but appear joined with nature into a single unity.<sup>13)</sup> "The influence

<sup>7)</sup> B. Bartmann, *Lehrbuch der Dogmatik*. Freiburg i. B. 1920 (4.—5. ed.), I, pp. 290, 291.

<sup>8)</sup> *Religion, ihr Wesen und ihre Geschichte*. 1869. II, pp. 60, 193. In this he is followed by Ed. v. Hartmann, *Das religiöse Bewußtsein der Menschheit im Stufengang seiner Entwicklung*. 1882.

<sup>9)</sup> cf. the Englishman M. Stead in his periodical *The Borderland*, apud A. M. Weiß, *Apologie des Christentums*. Freiburg i. B. 1907 (4. ed.), III, Part I, p. 18; cf. G. Raupert, *The New Clack Magic*. N. Y. 1919.

<sup>10)</sup> Pohle, *ibid.* I, p. 380.

<sup>11)</sup> Mausbach, *Catholic Moral Teaching and its Antagonists*. English transl. from the 6. German ed. by A. M. Buchanan. N. Y. 1914, p. 313.

<sup>12)</sup> Driscoll, *ibid.* p. 326; cf. Ed. A. Pace, art. "Pantheism", in CE. XI, pp. 447 sq. <sup>13)</sup> Pohle, *ibid.* I, p. 378.

of this school is not confined to writings strictly philosophical. It is found in poetry and in literature. Matthew Arnold, Carlyle, Wordsworth, Shelly in England, Emerson, Alcott and the Concord school in America disseminate its teachings. Modified somewhat by philosophic and scientific discussion, it is known today as the Neo-Kantian or Neo-Hegelian system".<sup>14)</sup> The logical inference from the teachings of pantheism regarding the concepts of Nature and the Supernatural is that *the Natural or the Supernatural alone exists*. For "pantheism assumes logically a Theistic or an Anti-theistic form. In the latter there is no place for the Supernatural; the Natural alone exists. In the former there is no place for the Natural. If I am part and parcel of God, if my intelligence is a portion of the universal divine self-consciousness, the word Natural is devoid of meaning".<sup>15)</sup> It is evident that whoever holds firmly to a personal God and an immortal soul must emphatically reject this concept of Nature and the Supernatural as an utopia and an absurdity.

"Herbert Spencer bringing to bear upon positivism the Evolutionism. theories of the cosmic evolution proposed by Kant and popularized by Laplace, and of biological evolution proposed by Lamarck and popularized by Darwin, became the exponent of a philosophical EVOLUTIONISM which attempts to interpret and explain all phenomena of the universe, the intellectual, moral, social, and religious life of man included, by the simple and necessary processes of mechanical progressive evolution".<sup>16)</sup> Nature is thus conceived not as a static, rigid being, but as a dynamic principle of living forces, as a continually active and progressive energy.<sup>17)</sup> And in this living and progressive evolution of nature the Supernatural appears as the destination towards which all activity of human nature is directed. Hence "the line between the natural and the supernatural is disappearing, and the supernatural is the natural viewed from its causal ground or its teleological import. Thus the supernatural is reinstated not as anomalous and shrouded in mystery, but as the ultimate source and final end of the rational order".<sup>18)</sup> Thus "the doctrine of evolution has led us to think of the world in which we live and of the history of man in terms of a long and gradual development rather than as originating through a special divine act . . . Now, since the religious soul recognizes God's activity in all that is of religious significance, faith finds God in the so-called natural as

<sup>14)</sup> Driscoll, *ibid.* p. 326. cf. J. B. Ceulemans. *Studies in American Philosophy. IV. The Modern Schools: Evolutionism*, in AER. Sept. 1912, pp. 257—282. <sup>15)</sup> Driscoll, *ibid.* p. 328.

<sup>16)</sup> Chas. R. Baschab, *A Manual of Neo-Scholastic Philosophy*. St. Louis, Mo. 1924 (2. ed.), p. 340.

<sup>17)</sup> cf. E. Le Roy, *Dogme et Critique*. Paris 1907, p. 60; A. E. Garvie, *A Handbook of Christian Apologetics*. N. Y. 1923, pp. 58, 59.

<sup>18)</sup> C. A. Beckwith, Supplemental to art. "Rationalism and Supernaturalism", in SHERK. IX, p. 402.



well as in the so-called supernatural. To draw a distinct line between the two realms is impracticable".<sup>19)</sup>

In the first place, the Catholic apologist must enter his solemn protest against this obliteration of the boundaries between the Natural and the Supernatural. There are no lies of continuity which lead imperceptibly and in unbroken evolution from the natural into the supernatural order. He must indeed insist upon the immanence of the Supernatural in Nature; but, at the same time, he must submit that, if the genuine concepts of the Natural and the Supernatural are to be kept unimpaired, the *transcendence* of the Supernatural may not be questioned.<sup>20)</sup>

Secondly, "the dynamic cannot be the sole element of reality, but implies the static as its natural complement. Evolution implies a fixed and definite natural subject, a fixed law of action and a definite goal. History cannot be the sole aspect under which experience should be studied, but requires philosophy to supplement it . . . Knowledge is built upon the universal, which is the general. The particular and individual would by themselves give us only an unintelligible chaos of sensations. If mediaeval philosophy has tended unduly to neglect the latter, modern thought far more fatally shows only too often despair of attaining to the former".<sup>21)</sup> However, in point of fact, the concept of evolution was not as unknown to the ancients as the followers of Darwin and Herbert Spencer would have the world believe. This is evident from the fact that Scholasticism was fructified by the Augustinian theory of the "*rationes seminales*" (*i. e.*, the primordial elements of creation were endowed with dispositions and powers for development), and became a "philosophy of continuity and evolution". Far from regarding human nature as a rigid, inert mass, which God used after the manner of a lifeless automat for the production of supernatural activities, the Scholastics proclaimed the pregnant principle, that God Himself has implanted in the deepest depths of the human soul a natural desire for the Supernatural (the vision of God as He is in Himself), although this desire is, in itself, inefficacious, since it is directed to a good, that is above the natural powers and exigencies of human nature. The various schools of the Middle Ages termed this longing of the soul either a "natural desire" (*desiderium naturale*), or an "innate impulse" (*appetitus innatus*), or more simply and correctly a "fitness or disposition" (*convenientia seu aptitudo*).<sup>22)</sup> Moreover, St. Thomas proceeds in perfect harmony

<sup>19)</sup> Gerald Birney Smith, *Systematic Theology and Christian Ethics*, in A Guide to the Study of the Christian Religion, ed. IDEM, p. 552, 553. — According to G. P. Fisher "strictly speaking, the 'natural' is 'supernatural', and *vice versa*" (The Grounds of Theistic and Christian Belief. N. Y. 1922 (Revised Edition), p. 163, foot-note). <sup>20)</sup> Pohle, *ibid.* I, p. 384.

<sup>21)</sup> Edward I. Watkin, *Some Thoughts on Catholic Apologetics*. (The Catholic Library — 17). London & St. Louis, Mo., pp. 61, 50.

<sup>22)</sup> Pohle, *ibid.* I, p. 383; cf. St. Thomas, *ST.* I, q. 12, a. 1; I, II, q. 3, a. 8; *SCG.* III, c. 50; for the inefficacy of this desire cf. *ST.* I,

with the so-called *psychological method*, which is so highly lauded in our days, when he seeks to prove the fitness of the supernatural vision of God in Heaven. No created good, so he maintains, such as riches, honor, pleasure, is able to satisfy the ineradicable impulse for happiness in man's heart. Only the uncreated, infinite God can completely fill the depths of the human soul; the immediate vision of the Divine essence alone is able to do this fully and in the most perfect manner. Therefore the beatific vision is the end of man's beatitude. If St. Thomas has concentrated his argumentation chiefly upon the intellect of man, it is only necessary to extend his method to include also the faculties of the human will and heart to obtain a perfectly "modern Thomas".<sup>23)</sup>

The Natural is sometimes said to be the *necessary* as opposed to the *free* and the *moral*. Thus Dr. Horace Bushnell teaches that "nature is that world of substance, whose laws are laws of cause and effect, and whose events transpire in orderly succession under those laws; the supernatural is that range of substance, if any such there be, that acts upon the chain of cause and effect in nature from without the chain, producing, thus, results that, by mere nature, could not come to pass".<sup>24)</sup> Acts which spring from human liberty, e. g. lifting a weight, criminal and artificial acts, are according to him supernatural acts. All functions of the soul, will alone excepted, are nature. Whatever is will, or is the effect of free agency is above nature. Hence true manly heroism, character, is supernatural.<sup>25)</sup> The same concept is quite commonly expressed in many contemporary non-Catholic writings.<sup>26)</sup>

Necessary-  
free.

In many respects this theory is, no doubt, plausible and advantageous. And it is this consideration which has led many minds to embrace it. For by fixing the scope of the supernatural so as to include free action, whether created or uncreated, the truth of its existence was establish beyond question. If my free choice, or the influence which I exert over the forces of nature are supernatural, then I am directly and immediately conscious that the supernatural is a reality. The sphere of miracles is likewise extended and I cannot gainsay their possibility. For, in this theory, miracles would not be specifically different from human action. Hence the truth of the miracle could be proved by showing the power of the will over inanimate nature". Nevertheless, "the benefits obtained by the sacrifice of truth are only apparent. They are never lasting or of real value. The extension of the supernatural beyond just limits, the restriction of the scope of the natural, do not advance us a step nearer the solution. The

q. 23, a. 1; q. 62, a. 1; I, II, q. 114, a. 2. cf. P. Fr. Reg. Garrigou-Lagrange, O P.; *Theologia Fundamentalis secundum S. Thomae Doctrinam*. Romae et Parisiis. 1918, I, pp. 385—398. (3. ed. 1925, pp. 201—211).

<sup>23)</sup> Pohle, *ibid.* I, pp. 383, 384.

<sup>24)</sup> *Nature and the Supernatural*. N. Y. 1869, p. 43.

<sup>25)</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 44, 51, 56, 57. <sup>26)</sup> cf. Driscoll, *ibid.* pp. 329, 330.

distinction is confusing, and under severe analysis stands without warrant. According to Dr. Bushnell the natural embraces physical and animal nature. But why exempt man? Is he not within the limits of nature? And is not the will a natural endowment? In the exercise of voluntary action man is not transcending the sphere of his own nature".<sup>27)</sup> This same criticism holds for the concept that identifies the Supernatural with the *spiritual*.<sup>28)</sup> For right reason justly regards the human spirit to be as truly a part and parcel of Nature as is matter, inanimate and animate.

Innate, original-  
acquired, extra-  
ordinary.

Finally, in the anti-Pelagian writings of St. Augustine and other Fathers the term "Natural", in the sense of *original*, is employed to designate the condition in which things were when first brought forth by God. Thus the state of Adam and Eve in paradise, with all the special gifts and graces, is said to be "natural", although this condition really embraces much that is over and above the purely "Natural" according to its usual definition. Baius and Jansenius abused this irregular terminology for their own heretical purposes, claiming that the original justice of Adam and Eve, with all its preternatural endowments, (corporal immortality, freedom from concupiscence) was something essentially natural, that is, demanded by nature.<sup>29)</sup> However, St. Augustine and the other Fathers employ the term *natura* "in its purely etymological sense, to designate that which Adam had from the very beginning received from God as a supernatural complement of his nature".<sup>30)</sup> Hence it is evident that this usage figuratively terms what is supernatural the natural, *i. e.*, "in accordance with nature, befitting to nature" (*conveniens, consentaneum*). — In a loose and popular terminology the Natural is sometimes said to be the *innate* as opposed to the *acquired* or the *artistic*, or the *extraordinary*. None of these expressions disclose the essential distinction between the "Natural and the Supernatural".

In the light of these many conflicting concepts it is imperative for the Catholic apologist to establish in clear language the genuine notion of these basic concepts.

Theistic concept of Nature  
and the  
Natural.

3. To obtain a correct concept of the Supernatural we must begin by analyzing the notion of Nature, for *Nature* precedes and supposes the Supernatural.

<sup>27)</sup> Ibid. pp. 331, 332.

<sup>28)</sup> cf. James Morris Whiton, *Miracles and Supernatural Religion* N. Y. & London. 1903, *passim*. Thus "animal" is synonymous with "natural", whereas any faculty transcending in its exercise the capabilities of matter, or of a vital principle immersed in matter, is said to put on a "supernatural" aspect.

<sup>29)</sup> Franz Diekamp, *Katholische Dogmatik*. Münster i. W. 1921. (3.—5. ed.), I, pp. 42, 43.

<sup>30)</sup> Pohle-Preuss, *God, The Author of Nature and the Supernatural*. St. Louis, Mo. 1916 (2. ed), pp. 183, 184. cf. St. Augustine, *Contr. Faust.* XXVI, 3; St. Leo the Great, *Serm. de Jejunio*, 1.



In its most general sense, the word "Nature" denotes the essence of a thing, or whatever can be expressed by a definition, and especially its essence in so far as it is connected with some definite activity. Again, in ordinary language, the term "Nature" is applied to creation as a whole and to its conformity to law. Man, the ruler of the irrational world, is often excluded from Nature in this sense; but in ethical and theological language the words "Nature" and "Natural" are employed primarily of man and his disposition.<sup>31)</sup>

According to the theistic concept "'Nature' designates that which (1) intrinsically constitutes the being of a created substance, either as an essential or as an integral note; or (2) spontaneously flows from its essence (e. g. faculties, talents, powers), or at least *can* flow therefrom through the exertion of one's own or some one else's power (technical skill, training); or (3) whatever, though external to a thing is necessary or suitable for its existence (e. g. instruction, civil society) or for the attainment of its end (e. g. the knowability of God, beatitude). All these factors (*i. e.* the constitutive elements of a thing's being, the faculties, powers, and the accomplishments flowing from its essence, and lastly such external agencies as are necessary or suitable for its subsistence, development, or the attainment of its final end), in their totality and severally respond to a proximate claim of the thing under consideration. Its essence demands them. The Scholastics embrace these moments under the term '*debitum naturae*' and define 'Nature' or 'Natural' as that which is due to a thing (*'Natura sive naturale est omne id quod alicui rei debetur'*)".<sup>32)</sup>

To put the matter in another way: "Nature" and the "Natural" signify everything "that almighty God has called into being by His free creative act, and therefore the entire visible world and the human race with all its dispositions, impulses, powers, and achievements, together with all those unlimited possibilities of a spiritual, corporal, and technical character, which only in the future may change the face of the earth and transform the world's image. Whatever man independently investigates or can investigate by experience, whether it be discovery or invention, as well as by his own reflection in syllogism and induction, falls into the domain of Nature. The broad, vast field of

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<sup>31)</sup> Mausbach, *Catholic Moral Teaching and Its Antagonists*, pp. 312, 313. <sup>32)</sup> Pohle-Preuss, *ibid.* pp. 184, 185.



the so-called profane sciences can perhaps most concisely be styled the circumference which encloses the purely Natural in its wide embrace. Not only the sphere of the natural sciences, like astronomy and physics, but likewise the research field of natural philosophy, which undertakes to formulate the highest laws of the cosmos and to solve the ultimate cosmic problems, constitute its domain. Moreover, theodicy and ethics, psychology and sociology, do not therefore belong to the supernatural order, simply because they make God and spirit, the psychological and the moral, hence something supersensible, the object of their investigation. For the objects, with which these sciences are concerned and the means with which they operate, either do not depart from the bounds of Nature at all or they consider their object, which can in another respect assume a supernatural aspect (*e. g.* the justified soul), under purely natural viewpoints".<sup>33)</sup>

Natural Order.

"Every creature has its own specific claims, corresponding to its peculiar nature, aptitude, and final end. Hence in determining the full extent of Nature, we must go beyond the individual creature and the various species of being (matter, man, angel), and consider the totality of all beings with their just claims or natural demands. 'Nature' must consequently be defined as the aggregate of all those perfections to which created beings have a claim, each according to its specific essence, and which, therefore, the Creator may not deny them. The sum-total of these perfections is commonly called the Natural Order (*ordo naturalis*). Of course, any superfluity of natural goods, which the Creator gives to a creature over and above its strict necessities, is not Supernatural, but part of the natural order. If the soil produces more food than the human race is able to consume, if the atmosphere contains more oxygen than we require to breathe, these gifts are not 'graces' in the strict sense of the term".<sup>34)</sup> In other words, the Natural Order is "the aggregate of all created entities and powers, including the highest endowments of which the rational creature is capable and even such Divine operations as are demanded by the effective carrying out of the cosmic order".<sup>35)</sup>

Unnatural,  
contrary to  
Nature.

4. Now it is possible to conceive a threefold opposition to the Natural. In the first place, a thing may be threatened or

<sup>33)</sup> Pohle, *Natur u. Übernatur*, I, pp. 378, 379.

<sup>34)</sup> Pohle-Preuss, *ibid.* p. 185.

<sup>35)</sup> J. F. Sollier, art. "Supernatural Order", in CE. XIV, p. 337.

wanting in respect to that which is extrinsically appropriate (*conveniens*) to its Nature. This relation is termed *unnatural*; for instance, human life spent in complete isolation, without fire and instruments. Secondly a thing may lack that which intrinsically belongs to its Nature. This condition we call *contrary to Nature*. Thus the state of blindness, the privation of the use of one's bodily limbs, the loss of one's spiritual faculties, the wasting of man's powers for ends, which contradict the task or the purposes of those powers, are conditions contrary to Nature. Both of these kinds of opposition express a lack or a want in respect to the Natural. The third form of opposition designates a surpassing of the Natural, that is, powers, properties, additions, occasions and circumstances that transcend the essence, the powers and the suitable claims of a thing, without, however, being in incompatible contradiction with the thing under consideration. This last form of opposition is the *Supernatural*.<sup>36)</sup>

5. According to the theistic concept of the Supernatural is that which lies beyond the order of Nature. *It is the contrary of naturae debitum*. It is *naturae indebitum* (that which is not due to the nature of a thing), in a positive as well as in a negative sense. The Supernatural may, therefore, be defined "as a gratuitous gift of God superadded to the nature of a rational being".<sup>37)</sup>

Theistic concept of the Supernatural.

In this definition the words "gift of God", being common both to Nature and the Supernatural, are the proximate genus, while the qualification "*gratuitous*" (not due) and "*superadded* to the nature of a rational being" expresses the specific difference. "The term *superadditum* indicates that the Supernatural supposes, or postulates, Nature, that it inheres therein as something superadded, and elevates it to a specifically higher order. To emphasize the last-mentioned element as the most important in the whole definition, the superadded higher perfection is further described as *naturae indebitum, i. e. grace*".<sup>38)</sup>

In this *negative* qualification the emphasis is placed first and foremost only upon the opposition of the Supernatural to the Natural. The answer to the further question as to what the Supernatural is *in itself*, without any reference to the opposition to Nature, is: It consists in the active participation in the life of God, as it is realized imperfectly in *grace*, and perfectly in *glory*.<sup>39)</sup>

Now gathering together the totality or complexus of supernatural gifts, we have the Supernatural Order (*ordo*

Supernatural Order.

<sup>36)</sup> Simon Weber, *Christliche Apologetik*, Freiburg i. B. 1907, p. 137.

<sup>37)</sup> Pohle-Preuss, *ibid.* p. 186. <sup>38)</sup> *Ibid.* p. 186.

<sup>39)</sup> Bartmann, *ibid.* I, p. 291.

*supernaturalis*), which may be defined as "the ensemble of effects exceeding the powers of the created universe and gratuitously produced by God for the purpose of raising the rational creature above its native sphere to a God-like life and destiny".<sup>40)</sup>

Potentia  
obedientialis.

6. "The best means of distinguishing properly between Nature and the Supernatural is furnished by the Scholastic concept of the 'potentia obedientialis'. No satisfactory theory of the Supernatural can be construed without a proper appreciation of this term".<sup>41)</sup> Although the Supernatural transcends Nature, it is designed for and becomes effective only in Nature. Thereby Nature is raised to a higher sphere of being and operation, exceeding all natural limitations and possibilities. "Such an elevation of a creature beyond the limits and powers of Nature cannot be attained by purely moral means, and therefore the realization of the Supernatural postulates on the part of God a special physical impulse distinct from His preservation of the universe and His general concurrence. Susceptibility to this specific physical impulse cannot coincide with any of the ordinary active or passive potencies of Nature, else the Supernatural would not really transcend the natural order. On the other hand, since the Supernatural does not hover above or alongside of Nature, but is intended for and becomes effective in Nature, Nature must needs be endowed with some specific passive potency which, while unresponsive to any creatural stimulus, willingly obeys the special impulse exercised by the Creator. This is the *potentia obedientialis*. The Scholastics define it as a passive potency by which a creature is enabled to receive into itself a supernatural impulse from God. This potency may be compared to a bridge connecting Nature with the Supernatural. Not as if Nature itself could by any creatural agency ever become supernatural; but it must contain some faculty which receives the divine impulse and by means of which this impulse effects the supernatural elevation of the recipient".<sup>42)</sup>

Divisions  
of the  
Supernatural.

7. A gift of God may be a supernatural grace, either as regards the manner of its production or with respect to its very substance. Hence we distinguish the following categories of the Supernatural:

A) The *modal Supernatural (supernaturale quoad modum)*, "which has its seat not in nature, i. e., in the creature

<sup>40)</sup> Sollier, *ibid.* p. 336.    <sup>41)</sup> Pohle-Preuss, *ibid.* p. 188.

<sup>42)</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 189, 190; cf. St. Thomas, *ST.* III, q. 11, a. 1; q. 1, a. 3 ad 3; *Quaest. disp. de Virt. in communi*, a. 10, ad 2 et ad 13; *Compendium theologiae*, c. 104; cf. *Tabulam auream operum St. Thomae ad verbum Potentia*, n. 10.



itself, but outside of it, *viz.*: in the divine *causality*. It is Supernatural only with regard to the manner in which it is communicated to the creature, as when a man is raised from the dead. The gift itself (in the case mentioned, *life*), is something intrinsically and essentially natural. This species of the Supernatural appertains to the domain of apologetics".<sup>43)</sup> Thus, in general, Divine Revelation and its evidences, miracles and prophecies, as well as Inspiration, belong to this category of the Supernatural. We say "*in general*", for when a divine effect, *e. g.* mysteries of faith, lies outside of the powers of Nature, not merely in the manner of its production but likewise by its very essence or substance, it has the character of the strictly or absolutely Supernatural.<sup>44)</sup>

B) The *substantial Supernatural* (*supernaturale quoad substantiam*), *i. e.*, which essentially and intrinsically transcends the bounds of Nature. This category of the Supernatural "may be subdivided into two well-defined species, according as the supernatural gift which God communicates to the creature transcends the sphere and power of Nature absolutely (*simpliciter*) or in a relative sense only (*secundum quid*)".<sup>45)</sup>

a) The *absolute Supernatural* (*supernaturale simpliciter s. stricte dictum*) is the Supernatural in the strict and proper sense of the term. It involves divine perfections, *i. e.* such as by nature belong solely to God. "The possession of such strictly divine prerogatives as the beatific vision or sanctifying grace, therefore, always entails a sort of deification (*deificatio*, *Θείωσις*) of the rational creature. For the creature to claim such prerogatives as strictly due to its nature, would be tantamount to a demand to be made like to God".<sup>46)</sup> The human nature of Christ by virtue of the hypostatic union in the Incarnation of the Son of God represents the climax of the Supernatural.<sup>47)</sup>

<sup>43)</sup> Pohle-Preuss, *ibid.* p. 187; cf. Garrigou-Lagrange, O. P.; *ibid.* I, pp. 202—210; (3. ed. 1925; pp. 93—96).

<sup>44)</sup> Pohle, *Natur u. Übernatur*, I, p. 385 sq.

<sup>45)</sup> Pohle-Preuss, *ibid.* p. 187. <sup>46)</sup> Pohle-Preuss, *ibid.* p. 188.

<sup>47)</sup> Pohle, *Natur u. Übernatur*, I, p. 386, 387.



b) If the supernatural gift, which God communicates to a creature, transcends the sphere and power of Nature only in a relative sense, it is called the *Preternatural* (*praeter-naturale*). "The Preternatural communicates only such perfections as, though belonging to a higher order, do not transcend the creatural domain. Thus freedom from concupiscence is natural to an angel, because his nature demands it; but it is not natural to man. If, therefore, God grants freedom from concupiscence to a man, He gives him a real grace, *i. e.* something which is not due to his nature, and which is consequently Supernatural. However, since such a Supernatural perfection of man does not in principle transcend the creatural order, a grace of the kind just mentioned is merely *praeter-naturale*"<sup>48)</sup> Thus there is an essential difference between it and the Supernatural.

Relation  
between the  
Natural and the  
Supernatural.

8. From the exposition thus far given it is evident that the Supernatural opens up for man a "*new world*", a cosmos not derived from nor reducible to the purely Natural. It is in very truth a "*new sun*", whose light and warmth flood and permeate man with its own Divine life. In the supernatural order the Natural does not cease to exist; for grace supposes Nature as its foundation and takes over the noble task of transforming, ennobling and exalting the Natural. Thus the Supernatural is not only a *grace*, it is likewise a *task* for Nature; it is not a dried up seed enclosed in a lifeless shell, but is rather a budding *germ* teeming with vital energy. Even though the Scholastics predominately defined the Supernatural according to the static rather than the dynamic mode of thought, namely as "a Divine gift not due to Nature and superadded to it (*donum Dei indebitum et superadditum naturae*), still nothing was farther from their thoughts than to devitalize the slumbering germ of Divine grace or to join it merely to the surface of the Natural after the manner of a resplendent ornamentation. On the contrary, in their minds the union and the intermingling of these two factors, the Natural and the Supernatural, into a single unity was conceived as the most intimate and vital that could be excogitated. In very truth the Supernatural strikes its roots deeply into Nature itself, lays hold of its inmost being and lifts it up to its own sublime heights and power. "The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts, by the Holy Ghost who is given to us" (Rom. v, 5).<sup>49)</sup>

<sup>48)</sup> Pohle-Preuss, *ibid.* p. 187 sq.

<sup>49)</sup> Pohle, *Natur u. Uebrenatur*, I, pp. 384, 385. cf. L. Labauche. S. S.; *God and Man*. Authorized Transl. N. Y. 1916; II, pp. 19–22 for the solution of the questions: 1) How can man be raised to the super-

9. Whoever considers with discerning vision the totality of God the Author of the Supernatural Order, cannot fail to see that it, too, like the fabric of the Natural Order, forms a sublime cosmos, whose principal parts are closely united with one another by mighty sustaining arches, which by their very construction, so thoughtfully arranged, appear to the reflecting mind as an edifice which in its imposing structure could never have come from the hand of man. It is rather the whole than its individual parts, cast, as it were, into one mold, that leads one to view it as a marvel of the Infinite Mind of God. Such a sublime creation can come only from the Divine Intellect.<sup>50)</sup>

10. The central problem of apologetics, as we have already stated, is concerned with the possibility and the evidences of the Supernatural Order. In this respect there are, in this modern age, two chief antagonists that either directly attack or, at least, threaten this order. On the one hand, *Naturalism* rejects the Supernatural entirely on the plea of philosophical impossibility or of critical non-existence.<sup>51)</sup> Human nature, so it is claimed, is self-sufficient in every department of life and in every respect. There is nothing in the world and in life, in religion and morality, which is not due to merely human causality. The Supernatural is, therefore, a phantom of the imagination, a superstition, which must be expelled as soon as possible from the realm of ideas and Naturalists confidently expect, that with the advance of science and criticism the last vestiges of this superstition (!) will surely disappear.<sup>52)</sup> *Modernism*, on the other hand, is not quite so pronouncedly antagonistic to the Supernatural. It protests that it wishes, as far as possible, to rescue and to retain the Supernatural. But logic is stronger than good will. By reason of its false principles, namely relativism and immanentism, modernism destroys not only the Supernatural, but even natural religion, as will be shown in detail below.<sup>53)</sup> While clinging to the dogmatic formulae concerning the Supernatural, it empties them of their content.<sup>54)</sup> Against

Transcendence  
of the Super-  
natural.  
Naturalism and  
Modernism.

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natural order without there being generated in him a conflict of activities? 2) Must he not thereby really suffer a loss of some of his moral personality?

<sup>50)</sup> Pohle, *ibid.* I, pp. 387—389.

<sup>51)</sup> Sollier, *ibid.* p. 338; cf. DB. n. 1001—1008, 1021, 1034, 1042, 1061, 1063, 1064, 1079. <sup>52)</sup> Pohle, *ibid.* I, p. 389. <sup>53)</sup> *Ibid.* I, pp. 390, 391

<sup>54)</sup> *The Programme of Modernism. A Reply to the Encyclical of Pius X, Pascendi Dominici Gregis.* Transl. from the Italian by Rev. Geo.

these attacks the Christian Catholic apologist must defend not only the reality, but also the *transcendence* of the Supernatural.

Now "the foundation and starting-point of the supernatural order of life with all its treasures of truth and grace is divine revelation".<sup>55</sup>) Hence we shall present a general theory and apology of revelation, first by establishing the genuine concept of supernatural revelation and secondly, by examining and evaluating the false notions of its adversaries.

## Chapter II.

### THE CONCEPT OF SUPERNATURAL REVELATION.

Divine Revelation.

1. Etymologically the term "*to reveal*" is derived from the Latin "*revelare*", that is, "*to remove the veil*" that impedes the vision of anything. Hence it signifies to manifest something hidden, to communicate what was before unknown. The word "*revelation*" can designate both the *act* of communicating the hidden or the unknown as well as the *contents* of what is communicated. We are now concerned primarily with the *act* of revealing. In this sense revelation directs itself first and foremost to the *understanding*. It may proceed from every rational being; but we are restricting our inquiry to that act of revealing which has *God* as its *immediate* author. We wish to arrive at a genuine concept of *Divine Revelation*.

This kind of revelation is mentioned frequently in the writings of the Old and the New Testament. It is *generally* designated by the verb ἀποκαλύπτειν, Latin *revelare*, (e. g. 1 Kings |iii, 21; ix, 15; Prov. xx, 19; Js. xl, 5; Dan. ii, 19 sq; Matt. x, 26; xi, 25, 27; xvi, 17; 1 Cor. ii, 10; Gal. i, 16; Phil. iii, 15) or by the noun ἀποκάλυψις. Latin *revelatio*, (Rom. xvi, 25; II Cor. xii, 1; Gal. i, 12; ii, 2; Eph. iii, 3). Besides this term the expression φανεροῦν, Latin *manifestare*, occurs in Eccl. i, 7; Mark iv, 22; John i, 31; ii, 11; xvii, 6; Rom. i, 19, as well as the corresponding noun φανερώσις, Latin

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Tyrrell, N. Y. & London 1908, p. 99 states: "It cannot be denied that our postulates are inspired by the principles of immanentism, for they all assume that the subject is not purely passive in its processes of knowledge and in its religious experiences, but brings forth from its own spiritual nature both the witness to a higher reality intuitively perceived and the abstract formulation of the same".

<sup>55</sup>) J. Brunsmann, S. V. D.; *Lehrbuch der Apologetik*. St. Gabriel bei Wien. 1924, I; "*Religion und Offenbarung*", p. 121.



manifestatio, (I Cor. xii, 7). Less frequent is the verb *ἀναφαίνειν* (Luke xix, 11), *ἀνακαλύπτειν* (Tob. xii, 11), Latin *manifestare*, or the adjectival mode of expression *φανερὸν ποιεῖν, γίγνεσθαι, ἐλθεῖν*, Latin *manifestare* (Mark iii, 12; Luke viii, 17).

Thus the mode of expression is varied, but the basic meaning of all these terms remains always the same: namely, making an object manifest, an object becoming visible. It is entirely immaterial as to whether the object has come into being only at the moment of the revelation, or whether it has already previously existed and only the obstacle to its perception has been removed. It suffices that the object has been made accessible to *knowledge*. Through revelation, therefore, what was before closed to knowledge, is now *opened* to it; what was hitherto hidden in obscurity, is now *made manifest* (*φανέρωσις, φαίνειν*); what was before veiled, is now *uncovered* (*ἀποκάλυψις*, *revelatio*) and, as it were, *made palpable* (*manifestare* = *manu fendere*).<sup>1)</sup>

2. The religious enlightenment of mankind which God grants to us through the agency of natural, intermediate causes (reason, nature, genius) may be termed a revelation.<sup>2)</sup> Indeed, whoever does not, like Kant and agnosticism, deny to human reason the power of arriving at a certain and natural knowledge of God, rightly perceives in the whole of creation, in the riches of man's spiritual nature, in the glories of nature, a real revelation of God. The universe is not dumb, nor is reason blind. Nature and the soul of man are a book in which the Creator has written the basic truths of natural religion.<sup>3)</sup> This enlightenment concerning God and divine things, which man is able to acquire from nature and his own being, through the exercise of his reason, we term *Natural Revelation*.

Natural  
Revelation.

"It is verily a *revelation*, because it manifests God's being and power. As the artist is known by his work, so in a much greater degree, God is known by this beautiful creation which is the work of His hands. Moreover, this revelation is *natural*, because nature is the object, and natural reason is the subject. By their united action the natural knowledge of God is acquired".<sup>4)</sup>

<sup>1)</sup> J. Brunsmann, S. V. D., *ibid.* I, pp. 121, 122.

<sup>2)</sup> Jos. Mausbach, *Grundzüge der katholischen Apologetik*. Münster i. W. 1921 (3.—4. ed.), p. 9.

<sup>3)</sup> Jos. Pohle, *Natur u. Übernatur*, in RCK, I, p. 398; cf. Ps. xviii 2; Rom. i, 20.

<sup>4)</sup> P. Schanz, *Apologie des Christentums*. English transl. *A Christian Apology*, by M. Glancey & V. Schobel. N. Y. (4. ed.), II: "God and Revelation", p. 247. We shall always quote this English translation, unless otherwise specified.



This revelation, however, is only *mediate*, for God does not speak directly to man, but rather through the works of His creation. Natural revelation prepares the way for and is the foundation upon which a higher, a supernatural, revelation is built.

Supernatural  
Revelation.

3. Christianity insists that it is a religion in a higher and a more perfect sense than purely natural religion. It claims to be a religion, which has been manifested to mankind through the supernatural, gracious intervention of God Himself. It proclaims that it is a *supernatural* revelation. That is to say, first from the viewpoint of its origin it is not the result of merely creatural powers, but is due to an immediate divine inspiration. Secondly, as regards its content it is supernatural, since it embraces truths which, in part at least, transcend the comprehensive powers of natural reason and communicates graces, which enable the creature to perform acts above the powers and exigencies of nature.<sup>5)</sup> The Christian religion is also an *immediate* revelation of God to man; it is the perfectly free self-communication of God for the purpose of an immediate vital union with man.<sup>6)</sup> "It is a communication of thoughts, ideas, and truths made by one spirit to another, who is able to think, and to drink in truth. It is a mysterious communing, a miraculous though withal intelligible action that the spirit of God works on the spirit of man".<sup>7)</sup> When God speaks to man supernaturally, He may sometimes employ created things; but He does so merely to attain the end of revelation. They are only means to this end; the entire process is of such a nature, that it may truly be called a direct speech of God to man.<sup>8)</sup> Christianity is also qualified as an *external* revelation. It is not, indeed, essential that a supernatural revelation should be communicated by means of external signs; it may also occur through a purely internal illumination, an immediate inspiration, as we shall show in detail below. The decisive factor is that it does not proceed from the natural ground of the soul, but rather from

<sup>5)</sup> Franz Sawicki, *Die Wahrheit des Christentums*. Paderborn. 1920 (4. ed.), p. 247.

<sup>6)</sup> Hermann Schell, *Apologie des Christentums*. Paderborn. 1907 (3. ed.), Part I: "*Religion u. Offenbarung*", p. 201.

<sup>7)</sup> Schanz, *ibid.* II, p. 262. <sup>8)</sup> Sawicki, *ibid.* p. 247.

God as another Ego manifesting Himself to man. Looking at Christianity as a concrete reality, we know from the testimony of history that it has not been communicated immediately to each individual, but has come at a definite time to definite persons, after which it has been handed down, as a precious heritage, from generation to generation. Hence we speak of the *historical* character of the Christian revelation.<sup>9)</sup> We shall deal with each of these characteristics of supernatural revelation below.

4. Besides the two kinds of Divine revelation just considered, there is a third and most perfect form of revelation consisting in the *beatific vision* of God in Heaven, by which the Saints see the Almighty intuitively, "face to face", and in Him all truth (cf. I Cor. xiii, 12; I John iii, 2). This category of revelation implies the highest enrichment of our knowledge; it is a self-revelation of God which will resolve even the darkness of mystery into clear vision.

To these three forms of revelation there correspond, on the part of man, three proportionate principles of knowledge: 1) the light of reason (*lumen rationis*); 2) the light of faith (*lumen fidei*) and 3) the light of glory (*lumen glorie*). The first of these methods of knowledge (*science*) is an integral part of every rational creature; the other two (*faith* and *vision*) belong entirely to the supernatural order and are related to each other as the imperfect to the perfect, as anticipation to fulfilment, as the pledge to actual possession.<sup>10)</sup>

In apologetics we are concerned only with the *second* of these three forms of revelation, whose object is embraced by the light of Christian faith.

Hence revelation, as understood in apologetics, may be defined as a supernatural communication of God to man, that is to say, it is a manifestation or a communication of truths to mankind, not indeed through merely natural and creatural enlightenment, but rather by means of a direct, free illumination and speech on the part of God Himself.<sup>11)</sup>

5. The third part of apologetics demonstrates *ex professo* that divine supernatural revelation is proposed to men with infallible certitude through the instrumentality of the Catholic Church and Revelation.

<sup>9)</sup> Sawicki, *ibid.* p. 247.

<sup>10)</sup> Pohle, *Natur u. Übernatur*, I, pp. 398, 399.

<sup>11)</sup> Mausbach, *Grundzüge etc.*, p. 9.

Church, which Christ Himself has instituted to be the infallible witness, custodian, interpreter and, when controversies arise, also the authentic judge of this revelation. Hence a *conditio sine qua non* of supernatural revelation is that it be *proposed* to mankind by the Church of Christ.<sup>12)</sup>

To obtain a more perfect notion of revelation we must distinguish between the *act*, the *manner* or *form*, the *object* or *content*, and the *public, historical character* of the divine message. We shall now treat of each of these aspects of revelation in the order specified.

### A. THE ACT OF REVEALING.

(Revelation and God.)

Sources of the  
concept of reve-  
lation.

1. It is the task of the Christian Catholic apologist to present the groundwork of Catholic faith. And since supernatural revelation according to the Catholic concept is the necessary prerequisite of this faith, it is clear that the apologist must accept the concept of revelation from *Catholic teaching itself* before he can proceed to formulate its philosophical expression and to undertake its comprehensive vindication. Now the doctrinal and traditional Christian concept of supernatural revelation is expressed particularly in the decrees of the Vatican Council. For the rest we shall follow the exposition of approved theologians.<sup>13)</sup> After stating the possibility of arriving at a knowledge of God by means of the natural light of reason (natural revelation), the Council teaches "that it pleased His (God's) wisdom and bounty to reveal Himself, and the eternal decrees of His will by another and a supernatural way, as the Apostle says: God, having *spoken* on divers occasions and in many ways' in times past to the fathers by the prophets, last of all in these days, hath *spoken* to us in His Son" (Hebr. iv, 13).<sup>14)</sup>

Revelation  
in the active  
sense.

2. In the formal and *active* sense, therefore, supernatural revelation is the divine, free and supernatural act, by which God discloses to man supernatural mysteries and natural truths of religion by means of a *direct speech* or *testimony*.<sup>15)</sup> Its immediate purpose is to *instruct* the rational creature and then to stimulate and to incite him to perfect self-activity.

<sup>12)</sup> P. Fr. Reg. Garrigou-Lagrange, O. P.; *Theologia fundamentalis secundum S. Thomae doctrinam*. Romae et Parisiis. 1918, I, p. 142.

<sup>13)</sup> J. Brunsmann, S. V. D.; *ibid.* I, p. 118; S. Weber, *Christliche Apologetik*. Freiburg i. B. 1907, p. 134, foot-note.

<sup>14)</sup> "Dogmatic Constitution on the Catholic Faith" (III Sess. 2. chap.), in DB. n. 1785; DCD. p. 220.

<sup>15)</sup> Garrigou-Lagrange, O. P.; *ibid.* I, pp. 139, 142 sq.

Hence it takes place, not by means of the *works* of creation, but rather through *words* and *deeds*, which are directed to man's spirit, in order to give him a knowledge of God and of the divine plans *based on experience*; to enrich him in his religious and moral conduct and to exhort him to fulfil the highest duties of the spiritual life.<sup>16)</sup> Accordingly the specific characteristic note of supernatural revelation, as the act of God, is the *directness* or the *immediateness* of the divine communication. Thereby revelation assumes the character of the *Supernatural*, even apart from its contents.<sup>17)</sup>

3. Modernists object that *speech* cannot be attributed to God save by **metaphor**, for God is a pure spirit and has no mouth. Hence the prophets, so they insist, did not really hear the divine speech in the proper sense of that term, but only metaphorically, that is, they merely enjoyed a more vivid religious experience. — We reply, that speech is indeed predicated of God only *analogically*, that is, there is a certain similarity and, at the same time, a dissimilarity between the speech of God and the speech of man. Speech is attributed to God and to man partly in the same and partly in a different sense.<sup>18)</sup> We distinguish between a *material* (physical) and a *spiritual* element in speech. In its physical aspect speech may not, of course, be predicated of God in the *proper* sense, but only metaphorically, just as anger may not be attributed to God, for He has no passions. However, speech also includes a *spiritual* element, namely that by which the thought of the speaker is made manifest to the intellect of the hearer. In this sense speech, like wisdom, may be rightly predicated of God both analogically and properly.<sup>19)</sup>

Objection.

4. When God speaks to us through His revelation He does so *as a Teacher*: His speech takes the form of *teaching* or doctrine (*per modum magisterii*).

Revelation  
a teaching  
process.

a) This is evident from Sacred Scripture. Thus the prophets spoke, e. g., Isaias (1, 4): "The Lord hath given me a learned tongue, that I should know how to uphold by word him that is weary: He wakeneth in the morning, in the morning He wakeneth my ear, that I may hear Him as a master". Christ, too, spoke as a Teacher (*Magister*), and "the people were in admiration at His doctrine. For He was teaching them as one having power, and

<sup>16)</sup> Schell, *ibid.* I, p. 202.

<sup>17)</sup> Schill-Straubinger, *Theologische Prinzipienlehre*. Paderborn. 1923 (5. ed.), p. 183.

<sup>18)</sup> For further details on the concepts of analogy, metaphor, etc. cf. any good text-book of logic.

<sup>19)</sup> Garrigou-Lagrange, O. P.; *ibid.* I, p. 151.



not as the scribes and Pharisees" (Matt. vii, 28 sq.). He Himself says: "You call me Master, and Lord: and ye say well, for so I am" John xiii, 13).<sup>20)</sup>

b) A rational analysis of the notion of Revelation confirms this assertion. For when God, the wisest of Superiors, speaks to us, disclosing to us higher truths, He does so as a Teacher speaking to His pupils. He enlightens us. There is a difference between simple speech and teaching or enlightening. "Not every speech is *enlightening*";<sup>21)</sup> thus when an inferior speaks he does not teach or enlighten us; but "every enlightening is a speech" (in the spiritual sense). A simple speech takes place by a simple manifestation of concepts, but an enlightening takes place by way of teaching and doctrine.<sup>22)</sup>

Analysis  
of the teaching  
process.

5. St. Thomas illustrates the divine act of revealing by the analogy drawn from the nature of teaching in general. He analyzes the notion of teaching. All teaching takes place by means of an *objective presentation of truth* and becomes efficacious by virtue of an *internal intellectual* light proportionate to the truth proposed. "In every man there is a certain principle of knowledge, namely the light of the active intellect, through which certain universal principles of all the sciences are naturally understood as soon as proposed to the intellect".<sup>23)</sup> This light enables the learner to judge concerning the truth proposed or, at least, concerning the authority of the teacher, that is, concerning the teacher's knowledge and veracity. Thereby the truth becomes either intrinsically evident or, at least, evidently credible.<sup>24)</sup>

Now a human teacher is able to present truth objectively to the intellect of the pupil and also to enlighten him, at least, objectively, namely by methodically arranging the pupil's ideas under proximate principles and finally by reducing the truth proposed to certain higher and more universal principles. Thus the teacher "strengthens the intellect of the learner... inasmuch as he proposes to the disciple the order of principles to conclusions"; perhaps the learner has not of himself sufficient collating power to be able to draw conclusions from principles.<sup>25)</sup> The medium of demonstration or the principles proposed by the teacher is, therefore, rightly called the objective light of the intellect, for it is that which is known and, at the same time, *that by which* many other things are made manifest. But a human teacher is unable to enlighten the pupil's intellect interiorly and subjectively. Only God, the Author of created intelligence, is able to do that. A human teacher can render truth intelligible, but he cannot give intelligence.<sup>26)</sup>

<sup>20)</sup> Ibid. I, p. 152. <sup>21)</sup> St. Thomas, ST. I, q. 107, a. 2.

<sup>22)</sup> Garrigou-Lagrange, O. P.; *ibid.* I, p. 153.

<sup>23)</sup> St. Thomas, ST. I, q. 117, a. 1.

<sup>24)</sup> Garrigou-Lagrange, O. P.; *ibid.* I, pp. 154, 155.

<sup>25)</sup> St. Thomas, ST. I, q. 117, a. 1.

<sup>26)</sup> Garrigou-Lagrange, O. P.; *ibid.* I, p. 156.

If we apply these principles of the teaching process in general to the divine act of teaching through revelation, it is evident that the act of revealing on the part of God involves two things: a) objectively, it is a *supernatural presentation of truths* and b) subjectively, it includes a *supernatural light*, which enables the recipient of the divine message to judge with infallible certainty concerning the truths disclosed or, at least, concerning the authority of God revealing or, what amounts to the same thing, the *fact* that God has spoken (i. e., the fact of revelation).<sup>27)</sup>

Application  
of principles to  
act of revealing.

Thus Pharaoh (Gen. 1xi, 25) received from God a representation of certain things through his senses or his imagination, but God did not, at the same time, enlighten Pharaoh's intellect, so that he might be able to understand the significance of the divine communication. On the other hand, Joseph of Egypt was given a divine supernatural light, which enabled him to judge with infallible certainty and to interpret God's message (Gen. 1xi, 25). In the same way Daniel interpreted the dream of Nabuchodonosor by means of this supernatural light.<sup>28)</sup>

6. Let us study these two factors in the act of revealing a little more in detail.

a) By objectively proposing to the prophet the truths to be believed and taught 1. *God makes known to the prophet what was before hidden from him.* Thereby revelation is distinguished from *simple inspiration*, which does not essentially include a supernatural acceptance of truths, but merely an infallible judgment on the part of the recipient of the inspiration as to what he is to narrate and write. "No matter where the knowledge of the writer on this point comes from, whether it be acquired naturally or due to divine revelation, it is something preliminary to inspiration. For inspiration has not essentially for its object to teach something new to the sacred writer, but to render him capable of writing with Divine authority".<sup>29)</sup> In like manner revelation differs also from the *grace of illumination* (e. g., the grace of faith, of Christian fortitude etc.), which is granted to all Christians and as a rule does not communicate any objective message,

Objective  
presentation.

<sup>27)</sup> Ibid. I, pp. 157, 158.

<sup>28)</sup> Ibid. I, pp. 153, 154.

<sup>29)</sup> A. Durand, art. "Inspiration", in CE. VIII, p. 46.

but merely moves the recipient to accept and to make the divine message his own.<sup>30)</sup>

Secondly, *God proposes the truths to be accepted in a definite sense.* For if the prophet did not understand in what sense the truths proposed are to be believed, he could not believe anything definitely, neither could he properly present that revealed message to others for their credence. Thus revelation is also differentiated from the *simple prophetic instinct* by which a person, whose mind is moved to utter certain words, does not understand what the Holy Spirit intends to express by those words, as in the case of Caiphas (John xi, 51).<sup>31)</sup>

Finally, *God manifests with certitude the divine origin of the revelation.* Otherwise the truth proposed could not be believed most firmly and in a formal way on the authority of God revealing; but it would be merely an object of religious opinion, which Protestants sometimes call faith or trust or religious experience. Neither could the prophet discern what was spoken to him by God from the things, which proceed from his own imagination or subconsciousness or the inspiration of the devil.<sup>32)</sup> This manifestation of the divine origin of the revealed message takes place by means of the so-called prophetic light (*lumen propheticum*), concerning which more will said presently.

Revelation an  
objective law.

7. Thus it is evident that supernatural revelation necessarily consists in the manifestation of *objective ideas*, which the understanding embraces, even though it may not comprehend them. It includes doctrines of faith and morals, decrees and facts relative to salvation, regulations in regard to divine worship and grace. The personal impulse and the fulness of knowledge, which the recipient of the revelation obtained from God, are means to the end that he may rightly accept and spread "the truths of God", "the word of God", "the law of God", "the deeds of God", "the mysteries of God". There can be absolutely no doubt of that according to the clear testimony of the Bible. For *Christ* appears above all else as the "Teacher" of mankind; He possesses the perfect "knowledge of the Father"; He teaches dogmatic

<sup>30)</sup> Mausbach, *Grundzüge etc.*, p. 9.

<sup>31)</sup> St. Thomas, *ST.* II, II, q. 173, a. 4.

<sup>32)</sup> *Ibid.* II, II, q. 171, a. 5; cf. Garrigou-Lagrange, *O. P.*; *ibid.* I, pp. 158 sq.



doctrines: His own Divine Sonship, His Messianic origin, His resurrection from the dead; He commissions His *Apostles* with the office of authoritative preaching. In the same way *St. John* calls the Son of God "the Logos", that is, the Divine source and essence of the intellectual world and emphasizes particularly the metaphysical and dogmatic substance of Jesus' preaching. *St. Paul* develops a profound doctrine of Redemption, compares faith — as the higher, divine wisdom — with philosophy and opposes the capriciousness of a pietistic, individualistic and inspirational religion. The *early Church*, too, presents divine supernatural revelation as a body of teachings and facts in her Rule of Faith, in her profession of Faith, in her martyrs and apologists.<sup>33)</sup>

A mere sentimental faith, which has for its object only this subjective feeling itself, contradicts the Christian concept of revelation just as much as pure knowledge, purged of all content, is at variance with the essence of our spirit and with the nature of science. Only by appearing as an *objective law*, which has brought every believing mind under the mild yoke of its authority, could the supernatural revelation of Christianity run its victorious course among the nations and subject the world of itself. If the prophets and Apostles had simply reveled in enthusiastic, mystic sentiments of the Divine Presence within their consciousness, instead of proclaiming with loud voice the objective truths and the concrete facts of divine revelation, the Christian religion would never have come down to us, with its clear sunshine, its purifying fire, but would have become merely one of the many phenomena which the history of religions records.<sup>34)</sup>

8. If the prophet is to judge with infallible certainty concerning the truths made manifest to him by God as well as concerning their divine origin, it is obviously necessary that his intellect be illumined *supernaturally by an internal light*, the so-called *lumen propheticum*. For this divine revelation pertains to the sphere of knowledge, which surpasses the powers of natural reason; hence an intellectual light is required exceeding the light of pure natural reason. There must be a proportion between the effect and the cause.<sup>35)</sup> This

Subjective  
light.

<sup>33)</sup> Mausbach, *Grundzüge etc.*, pp. 9, 10.

<sup>34)</sup> Pohle, *Natur u. Übernatur*, I, p. 399, 400. A. B. Bruce (*Apologetics*, N. Y. 1924, p. 31) describes the modern conception of revelation as consisting in the tendency "to regard the Bible as profitable, not for doctrine but for life, as edifying 'literature' rather than as divinely-given instruction in 'dogma'; as fitted and intended solely for religious edification, and laying no claim to any such function as scholastic theology has ascribed to it".

<sup>35)</sup> St. Thomas, *ST.* II, II, q. 171, a. 2; Garrigou-Lagrange, *ibid.* I, pp. 160 sq.



divinely infused light is a far more important factor in prophetic revelation than the mere objective proposition of the truths to his intellect, for judgment is the completion of knowledge.<sup>36)</sup> According to St. Thomas this prophetic light is not a permanent habit of the prophet, but merely a *transient gift* granted him by God.<sup>37)</sup>

From the above elucidation it is plain that divine revelation may rightly be termed a "speech of God in the form of teaching or doctrine" in the analogical sense. It is like the speech of a human teacher as regards the external presentation of the object; it differs from it as regards the infusion of the interior, subjective light, which God alone is able to give, since He is the Author of the created intelligence.<sup>38)</sup>

## B. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF REVELATION.

(Revelation and Man.)

The manner  
or form of  
revelation.

As regards the *manner* and *form*; or the *psychology* of revelation, it is Catholic teaching that supernatural revelation takes place after the manner in which the spirit generally receives higher truths. Its sphere, therefore, is not the physical or sensuous part of man's nature; for the divine communication is not merely feeling or sentiment or experience. It is *spiritual knowledge*. Thereby true prophecy is differentiated from the phantastic ravings of the pseudoprophets of paganism.<sup>39)</sup> Genuine prophecy and inspiration does not weaken or lessen the consciousness and the moral freedom of the recipient, but rather keeps the spirit vigilant and alert. The prophet's actions are and continue to be *vital* actions. The psychological medium of revelation, as noted above, is the so-called "prophetic light". The psychic forms of this supernatural light may be gleaned from the history of revelation, which shows, amid the great multiplicity of forms, a progressive ascent from the lower to the higher forms.<sup>40)</sup> St. Thomas<sup>41)</sup> teaches that God proposes His message to the prophet in the following ways:

<sup>36)</sup> Ibid. II, II, q. 173, a. 2.

<sup>37)</sup> Ibid. II, II, q. 171, a. 2.

<sup>38)</sup> Garrigou-Lagrange, O. P; *ibid.* I, pp. 162 sq.

<sup>39)</sup> Mausbach, *Grundzüge etc.*; p. 10.

<sup>40)</sup> Pohle, *ibid.* I, p. 432.

<sup>41)</sup> ST. II, II, q. 173, a. 2.

a) by signs, words and other actions which can be perceived by the *external senses (formae sensibiles)*.

Thus God spoke to our first parents in the garden of paradise; to Moses in the burning bush (Ex. iii, 2; cf. xix, xx, 18; xxiv, 9, 17; xxxiii, 9); to the Apostles and their contemporaries (*e. g.*, at the baptism of Jesus, Matt. iii, 16, and through the audible words of the Saviour).

b) God may also manifest Himself, without the agency of the external senses, namely through *internal vision perceived by the imagination*, either while the prophet is asleep or awake (*formae imaginariae*).

Examples of this manner of Revelation are the heavenly ladder seen by the patriarch Jacob (Gen. xxviii, 12); the great sheet with the animals seen by St. Peter (Acts of Apostles, xi, 5 sq.); the numerous visions of the prophets.

The vision which is granted to a prophet *in a dream* is a lower form of prophecy than that which occurs while the recipient is awake.<sup>42)</sup> In fact, the history of revelation shows that a revelation of a *public* character was only rarely granted through the medium of dreams. The recipients of dreams in the Old Testament were hardly ever *official* organs of revelation, but as a rule private personages, people of the world or heathen kings. In the New Testament besides St. Joseph, the foster-father of Jesus, we might mention also the Magi. Oftentimes it was necessary for a divinely enlightened interpreter to explain the dream correctly, as in the case of Pharaoh and Joseph of Egypt, Nabuchodonosor and Daniel. The divine origin of the dream could, as a rule, be verified, as regards persons other than the prophet, only by its historical fulfilment.<sup>43)</sup>

Dreams.

A higher form of revelation is *vision*, which is granted to the prophet while he is awake. Psychologically, this may be described as a supernatural state of consciousness, in which the spirit of man, illumined by divine light, sees or hears things by means of his imaginative faculty, which are removed from the normal and natural consciousness, as for instance, the vision of Isaias (vi, 1 sq.). This form of prophecy does not necessarily imply an immediate vision of the divine essence, but rather the immediate seeing and hearing of heavenly things. It took place only rarely in pre-Mosaic times, but appears characteristic especially of the prophets of the Old Testament. In the New Testament the Apocalypse of the Apostle John is entirely vision. St. Paul, too, had "visions and revelations of the Lord" (II Cor. xii, 1). Genuine prophetic visions are essentially distinguished from the false manifestations of pagan soothsayers and from the phenomena of modern spiritism, magnetic clairvoyance etc., in that they are not joined with

Visions.

<sup>42)</sup> St. Thomas, *ST.* II, II, q. 174, a. 3. <sup>43)</sup> Pohle, *ibid.* I, p. 433.

unconsciousness and spasmodic convulsions (*e. g.*, the Pythia of Delphi). On the contrary, in spite of the inhibition of sense perception genuine prophetic vision implies rather an intensive augmentation of spiritual activity. In the more rare cases where the vision occurred in *rapture or ecstasy*, as in the case of Isaias and St. Paul, the inner eye or ear was all the more sharpened for the divine message.

At times "Angels" were the intermediaries of the revelation. But as the "messengers of God" they enjoyed the same confidence as the "Spirit of God" Himself. However, this angelic vision — in contrast with the oldest theophanies of the "Jahve-Angel" — was most probably a subjective occurrence in the divinely enlightened consciousness of the prophet and consequently a real vision. With the last prophecies of Malachy the Old Testament revelation ceased entirely; the people of Israel was sufficiently prepared for the expectation of the Messias.<sup>44)</sup>

c) Psychologically, the third and highest form of revelation is that which takes place by means of the *divine inspiration of words and ideas*, which is as superior to the figurative language and symbolism of the prophets as the alphabet is to hieroglyphics.<sup>45)</sup> In this form of the divine communication God immediately produces *spiritual concepts, thoughts and understanding* in the prophet's mind (*formae intelligibiles*). The absolute mysteries of faith could come to our knowledge only by means of this supernatural infusion of words and ideas.

Examples of this form of revelation are the monotheistic idea revealed by the prophets, the enlightenment of the Apostles on Pentecost, the Prologue of the Apostle St. John.

It is, of course, not always possible to sharply distinguish this manner of revelation from the others. Moreover, this form of revelation brings into play the other natural powers of the soul as do the other forms. But even the most perfect earthly revelation cannot be compared with the heavenly vision (I Cor. ii, 9; xiii, 8; II Pet. i, 19). On the other hand, the spiritual plenitude of *Christ's knowledge*, in Whom "dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead corporally" (Col. ii, 9), far surpasses the beatific vision.<sup>46)</sup> Indeed in Christ we see the highest type of revelation in altogether unique and overwhelming form, for in Him all the various types of revelation appear united in the oneness of a higher synthesis. Dream is transformed into reality, symbolism into actuality, vision into autopsy.<sup>47)</sup>

<sup>44)</sup> Pohle, *ibid.* I, pp. 433, 444.      <sup>45)</sup> *Ibid.* I, p. 444.

<sup>46)</sup> Mausbach, *Grundzüge etc.*; p. 10.

<sup>47)</sup> Pohle, *ibid.* I, pp. 434, 435.

## C. THE OBJECT OR CONTENT OF REVELATION.

(Revelation and Religion.)

The divinely revealed truths, which constitute the *object* or *content* of supernatural revelation, may be such as are otherwise inaccessible to the human mind, that is to say, *Mysteries* in the strict sense, which, even after they have been made known by God, the intellect of man cannot fully comprehend. Such a revelation, in technical language, is said to be substantially supernatural (*supernaturalis quoad substantiam*). "Our reason teaches us with certainty, from His effects, that God is; what He is we know only inadequately and in a human way. The full knowledge of His inner being, His nature, and person, and attributes, and all those unfathomable mysteries which are absolutely and necessarily beyond the range of human reason, can only be learnt from God Himself; and the *beginning* of this knowledge can come to us only in a supernatural way, and by the infused light of faith. Hence belief in mystery is the form and principle of all true religious life. A religion, in fact, without a revelation is not worthy of the name".<sup>48</sup>) But supernatural revelation is not restricted to these truths. God may see fit to employ supernatural means to affirm truths, the discovery of which is not *per se* beyond the powers of natural reason. In this case, the knowledge of mankind is made easier, clearer and more certain, if God affirms these truths through His revealed word.<sup>49</sup>) Such a revelation is said to be supernatural only with respect to the manner in which it is made (*supernaturalis quoad modum*).

A truth or fact may also belong to the object or content of revelation either directly and in itself (*directe et per se*), or only accidentally (*per accidens*); but in either case it is infallible divine revelation.<sup>50</sup>)

<sup>48</sup>) Hettinger-Bowden, *Revealed Religion*. N. Y. (2. ed.), p. 37. cf. Hettinger-Müller, *Apologie des Christentums*, Freiburg i. B. 1915 (10. ed.), II. "Der Beweis des Christentums", Part II, pp. 37 sq.

<sup>49</sup>) G. H. Joyce, art. "Revelation", in CE. XIII, p. 1; cf. DB. n. 1786; DCD. p. 220, 221.

<sup>50</sup>) cf. D. Coughlin, art. "Dogma", in CE. V, pp. 89 sq.



## D. THE PUBLIC-HISTORICAL CHARACTER OF REVELATION.

(Mediate Revelation.)

Mediate  
revelation.

1. Supernatural revelation is not only a psychological fact of a purely internal and personal character; it is pre-eminently a fact of the historical order.<sup>51)</sup> The prophet is indeed the immediate recipient of the supernatural message (*revelatio immediata*), but the revelation communicated to him is meant primarily and *per se* for mankind taken as a whole (*revelatio publica*). God uses the prophet as His instrument or messenger to spread the divine message to all men (*revelatio mediata*).

This does not, of course, exclude a supernatural revelation, which is granted primarily for the personal instruction and edification of the recipient (*revelatio privata*). In apologetics, however, we are not concerned with this form of revelation.<sup>52)</sup>

Public.  
historical cha-  
racter of reve-  
lation.

2. In its first historical appearance<sup>53)</sup> supernatural revelation has, indeed, the note of the particular and the individual (Gen. xii, 1), but it contains within itself the tendency to *universality* (Gen. xii, 3; xxii, 18). The Logos, Who has, last of all, spoken to the nations (Heb. i, 1), has in times past spoken to the chosen people of Israel, by the Law and the Prophets, and as the *λόγος σπερματικός* to the pagans and thus prepared them for the higher revelation in Christ Jesus.<sup>54)</sup> Consequently supernatural revelation initiates a new and superior development of religion. It is, in very truth, a builder of history, a historical power intervening in the progress of mankind and subjecting the factors of history ever more and more to its own divine ends and purposes. It is a real Divine Pedagogy of the human race.<sup>55)</sup>

<sup>51)</sup> Mausbach, *ibid.* p. 11.

<sup>52)</sup> cf. Aug. Poulain, art. "Private Revelations", in CE. XIII, pp. 5 sq. with appended literature.

<sup>53)</sup> cf. Wm. Schmidt, S. V. D.; *Die Uroffenbarung als Anfang der Offenbarungen Gottes*, in RCK. I, pp. 91 sq.

<sup>54)</sup> Hettinger-Weber, *Lehrbuch der Fundamentaltheologie oder Apologetik*. Freiburg i. B. 1913 (3. ed.), p. 119; cf. Justin M. *Apol.* I, 10; Clement of Alexandria, *Strom.* i, 7.

<sup>55)</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 119; cf. St. Thomas, *ST.* II, II, q. 2, a. 3.

3. This public, historical character of revelation, which is the necessary concomitant of God's message to man, excludes, therefore, the false conceptions of those who imagine that the beginnings of revelation are enveloped in the impenetrable mists of fable, legend, myth and folklore and, therefore, removed from the possibility of certain historical verification. History shows beyond the shadow of a doubt that the claims of those who would clothe the revelation of the Old and New Testaments with a garb of myth and legend, are spurious and untenable.<sup>56)</sup>

It suffices to point to the *chief types* of the prophets of supernatural revelation, whose historical existence demonstrates also the historicity of the message of which they are chosen heralds. In the patriarchal age the history of revelation centers about the person of *Abraham*, whose vocation to be bearer of the Messianic promises, ushers in a new and decisive epoch.<sup>57)</sup> An even greater historical personage appears then in *Moses*, with whose name a new and significant period in the history of revelation is indissolubly joined. The exodus from Egypt, the Sinaitic legislation (the Decalogue), the sojourn in the desert, the conquest of Chanaan are events, which the most recent excavations and discoveries have confirmed more and more and which would necessarily lose all their meaning, without the central position of an historical Moses. The efforts of P. Jensen and others in the realm of the history of religions to prove that Moses and the other representative men of the Old Testament, nay more even Jesus Himself, are merely the mythical reflection of the old Babylonian sun-god, Gilgamesch, are based on a method, which, if consistently applied, could just as easily dissolve all the great figures of the world's history into so many mythical personages.<sup>58)</sup> Finally, the entire history of salvation, from the time of Moses, is nothing but a systematic preparation for the advent of the Messias, Who is to appear "in the fulness of time" in the person of *Jesus Christ*. With "Christ and the Apostles" the history of revelation was brought to a close just as definitely as was the history of the Old Testament with "Moses and the Prophets". The world's Saviour made His public appearance in the fullest light of history; His creation, the Church, still lives on. Both stand and fall

<sup>56)</sup> Pohle, *ibid.* I, pp. 442, 443.

<sup>57)</sup> cf. Dornstetter, *Abraham. Studien über die Anfänge des hebräischen Volkes*. Freiburg i. B. 1902.

<sup>58)</sup> P. Jensen, *Das Gilgamesch-Epos*. vol. I: *Die Ursprünge der alttestamentlichen Patriarchen, Propheten und Befreier-Sage und die neuteamentliche Jesus-Sage*. Strasbourg. 1906; cf. A. Condamin, S. J.; *Babylonia and Assyria*, in LHR. I, with appended bibliography.

together. If Jesus never lived, Christianity is a chimera, an effect without a cause.<sup>59)</sup>

Social character of revelation.

4. Supernatural revelation is also essentially a *social* phenomenon. It is the announcement and the beginning of the social work of salvation, namely the "Kingdom of God" on earth.<sup>60)</sup> The much vaunted "Religion of the spirit", which freethinkers claim to monopolize, is really nothing but a threadbare cloak with which they seek to cover their lack of religion. The social character of religion is determined by three factors: faith, tradition and authority. In each of these three respects revealed religion appears as a social power of the first magnitude.<sup>61)</sup>

The *transmission* of supernatural revelation by the prophets to the people takes place in a natural manner, by word or writing. But their credentials are generally certain *criteria* of a supernatural character, as we shall show below.

We shall now consider the *false concepts* of revelation.

### Chapter III.

#### FALSE CONCEPTS OF REVELATION.

Historical retrospect. — Theories of knowledge.

1. The close union between faith and science, which obtained during the Middle Ages, gradually relaxed during the period of the Renaissance according as the human mind devoted itself more and more to the study of nature and classical antiquity. Then began the critical attacks upon the fact and the doctrine of divine revelation as well as a one-sided emphasizing of *reason* as the exclusive source of truth. The Protestant Reformation proceeded, it is true, from other spiritual motives; but it, too, promoted the *rationalistic viewpoint* inasmuch as it rejected the teaching Church and surrendered the Sacred Scriptures, which now became the sole source of faith, to the "free investigation" of the individual.<sup>1)</sup> However, with the shifting of metaphysical systems the absolute autonomy of reason gradually led to the critical doubting

<sup>59)</sup> Pohle, *ibid.* I, pp. 443, 444.

<sup>60)</sup> Mausbach, *ibid.* p. 11.

<sup>61)</sup> cf. Pohle, *ibid.* I, pp. 445—450 for detailed proof.

<sup>1)</sup> M. Kähler, art. "*Revelation*", in SHERK. X, p. 4, says: "The Reformation planting itself on the Bible destroyed irremediably the assurance that Church doctrine and revelation coincide".

of the powers of reason itself and finally to scepticism and psychologism. In the face of this development of modern philosophy many sought salvation in *traditionalism*: they invoked revelation and tradition not only as the teacher of the Christian faith, but also as the only mediator of natural religious truths. The movement, which began with Rousseau, Herder, Kant and Schleiermacher, under the influence of Illuminism, continued to defend the natural and immanentistic explanation of religion; but reason now yielded place to the power of the *will* and of the *feelings*. All religious faith, so it is claimed, is the result of this practical or sentimental disposition and its historical development. This widely diffused tendency, which, in contrast with rationalism, may be designated as *voluntarism* or *mysticism*, likewise opposes the Supernatural and the historical Christian concept of revelation. Its latest form is *modernism*.<sup>2)</sup>

In the light of this historical retrospect we shall now deal with the notion of revelation as conceived 1. by naturalism in general, and by rationalistic naturalism in particular; 2. by voluntarism and mysticism, more especially by modernism; 3. by traditionalism.

2. The opponents of divine supernatural revelation may be qualified by the generic term of "*naturalists*" in contradistinction to the advocates of the traditional Christian concept of revelation, who are called "*supernaturalists*". For naturalists claim that whatever takes place in the world, happens purely by natural powers, without any immediate divine intervention. This fundamental dogma of naturalism is variously interpreted and, in consequence, we distinguish the following forms of naturalism: monistic, deistic and rationalistic naturalism.<sup>3)</sup>

Naturalism  
versus Super-  
naturalism.

a) The lowest form of naturalism is *materialism* (*materialistic monism*), which sees in the evolution of the universe merely a blind play of necessary mechanical forces working according to

Materialism.

<sup>2)</sup> Jos. Mausbach, *Grundzüge der katholischen Apologetik*. Münster i. W. 1921 (3.—4. ed.), pp. 14, 15. cf. C. A. Dubray, art. "*Epistemology*", in CE. V, pp. 506 sq; Leslie J. Walker, S. J.; *Theories of Knowledge* (Stonyhurst philosophical series). London & N. Y. 1911.

<sup>3)</sup> H. Felder, O. M. Cap; *Apologetica*. Paderborn. 1920, I, pp. 24 sq.



unchangeable laws. It denies the existence of the divine and of the human spirit, as principles essentially distinct from matter and the forces of matter. Its ultimate principles, as regards the explanation of the nature of the universe, are: "There is nothing in the universe except matter . . . All physical and chemical phenomena in the universe are reducible to the mechanical modification of matter".<sup>4)</sup> Materialism seeks to account for the origin of the universe by arbitrarily asserting that "the universe is due to the evolution of eternal matter eternally in motion". The existence of life in the universe is explained by the assumption of "spontaneous generation". Varieties of materialistic metaphysics appear in the *positivism* of Auguste Comte and his school, in the *evolutionism* of Herbert Spencer, in *phenomenalism* and *agnosticism*.<sup>5)</sup>

It is obvious that supernatural revelation is non-existent and devoid of all meaning from the viewpoint of atheistic materialism. This form of naturalism is refuted in philosophy.<sup>6)</sup>

Pantheism.

b) A higher form of naturalism is *pantheism* in the stricter sense (*spiritualistic monism*), which indeed acknowledges a God, at least in name, but confuses Him with the world, the divine with the human spirit, and declares the evolution of the universe as the evolution of God Himself, in which only the law of necessity holds sway.<sup>7)</sup> Pantheism "acquired intellectual influence in modern times through Giordano Bruno and above all, through its perfect systematization by Baruch Spinoza".<sup>8)</sup>

In this system a supernatural revelation is just as impossible as in materialism. Pantheistic philosophers (Hegel) and theologians (Schleiermacher) continued to use the term "revelation", but with them it had lost its specific Christian connotation.<sup>9)</sup> Pantheism seeks to explain the different religious phenomena by the hypo-

<sup>4)</sup> Chas. Baschab, *A Manual of Neo-Scholastic Philosophy*. St. Louis, Mo. 1924 (2. ed.), p. 338.

<sup>5)</sup> Baschab, *ibid.* pp. 339, 340. cf. J. B. Ceulemans, *Studies in American Philosophy. II American Materialism*, in AER. Oct. 1911, pp. 406—415.

<sup>6)</sup> cf. C. Gutberlet, art. "Materialism", in CE. X, pp. 41 sq. with appended literature; also P. Fr. Reg. Garrigou-Lagrange, O. P.; *Theologia fundamentalis secundum S. Thomae doctrinam*. Romae et Parisiis. 1918, I, pp. 258—264; 268—271.

<sup>7)</sup> Specht-Bauer, *Lehrbuch der Apologetik*. Regensburg. 1924 (2. ed.), p. 59; Schill-Straubinger, *Theologische Prinzipienlehre*. Paderborn. 1923 (5. ed.), pp. 84—88.

<sup>8)</sup> Baschab, *ibid.* p. 341. cf. J. B. Ceulemans, *Studies in American Philosophy. IV. Modern School: Evolutionism*. Sept. 1912, pp. 258—282. "American evolutionism followed in the wake of the European theorists, with this exception that it always claimed to be frankly theistic, and in harmony with the religious spirit of the people at large. At bottom, however, this theism differs only in name from pantheism, since all phenomena, both physical and psychical, are but manifestations of the underlying Power, the Eternal Reality" (*Ibid.* p. 282).

<sup>9)</sup> Specht-Bauer, *ibid.* p. 60.

thesis of the evolution of the religious sense (immanentism); human reason is held to be so independent, that faith cannot be enjoined upon it by God.<sup>10)</sup> The fundamental error of this system is refuted in detail in philosophy.<sup>11)</sup>

c) A third form of naturalism is *deism* (*naturalistic deism*), a term, which originally signified the same as theism, but which in the course of time assumed a specifically different meaning. "The deistic mode of regarding the great objects of philosophic contemplation — God, man and the world — differs widely from that of either of the systems previously considered. Deism recognizes a God distinct from the world, who stands to it in the relation of creator to creation. It not only recognizes such a distinction between God and the world, but lays exaggerated emphasis upon it, making God stand outside the world He has made, a mere spectator of the universe He has ushered into being, rigidly excluded from all subsequent interference with the course of nature He Himself established from the first".<sup>12)</sup> Neither does man need such an intervention, since he is self-sufficient in respect to religion and morality and does not require any supernatural truth and grace.<sup>13)</sup> Thus deism "separates the world from God, religion from revelation, the will from grace".<sup>14)</sup> It champions the religion of pure reason.

Deism.

This system of thought originated in England (Cherbury, Shaftesbury, Toland, Collins, Woolston etc.) in the seventeenth century, was promulgated in its most radical form in France in the eighteenth century (by the so-called Encyclopedists: Voltaire, Rousseau, Diderot) and affected not only Protestantism in Germany, but also, for a time, considerable circles among Catholics.<sup>15)</sup>

The error of deism is refuted in philosophy. Surely it is plainly repugnant to reason to conceive a created and contingent world, which does not require the divine concursus and guidance every single moment; neither is it possible to conceive a Creator and absolute God, Who no longer cares for the world He has called into being. Therefore deists are compelled either to deny the existence of God, or to concede the natural influence of God in the world, as the history of deism clearly demonstrates. For some deists (especially the English and French) soon lapsed into scepticism and atheism, while others (namely the German) embraced rationalism.<sup>16)</sup> The modern descendent and representative of deism goes by the name of "speculative theism".<sup>17)</sup>

<sup>10)</sup> cf. Vatican Council, in DB. n. 1810; cf. also n. 1701, 1803 sq.

<sup>11)</sup> cf. Ed. A. Pace, art. "*Pantheism*", in CE. XI, pp. 447 sq.

<sup>12)</sup> A. B. Bruce, *Apologetics*, N. Y. 1924, p. 115.

<sup>13)</sup> Specht-Bauer, *ibid.* p. 60.

<sup>14)</sup> Jos. Pohle, *Natur u. Übernatur*, in RCK. I, p. 442; cf. F. Aveling, art. "*Deism*", in CE. IV, pp. 679 sq. with bibliography.

<sup>15)</sup> Mausbach, *Grundzüge etc.* p. 25.

<sup>16)</sup> cf. C. Gutberlet, *Gott und die Schöpfung*. Regensburg. 1910, pp. 117 sq.

<sup>17)</sup> Bruce, *ibid.* pp. 117; 132—146 with literature.

Rationalism.

d) "*Rationalism (rationalistic naturalism)* is only the consequence of naturalism in its relation to human knowledge".<sup>18)</sup> It is partly a philosophical system (a theory of knowledge) and partly a theological tendency. In the former sense its starting point is the principle: "Reason is the chief and exclusive source of all knowledge". *Theological rationalism*, with which we are directly concerned here, applies this principle of philosophical rationalism to religion and morality. Thus reason becomes the only source and criterion of religion.<sup>19)</sup> In other words, "rationalism in theology has in common with rationalism in philosophy the effort to derive the essential in religious knowledge from reason as an original source, instead of regarding it as something received from some other source. . . The question is one of authority: supernaturalism adheres to revelation, rationalism to reason to determine the content and limit of religious truth".<sup>20)</sup> The point which the various systems designated as "rationalistic" have in common, is the denial of every immediate, positive revelation properly so-called.<sup>21)</sup> Two forms or tendencies of rationalism may be clearly differentiated, namely extreme (strict, absolute) and moderate (or semi-) rationalism.

Extreme  
rationalism.

A. *Extreme rationalism* denies the possibility, or at least the necessity, the reality (fact) and certain knowability of supernatural revelation. It either directly rejects Christian mysteries or transforms them into "truths of reason".<sup>22)</sup> The older rationalists (Reimarus, Lessing, Semler, Wegscheider etc.) dubbed all religious knowledge, which we acquire by means of natural reason, "revelation". Thus *natural revelation* or the manifestation of God through the works of creation usurps the place of supernatural revelation.<sup>23)</sup> The empirical rationalists also, following in the wake of Kant,

<sup>18)</sup> Hettinger-Weber, *Lehrbuch der Fundamentaltheologie oder Apologetik*. Freiburg i. B. 1913 (3. ed.), p. 122.

<sup>19)</sup> L. Baur, art. "*Rationalismus*", in Buchberger: *Kirchliches Handlexikon*. Freiburg i. B. 1912, I, pp. 1675 sq.

<sup>20)</sup> O. Kirn, art. "*Rationalism and Supernaturalism*", in SHERK. IX, p. 393.

<sup>21)</sup> Hettinger-Weber, *ibid.* p. 122.

<sup>22)</sup> Specht-Bauer, *ibid.* p. 60.  
<sup>23)</sup> cf. Wegscheider, *Institutiones theologicae*, Prol. c. 1, 12, p. 46 (5. ed.).



acknowledge only religion within the confines of pure reason.<sup>24)</sup> Pure or theoretical reason is unable to know any religious truths whatsoever; but practical reason, by the aid of internal experience, "*feels*" the utility, necessity and existence of religious truths. Thus revelation becomes this subjective experience or consciousness. Deprived of the support and guidance of supernatural revelation human reason, imbued with the principles of strict rationalism, either succumbed to complete *atheism* or, glorying in its own self-sufficiency, gave way to a *pantheistic* identification of the human reason and the divine reason (Hegel, Fichte, Schelling).<sup>25)</sup> In our own country "philosophy, in the first stages of its development, was intimately bound up with religion; as it grew and expanded into various systems, it kept up, in the main, an offensive and defensive alliance with it; and to this day the great majority of its representatives, with convincing sincerity, urge the claim that they are in perfect accord with religion".<sup>26)</sup> But this does not mean that these latter-day philosophers believe in a supernatural revelation. On the contrary, as a result of philosophical speculation, more particularly during the last half of the nineteenth century, there is a "general and persistent demand for a restatement of theology in terms of modern science and modern thought." Modern American philosophy does not attack revelation; "it ignores it as a supernatural agency, and substitutes for it the revelations which the human mind has brought about through science in this visible world. The pursuit of science and philosophy is religion. And evolutionism has done more than any other system to popularize this belief". "The leaders of Protestant thought in this country have resolutely given up all claim to a distinct science of religion and have adapted

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<sup>24)</sup> Thus Kant gives to one of his works the title: "Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft". cf. J. B. Ceulemans, *Studies in American Philosophy. III. The Modern Schools: Kantism in America*, in AER. Aug. 1912, pp. 185—211.

<sup>25)</sup> Mausbach, *Grundzüge etc.* p. 16; cf. Vatican Council, in DB. n. 1804, 1808; DCD. pp. 233, 234.

<sup>26)</sup> J. B. Ceulemans, *The Restatement of Theology in America. Studies in American Philosophy.* — V, in AER. Jan. 1913, p. 1.



their theology to the philosophical theories of the hour. The Rev. Lyman Abbott has made himself the spokesman and champion of this tendency". According to this viewpoint "God has but one way of doing things, and His way may be described in one word as the way of growth and development or evolution.... There are not occasional or exceptional theophanies, but all nature, all life is one great theophany".<sup>27)</sup> Hence inspiration and revelation are no longer to be considered as special interventions of God in the life of man, since it impossible to separate the natural from the revealed; both come from God. "There is no super-natural; all is natural and all is revelation". "The New Religion is the religion of truth as revealed by science". "Holy, holy, holy are the laws of the God of Nature. Puny man can faintly understand and obey them, but he can never escape or change them. Here the religious impulse finds the worthy object of veneration, and here we make the nearest possible approach to the Infinite. Here is God revealed, and here are the divine way and will set forth. In exact proportion as we learn the systems of laws that form the environment in which we live and move and have our being, and co-operate with them, heaven comes to us here and now".<sup>28)</sup>

Criticism.  
Rationalism  
false in prin-  
ciple.

3. *Rationalism is false in principle.* For it is an evident fact, that our reason is dependent in a multiplicity of ways upon intrinsic and extrinsic presuppositions, continually encounters insurmountable barriers and is surrounded by a host of errors and doubts. How then can reason, tortured by uncertainties, errors and doubts, lay claim to the possession of truth in its very source, to unlimited autonomy, without making itself guilty of the greatest presumption? Furthermore, we may rightly raise the question: Whence has rationalism derived its principle concerning the self-sufficiency of reason? From reason itself? But that would be a manifest vicious circle. Or is it perhaps deduced from ex-

<sup>27)</sup> Ceulemans, *ibid.* pp. 2, 5, 6; cf. Lyman Abbott, *The Theology of an Evolutionist* (Houghton Mifflin & Co.). 1897, pp. 3, 9.

<sup>28)</sup> John M. Watson, *Science as Revelation*. N. Y. 1925, pp. 294, 296, 297.

perience and the history of the sciences? Both prove the very contrary. Or is it perhaps derived from the authority of distinguished thinkers, especially Kant? But how can authority be a source of truth, if reason alone has the supreme word to say? And why are rationalists then opposed to the authority of divine supernatural revelation? Thus the chief principle of rationalism hangs suspended in the air.<sup>29)</sup>

The *evil consequences of rationalism* are unlimited individualism, autonomy in the sphere of religion and morality, untrammelled license of thought. There is a striking similarity between the results of modern rationalism and Greek sophistry against which Socrates raised the banner of virtue and truth. And the results? Everywhere the downfall of religion and morality, anarchy in scientific thought, distortion of the very concept of truth (relativism), universal scepticism. Surely there is a tragic self-humiliation of reason in the historical experience, that rationalism, glorying in its own wisdom, can so easily resolve itself into its direct opposite, namely complete doubt of all truth. This lapse of rationalism into *scepticism* is one of the best tests of its own intrinsic untruth. Moreover, *pantheism* is the other extreme of rationalistic autonomy as the history of philosophy abundantly demonstrates. But pantheism is repugnant to reason, since it casts all the errors, weaknesses and sins of men upon the Deity. Surely the human heart can never be satisfied with such an erring, ignorant and sinning "god". Therefore rationalism, false in principle and destructive in its consequences, stands self-condemned before the bar of reason and history.<sup>30)</sup>

Rationalism  
false in its  
consequences.

B. *Moderate or semi-rationalism* admits the fact of a positive, supernatural revelation, but questions its strict or absolute supernatural character. It maintains that revelation is supernatural only in respect to the manner of its bestowal (*modally* supernatural). In other words, it denies that reve-

Semi-  
rationalism.

<sup>29)</sup> Pohle, *Natur u. Übernatur*, I, pp. 425, 426; cf. St. Thomas, *Quaest. disput. 1. q. unica de spiritual. creaturis*, a. 10.

<sup>30)</sup> Pohle, *ibid.* I, pp. 426, 427; Hettinger-Weber, *ibid.* pp. 124 sq; cf. F. Aveling, art. "Rationalism", in CE. XII, pp. 652 sq. with literature.

lation contains truths which are *above* reason, *i. e.*, "mysteries" in the strict sense of that term. Therefore supernatural revelation is not strictly or absolutely necessary, but only because of the weakness of the human intellect as it now exists. The purpose of supernatural revelation according to this viewpoint is to enable mankind to attain *more easily* and *quickly* to a knowledge of natural religion and morality than it could, if it were left to its own native faculties.<sup>31)</sup> After certain truths (for instance, the mystery of the Blessed Trinity) have been supernaturally revealed, human reason of itself is able to demonstrate these truths by intrinsic argumentation. Hence all dogmas, even strict mysteries, will gradually become "truths of reason" as science progresses.<sup>32)</sup>

We discern traces of semi-rationalism in the Middle Ages (Berengarius); later on in Socinianism; in the writings of Locke, Lessing, and many of the so-called "Illuminati" theologians and apologists; to a degree also in Hermes, more pronouncedly in Günther (d. 1863) and Frohschammer (d. 1893); in certain Protestant circles, particularly among the "*Vermittlungstheologen*", *e. g.*, Ullmann (d. 1865), Aug. Tholuck (d. 1877), Joh. P. Lange (d. 1884), Martensen (d. 1884) etc.<sup>33)</sup>

Criticism.

Semi-rationalism satisfies neither Christianity nor the just claims of reason; for the most important Christian dogmas cannot be resolved into "truths of reason", since they are essentially mysteries in the strict sense of that term. Furthermore, the mighty fact of a supernatural revelation appears scarcely credible, if it has been granted *only* for the purpose of natural enlightenment.<sup>34)</sup>

Resumé.

These various classes of opponents of the traditional concept of supernatural revelation, which we have grouped under the generic term of "Naturalists", that is, deists, pantheists, rationalists, represent the *anthropocentric* viewpoint. God is no longer the sun around which the world and mankind revolve as planets, but Man proclaims himself the sun, which,

<sup>31)</sup> Mausbach, *ibid.* p. 16.

<sup>32)</sup> cf. DB. n. 1618—1621; 1634—1639; 1655—1658; 1666—1676; 1708—1714; 1795; 1816.

<sup>33)</sup> Specht-Bauer, *ibid.* pp. 61 sq; cf. arts. "*Hermes*" and "*A. Günther*", in CE. VII, pp. 276 sq; Nitzsch-Stephan, *Lehrbuch der evangelischen Dogmatik*. Tübingen. 1912 (3. ed.), pp. 51 sq.

<sup>34)</sup> Mausbach, *ibid.* p. 16; Hettinger-Weber, *ibid.* pp. 128 sq.



glorying in its self-illuminating power, no longer needs any other light.<sup>35)</sup>

4. The shallowness and inadequacy of rationalism, the attitude of the romantic period, the awakening of the historical sense, the appreciation of the element of the "popular" in religion, promoted, on the one hand, a re-invigoration of the Catholic faith, on the other hand, a *religion of the will and the feeling*.<sup>36)</sup> The advocates of the voluntaristic and sentimental concept of religion continued to employ the term "revelation", but perverted its meaning. For them revelation signifies all religious knowledge, which is not scientific, philosophical or metaphysical, which is not acquired by scientific argumentation, but whose origin or source is to be sought for in the will, or the religious sense, or the moral consciousness, or in a certain vital experience. Voluntarism  
and Mysticism.

Up to the last decade of the nineteenth century the Protestant orthodox type of theology, namely the appeal to the Bible as the sole authority to discover the content of Christian belief, was almost universally prevalent. Its sudden disappearance from the foremost American Protestant divinity schools is a striking fact. The method of authority insisted that the validity of a doctrine was to be found "in its biblical character rather than in its human appeal". "Today the younger theologians nearly everywhere are adopting a new conception of theology". This so-called "liberal" orthodoxy recognizes that "experience has a normative place in theologizing"; it attempts "to preserve both authoritative sanction and experimental testing", although the advocates of this method freely admit that "this involves many difficulties and compromises" and "the result is more or less vagueness and uncertainty in exposition. But such vagueness is inevitable in the stage of transition from one method to the other".<sup>37)</sup> Representatives of this appeal to Christian experience point out that "over a century ago Schleiermacher introduced a new epoch in the history of religious thinking by defining theology as the interpretation of the experience of Christian men. Since his day this conception of the task has become increasingly dominant". They insist that in this connection "it is impossible to read modern theological discussions intelligently without a knowledge of Ritschlianism", with its appeal *through* experience

<sup>35)</sup> Pohle, *ibid.* I, p. 425.

<sup>36)</sup> Mausbach, *ibid.* p. 16.

<sup>37)</sup> Gerald Birney Smith, *IX. Systematic Theology and Christian Ethics*, in *A Guide to the Study of the Christian Religion*, edited by IDEM. Chicago, Ill. (Second Impression). 1917, pp. 496—499 with literature.



to the spiritual authority of that which produces Christian experience. The particular theological solution furnished by Ritschlianism is today being generally abandoned by the younger generation of theologians; "but the method of a radically critical examination of the sources and the genesis of religious experience has gained widespread approval".<sup>38)</sup>

Examples of the voluntaristic concept of religion are furnished by Kant, who characterizes revelation as "the voice of conscience" (that is, religion based on the postulates of the moral consciousness or practical reason);<sup>39)</sup> by Schleiermacher who describes revelation as "the consciousness of our relations with the Infinite";<sup>40)</sup> by Sabatier for whom revelation is "the progressive knowledge of God manifesting Himself within our consciousness".<sup>41)</sup> Others regard revelation as consisting in certain *facts* of salvation (especially the person of Christ), which a person makes his own by trust or confidence in God and salvation according to the Lutheran concept of faith (Ritschl).<sup>42)</sup> The older concept of revelation, which characterized the scholastic period of Protestantism, connected the ideas of revelation and record so closely together that the Bible was not only the record of revelation, but the revelation itself. This viewpoint which makes revelation consist in the communication of *doctrines* and of the *Bible* as the repository of such teachings is being abandoned more and more in Protestant circles. The factor of *knowledge*, while admittedly important, is held to be neither the chief purpose nor the only means in the process of reve-

<sup>38)</sup> Ibid. pp. 499, 500—502.

<sup>39)</sup> cf. Aemil. Dorsch, S.J.; *Institutiones theologiae fundamentalis*. Oniponte, 1916, I, pp. 158 sq; 297.

<sup>40)</sup> In "*Über die Religion*" (Works, I, 248; English trans. *Discourses on Religion*. London. 1893) Schleiermacher evidences the pantheistic trend of his theology by designating revelation as "every original and new communication of the World-All and of its inmost life to man"; later on he insists on the great facts of history, which lay at the basis of the great religious communities.

<sup>41)</sup> *Esquisse d'une Philosophie de la Religion*. Paris. 1897; English transl. *Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion*. N. Y. 1901; *Les Religions d'autorité et la Religion de l'Esprit*. Paris. 1903.

<sup>42)</sup> According to Ritschl "the revelation of God is given only to the believer who religiously lays hold of it by experience, and recognizes it as such" (Jos. Pohle, art. "*Ritschlianism*", in CE. XIII, p. 87).

lation.<sup>43)</sup> Thus the Christian revelation "is not a religious or ethical doctrine or an ecclesiastical institution, but a religious intensification and exaltation of the personal life"; all doctrine and idea are simply the attempt to interpret this religious personal life (of Jesus) in its Divine activity and thereby to render it communicable; hence the doctrine is neither an end unto itself nor is it unchangeable.<sup>44)</sup> In other words, "the function of revelation is not, as has been supposed, to reveal truths which the human mind is unable to conceive. It is rather to convert conceivable possibilities into indubitable realities, to turn *e. g.*, the fancy or dream of God as a Father into a sober fact. Christ did that by Himself believing with all His heart in the Fatherhood of God, and by being Himself a heroically loyal Son. The revelation lay not in what He said so much as in His own personal religion and conduct".<sup>45)</sup> Hence Harnack proceeds logically to delete all doctrinal content from the Gospel and leaves nothing except the natural religious sense, as understood by the followers of the Ritschlian school of theology.<sup>46)</sup> It is indeed true, that the more conservative among Protestants protest energetically against this so-called "liberal" theology and seek to retain, in some way, the historical content of Christian doctrine.<sup>47)</sup> Most

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<sup>43)</sup> Nitzsch-Stephan, *ibid.* pp. 177 sq. W. T. Connor (*A System of Christian Doctrine*. Nashville, Tenn. 1924, p. 68) teaches that theology often "proceeded on the assumption that revelation was for the purpose of giving man a perfect intellectual understanding of the truth about God and his relation to the universe. This is a fundamental mistake. Revelation is redemptive in its end".

<sup>44)</sup> E. Troeltsch, *Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*, Monatsblatt, 1907. Nr. 1; IDEM, *Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*. Handwörterbuch, ed. Fr. M. Schiele & L. Zcharnack, 2. p. 1439.

<sup>45)</sup> A. B. Bruce, *ibid.* p. 501; cf. IDEM, *The Chief End of Revelation*, pp. 27—31.

<sup>46)</sup> *Das Wesen des Christentums*. Leipzig. 1902. Akademische Ausgabe. p. 92. English Transl. by Thos. Bailey Saunders. *What is Christianity?* London & N. Y. 1901, p. 146: "The Gospel is no theoretical system of doctrine or philosophy of the universe; it is doctrine only in so far as it proclaims the reality of God the Father. It is a glad message assuring us of life eternal, and telling us what the things and forces with which we have to do are worth"; cf. also pp. 119, 41 of the original German edition.

<sup>47)</sup> Thus L. S. Keyser, *A System of Christian Evidence*. Burlington. Iowa. 1924 (3. ed.), maintains that the principal proposition in Christian

of the modern philosophers of religion, however, as well as many Protestant theologians, favor the voluntaristic and mystic concept of revelation as described above. While some emphasize the experience of the individual, others stress rather the power of the religious faith of the masses.<sup>48)</sup>

Protestant  
concept of  
external and  
internal reve-  
lation.

5. A more complete illustration of the voluntaristic concept of revelation may be presented by studying the *relation of external to internal revelation* as conceived by Protestant theology. For the solution of the problem as to whether revelation is essentially external or internal, *objective* or *subjective*, or both in the same measure, the explanation elaborated by the Protestant theologian Rothe is generally held to be fundamental.<sup>49)</sup> According to Rothe revelation is "an entrance of God into natural human history" by means of historical events, which He effects in history, but without historical mediation, and in which He bears unmistakable witness to Himself even for the natural, sinful man. Revelation, viewed from this external, historical, and objective side, is the "*manifestation*" of God to man. But since man of himself alone is unable to correctly understand this Divine manifestation, it is necessary that an interior, immediate, *i. e.*, supernatural operation of God upon man's selfconsciousness be joined with this objective manifestation of God. The connecting link and means are said to be the religious stimulation and receptivity of man's spirit, due to this external Divine manifestation, under the guidance of the psychological principle of causality. Thereby all so-called "magical" mediation is held to be excluded. Revelation, viewed from this, its interior, subjective side, is divine "*inspiration*". Just as manifestation and inspiration postulate each other, so also both together are divine inspiration.<sup>50)</sup>

This concept of Rothe has found universal acceptance, at least in so far as all admit, that the concepts, "revelation" and "inspiration", do not coincide, but the former is the more comprehensive of the two. In the critical elaboration and development of Rothe's theory we note the intermingling of two contrasts: on the one hand, there is the contrast of the objective (in history) and of the subjective (in the human spirit); on the other hand, there is the contrast of the past (the Bible) and the present (experience).

a) *Conservative* theology attempts to place the objective historical side of revelation (manifestation) in the foreground,

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apologetics is: "The Bible is a Special Divine Revelation" (p. 65); cf. Nitzsch-Stephan, *ibid.* pp. 177 sq; David S. Clark, *A Syllabus of Systematic Theology*. Philadelphia, Pa. 1921. (2. ed.), pp. 17 sq.

<sup>48)</sup> Mausbach, *ibid.* pp. 16, 17.

<sup>49)</sup> R. Rothe, *Zur Dogmatik*, pp. 166 sq; *Dogmatik*, II, p. 45; cf. Nitzsch-Stephan, *ibid.* pp. 184 sq.

<sup>50)</sup> Nitzsch-Stephan, *ibid.* p. 185.



while stressing, at the same time, the significance of the subjective element of religious experience or consciousness (inspiration). On the one hand, the chain of facts culminating in the person of Jesus Christ is held to be "the" revelation; on the other hand, the Bible also is said to possess revelatory value.<sup>51)</sup> Or as others put it: the objective revelation of God in Jesus Christ has the tendency to become a "personal revelation" in the form of a subjective experience of faith.<sup>52)</sup>

b) The so-called *liberal* theology (Biedermann, Lipsius, Pfleiderer), loyal to speculative rationalism, the heritage of Hegel, acknowledges indeed the central position and significance of Jesus in Christianity, but developed in a onesided fashion the subjective side of Rothe's thought. Divine revelation is said to take place in the "mystic depths of the soul". We shall not attempt to outline here the various modifications of this liberalistic concept of revelation.<sup>53)</sup>

c) *Ritschlian* theology developed first of all the objective, biblical side of revelation; but gradually the subjective element, experience, was insisted upon again, particularly from the viewpoint of personality and an attempt was made, especially by Wendt and Hermann, to establish the harmonious synthesis of both, the external and the internal, the objective and the subjective side of revelation. Thus revelation was said to be something that lifts man above himself in times of moral need, in temptation and abandonment; something that subjects man completely to God

<sup>51)</sup> Ibid. pp. 186 sq.

<sup>52)</sup> Schaefer, *Theozentrische Theologie*, I, p. 49; cf. Nitzsch-Stephan, *ibid.* pp. 186—188 for further examples. — For our own country we might cite the teaching of W. T. Connor, *A System of Christian Doctrine*. Nashville, Tenn. 1924. "There are two factors in all knowledge — the objective and the subjective. There must be the object known and the subject who knows." (p. 30) "God has revealed himself in Jesus Christ in that he has brought himself within the reach of man". (p. 33) "The method of the revelation was that he (the Word of God) came into this world, the world was made through his agency, and thus by living a human life on earth he brought a concrete, historical revelation of God within the reach of men". (p. 42) "But this historical and objective revelation of God in Jesus Christ must become the discovery of the individual man. Every man must know God for himself. To do this he must search for God. Each man must find God in an experience that carries with it its own assurance; that is, it is of such a nature, that the one having the experience knows God and knows that he knows God". (p. 33) This knowledge of God, this communion with God, is *through faith in Christ*. "Faith is not an activity of the intellect primarily, but an attitude of heart and will. It is not belief of a doctrine". It is fundamentally "the attitude of a person to a person". It is "receptivity towards Christ as Saviour and self-surrender to him as Lord". "It is a redemptive experience". (p. 46) "To experience salvation and to know God are one and the same". (p. 47).

<sup>53)</sup> cf. Nitzsch-Stephan, *ibid.* pp. 188—190; Pfleiderer, *Grundriß der christlichen Glaubens- und Sittenlehre*, pp. 18.



and compels him to surrender himself to God in perfect trust, or faith. It is, therefore, an event that takes place between God and the individual soul, a divine operation which is necessarily individual for each Christian. Jesus is indeed the mediator of this divine activity; but to say that He is on that account "the" revelation, is to make use of an abbreviated formula of speech. Revelation is not deposited and codified in the book called the Bible; it is rather something living and present. Its objective element is not the Bible or Jesus as factors of history, but rather the divine manifestation, which the pious Christian experiences, particularly in the personal contact with Jesus (Hermann).<sup>54)</sup>

d) *Troeltsch*, analyzing the double aspect of revelation and viewing it from the vantage point of the history of religions, admits that the personality of Jesus and the totality of its effects makes the Christian revelation ethically and religiously the most vital, the richest and deepest revelation; but he is unwilling to concede to the Christian the right of speaking of Christianity as the absolute religion.<sup>55)</sup>

Criticism.

From the exposition just given it is obvious that the voluntaristic and mystic concept of revelation stresses, in a one-sided manner, the subjective element of personal faith in Christ, which is said to be followed by the experience of the Spirit's presence and power in the soul. This religious subjectivism is not due solely to the fact that the Reformation identifies justifying faith with a conviction of personal salvation. For Catholicism requires besides faith, which believes in the truth of redemption, also the hope that grasps it with confidence. The chief reason of this religious phenomenon is that Protestantism denies the teaching office of the Church and establishes in its stead the principle of "independent investigation". Moreover, it casts aside as worthless all the historical arguments, upon which the Catholic Church relies, with right, in favor of the subjective grounds of faith.<sup>56)</sup> And yet, religion is above all else *truth*, not mere feeling or senti-

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<sup>54)</sup> Nitzsch-Stephan, *ibid.* p. 192; cf. A. E. Garvie, *A Handbook of Christian Apologetics*. N. Y. 1923, pp. 21—69; IDEM, art. "Revelation", in HDB., extra vol. pp. 321—336; W. Hermann, *The Communion of the Christian with God*, transl. from the New German ed. by Rev. J. S. Stanyon & Rev. R. W. Stewart, N. Y. & London. 1906; Pohle, art. "Ritchlianism", in CE. XIII, pp. 87 sq. with literature.

<sup>55)</sup> Art. "Absolutheit des Christentums", in *Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*, I, cols. 125 sq.

<sup>56)</sup> Jos. Mausbach, *Catholic Moral Teaching and Its Antagonists*. Transl. from the 6. German ed. by A. M. Buchanan. N. Y. 1914, p. 322.

ment or experience. As we have shown above,<sup>57)</sup> revealed religion is essentially a *doctrine* or *teaching* of God, a divine communication of truths and laws possessing objective validity. Therefore the voluntaristic and mystic theory of revelation, which denies to revelation the essential concept of doctrine and of positive communication of truth or, which makes revelation consist rather in certain *facts*, which a person makes his own gradually and subjectively through the religious sense or experience, really introduces into the concept of revelation the factor of a false development.<sup>58)</sup> On this basis "every vagary of visionary mysticism would be justified, and religious truth, stripped of its objective dignity, would be at the mercy of every fantastic opinion".<sup>59)</sup> The history of Protestant theology shows plainly to what extremes voluntarism and mysticism leads. Supernatural revelation gradually resolves itself into natural religion; Christianity simply shares in the course of the natural evolution of mankind; the prophets and even Jesus Himself take their places beside the geniuses of history,<sup>60)</sup> despite the loud protestations of conservative Protestantism.

Voluntarists and mysticists fondly imagine that their concept of revelation makes religion more vital and that "whenever in the course of its history Christianity has become traditional, conventional, formal, the acceptance of a creed, observance of a ritual, submission to a code . . . dependence on priest and sacrament has taken the place of a communion with God in Christ, and so communication of His Spirit to man".<sup>61)</sup> But this opinion rests upon a total misunderstanding of the traditional concept of revelation. For the immediate purpose of a supernatural revelation is not a dead and barren instruction in matters of faith and practise, but rather an enlightenment of the rational creature, that incites and stimulates and exhorts him to perfect self-activity. The superhuman heroism of the Saints and Martyrs of the Catholic Church, as well as of the Prophets and the Saints of the Old

<sup>57)</sup> cf. above chap. 2: *A. The Act of Revealing*.

<sup>58)</sup> Schill-Straubinger, *ibid.* p. 183.

<sup>59)</sup> Mausbach, *ibid.* p. 317.

<sup>60)</sup> Mausbach, *Grundzüge etc.* p. 17.

<sup>61)</sup> Garvie, *ibid.* p. 65.

Testament, is the best witness of the vivifying religious power of the traditional concept of supernatural revelation.<sup>62)</sup> "Revealed truth is dynamic and functional in its nature. Spiritual truth has for its purpose the bringing of man into such fellowship with God as will make man like God in character, not the satisfaction of man's speculative instinct".<sup>63)</sup> The pious Catholic realizes the dynamic truth of God's revelation in his own religious and moral life every whit as much as the voluntarist, only he is unwilling to surrender the objective truth of Divine revelation for the vagaries of a subjectivism, whose only criterium of truth is the assurance of the religious sense itself or of the mystic experience of faith.

Theory of the  
subconscious.

6. The "modern mind", intolerant of all "intervention from without" in the history of mankind, invokes a new theory to explain in a scientific and purely natural manner the origin and the essence of religion and revelation. Because of its analogy with the voluntaristic and mystic theory just expounded we shall deal with it briefly now. This modern concept rests upon the *hypothesis of the subconscious*, which is the fruit of the latest psychology and is employed by the most recent branch of the science of religion, namely the psychology of religion.<sup>64)</sup>

The psychological theory of the subconscious takes for its starting-point various "planes of consciousness" and from the kaleidoscopic mutability of these planes of consciousness it concludes to the existence of a "subconscious Ego". All those remarkable phenomena, which are associated with the terms of hypnotism, somnambulism, spiritism and occultism, this theory seeks to explain by the sudden or gradual merging of the subconscious imaginations and feelings into the sphere of the consciousness. Firmly maintaining the continuity of the inner life of the soul, which persists uninterruptedly in strict causal sequence, this theory postulates that the disappearance of unconscious imaginations, feelings, impulses etc. beneath the threshold of the consciousness, by no means implies their destruction or

<sup>62)</sup> cf. J. P. Kirsch, *Die Geschichte der Kirche, ein Zeugnis ihrer höheren Sendung*, in RCK. III, pp. 212—278. <sup>63)</sup> Connor, *ibid.* p. 68

<sup>64)</sup> Among the advocates of the psychology of religion, as understood here, might be mentioned W. James, G. Stanley Hall, J. H. Leuba, E. D. Starbuck, G. A. Coe, Irving King, P. Janet, M. Dessoir, Th. Flournoy etc.; cf. G. Weingärtner, *Das Unterbewußtsein*. Mainz. 1911, pp. 6 sq.



annihilation. For beneath the surface of the consciousness, which, moreover, has no strictly definable limits, these psychic realities continue to exist as the subconscious and are ever ready to emerge above the threshold of the consciousness. Even in the subconsciousness these psychic elements are not separated from one another, but, by reason of their innate tendency to union, they intermingle with one another and form a unified complex. This is held to be evident from the phenomena of dreams that take place in fever and especially in artificially effected states namely in the "trance". Thus they become, as it were, a "second Ego". The so-called "medium" is held to be merely the subconscious personality of the hysterical person under the influence of the trance. Obsession, scrupulosity etc., are explained on this basis. These two categories of the conscious and of the unconscious are not separated by any definite and fixed boundaries, so that it is not possible for them to communicate with each other; on the contrary, there is a continual interchange between these two conditions of the soul through a "psychic diaphragm", as it were.<sup>65)</sup>

By applying this theory of the subconscious to religious experience the American professor, Wm. James, who is also the spokesman of pragmatism, believes that by the very law of continuity the distinction between the "two opposing worlds", that is, the natural and the supernatural, ought to be eliminated. The mechanism of the soul's life is immutably the same in all men and under all circumstances; hence the conversion of the sinner is said to be on the same plane as the cure of the drunkard and is effected by means of suggestion. Whether the so-called "conversion" took place gradually or suddenly, in either case it was due to the subconscious, which burst forth from the inexhaustible reservoir of the subliminal consciousness and brought about the spiritual "conversion". What the theologian terms "grace" is for the psychologist only the "invasion of the subconsciousness". It is assumed that even the "Supernatural" may now be drawn into the domain of empiric psychology by means of this same subliminal consciousness.<sup>66)</sup>

As regards supernatural *revelation* the advocates of the subconscious maintain that there can be no doubt whatsoever as to its origin and essence; revelation has its ultimate source

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<sup>65)</sup> Pohle, *Natur u. Übernatur*, in RCK. I, pp. 406, 407; cf. Weingärtner, *ibid.* pp. 7 sq.      <sup>66)</sup> Pohle, *ibid.* I, pp. 407, 408.

in the subconsciousness and is, therefore, *purely human and natural* just as the subconsciousness itself.<sup>67)</sup> Sir Oliver Lodge claims that all men are potential Christs inasmuch as they may, by their own powers, grow into Christhood.<sup>68)</sup> To escape the difficulties arising from a belief in the doctrine of the two natures in Christ, Prof. W. Sanday suggests the hypothesis of the super- and the subconscious in the God-Man.<sup>69)</sup> Thus this psychological theory of the subliminal consciousness does not halt even before the sacred Person of the Saviour.<sup>70)</sup>

Psychological  
criticism.

a) From the *psychological* viewpoint the subconscious, as described above, has at most the value of an *hypothesis*, and a very defective one at that. The facts of the abnormal life of the soul are really so obscure and unexplained in their physiological and psychic grounds, the accounts concerning telepathy, occultism and spiritism, are so little demonstrated and reliable, that an appeal to the subconsciousness, as the origin and source of all these phenomena, appears rather as a flight to an *asylum ignorantiae* than a genuine scientific analysis. Surely in this whole process it seems to be rather a question of a mysterious *name* rather than a clearly defined concept and a firmly established principle. Wm. James himself admits that "the psychologist knows just as little as the theologian what is taking place in the subconsciousness". Hence one might raise the question: To what extent can a mystery contribute towards the explanation and understanding of another mystery? Not only the representatives of the physiological school (Wundt, Ribot, Maudsley etc.), who join the facts of consciousness indissolubly with parallel nervous processes, but also distinguished Neo-Scholastics (Gutberlet, Cardinal Mercier etc.) believe that for the explanation of the alleged "subconscious" phenomena the simple term of the "unknown" suffices, although both tendencies agree with each

<sup>67)</sup> Pohle, *ibid.* I, p. 408.

<sup>68)</sup> *The Substance of Faith Allied with Science*. London. 1906 (3. ed.); cf. R. J. Campbell, *The New Theology*. London. 1907. In refutation cf. Chas. Gore, *The New Theology and the Old Religion*. London. 1910.

<sup>69)</sup> *Christologies Ancient and Modern*. London. 1910, pp. 165 sq.

<sup>70)</sup> Pohle, *ibid.* I, p. 413.

other neither as regards the essence nor the extent of the "unknown" facts of the soul's life.<sup>71)</sup>

b) While the majority of the European proponents of the theory of the subconscious conceive it as a psychological entity, Wm. James and the Englishman, F. W. Meyers, go a step farther and ascribe to it a *mystic* or metaphysical character. These two investigators extend human personality beyond the confines of the conscious Ego and make it embrace a deeper and more comprehensive unknown existence. They do not hesitate to merge this "invisible world" within us into the Absolute and to exalt the "subconscious Ego" until it becomes an integral part of the higher world. Thus the final crowning of this theory ends in the profession of pantheism.<sup>72)</sup>

Criticism of the mystical character of the theory.

Theological criticism.

c) From the *theological* viewpoint it must be noted that even though the subconscious were incontrovertibly demonstrated as a psychological fact, still it could not of itself alone, that is, without the aid of external factors, explain supernatural revelation. At most, one might concede that divine grace operates through the medium of the subconscious; but this is a very circuitous route as compared with the traditional Christian explanation. Surely it is an error of method to seek to explain the obscure phenomena of the soul's life by an unproved and unprovable hypothesis. Moreover, the theory of the subliminal consciousness contributes nothing whatsoever towards a more profound explanation of the Christian revelation. It is absolutely impossible to derive the sublime message of Jesus from the same source from which the morbid dreams of hysterical "mediums" proceed. Totally different effects postulate totally different causes.<sup>73)</sup>

Modernistic concept of revelation. Sources of modernism.

7. We now come to the immanentistic concept of revelation as proposed by *modernism*. This system borrows freely from the theory of the subconscious as well as from the false postulates of philosophy and theology current among liberal

<sup>71)</sup> Pohle, *ibid.* I, pp. 408, 409. For a philosophical appreciation of this theory cf. G. Weingärtner, *ibid.* cited above.

<sup>72)</sup> Pohle, *ibid.* I, pp. 410, 411; cf. F. W. Meyers, *Human Personality and its Survival of Bodily Death*. London. 1907 (Abridged edition).

<sup>73)</sup> Pohle, *ibid.* I, pp. 411—413.



Protestants. Briefly its main sources may be summarized under the following heads: a) Modernism derives its *agnostic* principles from Kant, A. Comte, and Herbert Spencer; b) its concept of truth from *pragmatism* (Wm. James, Schiller etc.); c) its doctrine of *immanentism* from the liberal Protestant theology of Schleiermacher, Ritschl, Réville etc.; d) modern *evolutionism* offers to modernism the principles for its doctrine of the gradual evolution of dogmas and ecclesiastical institutions from the religious sense (rooted in the subconsciousness) as well as the principles for its teaching in regard to the merely symbolic value of dogmas and their perpetually changing "truth". Thus agnosticism and immanentism linked with evolutionism form the frame-work of modernism.<sup>71)</sup>

Connection  
between agno-  
sticism and  
immanentism.

We are directly concerned here only with the doctrine of *immanentism*, since the modernistic concept of revelation depends upon it. The theory of immanentism is, of course, not absolutely independent of the first pillar of modernism, *i. e.* agnosticism; for immanentism is a psychological postulate as well as a logical result of agnosticism. Modernists are driven to the acceptance of "the immanence of God in the soul", because the transcendent God, Who cannot be discovered by rational demonstration, if He exists at all, must "reveal" Himself as an immanent God within the soul. Because of Kantian criticism all exterior bridges that lead to the knowledge of God have been destroyed; scientific proofs are in principle restricted to empiric reality, and even in this regard only the phenomena, not the essence of things, are accessible to rational knowledge. The essence of God, of the soul, of the world, is "unknowable". And since the science of history can trace only the "appearances", it too will never be able to advance to a knowledge of the Divine in Christ, of the divine origin of Christianity, of the causal efficacy of the Sacraments etc. Science and faith, metaphysics and religion, are not only totally *different*, but also totally *distinct*

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<sup>71)</sup> Pohle, *ibid.* I, p. 414; cf. A. Gislér, *Der Modernismus*. Einsiedeln. 1913 (4. ed.), pp. 301—611; A. Vermeersch, art. "Modernism", in *CE. X.* pp. 415 with appended literature.

and *separate* worlds.<sup>75</sup>) Since, however, religion and its correlative, the concept of God, are in the world as invincible realities, no amount of sophistry can reason them away. Therefore there is nothing left for the "modern man" except to assure himself of the presence of God within his own heart. Or as a modernistic Protestant expresses it: God is logically undemonstrable and whoever does not experience Him in his heart, can never find Him outside of his heart. Thus the final word of those who seek God after the modernistic fashion is always: I *feel* God, therefore He exists. But even this "conclusion" is without metaphysical value, for at bottom it is only the immediate "experience" of God. The consequences of this theory of immanence as regards the concept of revelation require no great elaboration; they are as clear as the daylight.<sup>76</sup>)

The elimination of every link between the "inner man" and the "immanent God" (God within man) of itself excludes every *external* revelation. Hence the revelation of God *to us* is nothing else except the revelation of God *within us*. Being in its origin and essence an interior communication, it rejects the external mediation of the prophets and of prophetic preaching as superfluous.<sup>77</sup>) Furthermore, just as God *re-*

Falsifications  
of the concepts  
of revelation  
and faith.

<sup>75</sup>) Pohle, *ibid.* I, pp. 414, 415; cf. *The Programme of Modernism. A Reply to the Encyclical of Pius X, Pascendi Dominici Gregis*. Transl. from the Italian by Rev. Geo. Tyrrell. London & N. Y. 1908. This programme indeed defends itself against the "reproach of agnostic principles" and proudly declares that "we are therefore perfectly logical in seeking to ground our affirmation of a transcendent divinity on the immanent needs of man's conscience" (pp. 101, 102); thus "our apologetics is precisely an attempt to escape from this agnostic knowledge" (p. 95). Still, even though modernism as a method wishes to free itself from agnosticism, the fact remains that it not only provisionally accepts agnosticism as a "methodical doubt", but also solemnly announces that "for us it matters little to attain to God through the demonstrations of mediaeval metaphysics or through arguments from miracles and prophecies, which offend rather than impress the modern mind, and evade the control of experience" (p. 98). Hence "we can no longer accept a demonstration of God supported by those 'idols of the tribe' — the Aristotelian conceptions of motion, of causality, of contingency, of finality" (p. 105).

<sup>76</sup>) Pohle, *ibid.* I, pp. 415, 416.

<sup>77</sup>) Geo. Tyrrell (*Through Scylla and Charybdis or the Old Theology and the New*. London & N. Y. 1907, p. 306) says: "Without personal revelation, then, there can be no faith, nothing more than theological or historical assent. Revelation cannot be put into us from outside; it can be occasioned, but it cannot be *caused*, by instruction". cf. *The Programme of Modernism* transl. by Tyrrell, pp. 40 sq.

veals Himself in the religious sense or experience, so too man believes by that same sense or experience. Hence revelation and faith are essentially the same thing, only different sides or aspects of the religious sense.<sup>78</sup>) If God is not only *in* us, but also operates in us, that operation manifests itself exclusively in the subjective sense or consciousness. And "this divine operation is light and grace, truth and power for good" (Loisy). Moreover, "to believe" in God's existence and revelation we do not need any supernatural grace; for the immediate apprehension of the Divine in the sense or consciousness is itself light and power, grace and truth. The *content* of the feeling or experience, *i. e.*, the Divine itself, is from the standpoint of truth just as subjective as the feeling itself; it is not truth outside myself, but only truth within myself. And because this immanent testimony of God is intimately entwined with the process of the whole life of the soul, it follows, that this sentimental "knowledge" is subject to the general laws of the evolution of mankind. But because of the mutability of these laws everything is only *relatively* true, that is, true for a definite epoch, but not true from eternity to eternity. In other words, "revelation could not be anything else but the consciousness acquired by man of his relation with God".<sup>79</sup>) Hence the mutability of the Christian

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<sup>78</sup>) The modernist argues in this way: "Man, he says, feels within himself instinctively the need of the Divine. That need of the Divine excites in him a corresponding sentiment, a sentiment described by one of the modernists as 'the ceaseless palpitation of the human soul panting for the Divine' (Buisson). That sentiment is the Religious Sentiment, and is God revealing himself to the soul of man. Thus considered, that Religious Sentiment is Revelation. Further, the Religious Sentiment unites the soul with God, it is an 'inward recognition of God, a response of spirit to spirit'. Thus considered, the Religious Sentiment is Faith". (J. M. Bampton, S. J., *Modernism and Modern Thought*. London & N. Y. 1913, pp. 36, 37); cf. Tyrrell, *Through Scylla and Charybdis*, pp. 285, 287, 305 sq.

<sup>79</sup>) cf. twentieth condemned proposition of the modernists, in DB. n. 2020; A. Loisy, *Autour d'un petit livre*, Paris. 1903, p. 195: "Ce qu'on appelle révélation n'a pu être que la conscience acquise par l'homme de son rapport avec Dieu"; IDEM, *Évangile et Église*, 3. ed. p. 202; *The Gospel and the Church*, transl. by Christopher Home, N. Y. 1904, pp. 210: "The conceptions that the Church presents as revealed dogmas are not truths fallen from heaven, and preserved by religious tradition in the precise form in which they first appeared"; A. Sabatier, *Esquisse d'une Philosophie de la Religion d'après la Psychologie et l'histoire*, pp. 43, 52.



dogmas, Sacraments etc., in the course of the centuries. Nothing is stable, everything is fluent. Authority and Church must give way. For if religion, revelation, and faith, are simply the product and expression of my own interior life, there can no longer be any external tribunal of last resort possessing power over me and exciting faith within me by its authoritative teaching. The doctrine of Christ and His Apostles, the reading of the Bible, the testimony of ecclesiastical tradition, may indeed, as *subsidiary* means, contribute much towards confirming and intensifying religious sentiment, or "faith", but they cannot be said to possess fundamental significance for the begetting of faith.<sup>80)</sup>

Pope Pius X was right when he branded modernism as the destroyer not only of Catholic faith, but likewise of all religion, as the "synthesis of all heresies".<sup>81)</sup> Orthodox Protestantism must oppose modernism just as strenuously as Catholicism, for it is a question of the very foundations of both natural and revealed religion.<sup>82)</sup> Only liberal Protestants, particularly Ritschlianism with its "undogmatic Christianity", can consort with modernism, for they are children of the same mother.<sup>83)</sup>

a) Modernism exaggerates the mystical, sentimental and practical in religion and overlooks almost entirely the mighty creative power of religion, which is latent in a belief in *authority*, as history amply testifies.<sup>84)</sup> To prove its claims as regards the self-manifestation of God in the soul modernism emphasizes the facts of genuine *mysticism*, by which God immediately demonstrates His presence in the soul

Criticism.

<sup>80)</sup> Pohle, *ibid.* I, pp. 416—418; cf. Cardinal Mercier, *Modernism*. Transl. from the French by Marian Lindsay. London. 1910, pp. 23—25.

<sup>81)</sup> cf. Encyclical of Pius X, "*Pascendi dominici gregis*", 8 Sept. 1907, in DB. n. 2071—2109; also the Decree "*Lamentabili sane*" of the Sacred Office, 3 July 1907, in DB. n. 2001—2065.

<sup>82)</sup> cf. L. S. Keyser, *A System of Christian Evidence*, Burlington, Iowa. 1924 (3. ed.), pp. 62 sq. with copious bibliography at the end of volume. — American representatives of modernism are Rall, Drake, Fosdick, Grant, Tyson, Matthews (Shailer), Case, McFadden etc. Among the more conservative Protestants who oppose modernism may be mentioned Faulkner, Wilson, Thomas (W. G. H.), Machen, Greene, Allis, Sloan, Macartney, Kennedy, Mullins, Robertson, Bloore, Ridout, Riley etc. The Fundamentalist-Modernist controversy continues to be a grave disturbing factor in the conventions of the Baptist, Presbyterian and other denominations in America at the present time.

<sup>83)</sup> Pohle, *ibid.* I, p. 418.

<sup>84)</sup> Mausbach, *Grundzüge etc.* p. 17.

without discursive reasoning and creatural mediation. But modernism loses sight of the patent fact, that this "mystic" vision of God has from the very beginning been granted to only a few chosen souls on earth, and that this vision has always been looked upon as a very extraordinary grace, much higher than the so-called "prayer of quiet".<sup>85</sup>) Surely, it is an illogical generalization to make these rare exceptions a universal law for mankind, nay more to ascribe to the impious, the lax, an immediate experience of God through the religious sense. Atheists deride this claim as an utopia. Even the preponderant majority of really pious souls, both in the world and in the seclusion of religious orders and congregations, whose lives guarantee their morality, do not experience any such immediate vision of God within their souls; they do not *feel* God. Christianity does indeed acknowledge an immanence of God in the world and in every creature; but this means that God is *objectively* present in all creatures by reason of His immeasurability and omnipresence; that as First Cause He cooperates in all the *activities* of His creatures. It is, however, a grave misunderstanding on the part of voluntarists, mysticists and modernists, to convert this objective fact into a *subjective experience* and to pretend that we have a psychological consciousness of this Divine presence and activity. This is a subjective hallucination.<sup>86</sup>) At any rate, what modernism calls "revelations" are essentially different from the facts which Christianity from the beginning has understood by the term "revelation".<sup>87</sup>)

b) In its ultimate *consequences* this mystic viewpoint leads to the destruction of theism, the foundation of true religion. For what is this "God within us"? Is this immanent God personal or impersonal? It is indeed highly suspicious, to say the least, that modernists prefer to speak of this God in the neuter gender as the "Divine" rather than of the personal "God". Protestant liberals openly and freely confess that this "Divine" is the *pantheistic* All-Spirit, the

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<sup>85</sup>) cf. Aug. Poulain, art. "Contemplation", in CE. IV, pp. 329 sq. with bibliography. <sup>86</sup>) Pohle, *ibid.* I, pp. 42 sq.

<sup>87</sup>) Mausbach, *ibid.* p. 17.

impersonal Consciousness, the monistic deity.<sup>88)</sup> This obscure, impersonal God of the voluntarists, mysticists and modernists is really *no God* at all. Thus modernism begins with agnosticism and ends with *atheism*. External revelation becomes an impossibility and internal revelation is an empty phrase devoid of truth. Theology has ceased and there is nothing left but religious philosophy.<sup>89)</sup>

8. A final heterodox notion of supernatural revelation Traditionalism. remains to be considered. This faulty concept materially exaggerates what is supernatural in revelation, but at the same time diminishes the powers of human reason. It may be termed *excessive Supernaturalism (ultra or pseudo-Supernaturalism)*. This viewpoint postulates the *absolute* necessity of the Supernatural in revelation by denying, wholly or in part, to man in his fallen nature the power of religious knowledge. This pseudo-Supernaturalism appeared in the nineteenth century in France and Belgium in the form of *Traditionalism*, which derives all religious knowledge from revelation that is preserved in tradition. Advocates of this exaggerated Supernaturalism are certain pseudo-Mystics, *e. g.*, the Quakers and the Anabaptists who, because of the weakness of fallen man, maintain that a revelation is necessary not merely in general, but even demand a continual inspiration of the individual by the Holy Spirit; likewise Luther, who because of his doctrine of man's original state and lapse into sin denied to man the use of reason in the realm of religion; in consequence he was obliged to derive all religious knowledge from a supernatural revelation.<sup>90)</sup>

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<sup>88)</sup> Pohle, *ibid.* I, pp. 419, 420; cf. A. Sabatier, *Esquisse d'une Philosophie de la Religion* etc. Paris. 1910 (9. ed.), p. 365; Réville, *Le Protestantisme libéral, sa nature, ses origines, sa mission*. Paris. 1903; Gertrud Prellwitz, *Der religiöse Mensch und die moderne Geistesentwicklung*. Jena. 1909, p. 93.

<sup>89)</sup> Pohle, *ibid.* I, pp. 420, 421; cf. J. Bessmer, S. J.; *Theologie und Philosophie des Modernismus*. Freiburg i. B. 1912, for a refutation of the modernistic system.

<sup>90)</sup> Specht-Bauer, *ibid.* p. 62. — Advocates of Traditionalism are Ventura (d. 1861) in Italy, Bonald (d. 1840) and Bonnetty (d. 1879), in France, Ubaghs (d. 1875) in Belgium. cf. Geo. Sauvage, art. "*Traditionalism*", in CE. XV, pp. 13 sq. with appended literature.



Criticism.

The exaggerations of traditionalism are really more harmful to supernatural revelation than helpful; for if we are no longer capable of demonstrating moral and religious truths, neither can we prove with certainty that it is God, Who speaks to us in revelation, and in general that we can and must believe.<sup>91)</sup>

After this general apology of the concept of supernatural revelation we shall proceed to defend the *possibility* of a divine supernatural revelation.

## Chapter IV.

### THE POSSIBILITY OF SUPERNATURAL REVELATION.

Theism and the possibility of revelation.

1. Whoever wishes to demonstrate the reality of a supernatural revelation, in the sense defined above, must, first of all, present the *conditions* for such a revelation. Only after these are known and established can any given historical religion be examined with a view to ascertaining whether it contains a supernatural revelation. Now since these conditions are, at the same time, the presuppositions of its possibility, the discussion of this question is commonly termed the theory of the *possibility* of revelation.<sup>1)</sup> The apologist begins by examining and analyzing the natural order of religion to determine whether it possesses the necessary foundation and starting-point for a higher religion.

Supernatural revelation has been defined as a *divine* communication of truth and grace to a created intelligence. Therefore the *standard* and *norm* for the possibility of revelation is not the world of experience according to the dictum of Protagoras: "*ἄνθρωπος μέτρον πάντων*", but rather God as the only adequate explanation of all reality: "*Θεὸς μέτρον πάντων*" (Plato). Indeed the postulate of a personal, supermundane God and of an immortal soul is the presupposition to the question as to whether a supernatural

<sup>91)</sup> C. Gutberlet, *Lehrbuch der Apologetik*. Münster i. W. 1904 (3. ed.), II, p. 35; cf. DB. n. 1649—1652.

<sup>1)</sup> S. Weber, *Christliche Apologetik*. Freiburg i. B. 1907, p. 137 sq.

revelation is possible. If this is not admitted, one must first come to an agreement as to the proofs for the existence of God and of the soul.<sup>2)</sup> "Receptivity on the part of man, and communicativeness on the part of God; the human heart needing and deserving help, and Almighty God's loving condescension; the soul going astray in the darkness and looking eagerly for the light to break from heaven, and the depths of the riches of the wisdom and the knowledge of God: such are some of the correlative conditions that render revelation possible".<sup>3)</sup>

2. Apart from *atheism* and *materialism* which deny not only revelation but all religion, the possibility of a supernatural revelation is impugned from a threefold viewpoint. It is held to be impossible either as regards *God*, or as regards *man*, or as regards the *relation* of man to God. Thus *Deism* claims that an intervention of God in the history of mankind is irreconcilable with the essence of God. *Rationalism* declares that the human reason is the only source of all truth. Hence a supernatural revelation is said to be incompatible with the essence of the human spirit. *Semi-rationalism* opposes particularly the possibility of the revelation of strict mysteries. Finally, *pantheism* makes God and man one; therefore nothing can act *upon* the world, but only *through* the world and the exercise of natural forces. The pantheistic Absolute does not intrinsically transcend the world nor is it more bountiful than the world; hence there can be nothing that is over or above the world. Thus a supernatural divine instruction of man is held to be a contradiction.<sup>4)</sup> The more specific objections will be considered in detail below.

Deism, rationalism, pantheism.

In the face of these denials it is incumbent upon the apologist to defend: I. the possibility of *immediate supernatural*

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<sup>2)</sup> H. Schell, *Apologie des Christentums*. Paderborn. 1907 (3. ed.) I: "Religion und Offenbarung", p. 219.

<sup>3)</sup> P. Schanz, *A Christian Apology*. Transl. by M. Glancey & V. Schobel. N. Y. (4. ed.), II: "God and Revelation", pp. 264, 265. We shall always quote from this edition, unless otherwise stated.

<sup>4)</sup> C. Gutberlet, *Lehrbuch der Apologetik*. Münster i. W. 1904 (3. ed.) II: "Von der geoffenbarten Religion", pp. 8 sq.; Franz Sawicki, *Die Wahrheit des Christentums*. Paderborn. 1920 (4. ed.), pp. 248 sq.

revelation in general; II. the possibility of *mediate supernatural* revelation; and III. the possibility of the supernatural revelation of *strict mysteries*. Thus the general outlines of this chapter are sufficiently indicated.

# I. THE POSSIBILITY OF IMMEDIATE SUPERNATURAL REVELATION IN GENERAL, AND OF THE NATURAL TRUTHS OF RELIGION IN PARTICULAR.

**THESIS: "Immediate supernatural revelation in general, and of the natural truths of religion in particular, involves no contradiction, i. e., is possible".<sup>5)</sup>**

State of the  
question.

This proposition has reference to *objective* revelation, i. e., to the supernatural communication by which God teaches man both theoretical and practical truths of religion as against the notion of immanentists (modernists), who conceive revelation as something purely subjective.<sup>6)</sup> These religious truths can, *per se*, be discovered by the powers of natural reason. However, when God manifests them to us by revelation, they become supernatural in respect to the *manner* in which they are made known to us (*supernaturalis quoad modum tantum*). We are restricting our inquiry here to *immediate* revelation, namely to the divine communication which is granted directly to the prophet.

We do not, of course, claim to know *a priori* whether God has any reasons for speaking directly to man; we merely maintain that no solid reasons can be alleged in favor of the impossibility of an immediate revelation. The proposition is, therefore, *negative* in form rather than positive; it aims at removing the aprioristic objections advanced by adversaries against the fact of a divine supernatural revelation. The positive proof for the non-repugnance of immediate supernatural revelation is furnished by the fact of revelation itself.<sup>7)</sup>

Finally, we assert that divine supernatural revelation is possible in a twofold sense: 1. *intrinsically*, that is, the elements constituting the essence of immediate supernatural revelation are

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<sup>5)</sup> This proposition is *philosophically certain* and *theologically de fide catholica definita*. cf. Vatican Council, "*Dogmatic Constitution on the Catholic Faith*", (III Sess.; 2 chap.; canon ii) in DB. n. 1807; cf. n. 1786; DCD. p. 234: "If any one shall say that it is *impossible* or inexpedient that man should be taught by divine revelation concerning God and the worship to be paid Him, let him be anathema". — We are using the authentic pronouncements of the Church here and elsewhere in this volume, not as arguments against adversaries, but rather as documents expressing the Catholic position.

<sup>6)</sup> C. Pesch, S. J., *Compendium theologiae dogmaticae*. Friburgi Brisgoviae. MCMXIII, I, n. 61.

<sup>7)</sup> Ibid. I, n. 61.



compatible with one another, *i. e.*, are not contradictory. Hence there is no repugnance either on the part of man to whom the truths are communicated, or on the part of the truths which are revealed. 2. Revelation is possible *extrinsically*, that is, there is no repugnance as regards the efficient cause of this revelation, namely God, either from the viewpoint of the divine omnipotence (*potentia absoluta*) or in the relation of God's omnipotence to the other divine attributes (*potentia ordinata*).<sup>8)</sup>

Historical  
argument.

1. The conviction as to the possibility of immediate divine supernatural revelation is a common heritage of the human race. Even uncivilized peoples derive their religious conceptions from a revelation of their gods and are firmly convinced, that their magicians and soothsayers have received communications from the gods and spirits. The great cultured peoples of antiquity look upon their sacred books as inspired and Max Müller even claims, that the Brahmins of India have developed the grounds for this inspiration not less efficiently than the early Fathers of the Church. In the face of this universal conviction of mankind, it is incumbent upon rationalists to demonstrate the impossibility of immediate supernatural revelation; for that impossibility is, at least, not immediately evident.<sup>9)</sup>

2. Since supernatural revelation is the communication of truths by means of a direct speech of God to man, its concept involves three factors: *God* from Whom the revelation proceeds, *man* to whom the revelation is communicated, and the *truths* which are revealed (or *religion* whose ends revelation subserves). Consequently, if there is no repugnance from any of these viewpoints, the possibility of an immediate supernatural revelation must be admitted. Now it is impossible to demonstrate conclusively that such a revelation implies a contradiction either as regards God or man or the

Philosophical  
argument.

<sup>8)</sup> J. Ottiger, S. J; *Theologia fundamentalis*, Friburgi Brisgoviae. MDCCCXCVII, I: *De revelatione supernaturali*, pp. 56, 58; cf. P. Fr. Reg. Garrigou-Lagrange, O. P; *Theologia fundamentalis secundum S. Thomae doctrinam*. Romae et Parisiis. 1918, I, pp. 322 sq. IDEM, (3. ed.), 1925, pp. 160 sq; St. Thomas, *ST.* I, q. 104, a. 3 et 4.

<sup>9)</sup> Gutberlet, *ibid.* II, p. 11; cf. Hettinger-Weber, *Lehrbuch der Fundamentaltheologie oder Apologetik*. Freiburg i. B. 1913 (3. ed.) p. 134 for special historical data and bibliography.

truths revealed. Therefore an immediate supernatural revelation is possible.<sup>10)</sup>

Revelation  
and God.

*I. There is no repugnance to an immediate supernatural revelation on the part of God revealing.*

1. a) This is evident from the omnipotence and perfection of God. For God is infinite truth itself and the primal font or source of all truth. Whatever truth there is in the world, ontological, logical, ethical, has God as its ultimate principle. He is likewise the fulness of power and life. Therefore He can communicate to man, out of the infinite richness of His knowledge and power, whatever can be communicated and is helpful to man's life.<sup>11)</sup> The personal God is independent of the world; consequently He can also act upon the world. He has created man according to His own free design and has determined the measure of man's perfection. Therefore He can, if He chooses, communicate new powers and new gifts to man. He has not exhausted the plenitude of His being by creation; hence He can bestow upon man new and greater gifts than those which He has conferred when He founded the world.<sup>12)</sup> Moreover, the power of communicating thought and of disclosing one's will belongs to the perfection of spiritual essence and life; therefore it cannot be wanting to the primal source of spiritual life, God.<sup>13)</sup>

It is indeed true, that we cannot represent to ourselves *how a pure spirit*, without sensible means and audible words, *can communicate his thoughts to others*. But we also lack the power of representing to ourselves how a word, that has been perceived by the senses, is capable of communicating thought; neither can we conceive how our soul is able to form words and to make them the messengers of thought. Habit merely makes it *seem* as though there were no mystery in this process.<sup>14)</sup> Still, in spite of our ignorance of the secret ways of God's activity, we can designate certain obvious ways, in which He can communicate His knowledge to creatures. For instance, God can instruct man either by interior enlightenment or by exterior signs, the understanding of which does not first have to be learned like the arbitrary sounds of language, or finally by the formation of sounds, the meaning of which the hearer either knew before or now learns by God's

<sup>10)</sup> H. Felder, O. M. Cap; *Apologetica*. Paderborn. 1920, I, pp. 33, 34.

<sup>11)</sup> Pesch, S. J; *ibid.* I, n. 62.

<sup>12)</sup> Sawicki, *ibid.* p. 249.

<sup>13)</sup> Schell, *ibid.* I, p. 221.

<sup>14)</sup> *Ibid.* I, p. 221.

speech in conjunction with the interior illumination granted to the intellect of the recipient by God.<sup>15)</sup>

Moreover, God is not only able to make Himself understood in various ways; He can also assure the rational creature with infallible certitude of the divine origin of the message. This can take place either by an internal or an external influence. God, the Creator, is present to the created spirit not merely outwardly, but He dwells within the creature substantially.<sup>16)</sup> Just as God alone, by reason of this intimate indwelling, can know what is going on in the depths of the soul (*καρδιογνωσία*) and can move the will immediately from within, not merely as object and end after the manner of a creature, so too He can immediately, that is, without the aid of sensible signs, infuse into the understanding of the prophet concepts and truths, concerning whose divine origin the prophet's intellect may obtain infallible assurance. Nay more, even though all intrinsic arguments were futile, God could make the prophet absolutely certain of the divine origin of the message through a miracle, precisely in the same way in which He can convince those who are merely the mediate recipients of supernatural revelation, namely by supernatural signs.<sup>17)</sup>

"Rationalists cannot form a correct estimate of the facts of religious history, or rightly diagnose the psychological conditions on which they are built, unless they rise to the complete concept of a living God. But a God Who can neither reveal nor communicate Himself, is not a God of religion, but a cold and lifeless abstraction. A man who cannot bring himself to believe in a God revealing Himself, has lost all true religious basis".<sup>18)</sup>

God can, therefore, reveal natural religious truths to man *potentia absoluta*; the physical possibility of immediate supernatural revelation, from the viewpoint of God, the efficient cause, is obvious. But is God also able to reveal truths to man *potentia ordinata*? In other words, is immediate supernatural revelation consistent with the other divine attributes, more particularly with God's wisdom? Is it morally possible?

b) The divine wisdom demands that every activity of God be directed towards a reasonable end or purpose. Now immediate supernatural revelation satisfies this postulate perfectly, since it communicates new knowledge to man by way of instruction. Deists object, indeed, that this divine instruction is incompatible with God's wisdom, since it involves a

<sup>15)</sup> Gutberlet, *ibid.* II, pp. 11 sq.

<sup>16)</sup> cf. St. Thomas, *ST.* I, q. 8, a. 2

<sup>17)</sup> Gutberlet, *ibid.* II, 12; cf. St. Thomas, *ST.* I, q. 105, a. 3 4; q. 111, a. 2.

<sup>18)</sup> Schanz, *ibid.* II, p. 270.



subsequent correction of human nature, which in the beginning must have been defectively or faultily constituted by the Creator.<sup>19)</sup> But this stricture is without foundation. For theism teaches that "God so created man as to bestow on him endowments amply sufficient for him to attain his last end. Had it been otherwise, the creation would have been imperfect. If over and above this He decreed to make the attainment of beatitude yet easier for man by placing within his reach a far simpler and far more certain way of knowing the law on the observance of which his fate depended, this is an argument for the Divine generosity; it does not disprove the Divine wisdom. To assume with certain Rationalists, that exceptional intervention can only be explained on the ground that God was unable to embrace His ultimate design in His original scheme is a mere *petitio principii*".<sup>20)</sup> Furthermore, revelation is an acknowledgment that in every spiritual creature there are imperfections and limitations joined with its exalted character. In man, a physical and spiritual being, the tension between the higher and the lower, the longing for and the striving after a vital nearness to God, are particularly easy to understand. Man's capacity for truth can and ought to be *intensified* and *exalted* in a supernatural manner, just as it is intensified and exalted naturally through education, instruction and art. But above all it must be remembered that revelation is not merely a higher evolution of Nature; it is rather an elevation and exaltation of Nature to *a perfectly new sphere of life*, the state of divine sonship. From this point of view revelation appears as the greatest act of divine love. It evidences the special wisdom of God both in the marvellous way in which it accomodates the Supernatural to Nature and in the systematic coherence and harmony of the supernatural manifestations themselves.<sup>21)</sup> Finally, religion is above all else a moral relationship. Now it is obvious, that

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<sup>19)</sup> J. Brunsmann, S. V. D; *Lehrbuch der Apologetik*. St. Gabriel bei Wien. 1924, I: "Religion und Offenbarung", p. 128.

<sup>20)</sup> G. H. Joyce, art. "Revelation", in CE. XIII, p. 2.

<sup>21)</sup> Jos. Mausbach, *Grundzüge der katholischen Apologetik*. Münster i. W. 1923 (3. ed.), p. 12.

the ethical activity of man is brought into play more by the subjection of his will to God through *Faith* than by merely rational knowledge.<sup>22)</sup>

Therefore immediate supernatural revelation appears in perfect harmony with the divine wisdom. We shall present more reasons in the chapter on the fitness of revelation.

2. a) Immediate supernatural revelation in general, and of the natural truths of religion in particular, is a *miracle* in the intellectual order. Naturalists object that a miraculous intervention is an impossibility. —

Negative  
argument. Re-  
futation of  
objections.

We reply, that this objection by no means argues a repugnance to an immediate supernatural revelation; for God's free will is not bound by physical and psychological laws, which are only *hypothetically necessary*, as will be shown more in detail in the chapter on the possibility of miracles. It is true, that God cannot act beyond the laws that are *absolutely necessary*, namely metaphysical and mathematical laws. For instance, He cannot act against the principles of contradiction, of causality, of finality; He cannot move the prophet's intellect to accept an absurd or impious thought. But supernatural revelation is not a miracle in this sense. It implies no violence, since it is in perfect accord with the inmost inclination and tendency of the creature, which it to obey its Creator, to Whom it is more naturally subject than the body is to the soul, or the arm of man to man's will.<sup>23)</sup>

b) Rationalists insist that immediate supernatural revelation objectively imposes upon human reason certain divine doctrines merely upon the authority of God revealing; but the adhesion of the intellect to truths merely upon God's authority is equivalent to the *abdication of reason*. —

We reply, that God cannot, indeed, demand the absolute abdication of reason, but He can unquestionably demand the *subordination of reason* to His infallible authority. The principle of the absolute autonomy of reason is false, as we have shown above.<sup>24)</sup> Moreover, reason assents to God's authority, not indeed blindly as rationalists pretend, but on the ground of the *motives of credibility*, which give clear evidence as to the fact of a supernatural revelation.<sup>25)</sup>

c) It is further objected, that God cannot subjectively move the intellect of the prophet to give infallible assent to the truths divinely revealed without doing violence to the *vitality of our knowledge*. For vital action is subjective and cannot proceed from without. Now understanding is essentially a vital action; there-

<sup>22)</sup> Gutberlet, *ibid.* II, p. 12.

<sup>23)</sup> Garrigou-Lagrangé, O. P.; *ibid.* I, pp. 325, 326; cf. St. Thomas, ST. I, q. 105, a. 6; SCG. III, c. 100. <sup>24)</sup> cf. above chap. 3. p. 42 sq.

<sup>25)</sup> Garrigou-Lagrangé, O. P.; *ibid.* I, p. 327 sq.

fore understanding cannot proceed from without, *i. e.*, from the extrinsic action of God revealing. —

We reply, that it is undoubtedly true that vital action is subjective and cannot proceed from without, as its *proximate cause*; but it can proceed from without, as from a *higher and principal cause*. For even in the natural order God moves all living beings as the first extrinsic cause. He exerts a determining influence upon the formation of ideas in man's mind; the first impulse comes from Him.<sup>26)</sup>

d) Deists object, that supernatural revelation contradicts the *eternity* and the *immutability of God*, since it takes place in time. —

We reply, that this exception arises from a false notion of God's eternity and immutability. For supernatural revelation, just like creation and all the other acts of God *ad extra*, are merely *temporal executions of an eternal and immutable act*, which is God Himself. Terminatively they are indeed temporal, but entatively they proceed from eternity. The eternal plan of God embraces the natural and the supernatural orders; hence supernatural revelation is not a change or an improvement, in the sense of a correction of the cosmic plan, but merely its realization.<sup>27)</sup>

Revelation  
and man.

## *II. There is no repugnance to immediate supernatural revelation on the part of man.*

1. a) This is evident from a consideration of the spiritual capacity of man for truth and goodness as such. In its ultimate analysis external revelation is a *spiritual* intercourse between God and man; hence a condition for its possibility as regards man is a certain receptivity for higher instruction. "As the bodily eye, to be acted upon by the sunlight, must be lightsome, so the eye of the soul must be able to perceive the rays of eternal truth".<sup>28)</sup> Now this condition is adequately fulfilled in man's spiritual capacity for truth. Man is "God's image and likeness", a reflex of the divine infinite Spirit itself; consequently by nature man is disposed to receive truth. He is not a dead block or a stone incapable of entering into spiritual communion with God; he is a rational creature.<sup>29)</sup> His soul knows being, truth, goodness in universal ideas and absolute principles. The human spirit never rests in its quest for truth, thereby attesting that it is capable, at least to some

<sup>26)</sup> Garrigou-Lagrange, O. P.; *ibid.* I, p. 330; cf. St. Thomas, *ST.* I, II, p. 109, a. 2 ad 1.

<sup>27)</sup> Schill-Straubinger, *Theologische Prinzipienlehre*, Paderborn. 1923 (5. ed.), p. 186; cf. *ST.* I, q. 19, 7. <sup>28)</sup> Schanz, *ibid.* II, p. 267.

<sup>29)</sup> Jos. Pohle, *Natur u. Übernatur*, in RCK. I, p. 51.



extent and imperfectly, of comprehending even the very highest, the Divine.<sup>30)</sup> The soul's capacity, receptivity and interest is as broad as truth and goodness itself. This formal perfection of man's spiritual capacity makes a supernatural revelation possible, because the greatest and most important sphere of truth is made accessible to man only through a supernatural revelation. In like manner the highest self-activity of the spirit is realized only by the personal vital communion of spirit with spirit, and that in the highest degree of the spirit with God.<sup>31)</sup>

b) Man's spirit is not absolute nor the measure of all things; man's reason must struggle laboriously upwards and, in all its investigations both individually and collectively, it attains only a little portion of the truth, which is based upon the meager materials of the sensible world. "In order to arrive at the use of reason and full-consciousness, it necessarily requires a stimulus and a help from without . . . Man is by nature amenable to external influences, and is dependent on them for the awakening of his self-consciousness . . . Even in natural knowledge, the human mind does not act or develop by its own unaided power. It is dependent on the impressions it receives from the outward world, on its perceptions, and on instruction. It is acted on by a thousand and one impressions, without the mental equilibrium being disturbed. It is swayed hither and thither by the association of the most paradoxical ideas, and yet its pulse beats normal and regular. Is, then, that divine influence, which we call revelation, alone to be scouted as impossible, and unworthy of man? All who confess a Creator, will answer: No. Those who affirm, have abandoned the theistic standpoint, and are, therefore, not entitled to be heard in the question of revelation".<sup>32)</sup>

2. a) Rationalists overlook this fundamental characteristic of man's spiritual nature, when they claim that a *supernatural revelation contradicts reason*. The human mind, so they object, cannot accept any knowledge from without, *i. e.*, knowledge based on authority, for *reason is the only source of knowledge*. Instead of accepting truth as something imposed objectively from without,

Negative  
argument.  
Authority  
and Faith.

<sup>30)</sup> Mausbach, *Grundzüge etc.* p. 12. <sup>31)</sup> Schell, *ibid.* I, pp. 266 sq.

<sup>32)</sup> Schanz, *ibid.* II, pp. 266. 267.

the Christian must beget truth "from within himself"; he must evolve all his thoughts from his own heart and he must base them upon his own experience.<sup>33)</sup>

We reply, that this viewpoint makes not only supernatural revelation, but all human pedagogy impossible. *Philosophy* teaches that reason is autonomous or independent only in the sense, that it admits nothing as true except what is proven to be true; but not in the sense, that it rejects everything save what is proven to be true on internal evidence. For *external authority*, both human and divine, is not less a source of knowledge than reason itself. Moreover, *practical life* bears witness to the same truth. Man is a child of instruction ("l'homme est un être instruit") says Lacordaire. The spiritual development of the child is not absolutely spontaneous; from the cradle to the evolution of self-consciousness the child is subject to a continual influx of external impulses. And after it has arrived at the use of reason the child does not spin its knowledge, as a spider its web, out of its own self-consciousness, but must imbibe its spiritual nourishment from without, as the bee gathers the material for its honey. The child's first step is not knowledge, but rather *faith* grounded on the authority of parents and teachers. And this deep need of faith in profane matters does not cease in adult life. Even the scholar has no other resource save to trust to the investigations of others in matters concerning which he himself has not made special studies. If he wishes to fill out the lacunae of his knowledge, he must hold fast to the authority of specialists, who hand over to him the results of their investigations. If he, in his pride of heart, insisted upon personal investigation in all matters, he would find that his finger nail would be amply sufficient to receive the record of all the knowledge he has acquired by his own personal investigation. How then, can it be said, that it is contrary to our nature to receive valuable information from the Divine Teacher in respect to the most important questions of religion and morality, which demand immediate consideration? Nothing is so natural to man as education, instruction and faith for the simple reason, that this triad is an indispensable necessity for man. Just as educational guidance is no coercion of human nature, but rather the natural development of its spiritual faculties, so too the supernatural instruction and guidance of man by God's revelation is not a suppression of man's nature, but rather the development, perfection and exaltation of his powers and dispositions.<sup>34)</sup>

The Vatican Council, therefore, teaches that "man being wholly dependent upon God, as upon his Creator and Lord, and

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<sup>33)</sup> cf. Herrmann, *Römische und evangelische Sittlichkeit*. Halle. 1903 (3. ed.), p. 59; cf. the excellent answer to this objection presented by Jos. Mausbach, *Catholic Moral Teaching and Its Antagonists*. Transl. from the 6. German ed. by A. M. Buchanan. N. Y. 1914, pp. 315 sq.

<sup>34)</sup> Pohle, *ibid.* I, p. 52; cf. Gutberlet, *ibid.* II, 13 sq.

created reason being absolutely subject to uncreated truth, we are bound to yield to God, by faith in His revelation, the full obedience of our intelligence and will".<sup>35)</sup>

b) Another objection frequently proposed by rationalists is taken from an antiquated concept of inspiration. The *infusion of ready made ideas from without*, so the stricture states, contradicts the nature of the human spirit.<sup>36)</sup> When the human intellect receives a supernatural revelation, it remains passive; it is like a lifeless receptacle into which ideas are infused from without, or like a dead mouth through which an external force speaks.<sup>37)</sup> Thus supernatural revelation is really the implacable foe to personal activity. —

We reply, that this objection is grounded upon a false conception of supernatural revelation. The recipient of God's supernatural message exercises a vital activity both *concomitantly* with and *subsequently* to the self-manifestation of God. For in the first place, at the very moment when the prophet accepts God's word he acts in the same vital manner as he does when he acquires other knowledge, even though he operates under the direct illumination of God, as we have stated in the chapter on the psychology of revelation. For God merely presents to the prophet's intellect the intellectual species, which in the case of natural knowledge are presented by the created objects themselves. Just as the impression of the intellectual species, which takes place by created objects, does not destroy the vital activity of our intellect, so neither does the impression of the species, which is produced directly by God in the act of revealing, interfere with the vitality of our knowledge. This spiritual activity of man is no more destroyed by supernatural revelation than by the natural concurrence of God in all other activities. Secondly, in like manner *after* God has spoken to us in supernatural revelation our intellect does not remain inert and passive.<sup>38)</sup> For according to the divine intention the message revealed is communicated to us, not indeed as something to be repeated in a merely mechanical manner, but rather as a truth to be apprehended by our intellect, as far as this is possible.<sup>39)</sup> Not a little labor is required on our part, if we are to comprehend the divine communication that has been granted to us. Moreover, while supernatural revelation offers the solution of this or that problem, it, at the same time, often opens up many other questions which stimulate our intellect to further study. One has but to consult the history of theology to realize how unjust is the objection of adversaries, that supernatural

<sup>35)</sup> "Dogmatic Constitution on the Catholic Faith", (III Sess. 3 chap.), in DB. n. 1789; cf. n. 1810; DCD. p. 223; cf. also p. 235.

<sup>36)</sup> Mausbach, *Grundzüge etc.* p. 13.

<sup>37)</sup> cf. O. Pfleiderer, *Religionsphilosophie* (3. ed.), II. pp. 419 sq; 425. English transl.: "The Philosophy of Religion, on the Basis of Its History", London (Williams & Norgate). 1886.

<sup>38)</sup> Felder, *ibid.* I, p. 38.

<sup>39)</sup> Sawicki, *ibid.* p. 251.



revelation does away with the progress of knowledge and with scientific inquiry.<sup>40)</sup>

c) A favorite exception proposed by rationalists states that *supernatural revelation contradicts the laws of the evolution of mankind*. For according to the modern principle of evolution the human race is a living unity, a social organism, which is subject to the biological laws of steady development and of internal growth and which, therefore, resents all foreign intervention as a violation of its inmost laws of life. How then, so rationalists inquire, is a worldhistory and the writing of profane history possible, if at every point in the direct course of events the pragmatic connection of cause and effect can be broken by a *deus ex machina*; if the natural stream of historical events can be directed at will, from time to time, into other channels? Just as a miracle breaks the connection of natural events, so too supernatural revelation interferes with the course of history (D. Fr. Strauss). Both contradict science — the one is at variance with natural science, the other with history.<sup>41)</sup> —

We reply, that it is not difficult to refute this objection on the basis of the actual course of the history of salvation and to show the *harmony between supernatural revelation and history*. For if we look, in the first place, to the action of God revealing, we perceive at the very outset a most far-reaching accomodation of God's operations to the faculties, weaknesses and prejudices of the recipients of revelation, a most delicate adjustment of the divine activity to the character, the civilization of the particular age in question, to the status of education and enlightenment of mankind, so that only an experienced eye is able to discern the hand of the Divine Architect throughout the entire process. Indeed, the history of salvation from Adam to Christ flows on in such a well-ordered and systematic tenor, that the modern science of religion pretends to be able to explain even the sublime phenomena of Christianity as spontaneous results of pre-Christian culture and civilization. Moreover, there have always been geniuses, not only a Moses and an Isaías, but also a Leibnitz and a Shakespeare. Now if God permits the history of the world to be made and fashioned by great men, without thereby destroying in the least the causal nexus of history, why should He not be able to weave the history of salvation (that is, revelation) into the fabric of history generally? The history of the world and the history of salvation are not two mutually exclusive oppositions;

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<sup>40)</sup> cf. M. Grabmann, *Die Geschichte der scholastischen Methode*. Freiburg i. B. 1909 f. 2 vols. Adolf Harnack, (*Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte*. Tübingen. 1910 (4. ed.), III, 356; *History of Dogma*. Transl. from the third German edition by Wm. M'Gilchrist. London (Williams & Norgate) & N. Y. 1899, VI, p. 25) admits: "The science of the Middle Ages gives practical proof of eagerness in thinking, and exhibits an energy in subjecting all that is real and valuable to thought, to which we can find, perhaps, no parallel in any other age". <sup>41)</sup> Pohle, *ibid.* I, pp. 436, 437.

on the contrary, they really constitute one harmonious unity, the kernel of which is supernatural, and the shell natural. The one cannot be separated from the other without destroying the whole. Revelation, like geology and paleontology, testifies to the gradual *evolution* from the lower to the higher, from the imperfect to the perfect, just as it witnesses to the gradual ascent from symbol to reality, from the sensible to the spiritual. For that very reason there is a *real history of revelation* just as there is a history of culture and civilization; only the idea of evolution appears more logically and persistently carried out in the case of the former than as regards the latter. For the history of revelation knows of no periodic leaps of cultural evolution, in which progress and retrogression, decay and upward tendency, alternate with each other in definite intervals. From the Proto-Evangelium in Paradise to the commission of Christ to baptize all the nations the supernatural revelation of God goes forward in methodic sequence and with a well-planned certainty to the end, which was conceived from the very beginning, — namely, to the establishment of the Kingdom of God on earth for the salvation of the human race through Christ Jesus.<sup>42)</sup>

Therefore the objection of modern evolutionism, that a supernatural revelation would destroy the continuity of the gradual evolution of the human race, is groundless. Let us now retaliate. We assert that *without the postulate of a supernatural revelation*, it is really impossible for the historian to arrive at a deeper conception of history (a philosophy of history). Every thinking man must ask himself the question: Does the history of the world represent a thoughtless chaos of facts, or does there shine forth from this motley confusion a dominant *idea*, a well-thoughtout content, a reasoned plan? The Christian conception of history, from the days of Augustine, sees in history the guiding hand of *Divine Providence*. Some indeed introduce the "transcendent World-Idea" into "mankind's evolution to freedom" (Rickert). But this very concept postulates a spiritual leader of infinite wisdom and might, for the idea of freedom in the world is neither self-evident nor can it be realized by itself. Others discern other ideas and ends in the process of history. None can avoid the infinite Spirit of God, Who has thought out these ideas from eternity and has prescribed the ends of the world's evolution. Least of all can any historian pass over the Christian revelation with closed eyes; for it is this revelation that sheds a fulness of light for the comprehension of the great turning-point of history. Without the historical documents of revelation it is impossible to write the history of the world. Without the conviction of the unity of the human race, which is guaranteed for us by the Bible and not by Darwinism, the historian cannot interpret the prehistoric conditions of primitive humanity as we explain psycho-

History  
without re-  
velation an  
enigma.

<sup>42)</sup> Pohle, *ibid.* I, pp. 437—440.

logically the facts of historic man; for in both cases the interpretation presupposes a univocal psychology. Without the "Superhuman" of the Old Testament prophets the continued preservation of monotheism among the people of Israel remains forever an enigma for the historian. But above all else, without Christ, that "turning-point of the world's history", there would be no proper division of time — no pre-and no post-Christian evolution. Remove Christ, in thought, from the center, and "immediately history collapses, it has lost its heart, its kernel, its division . . . a stream that flows down from the mountains" (Bavinck). Thus divine supernatural revelation is not only compatible with history, but history itself, without revelation, would be an incomprehensible riddle for human reason.<sup>43)</sup>

Revelation  
and religion.

*III. There is no repugnance to a supernatural revelation on the part of the truths revealed, or of religion whose ends it subserves.*

a) In the first place, it cannot be denied that there are many truths of the natural order of which we are ignorant. And even though, *per se*, all natural truths are indeed accessible to human reason, still, in point of fact, some of these truths are not known at all, while others are not known by all men, or are known only imperfectly and not with absolute certainty. Moreover, there are doubtless many truths, religious and moral, of which we are altogether ignorant, *e. g.*, strictly future truths, the free decrees of God, or mysteries in the broad sense of the term.<sup>44)</sup> Now the supernatural communication of these truths to man by means of God's supernatural revelation involves no contradiction. For the question as to whether they may be made manifest to us either by demonstration, or by authority, or by testimony, is irrelevant. These truths, considered in themselves, are indifferent as to all these methods of knowledge.<sup>45)</sup> It does not matter whether they be presented to man in a purely natural manner by demonstration, or in a supernatural manner on the authority or testimony of God revealing. In either case they are and remain good for man, and that is the chief point of importance in this connection.<sup>46)</sup>

<sup>43)</sup> Pohle, *ibid.* I, pp. 440—442; cf. Bavinck, *Philosophie der Offenbarung*. Heidelberg. 1909, p. 111.

<sup>44)</sup> Felder, *ibid.* I, p. 34.

<sup>45)</sup> Garrigou-Lagrange, O. P; *ibid.* I, p. 323.

<sup>46)</sup> A. Stöckl, *Lehrbuch der Apologetik*. Mainz. 1895, II, p. 6.



*Per se*, every augmentation and enriching of human knowledge is good for man. And a truth becomes all the more desirable, the greater its influence upon man's practical life. Truths upon which the welfare and perfection of human nature depend, are, therefore, more valuable than those which offer only a theoretically indifferent content. Now the natural truths of religion, which are made known to us by supernatural revelation, have reference precisely to the momentous question, the correct solution of which is of decisive significance for man's earthly life. They make us acquainted with the highest destiny of life and show us the way that leads thereto. At the same time, by reason of their divine origin, that is, the personal communication of God revealing, they give us the best guarantee of absolute certainty. Therefore the divine supernatural communication of these truths cannot but be of the greatest advantage for mankind.<sup>47)</sup>

b) Revelation is also in perfect harmony with the *ends or purposes of natural religion*. For by divine supernatural revelation the existence of God becomes a fact, which evidences itself also in history. Thereby the speculative proofs for God's existence acquire an empirical confirmation and an increased proving force. Through supernatural revelation God appears personally before mankind; thus the end of religion, union with God, is brought more closely to mankind; whereas in natural religion the end of religion retains its abstract form as long as we sojourn on the earth. Finally, through divine supernatural revelation man can gain a deeper insight into the natural order of life and, in consequence, a better understanding of much that is obscure and enigmatical, as for instance, the problem of suffering.<sup>48)</sup>

Rationalists object that supernatural revelation does away with the *internal character of religion*, namely with the soul of true religion. But this stricture is groundless; for if religious truths and values are communicated to man from without by divine revelation, man is not on that account prevented from making these truths and values his own by vital religious acts, as the history of revealed religions testifies. Moreover, the essence of

Objection.

<sup>47)</sup> Brunsmann, S. V. D; *ibid.* I, p. 131.

<sup>48)</sup> Schill-Straubinger, *ibid.* p. 187; cf. S. Weber, *ibid.* pp. 136 sq.

religion does not demand that religion, in all its content, should proceed solely from within the soul.<sup>49)</sup> This is an unproved and unprovable assumption of modern immanentists.

Therefore, since there is no repugnance to an immediate supernatural revelation as regards the three essential factors of its concept the internal and external possibility of such a revelation must be admitted.

## II. THE POSSIBILITY OF MEDIATE REVELATION.

**THESIS: "Mediate supernatural revelation involves no contradiction, i. e., is possible".<sup>50)</sup>**

State of the  
question.

a) The term "*mediate*" as applied to revelation has been used by non-Catholics in a great variety of senses. The majority of the *older orthodox Protestants* understood by mediate revelation the divine self-manifestation made to man through the medium of the Bible, in contradistinction to immediate revelation or the inspiration granted to the Apostles and the Prophets. On the other hand, most *rationalists* taught that God operates always only mediately, that is, through Nature's laws. However, here too a great diversity of terminology obtains. Thus Wegscheider, despite this rationalistic principle, asserts that "*dei operationes non nisi immediatae sunt*"; only human reason, bound as it is to the limitations of time and space and of successive knowledge, judges that God acts mediately. Pfleiderer, on the other hand, reduces the distinction between immediate and mediate revelation to a distinction of degree only, such as obtains between predominately original production and predominately imitative (receptive) reproduction. Broadly speaking, however, by mediate revelation might be understood all the phenomena of the life of Nature and of history, which serve as the means of eliciting the immediate revelation within the soul. *Modern Protestant theologians* generally no longer emphasize the twofold distinction between immediate and mediate revelation, or interpret it in different ways. In view of this discordant conception this distinction is now held to be an artificial fabrication, which can really be reduced to the distinction between internal and external revelation, as explained above.<sup>51)</sup>

<sup>49)</sup> Ibid. p. 188.

<sup>50)</sup> This proposition may be qualified as *metaphysically certain*. The Catholic teaching is stated by the Vatican Council, (III Sess. 2 chap.), in DB. n. 1787; DCD. p. 221: "Further, this supernatural revelation, according to the universal belief of the Church, declared by the sacred synod of Trent, is contained in the written books and unwritten traditions which received by the Apostles from the mouth of Christ Himself, or from the Apostles themselves, by the dictation of the Holy Spirit, transmitted, as it were, from hand to hand, came down even to us".

<sup>51)</sup> Nitzsch-Stephan, *Lehrbuch der evangelischen Dogmatik*. Tübingen. 1912 (3. ed.), pp. 196, 197; cf. above 3 chap. pp. 48 sq.

The *traditional Christian conception* of revelation refers the term "immediate" to the divine self-manifestation, which has been granted immediately to the prophet, as we have shown in the preceding thesis; "mediate" revelation, on the other hand, signifies the divine communication, which has been made to all the faithful through the mediation of the prophets or the Church.<sup>52)</sup>

b) We are concerned here, not so much with the knowability, as rather with the *possibility* of mediate supernatural revelation. According to God's will the divine message, which has been received directly by the prophet, can also be communicated by the prophet or the Church to others, who are able to receive it and believe it, since it is and remains substantially the same divine self-manifestation.<sup>53)</sup> In other words, mediate supernatural revelation implies no repugnance either on the part of God revealing (*extrinsic possibility*) or as regards man, to whom it is communicated (*intrinsic possibility*).

c) Apart from deists the chief *opponents* of the possibility of mediate supernatural revelation are certain pseudomystics (*e. g.*, the Anabaptists, who follow private inspiration as their rule of faith), liberal Protestants, modern evolutionists and immanentists (modernists), who maintain that all revelation is essentially immediate, since it occurs through the religious sense or experience of each individual, although it is admitted that this experience was more vivid in the prophets. Moreover, if faith is necessary for salvation, the truths and practises of faith, so it is contended, can be more easily proposed to all men by means of an immediate divine revelation, particularly since there are so many who are unable to hear the prophet's message.<sup>54)</sup> We shall consider these contentions of our opponents more in detail below.

1. "All religions have felt the need of slaking man's thirst with the waters of revelation. A divine revelation, given either in the dim past, or to the founders and reformers of religion known to history, is the well whence eastern religions have drawn their doctrines". Indeed nearly all peoples have shown themselves prone to listen to men who have, truly or falsely, claimed to be legates divinely sent to instruct men in the duties of religion and morality. Surely this universal belief cannot be the shot of accident, or the dart of chance.<sup>55)</sup>

Historical.  
argument.

<sup>52)</sup> Garrigou-Lagrange, O. P; *ibid.* I, p. 168.

<sup>53)</sup> Ottiger, S. J; *ibid.* I, p. 80.

<sup>54)</sup> cf. J. J. Rousseau, *L'Emile, Profession de foi du vicaire savoyard*.

<sup>55)</sup> Schanz, *ibid.* II, pp. 260 sq; cf. Fr. J. Mach, *Die Notwendigkeit der Offenbarungen Gottes, nachgewiesen aus Geschichte und Vernunft*. Mainz. 1883, for specific historical data.



Philosophical  
argument.  
(to  
revelation.

2. a) It must be admitted that *God* has the same right and power, at least, that human superiors possess. Now human superiors can rightly command their subjects through their ministers, whose word must be accepted in the same manner as the word of the superiors themselves. Therefore God has also the right and the power of manifesting religious truths and duties through the ministry of His prophets or legates and their word must be accepted as the very word of God Himself.<sup>56)</sup> Or to state the case in a positive manner: Divine Providence generally governs inferiors through the mediation of superiors, who are the ministers of God.<sup>57)</sup> Consequently it is most fitting and possible that divine supernatural revelation should take place according to the general dispositions of Divine Providence, that is, through the mediation of God's ministers.<sup>58)</sup>

The prophet  
and reve-  
lation.

b) Mediate supernatural revelation presupposes that the prophet is *authorized* by God to speak in His name and the *credentials* of his authorization are of such a nature as to make it evident to all, that the prophet is speaking in the name and by the commission of God and is proclaiming truths, which he has received immediately from God revealing. Otherwise men could not reasonably believe the prophet's message as the revelation of God Himself. Now these presuppositions cannot be reasonably denied without denying the divine omniscience and omnipotence. For God certainly has at His disposal *means* and *signs* by which He can authorize His messengers to speak in His name, so that all men can be reasonably assured of the prophet's divine mission.<sup>59)</sup> *What* these means and signs are, is irrelevant; for the point at issue here is whether, in point of fact, God has such signs at His disposal. And that cannot be questioned, as we have stated above. Therefore the possibility of a mediate supernatural revelation must be admitted.<sup>60)</sup>

<sup>56)</sup> Garrigou-Lagrange, O. P; *ibid.* I, p. 334.

<sup>57)</sup> cf. St. Thomas, *ST.* I, q. 22, a. 3.

<sup>58)</sup> *Ibid.* II, II, q. 172, a. 2; I, II, q. 111, a. 1 et 4.

<sup>59)</sup> We shall consider these signs later in the chapter on the *criteria* of revelation.

<sup>60)</sup> Stöckl, *ibid.* II, pp. 6, 7.

c) *Man* is a social being; hence it is perfectly reasonable to expect that, if God wishes to reveal truths which have reference to human society, He would not speak immediately to each individual, but rather to men specially chosen for the office of instructing others in God's name.<sup>61)</sup> For it is natural for man to learn from his fellowman in human society.<sup>62)</sup> Consequently if there is question of a revelation which is meant for all men, a mediate revelation accomplishes all that can be rightfully expected in this regard. Furthermore, mediate revelation is a far *simpler* method of revelation and allows greater play to the *free* acceptance of the content of the revealed message on the part of man. From this viewpoint an immediate supernatural revelation granted to *all* men appears to be not only without purpose, but whoever would demand such a revelation would really be claiming something from God to which he was in no way entitled in the light of the fact, that a mediate supernatural revelation is amply sufficient.<sup>63)</sup>

3. a) The objection is brought forward that God exercises His Providence over all men; that supernatural revelation depends upon God's providence and that, therefore, revelation ought to be given immediately to all men. —

Negative  
argument. Re-  
futation of  
objections.

We reply, that God does indeed provide for all men immediately as regards the *ordering* of all things, but not as regards the *execution* of this order.<sup>64)</sup>

b) Immanentists insist that God is intimately present in all souls and that He alone can act upon them. But the proper divine act for the illumination of the soul is divine revelation. Therefore revelation ought to take place immediately in all souls. —

We reply, that God alone can act *subjectively* upon man's soul, but others besides God can act *objectively* upon man's intellect and will. Divine revelation is granted objectively for the illumination of the mind of man; but it is given subjectively for the prophet, the recipient of the prophetic light; not, however, for others, who receive the light of faith.<sup>65)</sup>

c) A favorite exception of rationalists maintains that supernatural revelation, which is transmitted by the prophet to others, is no longer the word of God, but rather the word of a mere man. —

<sup>61)</sup> Pesch, S. J; *ibid.* I, n. 68.

<sup>62)</sup> Garrigou-Lagrange, O. P; *ibid.* I, p. 334.

<sup>63)</sup> Stöckl, *ibid.* II, p. 7.

<sup>64)</sup> Garrigou-Lagrange, O. P; *ibid.* I, p. 334.

<sup>65)</sup> *Ibid.* I, pp. 334, 335.

We reply, that the prophet is the *minister* or the *instrument* of God and the operation and the effect of the instrument are to be attributed to the principal cause in virtue of whose power the instrumental or ministerial cause operates.<sup>66)</sup>

d) But is it not possible that the prophet, consciously or unconsciously, may change God's message and thus mingle human elements with the word of God? —

We reply, that men who receive a supernatural revelation immediately or mediately know that God has spoken, but they conceive it after the manner of men, in a human fashion. This, however, does not affect the *objective* truth of what has been revealed. Man must believe the objective truth, not the *subjective* manner in which that truth is known. Then too, in as far as the objective truth may be endangered by reason of human imperfections and limitations, as for instance, the insufficiency of memory etc., it is only reasonable to suppose that God Himself will overcome these defects by special aids, both in individuals and in society generally, either in a natural or a miraculous manner. Therefore, if God wishes to send legates to announce His message to others, He surely will not only prevent the legates themselves from being deceived, but He will likewise strengthen them, so that they will not lead others into error. Faith must be given to the message of these legates only in so far as they are able to prove with sufficient arguments, that a given doctrine is divinely revealed. In all other respects these legates are subject to error just as other men.<sup>67)</sup>

e) Finally, mediate supernatural revelation is said to contradict the *divine wisdom* and *goodness*. For mediate revelation does not reach all men; there are many living in remote regions who cannot hear the prophet's message at all. And yet, faith is said to be necessary for salvation. Immediate revelation, on the contrary, which is granted to each individual enables the divine message to be promulgated everywhere at the same time and involves less danger that the recipients will reject God's immediate instruction. —

We reply, that this does not make a mediate supernatural revelation impossible. Every supernatural revelation, even when it takes place through the medium of human ministers and, in consequence, operates more slowly than a direct instruction by God Himself, must be welcomed by man as a valuable gift of God's wisdom and goodness and may not be said to be unworthy of God. If individuals reject the divinely accredited messenger, that is their own fault not God's. In regard to those who, through no fault of their own, do not hear the prophet's message, God's holiness and justice will not permit such persons to be lost on that account. If such a person acts in accordance with the dictates

<sup>66)</sup> Ibid. I, p. 335.

<sup>67)</sup> Pesch, S. J; ibid. I, n. 68.



of his conscience Divine Providence will make sufficient provision for his eternal salvation.<sup>68)</sup>

### III. THE POSSIBILITY OF THE REVELATION OF MYSTERIES.

Viewing divine revelation from the standpoint of its *material object* or *content* we distinguish between formal and material revelation. A revelation is said to be *formal*, if only its formal object or motive of assent is supernatural. *Material* revelation, on the other hand, connotes a revelation whose material object or content also is supernatural. Hence formal revelation contains truths, which are in themselves accessible to human reason, as for example, the existence of God and the soul's immortality. We have characterized such a revelation above as *modally* supernatural. Material revelation contains truths, which in themselves are not natural and which, therefore, are impervious to the human intellect. Their material object or content is of such a nature, that it can be known by human reason only through a special supernatural revelation. Above we have termed such a revelation *substantially* supernatural.<sup>69)</sup> These latter truths are technically qualified as "*mysteries*". The Christian religion claims to be, not merely a formal but also and, in the first place, a material revelation, in the sense just explained. Mysteries are the proper object of supernatural revelation. Therefore the Christian apologist must defend especially the possibility of a supernatural revelation of mysteries.

Formal and material revelation. Mysteries.

For the sake of clarity and precision we shall first establish the *genuine notion of a mystery and its kinds*; then we shall consider the *heterodox concepts* of the adversaries of mysteries. After these preliminaries we shall proceed to show that the supernatural revelation of strict mysteries is *possible*.

1. The word "*mystery*" in common parlance means something hidden or veiled. Moreover, "it implies the notion that some advantage attaches to the knowledge of it which gives the initiated a superior position to outsiders".<sup>70)</sup> Thus in *pagan antiquity* the Greeks used the term *μυστήρια* to designate esoteric doctrines and especially symbolic rites, which represented a rebirth in the life of Nature. These ceremonies were kept secret from the ordinary people and were performed

Generic concept of a mystery.

<sup>68)</sup> Brunsmann, S. V. D; *ibid.* I, p. 138; Garrigou-Lagrange, O. P; *ibid.* I, pp. 335, 336; cf. St. Thomas, *De Veritate*, q. 14, a. 11 ad 1; Pius IX, Allocution "*Singulari quadam*", 9 Dec. 1854, in DB. n. 1648; also n. 1677.

<sup>69)</sup> Felder, O. M. Cap; *ibid.* I, pp. 30 sq; cf. above 2 chap. p. 33 sq.

<sup>70)</sup> Wilhelm-Scannell, *A Manual of Catholic Theology*. London & N. Y. 1909 (4. ed.), I, p. 9.

only in private or before the initiated (*μύσται*) who were assembled for that purpose (e. g., the Eleusinian, Orphic and Dionysian Mysteries).<sup>71)</sup> Whoever was initiated into the knowledge of these mysteries was obliged to observe strict silence regarding all that he had learned. To impress this duty upon the candidate his mouth and eyes were covered with a bandage on that occasion. The word *μυστήριον* (from *μύειν* = "to close" [mouth and eyes]), owes its origin to this circumstance.

The concept was divested of its pagan meaning when taken over into the writings of the Old and New Testaments and was modified to accord with its new usage. In the *Old Testament* the term "mysterium" signifies both natural mysteries, for example, a secret confided to some one (Prov. xx, 19; Eccl. xxii, 27), as well as such hidden truths as are disclosed only by way of a divine revelation; for instance, the hidden meaning of a dream (Dan. ii, 18, 28 f. 47), or such as are grounded in the essence of God Himself (Wis. ii, 22; vi, 24). The *New Testament* draws the terms of the concept even more closely. Here only such truths are put down as mysteries as could not be known save by a divine revelation and which, even after they have been made manifest, also remain obscure for the most part. The *Gospels* use the word only three times (Matt. xiii, 11; Mark iv, 11; Luke viii, 10), where the disciples are told that to them it is given to know the mysteries of the kingdom of God. The incomprehensibility of revealed mysteries appears even more clearly in the *Pauline Epistles*. Thus in the Epistle to the Romans (xi, 25) St. Paul calls the divine guidance of Israel through blindness unto salvation a mystery and emphasizes (v. 33) the unsearchableness of the ways of God. Other instances are found in I Cor. ii, 6 ff.; xv, 51; Col. i, 26 f.; I Tim. iii, 9, 16; Apoc. i, 20; xvii, 7.<sup>72)</sup>

The *Vulgate* latinizes the Greek *μυστήριον* by *mysterium*; but sixteen times it translates it by the word *sacramentum*

<sup>71)</sup> Hettinger-Weber, *ibid.* p. 138; cf. *The Religion of Ancient Greece*. From the French of J. Huby, S. J.; in LHR. II, pp. 21 sq.

<sup>72)</sup> Brunsmann, S. V. D; *ibid.* I, p. 133.

(e. g., Tob. xii, 7; Wis. ii, 22; vi, 24; Dan. ii, 18; Eph. i, 9; iii, 3, 9; Col. i, 27), which is equivalent in concept to the Greek expression. The etymological signification, however, is different. For sacramentum designates, first of all, that which is consecrated or dedicated to God; something sacred or holy. In the writings of the early *Fathers* the term *mysterium* occurs very rarely; it appears more commonly among the Greeks, although the concept is not precise; the sense stressed is especially the knowledge of mysteries.<sup>73)</sup>

From the above it is evident that there is a most intimate connection between *revelation* and *mystery*. Cardinal Newman says: "A Revelation is religious doctrine viewed on its illuminated side; a Mystery is the self-same doctrine viewed on the side unilluminated . . . No Revelation can be complete and systematic, from the weakness of the human intellect; so far as it is not such, it is mysterious".<sup>74)</sup>

Revelation  
and mystery.

The more specific concept of mystery will appear from a consideration of the *various kinds* of mysteries.

2. A reality or truth may surpass our knowledge in different ways. If it can be known, at least as regards its existence, without a supernatural revelation, it is termed a *natural mystery*. If, on the other hand, a fact or truth cannot be known, even as regard the fact of its existence, save by a supernatural revelation, it is called a *supernatural mystery*.<sup>75)</sup>

Natural and  
supernatural  
mysteries.

I. A *natural* mystery may exceed our knowledge in a twofold manner: 1) as regards the fact of its *existence*, although that fact may, of itself, be naturally knowable. Thus we are ignorant of what is in the bowels of the earth or in the depths of the sea; the secrets of hearts are hidden from us. Or 2) a certain truth or fact may surpass our knowledge in respect to its *intimate nature* or *essence*, although we may be fully aware of its existence by the natural light of reason. For instance, we do not know the essence of physical energy, nutrition, sensation, understanding, free choice, transitive

Natural  
mysteries in  
particular.

<sup>73)</sup> B. Bartmann, *Lehrbuch der Dogmatik*. Freiburg i. B. 1921 (4.—5. ed.), II, pp. 215, 216; cf. F. Zorell, "*Novi Testamenti Lexicon Graecum*". Parisiis. 1911, sub voce *μυστήριον*.

<sup>74)</sup> *Essays, Critical and Historical*. London. 1897 (New Edition), I, p. 41.

<sup>75)</sup> Garrigou-Lagrangé, O. P; *ibid.* I, p. 174.



causality, how soul and body are joined in the unity of being, how from the tiny cell a perfect organism with all its artistic structure develops. We do not comprehend the *quomodo sit*, although we do perceive the *an sit* of these truths and realities. In like manner in the uncreated order there are certain truths, which are inaccessible to every created intelligence, even to the angels. There are certain attributes of God, for example, which are naturally knowable as regards their existence, but the intimate harmony, the inner coincidence, of these divine attributes is hidden from every created intelligence. We know, indeed, *that* there is perfect harmony among these attributes of the Deity and we also know, negatively and relatively, *how* this harmony may be explained; but the *intimate* manner of this harmony remains a secret for us. What created intelligence is able to comprehend how the absolute simplicity of God is reconcilable with the plurality of His absolutely simple attributes? Or what creature can understand how God's absolute immutability harmonizes with His freedom of action? Or His infinite goodness with His permission of evil? Or His supreme mercy with His infinite justice?<sup>76)</sup>

Supernatural  
mysteries in  
particular.

II. *Supernatural* mysteries are of two kinds: relative and absolute. 1) A *relative* supernatural mystery is a truth, which, after it has been revealed, no longer remains obscure but can be easily understood. The reason of this is, that it surpasses the created intelligence not, indeed, because of its intrinsic supernatural character, but on account of its contingency or its indeterminate character. For instance, without a supernatural revelation we cannot know when the end of the world will occur; so too, we cannot know, save by a special supernatural manifestation, that it is Christ's will that His Church should always be ruled by one Supreme Pontiff.<sup>77)</sup> The Vatican Council refers to this class of mysteries, when it teaches that: "It pleased His (God's) wisdom and bounty to reveal Himself, and *the eternal decrees of His will* to mankind by another and supernatural way".<sup>78)</sup>

<sup>76)</sup> Garrigou-Lagrange, O. P.; *ibid.* I, p. 174; cf. Gutberlet, *ibid.* II, p. 23.

<sup>77)</sup> Garrigou-Lagrange, O. P.; *ibid.* I, pp. 175, 176.

<sup>78)</sup> "Dogmatic Constitution on the Catholic Faith" (III Sess. 2 chap.), in DB. n. 1785; DCD. p. 220.

2). *Absolute* supernatural mysteries (or *strict* mysteries) are those truths, which remain obscure even after they have been communicated to us by God. The reason of this obscurity is that they surpass the created intelligence not indeed because of their contingency or futurity, but on account of their *intrinsic supernatural character* or, as the Vatican Council states: „For the divine mysteries *by their own nature so far transcend the created intelligence* that, even when delivered by revelation and received by faith, they remain covered with a veil of darkness, so long as we are pilgrims in this mortal life, not yet with God: for we walk by faith, and not by sight“; therefore "if anyone shall say that in divine revelation there are no mysteries, truly and properly so-called, but that *all the doctrines of faith can be understood from natural principles by properly cultivated reason*; let him be anathema“.<sup>79)</sup> They are mysteries, which pertain to the intimate life of God or to a participation of this intimate life, that is, to grace and glory. God is, indeed, knowable under the common and analogical notions of being, truth, intellect, will etc.; but not under the proper and intimate aspect of Deity as such (*sub intima ratione Deitatis*).<sup>80)</sup> Therefore in the strict and theological sense of the term "*an absolute mystery is a truth, whose existence or possibility could not be discovered by a creature, and whose essence (inner substantial being) can be expressed by the finite mind only in terms of analogy*“.<sup>81)</sup> In other words, strict mysteries are religious truths, which reason, left to its own resources, could never have discovered without a revelation of God, and which even after they have been made known to us by divine revelation, cannot be adequately comprehended by reason, but the existence of which reason admits on the supreme and infallible authority of God.<sup>82)</sup>

<sup>79)</sup> Ibid. (III Sess. 4 chap. and canon i attached to this chapter), in DB. n. 1796, 1816; DCD. pp. 229, 237.

<sup>80)</sup> Garrigou-Lagrange, O. P.; *ibid.* I, p. 177; cf. Pius IX, Epistle "*Gravissimas inter*", 11 Dec. 1862 against Frohschammer, in DB. n. 1669, 1671.

<sup>81)</sup> J. A. McHugh, art. "*Mystery*", in CE. X, p. 662.

<sup>82)</sup> cf. Devivier-Sasia, *Christian Apologetics*. N. Y. 1924 (New Edition). I, p. 208; Schill-Straubinger, *ibid.* p. 188.

Two factors, therefore, are required to constitute a mystery in the strict sense: a) it is necessary that the human mind be unable of itself to demonstrate the *reality* or the *existence* (*an sit*) of the truth in question; and b) it is also necessary that human reason be incapable of comprehending the *essence*, the "what" (*quid sit*) and the "how" (*quomodo sit*) of the truth called a mystery.<sup>83)</sup>

Examples of strict mysteries are the Trinity or the mystery of the intimate life of God; the mystery of our elevation to the supernatural order, namely the mystery of grace and glory; the mystery of the Incarnation, of the Redemption, of the indwelling of the Holy Ghost in the soul of the righteous man; in a word, whatever is intrinsically supernatural. In strict mysteries there are, indeed, *certain things* which are *naturally visible*, but that which is intrinsically supernatural remains invisible and mysterious. Thus the Church itself with all its notes or marks is visible, but not the intimate life of the Church; so too, the fact of revelation, in so far as it is confirmed by miracles, is naturally visible to us; but that which is intrinsically supernatural in divine revelation remains a mystery as far as our knowledge is concerned.<sup>84)</sup>

Intelligibility  
of mysteries.

3. All supernatural mysteries, which are *per se* objects of faith, are proposed to us by the Church as obscure, incomprehensible and non-demonstrable truths; but they are *not* on that account *unintelligible truths*, as rationalists object. Furthermore, all mysteries are proposed to us by the Church, *not as isolated truths*, but rather as truths so connected with one another as to form a "determinate (definitely fixed) body of doctrine".<sup>85)</sup> Therefore the Vatican Council states: "We believe that the things which He (God) has revealed are true; *not because the intrinsic truth of things is plainly perceived* by the natural light of reason, but because of God Himself, Who reveals them".<sup>86)</sup> "Reason, indeed, enlightened by faith, when it seeks earnestly, piously and calmly, attains by a gift of God, *some*, and that a very fruitful, *understanding* of mysteries; partly from the *analogy* of those things which it

<sup>83)</sup> Specht-Bauer, *Lehrbuch der Apologetik oder Fundamentaltheologie*. Regensburg, 1924 (2. ed.), p. 65.

<sup>84)</sup> Garrigou-Lagrange, O. P.; I, p. 178; cf. G. Huarte, *Quomodo Ecclesia Christi, quae visibilis est, possit esse objectum fidei?*, in *Gregorianum*, Romae, Mense Martio, 1922, III, fasc. I, pp. 90 sq.

<sup>85)</sup> cf. fifty-ninth condemned proposition of the Modernists, in the Decree "*Lamentabili sane*", in DB. n. 2059; also Vatican Council (III Sess. 4 chap.), in DB. n. 1796.

<sup>86)</sup> III Sess. 3 chap. in DB. n. 1789; DCD. p. 223.



naturally knows, partly from the *relations which the mysteries bear to one another and to the last end of man*".<sup>87)</sup>

The intelligibility of strict mysteries may be more fully illustrated by the following considerations.

a) Supernatural mysteries are incomprehensible and non-demonstrable, but *not unintelligible*; for incomprehensibility is not identical with unintelligibility. Indeed "all that we know is incomprehensible, *i. e.*, not adequately comprehensible as to its inner being".<sup>88)</sup> Superiority to reason is not identical with contradiction. A thing is said to be unintelligible, if it is repugnant to reason, either because it is evidently absurd, as a square circle, or because it has no meaning, as words spoken without any relation to one another. Now according to the Church's teaching strict supernatural mysteries are indeed incomprehensible; nay more, they cannot be demonstrated either *a priori* or *a posteriori*, or *per absurdum*.<sup>89)</sup> Nevertheless, the testimony concerning them is not unintelligible, nor is it evidently absurd; for we are able to understand what the predicate signifies, what the subject means, and God Himself also affirms the word *is*, or the existence of the mystery. The connection, however, between the predicate and the subject remains invident and, therefore, we say: "Faith is of things unseen".<sup>90)</sup>

b) Supernatural mysteries are *analogically intelligible*. For God in revealing them uses our notions which we have acquired naturally and which express directly something created and analogically something uncreated, to declare His testimony concerning the truth thus disclosed. For instance, the notion of paternity expresses analogically the Divine Paternity; likewise the concept of natural sonship expresses the Divine Sonship of the Second Person of the Blessed Trinity; in the same way also the notion of adoptive sonship expresses our supernatural sonship. The principal analogies are indicated by divine supernatural revelation itself.<sup>91)</sup>

c) This intelligibility of strict mysteries is not known *formally* "without the illumination and inspiration of the Holy Ghost";<sup>92)</sup> for this understanding of mysteries is supernatural. Therefore it cannot be attained in a formal manner save by the

<sup>87)</sup> III Sess. 4 chap. in DB. n. 1796; DCD. p. 229.

<sup>88)</sup> McHugh, *ibid.* in CE. X, p. 662.

<sup>89)</sup> Garrigou-Lagrange, O. P; *ibid.* I, pp. 178, 179; cf. the twentyfifth condemned proposition of Anthony de Rosmini-Serbati, in the Decree of the Sacred Office, 14 Dec. 1887, in DB. n. 1915.

<sup>90)</sup> *Ibid.* I, p. 179; cf. St. Thomas, ST. II, II, q. 1, a. 5.

<sup>91)</sup> *Ibid.* I, p. 179.

<sup>92)</sup> Vatican Council (II Sess. 3 chap.), in DB. n. 1791; DCD. p. 225: "No man can assent to the Gospel teaching, as is necessary to obtain salvation, without the *illumination* and *inspiration* of the Holy Spirit".

light of infused faith, by which the intellect is raised above its natural powers and our notions and the word "is" of the dogmatic proposition are supernaturally illustrated. Otherwise there would be no proportion between our knowledge and the object believed, neither would we believe most firmly, as divine faith implies and demands.<sup>93)</sup>

d) Finally, the *intimate connection of the mysteries with one another and man's ultimate end* is partly revealed, and partly deduced by Sacred Theology.<sup>94)</sup>

Mystery and  
dogma.

4. We have already shown the connection between revelation and mystery. There is likewise a close association between *mystery* and *dogma*. By the term "dogma" we understand an assertion, "which is contained in the Word of God (revelation), written or handed down, and which the Church, either by a solemn judgment or by her ordinary and universal teaching (*magisterium*), proposes for belief as having been divinely revealed".<sup>95)</sup> Or to put it more briefly, a dogma is "a revealed truth defined by the Church". "Some theologians confine the word *defined* to doctrines solemnly defined by a pope or by a general council, while a revealed truth becomes a dogma even when proposed by the Church through her ordinary magisterium or teaching office. A dogma therefore implies a twofold relation: to Divine Revelation and to the authoritative teaching of the Church".<sup>96)</sup> Hence *a dogma is related to a mystery in the same way that an assertion or declaration is to the thing asserted*. Therefore we say: The Church states the meaning of a dogma rather than the meaning of a mystery, that is, the Church declares the meaning of the assertion, which expresses the mystery.

However, a dogma is not absolutely identical with a *dogmatic formula*, for there can be several dogmatic formulae concerning the same dogma and the later formulae can be more explicit than the earlier expressions. For example, the mystery of the Incarnation can be expressed in the first place by the formula: "The Word of God was made flesh", and later it may be announced in the

<sup>93)</sup> Garrigon-Lagrange, O. P.; *ibid.* I, pp. 182, 183.

<sup>94)</sup> *Ibid.* I, pp. 182, 183.

<sup>95)</sup> Vatican Council (III Sess. 3 chap.) in DB. n. 1792; cf. also n. 1683, 1709, 1722, 1800, 1816, 1818, 2079 sq., 2089. For the principal definitions concerning dogma cf. IDEM, in DB. n. 1818, 1800.

<sup>96)</sup> D. Coughlin, art. "*Dogma*", in CE. V, p. 89; cf. also Jos. Bittremieux, *Apologetical Questions*. Louvain. 1910, pp. 1—22.

formula: "The Word, consubstantial with God, the Father, was made man". Therefore we speak of the *history of dogmas*, not of the history of mysteries. For the preparation of a dogmatic formula, its promulgation, and later on its promulgation in more explicit formulae, are historical facts, whereas a mystery, considered in itself, is not a historical fact.<sup>97)</sup>

5. The principal *errors* concerning the notion of mystery and of dogma may be reduced to two general classes: a) the *naturalistic* notion proposed by rationalists, liberal Protestants and modernists and b) the *semi-naturalistic* notion advocated by the semi-rationalists.

Heterodox  
notions of  
mystery and  
dogma.

a) Modern rationalistic philosophers (Kant, Fichte) and liberal Protestants (Hermann, Harnack, Le Roy) either absolutely reject supernatural mysteries as absurd and unintelligible or reduce them to purely natural mysteries or natural truths knowable without a supernatural revelation.<sup>98)</sup> The very concept of a mystery, so it is objected, prevents all spiritual apprehension, for the Supernatural lies beyond the sphere of rational thought. Thus Kant reduces the three Persons of the Blessed Trinity to three naturally knowable attributes of God, while Hegel sees in the Trinity merely the three momenta of universal evolution, that is, thesis, antithesis and synthesis.<sup>99)</sup> Hence dogma is held to be a vain fiction of the imagination, empty verbiage, a symbolic expression of natural truth, "an honorable ecclesiastical burial" whereby contradictory concepts are rendered innocuous, and antiquated ideas become unimpeachable (Harnack). Or a dogma is said to be an artifice of the ecclesiastical hierarchy to deaden man's confidence in the powers of reason and to render the intellect docile (Pfleiderer).<sup>100)</sup> It is obvious that

<sup>97)</sup> Garrigou-Lagrance, O. P; *ibid.* I, p. 170.

<sup>98)</sup> cf. Vatican Council (III Sess; canons ii and iii attached to 2 chap. and canon iii joined to 3 chap.) in DB. n. 1807, 1808, 1812; DCD. pp. 234—6.

<sup>99)</sup> Garrigou-Lagrance, O. P; *ibid.* I, p. 171; cf. the seventh proposition condemned by Pius IX in the Syllabus: "The mysteries of the Christian Faith are the sum-total of philosophical investigations", in DB. n. 1707; DCD. p. 189 sq.

<sup>100)</sup> Jos. Mausbach, *Die Religion und das moderne Seelenleben*, in RCK. I, p. 141.



if a dogma is merely a symbolic expression of natural truth, a part of the truth which is contained in this symbolic expression should be more accurately determined by human reason, which is the arbiter of truth and falsehood, and the sense of the dogma is variable according to the progress of the sciences and of philosophy.<sup>101</sup>)

Strictly speaking, modernistic agnosticism must refrain from all intrinsic criticism of dogma, since it maintains that reason is absolutely incompetent in respect to metaphysical matters. Faith is held to a mere vital experience. Hence according to this viewpoint theoretic reasoning may express in conceptual formulae only what has been vitally experienced. Thus a mystery, as an objective teaching guaranteed by an external revelation, is devoid of all meaning.<sup>102</sup>)

b) Semi-rationalists (Hermes, Günther, Frohschammer) differ from rationalists in that they admit that the mysteries of Christianity have been revealed to us supernaturally by an external divine revelation, properly so-called; but they reduce supernatural mysteries to natural truths (*relative* mysteries), which remain obscure only for a time. Because of sin human reason, so they teach, is incapable of comprehending many truths of revelation in the beginning; however, with the advance of speculation theology and faith itself become pure philosophy. Thus Günther imagines that he has demonstrated that the mystery of the Blessed Trinity is a necessary logical conclusion of his speculation.<sup>103</sup>) The Vatican Council condemned as heretical the view that states that "all the doctrines of faith can be understood and demonstrated from natural principles by properly cultivated reason".<sup>104</sup>)

<sup>101</sup>) Garrigou-Lagrange, O. P; *ibid.* I, p. 171; cf. Syllabus of Pius IX. in DB. n. 1703, 1704; DCD. p. 188.

<sup>102</sup>) Mausbach, *ibid.* I, pp. 135 sq; cf. Encyclical of Pius X, in DB. n. 2077 sq. and the Syllabus of condemned errors of modernists in DB. n. 2022, 2026, 2058, 2059, 2060, 2062, 2064. <sup>103</sup>) Gutberlet, II, p. 24.

<sup>104</sup>) "*Dogmatic Constitution on the Catholic Faith*" (III Sess. canon i attached to 4 chap.), in DB. n. 1816; DCD. p. 237. The principal errors of semi-rationalism are condemned by Pius IX; cf. DB. n. 1618; 1634 sq; 1655 sq; 1666 sq; 1708—1714.

**THESIS: "It cannot be demonstrated that the revelation of supernatural mysteries involves a contradiction, i. e.; is impossible".<sup>105)</sup>**

a) When we speak of the revelation of a strict mystery we mean that God makes known to the prophet the *existence* of a truth through the union of two terms (subject and predicate), although the internal essence of that truth, or the intimate manner in which the predicate coincides with the subject, remains hidden from the prophet's mind after God has disclosed the fact or the existence of the mystery.<sup>106)</sup> We are restricting our consideration to the question of the possibility of *immediate* revelation of mysteries; for the possibility of mediate revelation of mysteries presents no special difficulties, since the same reasons obtain here as hold for the possibility of mediate revelation in general. The thesis is stated in a *negative* form on account of the controversy which obtains as to whether it is possible to demonstrate *positively*, *a priori* and scientifically, that is, apart from divine supernatural revelation, that strict mysteries exist, and, if they exist, can be revealed, as we shall point out more in detail below.<sup>107)</sup>

State of the question.

b) The proposition which we propose to defend is opposed chiefly for the following reasons: 1) rationalists and semi-rationalists question the *existence* of an order of truths, which *objectively* surpasses the powers of natural reason; 2) many rationalists insist that, if such truths really exist, their supernatural manifestation is incompatible with the *nature of God*, since it contradicts the divine attributes. Hence the apologist must show that no valid reasons can be alleged against the existence of a supernatural order of truths in God and that the supernatural revelation of such truths accords perfectly with the divine essence and attributes (that is, is *extrinsically* possible). 3) Modernists maintain that a divine supernatural revelation of truths, which infinitely exceed the powers and exigencies of man's nature, both *objectively* and *subjectively*, contradicts *human nature*, since it violates the perfect vitality of our reason. The apologist must therefore show that the supernatural revelation of strict mysteries is in harmony with the nature of man (that is,

<sup>105)</sup> This proposition may be qualified as *philosophically certain*. The Vatican Council declares the possibility of the revelation of supernatural mysteries an *article of faith*. cf. III Sess. 3 canon attached to 2 chap. in DB. n. 1808; DCD. pp. 235, 236: "If anyone shall say that man cannot be raised by divine power to a higher than natural knowledge and perfection, but can and ought, by a continuous progress, to arrive at length of himself to the possession of all that is true and good; let him be anathema".

<sup>106)</sup> Dorsch, S. J; *ibid.* I, p. 324.

<sup>107)</sup> H. Van Laak, S. J; *Institutionum theologiae fundamentalis Repetitorium* ad usum privatum auditorum universitatis Gregorianae. Romae. 1921, Pars I, p. 28.

is *intrinsically* possible). Thus the general outlines of the demonstration are sufficiently indicated.<sup>108)</sup>

General  
philosophical  
argument.

1. The divine revelation of supernatural mysteries could be shown to be impossible, if it could be demonstrated either that the *existence* of an order of supernatural truths in God involves a contradiction, or that *God* cannot communicate such truths to man, or that *man* cannot believe in revealed mysteries without contradicting reason. Now it is impossible to demonstrate a repugnance from any of these viewpoints. Therefore the divine revelation of supernatural mysteries cannot be shown to be impossible.<sup>109)</sup>

The *minor* of this argument requires a detailed proof. We shall deal with each of the three assertions involved in the minor premise in order.

*A. The existence of supernatural mysteries in God is not repugnant to reason.*

State of the  
question.

a) If we understand the term "mystery" in an *indefinite* sense, that is, if we prescind from the question as to whether there are mysteries in the broad or in the strict sense, it is not difficult to show that the existence of such truths is not repugnant to reason. This will be evident from the three arguments developed below. The matter is not so simple, however, if we employ the term mystery in the *strict* sense, *i. e.*, if we understand by a mystery a truth which human reason, of itself, can neither discover nor demonstrate. The arguments by which many attempt to deduce *a priori* the existence of strict mysteries do not seem to us be conclusive; at most, they demonstrate the existence of mysteries in the broad sense only.<sup>110)</sup> For a strict mystery, by its very concept, absolutely transcends the created intellect. Therefore as regards the created intellect a strict mystery has no more the character (*ratio*) of being than of non-being; the created intellect cannot assert anything *a priori* concerning such a truth.<sup>111)</sup> Secondly, apart from a supernatural revelation, the existence of a strict mystery would have to be demonstrated upon evidence *intrinsic* to the mystery itself; for it is not otherwise evident. This, however, is impossible since the *internal nature* of a strict mystery is not evident either before or after the mystery has been communicated to us by a supernatural revelation. Therefore human

<sup>108)</sup> Garrigou-Lagrange, O. P; *ibid.* I, pp. 337 sq; 371 sq.

<sup>109)</sup> Felder, O. M. Cap; *ibid.* I, p. 40.

<sup>110)</sup> Dorsch, S. J; *ibid.* I, pp. 306—308.

<sup>111)</sup> Pesch, S. J; *ibid.* I, n. 165.



reason, left to its own resources, cannot assert anything positive concerning the existence of strict mysteries.<sup>112)</sup>

b) But neither is it, strictly speaking, necessary to demonstrate positively, *a priori* and scientifically, that strict mysteries really exist. For the adversaries of strict mysteries claim that the existence of such truths is repugnant to reason. It suffices, therefore, to show that the alleged repugnance is not immediately evident. Consequently *for the defence of a supernatural revelation a negative or indirect proof is sufficient.*<sup>113)</sup> We shall present this proof especially under the fourth argument.

c) The *positive* proof for the existence of an order of supernatural truths in God can be derived *only from the testimony of divine supernatural revelation itself.* And in this regard it is absolutely certain that the mysteries of faith are indissolubly bound up with the historical essence of Christianity. For a) the *Synoptic Gospels* teach clearly the mysteries of the Divine Sonship of Christ, of His redemptive death, of Baptism, of the Eucharist, of the resurrection of the body. *Christ Himself* speaks of the "mysteries" of the kingdom of heaven, which are presented to the multitudes in parables, but are "known" by the disciples (cf. Mark iv, 11; Matt. xi, 27; xxiv, 36; Luke x, 21; Rom. xvi, 25; I Cor. ii, 7; Col. ii, 3). In *St. John's Gospel* these ideas appear even more distinctly. His Prologue exposes the intimate connection between the doctrine of the Logos, the redemption and sonship through grace. *St. Paul* teaches, without a doubt, mysterious, religious truths and calls them expressly "mysteries"; he conceives the whole of Christianity as one great "mystery, which has been hidden from ages and generations, but now is manifested to his saints" (Col. i, 26), — a precious treasure of wisdom, spiritual insight and knowledge. Classic are his assertions, in the beginning of his First Epistle to the Corinthians, which are repeated by the Vatican Council. He contrasts not only faith and secular knowledge as two kinds of science; but he also makes a distinction between the genuine wisdom of the faithful and the Christian *dogma of salvation*, which is a scandal to the Jews and a folly to the Gentiles and which, nevertheless, surpasses all the wisdom of men. It has not been known to any of the worldly wise; nay more, it has been inaccessible to every presentment and experience of the heart; only the Spirit of God, which "searcheth all things, yea the deep things of God", could make it manifest to us.<sup>114)</sup>

Divine revelation asserts the existence of strict mysteries.

<sup>112)</sup> Felder, O. M. Cap; *ibid.* I, p. 40.

<sup>113)</sup> Garrigou-Lagrange, O. P; *ibid.* I, p. 341; cf. St. Thomas, ST. I, II, q. 112, a. 5.

<sup>114)</sup> Jos. Mausbach, *Die Religion und das moderne Seelenleben*, in RCK. I, pp. 309, 310. cf. Vatican Council (III Sess. canon i attached to 4 chap.) in DB. n. 1816, DCD. p. 237: "If anyone shall say that in divine revelation there are no mysteries, truly and properly so called ... let him be anathema".

However, since we have not yet demonstrated the fact of a divine supernatural revelation, we shall not use this positive proof from revelation, but shall content ourselves with a negative or indirect proof.

### *Mysteries in the Broad Sense.*

Essential  
difference  
between Di-  
vine and  
human reason.

1. Between the Divine and the human reason there is an *essential* difference, not merely a difference of degree, so that everything, hence reason itself, can be predicated of God and of man only in an analogical sense, that is, partly in the same and partly in a different sense. Therefore God knows not only *more* objects *in a more perfect manner* than we, but He also has a specific object of knowledge to which no created reason can attain. Only thus can the Infinite reason of God be said to be essentially and absolutely above human reason. Consequently many truths, which God communicates to human reason, must be unattainable by and incomprehensible to all human understanding.<sup>115)</sup> The essence and attributes of God are, therefore, veiled in a certain obscurity, which only He Himself can clarify by means of a supernatural revelation.<sup>116)</sup>

That is precisely the essence of *rationalism*, that it endeavors to measure the absolute Divine reason according to the narrow standard of its own subjective and individual reason, the perfect reason according to the immature, the holy reason of God according to reason darkened by sin.<sup>117)</sup>

Analogy,  
man's way  
of knowing  
God.

2. "If it is true that in this life we can acquire a knowledge of God only from the contemplation of nature, it follows that our concept of Him is not intuitive (immediate, adequate), but abstractive (mediate, inadequate). And if the concept we form of God does not represent Him as He is in Himself, but only analogically, it follows further that our knowledge cannot be univocal, but must be analogous. Being abstractive and analogical, then, it must be very imperfect".<sup>118)</sup>

<sup>115)</sup> Gutberlet, *Ibid.* II, p. 25. <sup>116)</sup> cf. St. Thomas, *ST.* I, q. 13, a. 5.

<sup>117)</sup> Hettinger-Müller, *Apologie des Christentums*. Freiburg i. B. 1915 (10. ed.), II: "*Der Beweis des Christentums*", Part II, p. 28.

<sup>118)</sup> Pohle-Preuss, *God: His Knowability, Essence and Attributes*, St. Louis, Mo. 1914 (2. ed.) p. 59. We know God naturally by way of *affirmation* or causality, by way of *negation* and by way of *intensification* or eminence. That is, when we affirm some divine perfection, we are

Therefore it is perfectly logical to assume that, if God personally reveals Himself to man, He will communicate to man truths concerning Himself, His essence and designs, which are not contained in purely natural revelation, that is, which are mysteries.<sup>119)</sup>

In other words, the proper object of the Divine intelligence is the Divine essence, which God penetrates so perfectly and adequately, that there is nothing incomprehensible in it. Human understanding, on the other hand, can represent to itself God's essence only by concepts which do not represent God in His own form (*in specie propria*), but in that of some other being (*in specie aliena*), that is, by means of concepts that are foreign and far-removed. Consequently to human knowledge many things must necessarily remain obscure and incomprehensible in the Divine essence.<sup>120)</sup>

In point of fact, we do not know even the things of Nature, which are the proper object of our intellect, in their inmost essence but only from their effects and appearances and, therefore, so much appears mysterious and unexplainable to man. No created spirit penetrates into the interior of Nature. How much more, then, must not the infinite essence of God, mirrored in the concepts of finite beings, be incomprehensible to us? Since the analogous concepts of God give us only an imperfect image of the proper perfections of God, it is only to be expected that in these concepts not all the relations can be represented, which these perfections have in themselves. The analogical ideas, which we have of God, are comparable to the outlines of shadows. If we were unable to view the actual world itself, but were obliged to render it intelligible to ourselves by means of the shadows of the bodies and the positions and relations of the bodies to one another, how many occurrences of the actual world would necessarily remain unknown to us? Indeed; everything that does not produce a change in the outlines and the size of the shadows would escape us. And many things would seem very puzzling to us; for instance, seeing a shadow penetrate another shadow, we might be led to deny the impenetrability of bodies.<sup>121)</sup>

Recall the comparison which Plato uses and develops in detail in the seventh book of his work "On the State". To present the fact that man, entangled in the things of sense, is able to know only imperfectly what is spiritual, Plato compares man to a captive tarrying in a subterranean prison. Such a person

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immediately constrained to eliminate from the perfection, by an act of negation, every species of imperfection, common to creatures, and further to raise the perfection thus purged by a series of negations to its superlative and into the domain of the infinite. (Ibid. p. 68); cf. also St. Thomas, ST. I, q. 12, a. 12.

<sup>119)</sup> Specht-Bauer, *ibid.* pp. 65, 66.

<sup>120)</sup> Gutberlet, *ibid.* II, p. 25.

<sup>121)</sup> *Ibid.* II, pp. 27 sq.



knows what is going on in the world above only by means of the little light which falls upon the wall of his prison through an opening above. The shadows of those who pass above are reflected on the wall of the prison towards which the captive's face is turned. This representation communicates, indeed, only a very imperfect understanding of what is taking place in the world above; very much will be distorted to such a degree, that the prisoner will not be able to comprehend the real bearings of the occurrence nor to understand the picture.

Now we are in this position as regards the things of God. The divine light penetrates through a narrow crack into our world; we are seated in semi-darkness. Our spiritual eye, as Aristotle remarks, bears the same proportion to the most intelligible object, namely God, that the eye of the bat bears to the light of the sun. The divine life can be represented to our eye only in indeterminate, shadowy images, through analogous concepts, and in the twilight of our reason, which is bound to the things of sense. What wonder, then, if the Infinite represents Itself so imperfectly and in such a distorted manner, that we strike upon many things which to us are incomprehensible!

Just as a person born blind can represent to himself colors only by the analogous images of sound, the deaf man sound only through a comparison with color and the other qualities of the senses, so we, too, are constrained to represent the Divine by means of analogy with sensible things. How imperfectly, then, can these poor creatures comprehend the rich kingdom of color and sound! A deaf man will have only a weak notion of the painfully unpleasant impression of disharmony, which he derives from his perceptions of color; the fact that there are tones in various octaves, that is, tones which, although different in pitch, represent, nevertheless, the same tone, will remain a puzzle to the deaf man.<sup>122)</sup>

Man's knowledge of the spiritual is imperfect.

3. Because we are obliged to represent to ourselves the *purely spiritual* after the manner of the sensible, which is the proper and adequate object of human knowledge, many a spiritual thing must remain obscure and incomprehensible to us. We cannot represent to ourselves how a pure spirit can be present in every part of space which it occupies, because this mode of presence is directly opposed to the manner of corporeal presence to which we are accustomed. How much greater difficulty must not the inner life of God cause us, which is infinitely superior, not only to the sensible, but to everything finite, no matter how sublime it may be? In fact,

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<sup>122)</sup> Gutberlet, *ibid.* II, pp. 25—27.

it is absolutely incomprehensible to us how, for instance, the divine unchangeableness can be harmonized with God's activity in time and with His freedom of action. Neither does the essence of God undergo the least change, when He creates the world; His activity and His will are His very essence and yet, His essence is absolutely necessary and His will free. In spite of the various attempts that have been made to harmonize these apparent contradictions, in the end we must plead ignorance.<sup>123)</sup>

*Mysteries in the strict sense.*

4. The case just mentioned does not, indeed, constitute a mystery in the strict sense; for we are able to know by reason *that* a perfect harmonization between the various divine attributes is both possible and necessary, although we are ignorant of *how* such a harmony and coincidence takes place. In order to prove that there are truths in God, which we are unable either to understand or to demonstrate (that is, strict mysteries), we must show that *in God's inmost essence there are or can be relations, which cannot be expressed or represented in any way whatsoever*. Now it is obvious, that God cannot express externally (*ad extra*) and thus make accessible to human reason everything, that is within Himself and that takes place in His inmost essence. Infinity, immensity, and in general all the so-called negative attributes, which contain the distinguishing notes of the Divine and the human, cannot be communicated to creation, either individually or in general. Still, they can be deduced by reason and, therefore, are not strict mysteries. But it is possible to surmise, from the infinite sublimity of God over all created things, that in Him there are also *positive* realities and activities, which can neither be expressed in a creature, nor be deduced by reason by way of opposition like the negative attributes, nor by analogy like the positive notes. The same reasons, which demonstrate the incomprehensibility of the divine essence, prove also the inexpressibility of the divine essence in creation.

God's infinite transcendence over all created things.

<sup>123)</sup> Gutberlet, *ibid.* II, p. 27.

We cannot, indeed, show *a priori* that God cannot express or represent externally (*ad extra*) something or other of His inner life; we assert merely the *possibility* of such inexpressible perfections. Neither must we demonstrate the necessity, but only the possibility of the Incomprehensible, in order to establish the possibility of strict mysteries, as stated above.<sup>124)</sup>

Therefore we may conclude that it is impossible to demonstrate that the existence of an order of supernatural truths in God is repugnant to reason.

Negative  
argument.  
Refutation of  
semi-ratio-  
nalism.

5. *Semi-rationalists* deny the possibility of the revelation of mysteries on the ground that there are no absolute but only *relative* mysteries.

We reply, that the simplest refutation of semi-rationalism is found a) in the fact, that there are truths contained in divine supernatural revelation, which not even the most subtle speculation is capable of rendering comprehensible. It is possible to review all the various attempts which have been made throughout the centuries, to understand strict mysteries and to show that all of them, Günther's not excepted, have been fiascos. It does not, indeed, follow from this that they are absolutely incomprehensible; but neither is it incumbent upon the Christian apologist to demonstrate such an incomprehensibility. If we know that certain propositions have been divinely revealed and believed by men, which the most strenuous investigations of the centuries have been impotent to render comprehensible, nothing stands in the way of the possibility of the supernatural revelation of mysteries, which apologetics undertakes to demonstrate. For at the time when the revelation was given and believed, certain truths were real mysteries; in respect to the human intellect they were like absolutely incomprehensible mysteries. b) If human reason, as we have already shown, is not the measure of all truth, it is to be expected that there are many truths, which reason not only does not know, but which it likewise is unable to comprehend. Semi-rationalism can assert the impossibility of strict mysteries only on the hypothesis of the rationalistic principle of knowledge; with the refutation of that principle we have also demonstrated, not indeed the necessity or the actual existence, but at least the *possibility* of strict mysteries.<sup>125)</sup>

General  
philosophical  
argument.

*B. The revelation of supernatural mysteries involves no repugnance on the part of God revealing.*

If there were any repugnance to the revelation of supernatural mysteries *on the part of God*, it would arise either

<sup>124)</sup> Gutberlet, *ibid.* II, pp. 27, 28.

<sup>125)</sup> Gutberlet, *ibid.* II. p. 24.



from the divine omnipotence (*i. e., potentia absoluta*) in the sense that God would be unable to communicate such truths to man, or from the divine omniscience, since He would lack the ways and means of manifesting such truths, or from the divine wisdom (*i. e., potentia ordinata*), since such a revelation would be useless and without purpose. Now it is impossible to show that a divine revelation of supernatural mysteries involves a repugnance in respect to any of these viewpoints. Therefore it is impossible to demonstrate that the revelation of supernatural mysteries is impossible as regards God.

The *minor* of the argument is evident from the following considerations:

a) *The divine omnipotence does not lack the power of communicating supernatural mysteries to man.* For if men are able to communicate to other men truths the internal nature of which they do not comprehend, *a fortiori* God must be able to do likewise. Moreover, the omnipotent God is unable to do only what is intrinsically impossible, or what involves a contradiction. But mysteries, if they really exist, imply no contradiction, as will be shown in detail below. Therefore the omnipotent God is able to communicate supernatural mysteries to man.<sup>126</sup>)

b) *Neither does the divine omniscience lack ways and means of revealing supernatural mysteries to man.* For God is able to manifest mysteries by the very same means and methods by which He makes natural and preternatural truths known to us. This He can do either by inventing and explaining *signs not yet known to us*, or by employing and composing *signs which we already know*. Thus when He revealed to us the mystery of the three Divine Persons in the one Divine Nature, the subject (the one essence of God) and the predicate (three Divine Persons) were already known to us, although we do not comprehend how the predicate coincides with the subject. Indeed the inventors of new things and especially those who perfect language employ both of these

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<sup>126</sup>) Felder, O. M. Cap; *ibid*; I, p. 41.

methods. Nay more, by these very same means all men communicate to others truths the internal nature of which they themselves do not comprehend. Therefore with greater reason must God be able to disclose mysteries to men.<sup>127)</sup>

c) *Neither is the divine wisdom without wise reasons for manifesting supernatural mysteries to us.* The ways of God are unsearchable and His judgments incomprehensible. "For who hath known the mind of the Lord? Or who hath been His counsellor?" (Rom. xi, 33. 34). Surely then it is absurd to deny to the divine wisdom reasons and purposes for disclosing mysteries to men! Moreover, even though we are unable to state positively the reasons why the divine wisdom should manifest these incomprehensible truths to mankind, still we can, at least, surmise some reasons why God should disclose supernatural mysteries to men. His purpose may have been *to increase our knowledge*. For revealed mysteries help us to understand more easily and profoundly purely rational and preternatural truths. Thus the revealed mystery of the Blessed Trinity has aided us to know the nature of God better and more correctly. Indeed, all the arts and sciences have advanced more perfectly precisely because of the Christian mysteries,<sup>128)</sup> as we shall show below in the chapter on the utility of supernatural revelation. Mysteries are like the sun, which, although it cannot be viewed by the naked eye, still illuminates all things, or like the telescope by whose aid very many things can be perceived, which because of their remoteness cannot be reached at all by the unaided eye. Furthermore, mysteries add to the rational and preternatural objects of knowledge already known a higher and nobler content of knowledge, namely that which is *superrational*. Thereby *our mind is perfected*.<sup>129)</sup> Finally, the *goodness of God is made manifest to us* through the revelation of supernatural mysteries. For God by communicating to us the intimate and deep mysteries of His own hidden life discloses to us His charity, benignity, mercy, liberality and paternal affection.

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<sup>127)</sup> Felder, O. M. Cap. *ibid.* I, p. 41.

<sup>128)</sup> *Ibid.* I, p. 42; cf. Gutberlet, *ibid.* II, pp. 31 sq.

<sup>129)</sup> cf. St. Thomas, *SCG.* I, 5.

Thereby He excites and stimulates man's love and gratitude. Consequently, if there are supernatural mysteries, their revelation does not involve any repugnance on the part of God revealing, but rather expresses the fitness and the utility of such a divine communication.<sup>130)</sup>

*C. The revelation of supernatural mysteries involves no contradiction on the part of man who believes them.*

If the assent of man's intellect to a supernatural mystery were repugnant to reason, this repugnance would arise either because such truths *objectively contradict reason*, or because they *cannot be known subjectively by reason*. Now it is impossible to demonstrate conclusively a repugnance from either of these viewpoints. Therefore man can believe in supernatural mysteries revealed by God without contradicting his reason.<sup>131)</sup>

General  
philosophical  
argument.

The truth of the *minor* of the argument is obvious for the following reasons:

a) *Mysteries do not objectively contradict reason.* Rationalists indeed argue that no medium exists between the reasonable and the unreasonable; consequently they conclude that the mysterious is opposed to reason (Toland, Pfleiderer). However, this argumentation is fallacious, "since it confounds incomprehensibility with inconceivability, superiority to reason with contradiction to reason".<sup>132)</sup> A simple inspection of the facts is sufficient to show the weakness of the rationalistic position. In many dogmas (mysteries) the concepts are clear and known to us; the judgment which unites the predicate with the subject is also known to us as a fact; we lack only the insight into the truth itself. Thus the proposition: "Christ is risen from the dead" presents a clear conceptual content, which is accessible also to the ordinary man; the concepts of a dead man and a living man are likewise known to everyone; the expressed fact is also just as intelligible. In the same way the presence of

<sup>130)</sup> Felder, O. M. Cap. *ibid.* I, p. 42; cf. Ottiger, S. J; *ibid.* I, pp. 75—77.

<sup>131)</sup> *Ibid.* I, p. 42.

<sup>132)</sup> J. A. McHugh, art. "Mystery", in CE. X, p. 662; cf. above p. 102.



Christ on our altars has a very definite meaning; only by sophistically obscuring the words was it possible for Le Roy to object that "to be present" has no other meaning than "to be perceptible". As regards mysteries which imply purely spiritual and supernatural realities, for instance, the Divine Persons, sanctifying grace, the concepts are derived partly from earthly things and must, of course, first be purified and elevated; but then they also express a specific conceptual content, as is evident from the fact that we often search for better, more appropriate word-images to express that content, that we reject certain formulas as false or foreign to the concepts. The deepest reason for this possibility is found in the fact, that the essence of the human spirit is destined and disposed for truth, for the most comprehensible and highest truth, and not merely for the outward appearances of things.<sup>133)</sup>

Strictly speaking, it is really impossible to demonstrate that supernatural mysteries are contrary to reason. For reason is absolutely unable to affirm anything positively concerning truths which are absolutely above reason; it can affirm neither the agreement nor the repugnance of such truths. For the repugnance of a thing can only be demonstrated, when the intrinsic nature of that thing is clearly perceived. But we do not clearly perceive the intrinsic nature of supernatural mysteries, as the very concept of a strict mystery implies. Consequently rationalists cannot assert that strict mysteries objectively contradict reason.<sup>134)</sup>

Objection.

Men, who like Strauss, Paulsen and Tolstoi speak of dogma as contrary to reason, point to the words which Tertullian is alleged to have written: *Credo quia absurdum!* — But as a matter of fact in the pertinent writing, which he penned by the way after his defection from the Church, Tertullian says: "Mortuus est Dei Filius, prorsus credibile est, quia ineptum est. Et sepultus resurrexit, certum est, quia impossibile est".<sup>135)</sup> Tertullian was fond of bold, paradoxical phrases. According to the context he wishes to say, that the teaching concerning the cross, the crucified and resurrected Saviour appears to worldly wisdom as foolishness; faith contains the impossible, "if we judge of God according to

<sup>133)</sup> Mausbach, *Die Religion und das moderne Seelenleben*, in RCK. I, pp. 137, 138. <sup>134)</sup> Felder, O. M. Cap. ibid. I, p. 43.

<sup>135)</sup> *De carne Chr.* 5; cf. ibid. 4; *De bap.* 2.

our viewpoint". Human short-sightedness may not reject as incredible what is "marvellous and sublime", may not measure the essence and the deeds of God according to its own standards. How little Tertullian is inclined to deny to the human mind a positive relation to faith and its mysteries, is shown to us by his utterance concerning the "*anima naturaliter christiana*" and his endeavor to penetrate speculatively into the content and the connection or harmony of Christian dogmas.<sup>136)</sup>

b) Even though supernatural mysteries are incomprehensible, still they *can be known subjectively by human reason* through a divine supernatural revelation. The fact that a dogmatic truth (a supernatural mystery) is not deducible from the sphere of natural concepts, or is unknowable as regards its intrinsic nature, by no means prevents our acceptance of it as an *actuality*. For otherwise we should have to reject many facts of internal and external life as repugnant to reason. Indeed, every actuality as such is, to a certain extent, a mystery. There is something impervious, impenetrable, in everything real and objective as compared with what we think or postulate subjectively. What is true of the mundane world is equally true of the supersensible and the heavenly world. The fulness of truth in the Deity, both in respect to its extension and its depth, must necessarily surpass all the standards of creatural reasoning-power. Moreover, we must remember that the counsels of God which are realized in the order of salvation, are *free evidences* of His love and wisdom; hence they are facts which evade every attempt at logical deduction and which reason is unable to deduce from any concept of God, no matter how perfectly that concept be visioned.<sup>137)</sup>

In other words, a proposition is sufficiently presented to human reason, if we understand the *fact* of the proposition namely the subject and the predicate, and if we know that the one is certainly connected with the other, even though we may be ignorant of the intimate *manner* in which that coherence or coincidence is verified. Such knowledge does not, indeed, produce (intrinsic) evidence of the thing itself, but it does beget, at least, certitude of the thing, that is, certitude of the fact or of the existence of the thing and human reason may rest securely in

<sup>136)</sup> Mausbach, *Die Religion* etc. in RCK. I. pp. 138, 139.

<sup>137)</sup> Mausbach, *ibid.* I, p. 138.

that certain knowledge. This certitude of the fact is, of itself, sufficient to allow us to assert scientifically many things of ordinary life, for instance, electricity, light etc., even though the intrinsic nature of these facts and realities remains hidden from our knowledge. In the same way, therefore, it is sufficient, if we have certitude concerning the fact or the existence of supernatural and strict mysteries.<sup>138)</sup>

It is indeed true, that it is in the nature of reason to accept only what is evident (*Toland*), if we understand the term "evident" either in the sense of *internal* evidence of the thing itself, or of *external* evidence furnished by trustworthy witnesses. The mysteries of divine revelation, like the facts of history, are supported by external evidence and are, therefore, evidently credible. But it is false to assert that reason can accept only what is presented to it upon internal evidence.<sup>139)</sup>

The luminous  
side of  
mysteries.

Human reason can obtain not merely a knowledge of the specific meaning of a dogmatic truth (mystery); it can also *elucidate, to a certain extent, the intrinsic truth which the mystery contains*, that is, the how and the why of the mystery. But this knowledge never becomes an insight into the truth itself, as in natural knowledge. Holy Scripture employs *comparisons (analogies)* drawn from Nature to illustrate dogmatic concepts. Thus it compares the action of the Holy Ghost with the wind, the grace of faith with light, the mystical union of the soul with Christ with the union of the vine and its branches, the resurrection from the dead with the germination of the seed. Moreover, since Nature also keeps its deepest secrets veiled, the processes of Nature may oftentimes become the most appropriate symbolic habiliment of a mystery. Other analogies reach down into the life of the soul and the spirit of man. How great has not been the influence, which the terms Logos and Pneuma, Word and Spirit, have exercised upon the doctrine of the Blessed Trinity! What a vital impulse did not the trinitarian speculations receive from the analogy of thought and will in respect to the processions in God! Even though the philosophical terms, which are meant to illustrate the content of dogmas, always remain imperfect expressions of the Divine, they are, never-

<sup>138)</sup> Felder, O. M. Cap. I, p. 43.

<sup>139)</sup> McHugh, *ibid.* in CE. X, pp. 662 sq.



theless, not meaningless signs and sounds. They do not, indeed, tell us all that can be said concerning God; but neither do they express nothing at all, as rationalists frequently maintain; for between all and nothing there is something.<sup>140)</sup>

Even more convincing than these natural analogies is the conceptual *harmony* of the dogmas with one another, as even non-Catholics admit. What seems puzzling in itself, receives from the sum-total of the Church's teaching an illumination and confirmation, which is all the more impressive the more difficult it must be, to maintain from all angles this unified and certain position in respect to the most sublime and abstract things. Thus the obscurity of individual truths disappears under the light that comes from the ensemble of revealed truths. In the end, however, all mysteries are merely the unfolding of the one fundamental Christian mystery, namely the vocation of mankind to the great *end* or purpose, the supernatural vision of God Himself.<sup>141)</sup>

2. All *objections* against the possibility of the revelation of supernatural mysteries rest upon misconceptions. We shall consider 1) some exceptions urged against the *nature* and *existence* of strict mysteries and 2) against the possibility of the revelation of mysteries as regards *man's nature*.

Negative proof.  
Refutation  
of objections.

1. a) Rationalists insist that the distinction, which the defenders of strict mysteries are compelled to make between truths in harmony with reason (*juxta rationem*) and truths above reason (*supra rationem*), is untenable. For the apologists of supernatural mysteries maintain that mysteries are not against reason; neither are they truths of reason, but rather truths above reason. But if one demonstrates that a proposition is not against reason (*contra rationem*), that proposition is in harmony with reason (*juxta rationem*) and, therefore, it is no longer a mystery. —

We reply, that this objection is fallacious. For a proposition that has been shown not to be against reason (*contra rationem*) does not *eo ipso* become a truth of reason, unless one sophistically assumes the point in question, namely that there can be no intermediate alternative. But this has not been demonstrated, much less is it immediately evident. To be sure, if one conceives the qualification *juxta rationem* simply as a contradictory opposite to *contra rationem*, as is commonly done in ordinary life, there is no

<sup>140)</sup> Mausbach, *ibid.* I, pp. 139—140; cf. Chr. Pesch, S. J; *Theologische Zeitschrift*, IV, p. 170, 172.

<sup>141)</sup> Mausbach, *ibid.* I, p. 140. cf. Vatican Council, (III Sess. 4 chap.) DB. n. 1796; DCD. p. 229.

other alternative; but understood in that sense strict mysteries are *juxta rationem*.<sup>142)</sup>

b) A favorite objection asserts that one can and must be able to demonstrate the non-repugnance of a strict mystery. But *once the non-repugnance of mysteries has been demonstrated, the existence of such mysteries, in many cases, has also been proven*; thus the mysterious character of the truths disappears. For example, if it has been shown that the Trinity of Persons does not conflict with the unity of the Divine Nature, the Trinity immediately appears as a pure perfection, which may not be wanting to the Infinite. Therefore reason has demonstrated the mystery and resolved it into a truth of reason. —

We reply, that one can demonstrate the non-repugnance of a proposition either *directly* and *in general*, or *indirectly by replying to every specific attack*. Now only the latter method may be used in respect to strict mysteries. I cannot show by a universal, or an aprioristic proof, drawn from the nature of the case, that there is no contradiction in the unity of the three Divine Persons; — by such a demonstration the mystery would indeed be resolved into a truth of reason and, therefore, its existence would be demonstrated. But the case is entirely different, if I answer the individual difficulties, which arise against the truth in question. This will surely be possible whenever human reason stands pitted against human reason; but that does not demonstrate that the mystery is *juxta rationem*, but rather only that the objections advanced, for the time being, do not prove its repugnance to reason.<sup>143)</sup>

2. a) Some modernists maintain that a supernatural order of truths in God, which infinitely surpass the powers and exigencies of *man's nature*, both objectively and *subjectively*, really implies *violence* to human nature. For our adhesion to supernatural mysteries must be essentially supernatural and, therefore, would not proceed from the *native vitality* of our being. Our knowledge would not be vital knowledge, but would rather be imposed authoritatively from without. This, however, is against the autonomy of reason, or against the perfect vitality of our intellect. A knowledge of that character would be for us rather a "principle of death" than of life. —

We reply, that modernists overlook the fact, that supernatural knowledge is really vital knowledge in the perfect sense of the term, since it proceeds from the natural vitality of our intellect *elevated by divine grace*, which is really a *new life of the soul*.<sup>144)</sup>

b) A further objection of modernists asserts that *we must change our notion of nature*, which is to be conceived rather as something fluent and dynamic, always progressing by evolution and containing within itself the germ of the supernatural life. —

<sup>142)</sup> Gutberlet, *ibid.* II, p. 29.      <sup>143)</sup> Gutberlet, *ibid.* II, pp. 29, 30.

<sup>144)</sup> Garrigou-Lagrange, O. P.; *ibid.* I, pp. 320, 401.

We reply, that this viewpoint really renews the error of Baius and pantheistically confuses the Divine and the human nature, as we have already stated above in the chapter on Nature and the Supernatural.<sup>145)</sup>

c) Many immanentists claim that no truth can enter into our mind, unless it be *postulated* by some other truth, which we have perceived before. —

We reply, that this assertion is false because of the underlying equivocation of the term "postulates". It is, indeed, true that no truth can be proposed to us from without, unless we have already in our mind some concepts by which we are able to perceive, at least *analogically*, the meaning of the truth revealed. But it is not at all necessary that the revealed truth be strictly connected with the concepts previously latent in our mind, or that they be absolutely postulated by them.<sup>146)</sup>

d) Finally, it is objected that an obscure revelation of supernatural mysteries is repugnant to reason, since such mysteries would be unintelligible to us and could be expressed only *metaphorically* by natural concepts. —

We reply, that supernatural mysteries could, indeed, be expressed only metaphorically by natural concepts, if some imperfection in God would follow from those concepts understood in their proper sense, but not otherwise. For from the notions of paternity, sonship, for example, no imperfection follows in respect to God, as special Theology clearly demonstrates. Therefore supernatural mysteries, although incomprehensible, are intelligible, to us, not merely metaphorically, but also analogically and properly.<sup>147)</sup>

*Conclusion:* From the above inquiry it is obvious that natural religion contains the requisite grounds and connecting ideas for a higher religion. Therefore a supernatural revelation is possible.

We shall now deal with the question of the *appropriateness* and *value* of a supernatural revelation.

## Chapter V.

### THE APPROPRIATENESS AND UTILITY OF REVELATION.

1. Not everything that is possible is also, *eo ipso*, fitting and useful. *Rationalists* object that a supernatural revelation particularly of the natural truths of religion is useless, super-

Rationalists  
and semi-  
rationalists.

<sup>145)</sup> Ibid. I, p. 401.

<sup>146)</sup> Ad. Tanqueray, *Synopsis theologiae dogmaticae*. Romae, Tornaci, Parisiis. 1922 (19. ed.), I, p. 116. n. 2.

<sup>147)</sup> Garrigou-Lagrange, O. P.; *ibid.* I. p. 401.



fluous and even harmful to the progress of science. On the other hand, *semi-rationalists*, while admitting the appropriateness and value of a divine supernatural revelation of the truths of natural religion, deny that a divine revelation of strict mysteries is fitting and useful for practically the same reasons which rationalists allege. Furthermore, the expediency and value of a mediate divine supernatural revelation have been questioned for various reasons. Consequently it is incumbent upon the Christian apologist to defend the *appropriateness (convenientia)* and the *usefulness (utilitas)* of a divine supernatural revelation 1) *in general and of the natural truths of religion in particular* and 2) *of strict mysteries*. He must show 3) that a *mediate* divine supernatural revelation is proper and valuable. We shall deal with each of these three problems in the order specified.<sup>1)</sup>

Traditional  
Christian  
position.

2. The *traditional Christian viewpoint* in this connection is expressed by the Vatican Council. After asserting that God can be known by the natural light of reason from created things, the Council teaches that "it pleased His (God's) wisdom and bounty to reveal Himself, and the eternal decrees of His will to mankind by another and supernatural way . . . It is to be ascribed to this divine revelation that such truths among things divine as of themselves are not beyond human reason can, even in the present condition of mankind be known by everyone with facility, with firm assurance, and with no admixture of error".<sup>2)</sup> Therefore "if anyone shall say that it is impossible or *inexpedient* that man should be taught by divine revelation concerning God and the worship to be paid to Him; let him be anathema".<sup>3)</sup> Furthermore, it is most fitting and useful that man should be taught supernatural

<sup>1)</sup> P. Fr. Reg. Garrigou-Lagrange, O. P.; *Theologia fundamentalis secundum S. Thomae doctrinam*, Romae et Parisiis. 1918, I, pp. 404, 405. (3. ed. 1925, pp. 216, 217).

<sup>2)</sup> "Dogmatic Constitution on the Catholic Faith" (III Sess. 2 chap.), in DB. n. 1785; DCD. p. 220; cf. also sixth condemned proposition in the *Syllabus* of Pius IX, in DB. n. 1706; DCD. p. 188: "The faith of Christ is in opposition to human reason, and divine revelation not only is not useful, but is even hurtful to the perfection of man".

<sup>3)</sup> DB. n. 1807; DCD. p. 234.

truths hidden in God (strict mysteries) by the direct activity of God's word, "because God of His infinite goodness, has ordained man to a supernatural end, *viz.*, to be a sharer of divine blessings which utterly exceed the intelligence of the human mind; 'for eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man, what things God hath prepared for them that love Him'" (I Cor. ii, 9).<sup>4</sup>) Consequently there are reason and purposes most worthy of God as well as blessings most worthy of man's desires, which give to a divine supernatural revelation a fitness and a value far above that of purely natural knowledge.

This does not, however, mean that it would be unbecoming on the part of God, if He were to omit such a revelation. But on the hypothesis that God *freely* chooses to impart a supernatural revelation, whether it embraces merely the natural truths of religion or also an order of supernatural truths hidden in God, we must admit that such a revelation causes the divine perfections to shine forth with special splendor and glory.<sup>5</sup>)

## I.

**THESIS: "Divine supernatural revelation in general, and of the natural truths of religion in particular, is most fitting and useful".**

1. a) A divine supernatural revelation is a *new manifestation of the divine perfections*. For if we consider the *manner* in which it takes place, supernatural revelation appears as a *miracle* and, as such, manifests to us in a marvelous manner the existence of God, His glorious power and other perfections. Viewed in its *essence* a divine supernatural revelation is a *divine utterance* and, as such, communicates to us the most sublime truths in which God's wisdom and knowledge shine forth far more splendidly than in the works of creation or in purely natural revelation. For God speaks directly to man as a person conversing with a person and not

New evidences of the divine perfections — new communications of divine blessings

<sup>4</sup>) DB. n. 1786; DCD. p. 220 sq.

<sup>5</sup>) H. Van Laak, S. J.; *Institutionum theologiae fundamentalis Repetitorium ad usum privatum auditorum universitatis Gregorianae*. Romae. 1921, Pars I, p. 32.

merely indirectly through the works of His hands. Finally, divine supernatural revelation demands absolute faith on the part of man; this *effect* of the divine self-communication, namely man's unconditional obedience and submission to the authority of God revealing, displays the divine dominion over His creature in the brightest light.

b) A divine supernatural revelation is likewise a *new communication of blessings and benefits to man*, which is unquestionably most worthy of God, the Supreme Good. This divine instruction perfects our intellect and disposes us to give to God greater praise and glory. Thereby we also acquire more perfect norms for our practical moral life.<sup>6)</sup> Indeed every imparting of truth is useful to man. Surely then the instruction which God grants to us through the medium of a supernatural revelation must be of the greatest value. Moreover, the instruction becomes all the more valuable the *wiser and more truthful*, the *freer from error* the teacher is, who imparts the instruction; the better the *method of instruction* is adapted to the pupil and the *greater the importance of the truths* to be imparted. Now in a divine supernatural revelation God Himself is the teacher, infinite truth and wisdom. The method which He employs, namely authority, is most in keeping with the ordinary manner in which man learns most things. For from earliest childhood man has recourse to teachers and learned men to acquire a knowledge of what is necessary for any specific period of life. Nearly all the sciences and the social order rest entirely or, for the most part, upon external authority. Most men are, furthermore, incapable of acquiring a knowledge of the chief truths of life by their own efforts, either because they lack the requisite talents, or the time, or for other reasons. Hence if they do not wish to remain ignorant, they are obliged to accept these truths upon the authority of others.<sup>7)</sup> Finally, the instruction imparted to us by divine supernatural revelation is concerned with truths of the highest import, namely with religion, with

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<sup>6)</sup> Aemil. Dorsch, S. J.; *Institutiones theologiae fundamentalis*. Oneponte. 1916, I, p. 333.

<sup>7)</sup> Ibidem I, pp. 334, 335.



God and man's relations to God, the final end of all things.<sup>8)</sup>

2. The religious truths which we can *easily* know, without a supernatural revelation, become all the *more certain* and *vivid*, if they are communicated to us through the immediate self-communication of God Himself. And the truths derived from the nature of things and from the testimony of history, which we find it *more difficult* to know, without a supernatural revelation, can be learned *from the very dawn of reason by all men*, even by the unlettered, *with greater facility, without any admixture of error, with the greatest certitude, and in all their amplitude*, if they are imparted to us through the medium of a direct self-communication of God Himself.<sup>9)</sup> For example, a) the *existence of God* is guaranteed to us, not merely by logical deduction, as in natural revelation, but also by the immediate and direct act and word of God Himself; not only by His "works", but likewise by His personal "words" and "deeds". b) The *essence of God*, as the spiritual and living Creator, emerges from behind the veil of Nature; the wise and the loving purposes of God, which otherwise are hidden amidst the course of Nature and of history, are uttered in a most solemn manner through a divine supernatural revelation. Finally, c) *man's relations to God*, the hope in God's protection and pardon, man's firm confidence in *eternal life*, which easily wavers and grows unsteady because of death and dissolution, become strengthened by God's positive commands and promises, which are made manifest to us in an immediate divine supernatural revelation.<sup>10)</sup>

Divine revelation imparts knowledge more easily, surely and universally.

3. a) Rationalists object that the divine supernatural revelation of the natural truths of religion is not only *useless*, but also *superfluous*, since these truths are already known to human reason. —

Negative argument. Refutation of objections.

<sup>8)</sup> Ibid. I, p. 335; cf. St. Augustine, *De utilitate credendi*, n. 24; 28; *De moribus eccl.* I, 11 sq; St. Thomas, *ST.* II, II, q. 2, 2. 4; Hettinger-Müller, *Apologie des Christentums*, Freiburg i. B. 1915 (10. ed.), II, Part II: "*Der Beweis des Christentums*", pp. 6 sq.

<sup>9)</sup> Van Laak, S. J; *ibid.* I, p. 33.

<sup>10)</sup> Jos. Mausbach, *Grundzüge der katholischen Apologetik*. Münster i. W. 1921 (3.—4. ed.), p. 19.

We reply, that it is false to assert that all, or even the greater part of these truths, are already known with the same clearness and certitude as they are after they have been revealed to us supernaturally. History proves the contrary, as we shall show in detail in the chapter on the necessity of a supernatural revelation.<sup>11)</sup>

b) A favorite objection, particularly of certain modernists, claims that the divine supernatural revelation of many truths unduly interferes with the *freedom of science*, since it imposes immutable doctrines which are expressed according to the concepts of a particular age. —

We reply, that science is knowledge derived from intrinsic causes. Now a divine supernatural revelation in no way impedes the inquiry into the intrinsic causes of things revealed. On the contrary, it is really a new external and infallible norm, which enables us *to avoid errors all the more efficaciously* and renders our knowledge all the more secure.<sup>12)</sup> A divine supernatural revelation does, indeed, restrict our liberty in the matter of overstepping the bounds of truth, but it does not deprive us of the freedom of inquiring into the truth. For God cannot reveal anything except the truth; the freedom of scientific investigation is the freedom of applying the principles and the proper method in the discovery of truth. Hence Christ has said: "If you continue in my word, you shall be my disciples indeed. And you shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free" (St. John viii, 31 f.). Revealed truth not only frees us from evil passions, from sins, inasmuch as it manifests to us what is good, but it also makes known to us the principle for the synthesis of all truths. For this principle can only be the First Truth and whoever rejects the First Truth is incapable of harmonizing particular truths. Such a person imagines that among these particular truths there are antinomies and gradually lapses into relativism, that is, he fancies that all opinions are relatively true. In the end, he arrives at the absolute denial of the first principles of truth, as Hegel did. But absolute freedom to affirm all things, even contradictories, gives the death blow to all science. Thus a divine supernatural revelation is really the custodian of reason and of legitimate liberty.<sup>13)</sup>

c) A divine supernatural revelation is said to be *harmful to science*, for a person who has received truths through a supernatural revelation will of necessity *lack the stimulus to scientific*

<sup>11)</sup> Garrigou-Lagrange, O. P.; *ibid.* I, p. 420.

<sup>12)</sup> Van Laak, S. J.; *ibid.* I, p. 33.

<sup>13)</sup> Garrigou-Lagrange, O. P.; *ibid.* I, pp. 420, 421; cf. especially Jos. Donat, S. J.; *The Freedom of Science*. English transl. N. Y. 1914, pp. 1—12 and *passim*.

*inquiry*; the habit of believing without question revealed truths will gradually cause him to lose a taste for matters scientific. —

We reply, that this stricture might indeed have value, if all truths were revealed to us with the greatest clarity, but not if there are many truths which a divine supernatural revelation does not disclose to us, or which it does not impart with absolute clearness. Moreover, history testifies that the believers in a supernatural revelation have always been the most faithful custodians of the profane sciences, as *Harnack* freely admits in respect to the great scholastic philosophers and theologians of the Middle Ages.<sup>14)</sup>

d) The poet and philosopher *Lessing* raises the captious objection that the certain possession of religious truth makes one proud and indolent; that the *restless searching for the truth* is truly human; that the *inquiry into truth is more perfect than the actual possession of truth*, since the desire and effort expended in investigating the truth perfects the intellect. —

We reply, that the human intellect is, indeed, made more perfect through the effort of investigation than through the omission of such effort; but it is not true to assert that the intellect is made more perfect through the inquiry into truth than through the actual possession of the truth, for the possession of truth is the end of intellectual effort and investigation.<sup>15)</sup> All inquiry is directed to the discovery and the possession of truth; and truth found is an encouragement and support for further inquiry; whereas unsuccessful seeking discourages and makes the searcher weary. Now divine supernatural revelation provides just such a support; it opens up, at the same time, the vision of man into realms of far-reaching extent; it places before the believer further tasks; it stimulates to spiritual and moral progress; it bestows humility and, at the same time, gives trust and confidence.<sup>16)</sup>

Therefore a divine supernatural revelation in general, and of the natural truths of religion in particular, is most fitting and useful.

<sup>14)</sup> A. Harnack. *Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte*, cf. above p. 74, note 40. The Protestant historian of dogma, R. Seeberg, says that a due historical appreciation of the religious, ecclesiastical and scientific conditions, from which scholasticism proceeded, "will lead to the verdict that scholasticism fixed its vision firmly upon the loftiest goals of human knowledge, and that it strove for their attainment with a marvelous untiring acumen, faithfully availing itself of all means at its disposal" (Art. "Scholasticism" in *SHERK*, X, p. 259); cf. John S. Zyburia, *Present-Day Thinkers and the New Scholasticism*. An International Symposium. St. Louis, Mo. & London. 1926, *passim*.

<sup>15)</sup> Dorsch, S. J; *ibid.* I, p. 335.

<sup>16)</sup> Mausbach, *Grundzüge etc.*, p. 13. cf. Vosen-Weber, *Das Christentum und die Einsprüche seiner Gegner*. Freiburg i. B. 1905 (5. ed.). pp. 41 sq.



## II.

THESIS: "The divine supernatural revelation of mysteries is most fitting and useful".

Supernatural  
revelation of  
mysteries per-  
fects religion.

1. The divine supernatural revelation of mysteries makes it possible for man to render to God the *highest act of religion*, namely the surrender of reason to the incomprehensible God. Thereby man pays to God a tribute that is most worthy of God and of himself and acknowledges God's supreme dominion in the world of the spirit, in the realm of ideas.

The ancient myths represent the greatness of God by means of concepts based on the senses, which are oftentimes of a very exaggerated character (Hindus, Greeks); even among the Hebrews the sensible element comes to the fore in the descriptions of God's greatness (El Schadai). But in the Christian revelation God appears before the human spirit in all His majesty and *spiritual* greatness, which thought is incapable of comprehending and human intelligence cannot understand.<sup>17)</sup>

Even the semi-darkness, which clings to a mystery and is impervious to human investigation, is pregnant with religious significance. For it makes the creature conscious of his intellectual helplessness in respect to the Infinite and awakens in him a *religious awe and reverence for the Deity*. Indeed without the reality and supernatural content of supermundane mysteries what would Christmas, Easter and Pentecost mean to Christian *piety*, to the fervor of faith and the flight of hope, to the religious emotion, exaltation and comfort of the Christian soul? The pillar of cloud, which precedes us in the desert of life, sends forth ever and anon rays of fire to light up our path and to vivify the courage of our earthly pilgrimage.<sup>18)</sup>

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<sup>17)</sup> Hettinger-Weber, *Lehrbuch der Fundamentaltheologie oder Apologetik*. Freiburg i. B. 1913 (3. ed.), p. 146; cf. St. Thomas, *SCG.* 1, 5: "For then alone do we know God truly, when we believe that He is *far above all that man can possibly think of God*, because the divine essence surpasses man's natural knowledge, as stated above (Book 3). Hence by the fact that certain things about God are proposed to man, which surpass his reason, he is strengthened in his opinion that God is *far above what he is able to think*".

<sup>18)</sup> Jos. Mausbach, *Die Religion und das moderne Seelenleben*, in RCK, I, p. 146.

2. To believe in truths which are witnessed to by God Himself, without our being able to comprehend them, is not only not against the essence of the human spirit, but rather in perfect harmony with it. For it is an essential postulate of reason not to accept anything except upon evidence. Now this postulate of reason receives full satisfaction when the intellect assents to revealed mysteries; for reason sees clearly that infinite truth itself guarantees those mysteries. Moreover, if it accords with human nature to believe one's fellowman in order thereby to enrich one's theoretical and practical knowledge, surely it must appear most desirable to surrender oneself by faith to infinite truth itself and by the communication of mysteries to receive most sublime and unlooked for enlightenment concerning God, man's relations with God and other realities. The mysterious element, which remains even after the truth has been imparted to us, is not contrary to our natural inclinations; it is in most perfect harmony with them.<sup>19)</sup> For the history of superstition, of esoteric doctrines, of secret societies, of mystery-cults, shows that the mysterious exercises a most powerful charm over man. Even though there is admittedly much absurdity bound up with the mysterious at times, still a belief in mysteries is much more natural to man than infidelity and the so-called "Illuminism", which appear only sporadically in human history. If "there is nothing in life, in art, in the State, that is really deep without mysteries" (*Strauss*), surely reason ought not to search in vain for mysteries in that which is highest and deepest, namely in supernatural religion. Therefore the sacrifice of reason, understood in the proper sense, is for the unprejudiced and unspoiled intellect, not indeed a pressing load, but rather an agreeable necessity.<sup>20)</sup>

Belief in  
mysteries  
more natural  
than unbelief.

3. The communication of mysteries by means of a supernatural revelation is likewise productive of the *most practical results* for the believer. For a mystery is the foundation and

Practical  
consequences  
of a belief in  
mysteries.

<sup>19)</sup> C. Gutberlet, *Lehrbuch der Apologetik*. Münster i. W. 1904 (3. ed.), II, p. 30.

<sup>20)</sup> Ibid. II, p. 31; cf. Hettinger-Bowden, *Revealed Religion*. N. Y. 1895 (2. ed.), pp. 33 sq.

starting-point for a new life. The mysteries of the Blessed Trinity, the Incarnation and the Redemption, condition our supernatural sonship; and this sonship itself, especially in its final consummation, the beatific vision, is a state so sublime, that we are able to comprehend it only with difficulty or, to speak more correctly, not at all. Likewise the other mysteries, particularly the Holy Eucharist, imply the greatest privileges for man.<sup>21)</sup> Thus the religious life of man receives new purposes and duties, new impulses and motives, and is raised to the sphere of the Supernatural.<sup>22)</sup>

It is false, therefore, to assert that mysteries, especially purely theoretical mysteries, exert no influence at all upon the life of the believer by reason of their incomprehensibility. For purely speculative mysteries are also of the highest importance for the moral life precisely because, on the one hand, they place before man's eyes his own intellectual weakness, and on the other hand, they effect the most meritorious act of religious worship, the most beautiful deed, namely the sacrifice of the noblest part of human nature, reason, to the Lord God.<sup>23)</sup>

Influence of  
a belief in  
mysteries on  
human pro-  
gress.

4. From the revelation of mysteries there result, even for human reason itself in its own sphere, disclosures of the most far-reaching significance. How has not the mystery of the Blessed Trinity, for example, clarified our concepts of nature, of person, of hypostasis! What information does not the mystery of the Holy Eucharist impart to us concerning the essence of bodies and their laws! The mystery of original sin in respect to guilt, to morality and divine justice! Nothing has promoted so mightily philosophical *speculation* as the incomprehensibility of the Christian mysteries. The desire to spread some little light upon these supernatural truths, to find points of contact for these mysteries in the world of creatures, to bring them into harmony with one another, has stimulated the most acute thinkers to tireless investigation.<sup>24)</sup>

<sup>21)</sup> Gutberlet, *ibid.* II, pp. 30, 31.

<sup>22)</sup> Schill-Straubinger, *Theologische Prinzipienlehre*. Paderborn. 1923 (5. ed.), p. 189.

<sup>23)</sup> Gutberlet, *ibid.* II, p. 31; cf. Hettinger-Bowden, *ibid.* pp. 38 sq.

<sup>24)</sup> Gutberlet, *ibid.* II, pp. 31, 32.



The great ecclesiastical thinkers of antiquity have grown up in the midst of the trinitarian and christological controversies; the genius of Augustine has developed to full vigor by delving into the mysteries of the Trinity, of grace, of the Church; from Anselm to Luther the problems of redemption and justification have stimulated the thought of the mightiest thinkers in the Church and have promoted the development of Theology.<sup>25)</sup>

It is, indeed, true that the results of these speculations are oftentimes spoken of disparagingly as scholastic hair-splitting and it may be true, that sometimes these investigations of the Scholastics have been overdone. But if one will only look at the sublime thoughts of a healthy science of faith a little more closely, it will be evident, that for sublimity and depth no purely natural speculation approaches, even remotely, the accomplishments of the great Scholastics. The purely formal sharpening of human intelligence by speculation on the mysteries has rendered such essential services to human reason, that the reproach of obscurantism and of enslavement of reason by a belief in mysteries appears most unjust indeed.<sup>26)</sup>

Objection.

5. Christian *mysticism*, with its tender blossoms of sanctity and poetic enthusiasm, is rooted deeply in the mysteries of the Incarnation, the Passion and the Holy Eucharist.<sup>27)</sup> What sublime inspirations does not *art* owe precisely to the mysteries of Christianity, to the believing veneration of the Virgin Mother, to the Lamb of God on the cross, to the Blessed Eucharist! That mystery, which is strangest to non-Catholics, the Holy Eucharist, has really called forth the highest masterpieces of art, the Gothic cathedrals, the *autos sacramentales*,<sup>28)</sup> the *Disputa* of Raphael and the *Missa Solemnis* of Beethoven.<sup>29)</sup> Christian mysteries have given to the masterpieces of Christian art, architecture, sculpture, painting etc. a sublimity, a wealth of meaning and a soulful fervor, of which cold intellectual or sensual antiquity, despite its technical perfection and formal beauty, is hardly able to show a trace.<sup>30)</sup>

Influence of a belief in mysteries on mysticism etc.

<sup>25)</sup> Mausbach, *Die Religion etc.*, I, pp. 141, 142.

<sup>26)</sup> Gutberlet, *ibid.* II, p. 32; cf. Zyburá, *ibid. passim.*

<sup>27)</sup> *Ibid.* II,

p. 32.

<sup>28)</sup> cf. Venture Fuentes, art. "*Autos sacramentales*", in CE. II, pp. 143 sq.

<sup>29)</sup> Mausbach, *Die Religion etc.*, I, p. 141.

<sup>30)</sup> Gutberlet, *ibid.* II, p. 32.

Fruitful influence of mysteries on the love of God and man.

6. Finally, the mysteries of the divine love, particularly the Incarnation and the Holy Eucharist, have inflamed numberless hearts with the *love of God and of man* so ardent, that it could not and cannot be comprehended by the pagans and by the world in general; and so mighty is this charity that neither the pagans nor the world generally can withdraw themselves entirely from the rays of divine faith. Thus mysteries have given to human nature in every direction impulses for progress and development, which would never have been possible even to the clearest insight into rational truths. In mysteries there is latent, above all else, the mighty ferment, by which Christianity has imparted to the world of human culture that specifically *spiritual* tendency by reason of which it stands superior to all purely worldly culture.<sup>31)</sup>

We have already answered the chief objections of rationalists and semi-rationalists against the appropriateness and utility of a supernatural revelation of mysteries, when we dealt with the concept and existence of strict mysteries<sup>32)</sup>; for a false notion of a strict supernatural mystery leads to erroneous views in respect to the possibility, the fitness and value of a divine supernatural revelation of such truths.

The appropriateness and utility of a divine supernatural revelation of mysteries cannot, therefore, be reasonably called into question. We shall now treat of mediate revelation.

### III.

**THESIS: "A mediate divine supernatural revelation is most fitting and useful".**

State of the question.

a) Many rationalists deny the appropriateness and value of a *mediate* divine supernatural revelation. For God wishes to receive all men, so they object, into His immediate divine communion; therefore it is far more fitting that He should reveal Himself directly not only to the greatest prophets, but likewise to the smallest in the kingdom of heaven (*Sabatier*). Moreover, a mediate supernatural revelation has the disadvantage that it can be communicated only to a few and that there will always be many who will never hear the prophet's message.

b) We freely admit that an immediate divine supernatural revelation might, indeed, offer to the religious life of mankind many advantages, which are lacking to a mediate divine

<sup>31)</sup> Ibid. II, p. 32.

<sup>32)</sup> cf. above chap. 4. pp. 107 sq.

revelation. But this is no reason for asserting that a mediate supernatural revelation of God is inappropriate and valueless<sup>33</sup>), as will be obvious from a thoughtful consideration of the arguments given below. If God so chose, He might, indeed, strictly speaking, convince mankind of the truths of revelation by means of an immediate, interior illumination and instruction. In that case, every man would be his own prophet and apostle. Such a system of private revelations could, indeed, unite its recipients into a communion of mind and heart by the invisible ties of faith and charity. But it would be powerless to cement them into a firm union of external organization; there would be no teaching, ruling and punitive Church. As a matter of fact, the history of Pietism, Quakerdom and of the multitudinous sects of Protestantism, shows conclusively to what lengths the claims of a private inspiration of the Bible lead. Not the Holy Spirit, but man's own private and deceptive spirit, could give occasion to so many contradictory interpretations of the revealed word of God.<sup>34</sup>) Thus a system of private revelations granted immediately to all men tends to individualism and subjectivism.

1. Mediate divine supernatural revelation is *in perfect harmony with the order of all creation* according to which God carries out His designs through the medium of intermediate and instrumental causes. One of the very first laws of the natural order is "the law of intermediate causes". That is to say, the First Cause does not itself do what it can execute through the agency of creatural, secondary causes. Just as a king rules the State through his officials, so too God rules the world through His chosen representatives and agents. Surely it is antecedently probable, that the law of intermediate causes should also obtain in the supernatural order. It accords, then, with the divine *wisdom* that in the matter of his eternal salvation man should be directed to other men, in order to receive instruction and blessings from them in God's name. Moreover, one has only to consult the *actual historical development* of divine supernatural revelation to note the practical application of this law in the economy of salvation.

The second law of Divine Providence in nature is "the law of parsimony", which Scholastics formulate in the axiom:

From the analogy of God's activity in nature.

<sup>33</sup>) J. Brunsmann, S. V. D; *Lehrbuch der Apologetik*, St. Gabriel bei Wien 1924, I, "Religion und Offenbarung", pp. 136, 137.

<sup>34</sup>) Jos. Pohle, *Natur und Übernatur*, in RCK. I, pp. 400, 401.



"non sunt multiplicanda entia sine necessitate — entities are not to be multiplied without necessity". Now this principle would be seriously impaired, if God repeated the miracle of immediate revelation as often as there were individuals needing divine instruction. Surely here again God's dealing with men shines forth as truly wise and His *omnipotence* appears in the clearest light, since He employs miracles sparingly and accomplishes with few means the very same results, yes even higher results, when He uses the prophets and the Church to spread His revealed teachings and laws among mankind in general.<sup>35)</sup>

From the  
analogy of  
human acti-  
vity.

2. In *human culture*, in the *moral and religious life*, there is an intermediate communication of spiritual blessings through genius, authority and tradition. Surely then it is most fitting that the same process should be verified in respect to God's dealings with mankind in the order of grace.

Means of  
glorifying God  
in history.

3. Error and sin have become mighty historical powers in the world. Therefore truth and morality also demanded a great *historical glorification of God*. Mediate divine supernatural revelation is indeed a most patent evidence of the power and might of truth and morality; for God's chosen messengers, particularly in periods of moral and intellectual darkness, proclaim the sovereign power of divine truth and goodness in the face of a sinful and ignorant world, as the history of the Old and New Testaments plainly shows.

An occasion  
for the prac-  
tise of social  
virtues.

4. Then too, the gift and the authority of teaching on the one hand, and the grace of faith on the other hand, awaken special *social and religious virtues*, as for instance, apostolic zeal, apologetical depth, a feeling of unity, humility, discipline of the mind etc.

Historical  
argument.

Finally, 5. the *history of religions* testifies to the undeniable fact, that all peoples are accustomed to receive revelation alleged to be divine through the agency of mediators.<sup>36)</sup> Therefore the appropriateness and utility of mediate divine supernatural revelation cannot be reasonably denied.

<sup>35)</sup> Pohle, *ibid.* I, pp. 402, 403.

<sup>36)</sup> Mausbach, *Grundzüge etc.*, p. 11; cf. Van Laak, S. J., *ibid.* I, p. 36.

We shall now deal with the problem of the *necessity* of a divine supernatural revelation.

## Chapter VI.

### THE NECESSITY OF SUPERNATURAL REVELATION.

Plotin, the real founder of Neo-Platonism, is said to have spoken the proud words: "The gods must come to me, not I to them". Inasmuch as these words seem to acknowledge the necessity of a divine help, they contain a grain of truth. But they also give expression to the deep sighing of the pagan heart, to the cry for light to illumine the riddles, which only a god can unveil to us fully and completely. Plotin's utterance was only the echo of the aspiration of his more distinguished predecessor, Plato, who in his "Apology of Socrates" penned these remarkable words: "We must expect that some one will come and teach us how we are to act as regards the gods and our fellowmen; only a god can enlighten us". Thereby the necessity of divine revelation, from the religious and moral viewpoint, is acknowledged by one of the noblest philosophers of antiquity.<sup>1)</sup> We shall now inquire in what sense a divine supernatural revelation must be said to be *necessary*.

Purpose of  
this treatise.

The purpose of this investigation is not, indeed, to enable us to conclude from the necessity of a divine revelation to its actual existence, as certain rationalists (*e. g. Sabatier*) falsely accuse us of doing. Apologetics demonstrates the fact of a divine supernatural revelation on other grounds. We shall defend the necessity of a divine revelation for the following reasons: 1) a thoughtful consideration of the arguments on behalf of this necessity will show how groundless are the claims of *rationalists*, that a supernatural revelation, at least as regards the truths of natural religion, is superfluous; 2) the "*modern mind*" will be more disposed to consider the Christian viewpoint and 3) *believers* in a divine supernatural revelation will recognize more vividly the value and advantages of supernatural revelation and the merciful

<sup>1)</sup> Jos. Pohle, *Natur und Übernatur*, in RCK, I. p. 451.

condescension of God in coming to the assistance of weak human nature.<sup>2)</sup> We begin by establishing the notion of necessity and its kinds in respect to a divine supernatural revelation.

Notion and  
kinds of  
necessity.

1. In the first place, it is obvious that there can be no question of an *absolute* or *aprioristic necessity* of a divine supernatural revelation (*necessitas absoluta et antecedens*), in the sense that a supernatural revelation is demanded for reasons intrinsic to the essence of God or to the natural relations of man to God, that is, to the essence of religion.<sup>3)</sup> For in that case God would be placed in a relation of necessary dependence upon creation after the manner of pantheism.<sup>4)</sup> Moreover, just as creation is the work of God's free love, so too God's self-manifestation to man is the work of His *free* love.<sup>5)</sup> Therefore a divine supernatural revelation can be said to be necessary only for extrinsic reasons. "As in the natural revelation the divine majesty was unveiled for God's honor and glory, which man, as the eye of creation, was bound to learn and to declare, so that same divine majesty has been supernaturally revealed to foster the inner life of the soul, and to promote the soul's salvation in God. The higher *end* which supernatural revelation proposes to itself renders revelation a necessity".<sup>6)</sup>

Hence we speak of a *relative* or *hypothetical* necessity of supernatural revelation (*necessitas relativa et hypothetica vel consequens*). That is to say, certain free designs of God cannot be fulfilled and certain actual needs of man cannot be satisfied save by a supernatural revelation of God to man.

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<sup>2)</sup> J. Brunsmann, S. V. D; *Lehrbuch der Apologetik*. St. Gabriel bei Wien. 1924, I, "Religion und Offenbarung", p. 139.

<sup>3)</sup> S. Weber, *Christliche Apologetik*, Freiburg i. B. 1907, p. 230.

<sup>4)</sup> *Ibid.* p. 231.

<sup>5)</sup> Hettinger-Weber, *Lehrbuch der Fundamentaltheologie oder Apologetik*. Freiburg i. B. 1913 (3. ed.), p. 147; cf. St. Thomas, *ST.* I, q. 44, a. 4: "It does not belong to the First Agent, Who is Agent only, to act for the acquisition of some end; He intends only to communicate His perfection, which is goodness"; *ibid.* ad 1: "He is alone the most perfectly liberal giver, because He does not act for His own utility, but only for His own goodness".

<sup>6)</sup> P. Schanz, *A Christian Apology*. English transl. by Glancey & Schobel. N. Y. (4. revised ed.), II: "God and Revelation", pp. 274, 275.



We distinguish two kinds of relative or conditional necessity: a) if this fulfilment of the divine plans or the satisfaction of human needs postulates a divine supernatural revelation as an essential means, divine revelation is said to be *physically* or *strictly* necessary (*necessitas physica vel stricta*). This kind of necessity implies a lack of means in the physical order on the part of man. b) If, however, divine supernatural revelation is postulated only for personal reasons or circumstances, it is said to be *morally* necessary (*necessitas moralis*). Understood in this latter sense, a divine supernatural revelation is merely of the *greatest utility* for the attainment of the end in question.<sup>7)</sup> Moral necessity presupposes moral impotency on the part of man. It implies a great difficulty which cannot be actually overcome according to the ordinary conditions of life. Man is, indeed, physically able to surmount the obstacles that stand in the way of attaining the end in question, but, considering the concrete circumstances of human life, man is actually unable to reach that end through his own natural resources.<sup>8)</sup>

Finally, a moral necessity is either *objective*, if the personal needs of man are rooted in the general conditions that obtain, or *subjective*, if it involves a moral obligation on the part of man to accept a divine supernatural revelation.<sup>9)</sup>

2. Besides the notion and kinds of necessity the question of man's *end* or destiny is also of fundamental importance in this connection. On the hypothesis that God willed to create man, He could not have set for him any other end except the knowledge and love of his Creator, the highest good. This possession of God through knowledge and love can be either a) a *natural* end, which corresponds to the natural power and desire of man or b) a *supernatural* end, which surpasses all the powers and desires of human nature. The former order of man's destiny follows necessarily from the divine plan of

Natural and  
supernatural  
ends.

<sup>7)</sup> Weber, *ibid.* p. 230; cf. P. Fr. Reg. Garrigou-Lagrange, O. P.; *Theologia fundamentalis secundum S. Thomae doctrinam*. Romae et Parisiis. 1918, I, pp. 408 sq.

<sup>8)</sup> Aemil. Dorsch, S. J.; *Institutiones theologiae fundamentalis*. Oeniponte. 1916, I, p. 324; cf. Garrigou-Lagrange, O. P; *ibid.* I, pp. 408 sq.

<sup>9)</sup> Weber, *ibid.* pp. 230, 231.

creation and from the very concept of man; it is, therefore, known to us by rational thought. But the other order of man's destiny is a fruit of the free grace of God and is, therefore, knowable only by a positive divine revelation.<sup>10)</sup>

In the light of these preliminary notions and distinctions we shall now proceed to defend the necessity of a divine supernatural revelation in the two following theses.

# I.

**THESIS: "On the hypothesis that man is destined to a supernatural end a divine supernatural revelation is strictly (physically) necessary".<sup>11)</sup>**

Argument.

St. Thomas teaches<sup>12)</sup> that if men are to direct their thoughts and actions to an end, it is strictly necessary that they should first know that end; for nothing is willed that is not first known. Now the supernatural end towards which men are to direct their thoughts and actions, cannot be known save by a divine supernatural revelation. For the order of *supernatural* truth infinitely surpasses the objective medium of our *natural* knowledge, as the very concept of "supernatural truth" implies.<sup>13)</sup> In other words, man can deduce his life's task only from the dispositions of his own essence, and these point only to a natural end of life. Moreover, the vocation to the Supernatural is a *free* act of God's grace, and of this man can know nothing without a divine supernatural revelation. Man's will is even weaker than his intellect. It needs even more urgently than his reason a divine supernatural assistance, if it is to attain the purpose of life, which a supernatural knowledge reveals. Man is able to perform supernatural deeds only if his faculties are intensified beyond the measure of Nature.<sup>14)</sup> Therefore, if we assume that man has been gratuitously destined by God to a supernatural end, a divine supernatural revelation is strictly (physically) necessary.

However, since we have not yet demonstrated the existence of a supernatural order, we are not now directly con-

<sup>10)</sup> Hettinger-Weber, *ibid.* p. 147; cf. St. Thomas, *De Veritate*, q. 14, a. 2; *SCG.* 5, 1.

<sup>11)</sup> The Vatican Council (III Sess. 2 chap.) teaches that a divine supernatural revelation is absolutely (that is, strictly) necessary, "because God of His infinite goodness, has ordained man to a supernatural end, *viz.*, to be a sharer of divine blessings which utterly exceed the intelligence of the human mind" (in DB. n. 1786; DCD. p. 221). Hence this proposition is *de fide*.<sup>12)</sup> ST. I, q. 1. a. 1.

<sup>13)</sup> Garrigou-Lagrange, O. P.; *ibid.* I, p. 415.

<sup>14)</sup> Fr. Sawicki, *Die Wahrheit des Christentums*. Paderborn. 1920 (4. ed.), pp. 252—255.

cerned with the truth expressed in the above proposition. But we know by *reason* and *philosophy* that man is destined to a *natural end*, that is, to eternal happiness proportionate to human nature, and that man can attain this end by the practise of natural religion. Hence the question arises: Is a divine supernatural revelation necessary in order that man may be able to know the theoretical and practical truths of natural religion? If so, in what sense is such a revelation necessary? The answer is given in the following proposition.

## II.

**THESIS:** "After the human race had lapsed into polytheism a divine supernatural revelation became morally necessary for mankind in its present condition, to enable all men to arrive at a relatively perfect and certain knowledge of the truths of natural religion and morality".<sup>15)</sup>

1. "The history of mankind is the history of its estrangements from God, and the consequent loss of the true idea of religion. Offspring though he was of race divine, man soon forgot his supernatural destiny, bowed down before idols, and worshipped the work of his own hands. Thus a dark night of superstition and idolatry covered the earth".<sup>16)</sup> Monotheistic religion all but disappeared from the face of the earth. From that time to the present the condition of mankind, religiously and morally, became more and more precarious. Man's religious knowledge waxed more difficult and was disturbed by untoward circumstances.<sup>17)</sup> Our thesis has reference to this historical development or rather degenera-

State of the question.  
Pagan humanity as history displays it.

<sup>15)</sup> Theologically it is *de fide*, that a divine supernatural revelation is relatively or morally necessary, in order that mankind may be able to arrive at an easy and certain knowledge of the natural truths of religion. The Vatican Council (III Sess. 2 chap.) states: "It is to be ascribed to this divine revelation that such truths among things divine as of themselves are not beyond reason can, even in the present condition of mankind, be known by everyone with facility, with firm assurance, and with no admixture of error" (in DB. n. 1786; DCD. p. 221). Apologetically the proposition stated above may be qualified as *historically certain*, for it is based on the concrete facts of experience and history, which are absolutely independent of divine revelation.

<sup>16)</sup> Hettinger-Bowden, *Revealed Religion*. N. Y. (2. ed.), p. 44.

<sup>17)</sup> H. Felder, O. M. Cap., *Apologetica*. Paderborn. 1920, I, p. 48.



tion of the human race. We assert that from the time when the worship of false gods was introduced and obtained almost universally, it became practically impossible for mankind, left to its own resources, to know the truths and precepts of natural religion for the proper ordering of human life.<sup>18)</sup> Some special divine intervention was necessary "*even in the interests of natural religion*".<sup>19)</sup> Hence we are considering man from the viewpoint of his purely *natural powers* and his *natural end* or destiny.

Hypothetical  
state of pure  
nature.

However, while focusing our attention upon man's natural destiny and the means proportionate to that end, we are fully aware of the fact, that man really never existed in a state of pure nature (*natura pura*). For such a state is not a historical, but only a purely possible state. "The concept of the *status naturae purae* involves only such notes as belong to the essence of human nature and are due to it by virtue of creation, preservation, concurrence, and the general providence of God. Among the things that are due to man, as man, (aside from his physical endowment which is included in the definition of *animal rationale*), is the ethical faculty of knowing God as his natural end and of discovering and observing the moral law of nature. This is, man must be able, by leading a naturally good life, to attain to his natural destiny, which would consist not in the beatific vision, but in an abstractive knowledge of God apt to render the creature naturally happy. To these positive notes must be added a negative one, *viz.*: the exclusion of all such prerogatives as are either strictly supernatural (*e. g.*, grace, actual and habitual), or at least preternatural".<sup>20)</sup> On the hypothesis of the state of pure nature man ought to be able to arrive at a knowledge of naturally necessary truths by the ordinary use of his reason; for otherwise man's nature would have been defectively constituted by God, which is repugnant to the divine wisdom.<sup>21)</sup> Therefore *per se* such a state is possible. To deny this would be "tantamount to asserting that God was bound to endow man with supernatural graces and prerogatives", which is at variance with sound Catholic teaching.<sup>22)</sup>

<sup>18)</sup> J. Ottiger, S. J; *Theologia fundamentalis*. Friburgi Brisgoviae. MDCCCXCVII, I: *De revelatione*. p. 92.

<sup>19)</sup> Schill-Straubinger, *Theologische Prinzipienlehre*. Paderborn. 1923 (5. ed.), p. 190.

<sup>20)</sup> Pohle-Preuss, *God, The Author of Nature and the Supernatural*. St. Louis, Mo. 1916 (2. ed.), pp. 227—229.

<sup>21)</sup> Felder, O. M. Cap., *ibid.* I, p. 47.

<sup>22)</sup> Pohle-Preuss, *ibid.* p. 230; cf. the fifty-fifth condemned proposition of Baius, in DB. n. 1055: "Deus non potuisset ab initio talem creare hominem, qualis nunc nascitur".

In our thesis we are not considering this purely *hypothetical* condition of human nature. On the contrary, we are restricting our study to mankind in its present condition, as *history* displays it.

Divine supernatural revelation teaches us that from the very beginning God revealed Himself supernaturally to our first parents, so that historically there never was a state of pure nature, as will be shown in detail in the chapter on Primitive Revelation.<sup>23)</sup> Now there is, in point of fact, no purely natural happiness for mankind as a parallel end to the religion of reason. The supernatural end of man's beatitude in the beatific vision, with all its antecedents and concomitants, is now authoritative and a duty for all men. Therefore in the present economy of salvation God must do by a divine supernatural revelation and grace all He would have done by purely natural means and aids in a purely natural order. As things are now, nature and grace are intimately and indissolubly united and the supernatural end of man has absorbed and cancelled the natural end. Therefore whoever does not listen to the God of revelation will also, in the end, lose the God of reason, as the history of deism and illuminism clearly demonstrates.<sup>24)</sup>

We know, further, by divine supernatural revelation that in Paradise God endowed our first parents with certain supernatural prerogatives, which placed them in the state of original justice (*status justitiae originalis*). But owing to the sin of Adam (original sin) mankind was precipitated into the state of fallen nature (*status naturae lapsae*), which consists "in the loss of all supernatural and preternatural prerogatives which our first parents enjoyed in the Garden".<sup>25)</sup> This state is, in many respects, inferior to the state of pure nature. For now our nature is wounded, whereas in the state of pure nature we must conceive human nature without that wound. It is assuredly much better to preserve innocence in a purely natural order of being than to fall from the heights of the supernatural order through one's own fault.<sup>26)</sup>

Historical  
state of fallen  
nature.

Our thesis has reference to this historical state of fallen nature.

Natural reason can *suspect*, at least, that the present weakness of human nature is due to some sin of mankind.<sup>27)</sup> But the fact of original sin can be known positively only by a special divine supernatural revelation. Since, however, we have not yet demonstrated the existence of a divine supernatural revelation,

<sup>23)</sup> cf. P. W. Schmidt, S. V. D.; *Die Uroffenbarung als Anfang der Offenbarungen Gottes*, in RCK, I, pp. 631—670.

<sup>24)</sup> Jos. Pohle, *Natur u. Übernatur*, in RCK, I, p. 453.

<sup>25)</sup> Pohle-Preuss, *ibid.* p. 227.

<sup>26)</sup> C. Gutberlet, *Lehrbuch der Apologetik*. Münster i. W. 1904 (3. ed.), II, p. 35.

<sup>27)</sup> cf. Cardinal John H. Newman, *An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent*. London. 1898 (New Impression), 10. chap. pp. 389 sq.

in our present apologetical treatment of man's religious and moral impotence, we may not assume the fact of original sin without making ourselves guilty of a *petitio principii*. But neither is it necessary to assume this moral lapse of mankind through original sin. Furthermore, it is theologically certain that man did not lose the powers that were his by nature after his lapse into sin.<sup>28)</sup>

At any rate, in our thesis we are viewing mankind in its present condition without entering further into the causes of this status of human nature.<sup>29)</sup>

Moral  
necessity.

2. The need which mankind has of some special divine intervention, in the circumstances just described, is *not physical*. "Wounded though he be in his fallen nature, man's will still has sufficient strength really and physically to do what is good, and his intellect sufficient light to persuade and induce it so to act. Neither faculty has lost any of its intrinsic power by the fall, for the entity of both remains entire and intact".<sup>30)</sup> Man has the physical power of knowing God, as his author and final end; he has also the faculty of deducing from that knowledge the duties of external and internal religion. His reason does not lack the power of knowing and understanding the immediate precepts of natural morality; neither does his will lack the potency which will enable him to live in accordance with that knowledge. There are, furthermore, divine helps at hand in the purely natural order, which can assist man's weak intellect and will, so that there can be no question of a strict or physical necessity of a divine supernatural intervention in the interests of natural religion and ethics.<sup>31)</sup> Nevertheless in spite of this, we maintain that pagan mankind, if left to its own natural resources, is powerless to arrive at a knowledge and practise of natural religion and morality befitting human nature, *because of certain impediments surrounding human nature* as history displays it. "The weakness of will and the mental ignorance to which man is subject proceed from an external impediment, the attraction which objects of sense possess for his lower appetites, and which is so urgent, close, and disproportionate that reason scarcely if ever

<sup>28)</sup> Felder, O. M. Cap; I, p. 47; cf. Suarez, *De Gratia*, Proleg. IV, c. 8, n. 5. <sup>29)</sup> Brunsmann, S. V. D; *ibid.* I, p. 140.

<sup>30)</sup> Hettinger-Bowden, *ibid.* p. 47. <sup>31)</sup> Gutberlet, *ibid.* II, p. 33.



asserts its rightful sway. Hence arises an impotence to see and do what is right, which is *moral* not physical".<sup>32)</sup>

3. If man is to attain his natural end he ought to possess a *relatively perfect and certain knowledge* of all those truths without which it is impossible to lead a religious and moral life that accords with reason and is worthy of human nature and dignity. That much knowledge, at least, is necessary and sufficient, as reason itself tells us. More than that cannot be demanded as necessary. Hence an absolutely perfect and complete religious knowledge is not required. Indeed, in point of fact, even many Christians do not know the natural law perfectly. On the other hand, a very defective and imperfect knowledge cannot suffice to enable man to order his life in such a manner as befits his dignity as a man.<sup>33)</sup> To be more explicit, we assert that man ought to possess a relatively perfect and certain knowledge of the following truths: a) the existence of one personal God, Who provides for His creatures and remunerates their actions; b) the immortality of the human soul and c) the sum-total of duties which man ought to fulfil towards God, his neighbor and himself.<sup>34)</sup> These duties are contained in the so-called primary principles of the natural law (*i. e.*, "we must do good and avoid evil"; "we must worship God"), in the secondary principles of the natural law (*i. e.*, the second table of the Decalogue!) and the proximate conclusions which can easily be deduced from these principles.<sup>35)</sup>

Kind of  
knowledge  
required.

4. We do not deny that there are perhaps certain privileged individuals, who, by reason of the abundant endowments of their nature, can know the religious truths and precepts of the moral law and live accordingly; but they are the rare exceptions. From the data which we shall present below it will be evident that, apart from a divine supernatural revelation, not even the greatest pagan philosophers have actually arri-

Mankind  
taken as a  
whole.

<sup>32)</sup> Hettinger-Bowden, *ibid.* p. 47.

<sup>33)</sup> Ottiger, S. J.; *ibid.* I, p. 95; cf. Felder, O. M. Cap. *ibid.* I, p. 46.

<sup>34)</sup> Ad. Tanqueray, *Synopsis theologiae dogmaticae*. Romae, Tornaci, Parisiis. 1922 (19. ed.), I, p. 119.

<sup>35)</sup> Felder, O. M. Cap. *ibid.* I, p. 46; cf. Koch-Preuss, *A Handbook of Moral Theology*. St. Louis, Mo. 1918, I, pp. 128 sq.

ved at a relatively certain and perfect knowledge of natural religious truths. Consequently we may rightly conclude that some special divine intervention is *a fortiori* necessary for the totality of mankind. However, our thesis, as stated above, prescinds from these possible rare exceptions among the specially favored individuals of paganism. It simply asserts that some special divine assistance is morally necessary for *mankind taken as a whole*. It is extremely difficult for men *generally* to know and practise natural religion and morality as befits human nature; for this purpose some extraordinary assistance on the part of God is required.<sup>36)</sup>

This divine  
help is super-  
natural reve-  
lation.

5. This extraordinary help must not necessarily take the form of an external supernatural revelation. For, strictly speaking, God is able to enlighten and strengthen man interiorly; He can likewise send very exceptional personalities in sufficient number, who can exert such an influence over the masses, that they will be able to successfully communicate to others the truths which they themselves have clearly and perfectly conceived. Moreover, there are surely also other ways and means at the disposal of the infinite power and wisdom of God. But these means would have to be *extraordinary* and different from the regular dispositions which obtain in the present natural Providence of God. For there have always been providential men and each individual is also enlightened and directed by God. And yet, these ordinary means and helps do not and did not lead to the desired result. Therefore a supernatural or, at least, an extraordinary assistance of God is necessary for man in the circumstances described. And since, in point of fact, this assistance is found in divine supernatural revelation, and this method of instruction has been regularly chosen by the divine wisdom in preference to all others, we conclude that a *divine supernatural revelation*, in particular, is morally necessary.<sup>37)</sup>

Errors.  
Traditio-  
nalism. Ratio-  
nalism.

6. The chief errors in reference to the necessity of a divine supernatural revelation, on the hypothesis of a natural order, are twofold. The one unduly minimizes, the other

<sup>36)</sup> Gutberlet, *ibid.* II, p. 34.

<sup>37)</sup> Gutberlet, *ibid.* II, p. 34.

overexaggerates the rational faculty of human nature. The truth, we claim, is in the golden mean.

a) Ultra-supernaturalists, namely *traditionalists* (Huet, Bonald, Bautain, Bonnetty, Ventura, Ubaghs, Laforêt), assert explicitly or, at least implicitly, that a divine supernatural revelation is strictly (*physically*) necessary, in order that mankind may arrive at a knowledge of the truths of the moral and religious order, or at least prove them with certitude. An external or internal revelation (Bautain), or a primitive revelation, which is handed down from generation to generation, must supply for what is lacking to human reason.<sup>38)</sup>

Closely akin to this ultra-supernaturalism is the *fideism* of the so-called Protestant Reformers (Luther, Calvin), "who failing to draw the proper distinction between nature and the Supernatural, heretically affirmed that, besides his preternatural prerogatives man by sin also lost certain essential properties of human nature itself, such as the moral freedom of the will".<sup>39)</sup> The same erroneous notion appears again in *Jansenism* (especially from the viewpoint of grace) and in certain *pseudo-Protestant mystics* (Anabaptists and Quakers). Dogmatic Theology refutes this teaching, since it presupposes the fact of original sin. We may not assume that truth here, as stated above. Consequently we are not now directly concerned with these adversaries.

The exaggerations of traditionalists really harm the faith more than they defend it. For if we are not able to prove the truths of natural religion because of the physical impotency of human nature, neither can we demonstrate with certitude that it is God, Who speaks to us in revelation, or in general that we must believe.<sup>40)</sup> Moreover, the errors of traditionalism are refuted *ex professo* in philosophy, to which we must refer the student.

b) *Rationalists*, on the other hand, exaggerate the powers of human reason. For them reason is the self-sufficing principle of religion; reason is strong enough of itself to help itself. Accordingly a supernatural revelation of the natural truths of religion and morality is not only not morally necessary, but also superfluous.<sup>41)</sup> We shall show the falsity of this

<sup>38)</sup> Ottiger, S. J; *ibid.* I, pp. 96 sq; cf. DB. n. 1613, 1622, 1649.

<sup>39)</sup> Pohle-Preuss, *ibid.* pp. 221 sq.

<sup>40)</sup> Gutberlet, *ibid.* II, p. 35. — For a refutation of this philosophical system cf. Gutberlet *Psychologie* (4. ed.), pp. 167 sq; P. Coffey, *Epistemology*, II, pp. 290 sq. London & N. Y. 1917.

<sup>41)</sup> Pohle, *ibid.* I, p. 452.



viewpoint in the course of our demonstration of the thesis. A variation of the rationalistic exaggeration of reason appears in the opinion of those who appeal to the fact and nature of *conscience*, as a self-sufficing principle of religion, to explain the introduction of the Christian religion into the consciousness of the human race.<sup>42)</sup>

The *Catholic doctrine* enuntiated in the thesis holds the golden mean between the extremes of traditionalism and rationalism.

Method of  
argumentation.

We shall first present a *psychological argument* for the truth of our proposition, in order to dispose the "modern mind" to consider the reasons brought forth by the traditional defenders of the Christian viewpoint. Then we shall add the positive argument from *history* supplemented by *reason*.

### I. Psychological Argument.

General  
psychological  
argument.

1. Whoever strives to gauge aright the spirit of the "modern man", will find that it is actuated by just as honorable a longing for the truth and a desire for happiness as were the generations of the past. But judging from the symptoms it is evident, that a great many of those who have placed themselves, consciously or unconsciously, outside the pale of Christianity, are sick at heart, yes, oftentimes sick unto death. Their souls hunger for bread that they may recuperate and live; but instead of breaking bread stones are handed them. By surrendering Christianity they have, at the same time, lost God, and with God all religious and moral support. Persecuted by torturing doubts, caught in the meshes of "relative values", the modern soul has pawned the very concept of "truth", — surely the very worst diagnosis which a physician of souls can make. The world of today stands before us perplexed, even as Pilate stood before Christ, with the sceptical question: "What is truth?" This condition of spiritual weakness demands as its proximate remedy the application of the *psychological method*, which aims, in the

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<sup>42)</sup> Nitzsch-Stephan, *Lehrbuch der evangelischen Dogmatik*. Tübingen. 1912 (3. ed.), pp. 202 sq.

first place, at initiating the healing of the intellect and at making the soul receptive of and disposed for the acceptance of the treasure of Christian truths.

Now the prerequisite for all spiritual convalescence is *self-introspection*, a courageous self-knowledge. It is a question of the old wisdom of Greek philosophy: "Man, know thyself"! Every man will discover in the deepest recesses of his soul two primal impulses: the irresistible *impulse for truth* and the insatiable *impulse for happiness*. In the finer tempered souls a third one appears, namely the *impulse for beauty*. Truth, goodness and beauty that sacred triad, which constitutes the nourishing and strengthening bread of the soul and which satisfies at once intellect, will and heart. The impulse for happiness is perhaps the most assertive, for in the end the thirst for truth and the desire for beauty are really only the secret impulse for infinite happiness.

*St. Thomas Aquinas* was deeply versed in the science of the heart and a psychologist of the first calibre. Scrutinizing with certain vision the unfathomable depths of the human heart, he showed that neither wealth nor sensual pleasure, neither fame nor honor, neither separately nor collectively, can permanently captivate and satisfy man. Only the infinite Good, which is at the same time All-Truth and Infinite Beauty, is able to fill the infinite void of our hearts and to satisfy these elemental impulses to the full. That alone can explain the perpetual "seeking for God" of the soul turned in on itself. Is it not the sad experience of the contrary, which impels the despairing debauchee and worldling to grasp the pistol, to put a violent end to a long chain of disallusioned hopes? What atheist or agnostic can say in all honesty and sincerity of himself: "Not until I deserted God have I become really happy? The riddles of life are solved"? And even though such a one, at times, tries to deceive himself in regard to that alleged "happiness", the school of suffering will soon sober him. Surely, whoever places himself in spirit into the wretched condition of such darkened and tortured souls, must finally be convinced that all purely human remedies are helpless under these circumstances; that only a divine super-

natural revelation, such as is incorporated in Christianity, is able to proffer counsel and help.<sup>43)</sup>

Special  
psychological  
argument.  
Four types of  
the "modern  
soul".

2. But the "modern soul" is too complicated and varied to allow the physician to prescribe a general remedy for the ailment. The malady of the soul, like bodily sickness, has its history and its crisis, and likewise also its antidotes. If we review the present-day world, we can easily discern four types of patients.

The Intellectuals.

a) In the first place, there is the category of the *Intellectuals*, those strong spirits, the belated stragglers of earlier rationalism, who, intoxicated by the triumphs of mathematics and natural science, expect all salvation for mankind from "education and science" alone, from the sublime "goddess Reason", and who look upon all light and power from above as worthless and superfluous. Only the experimental, empiric world of "phenomena", so they claim, not the "thing in itself", is knowable; whatever transcends experience, hence the "supersensible" (God, spirit), is "unknowable". This agnosticism has as its parallel a change in the traditional concept of truth. Thus apart from logic and mathematics, such is the opinion of Paulsen, there is only relative, not absolute truth.<sup>44)</sup> Nay more, according to Spitta<sup>45)</sup> even mathematical propositions have not absolute validity, just as little as other scientific knowledge. Fr. Nietzsche drew the final conclusions from this viewpoint and ended in perfect nihilism: "Nothing is true, everything is allowed". Thus in the end proud reason itself demolishes the glorious image, which it has created and, like Kronos, swallows her own children. The rationalistic deification of reason leads inevitably to agnosticism; such is the sad paradox. The goddess Reason, believing only in herself, soon begins to waver and to fall from the throne. What experienced pedagogue would venture to be so optimistic as to believe that a spirit gone astray in such a jungle,

<sup>43)</sup> Pohle, *ibid.* I, pp. 454, 455. cf. O. Zimmermann, *Das Gottesbedürfnis*. Freiburg i. B. 1910.

<sup>44)</sup> Immanuel Kant, *sein Leben und seine Lehre*. Berlin. 1899 (3. ed.), p. 399.

<sup>45)</sup> *Mein Recht auf Leben*, p. 63, cited by Pohle, *ibid.* I, p. 456.



can make the psychological return to self-introspection save by the Christian revelation, which, with its genuine concept of God and of truth, possesses from the very outset the true key to all the marvelous achievements of science!<sup>40)</sup>

b) A second type of the modern soul are the numerous The Cultured. protagonists of the *progress of culture*, the adorers of success in the technical realm, in political economy, in politics, and in art. It is rather practical wisdom than abstract science in which these highly educated spirits believe that they have found their all. Music, poetry, painting, the theater, are to them so many surrogates for religion; the cult of the beautiful is likewise a prominent trait of modern monism. Since without labor no new culture comes into being, yes the old must perish, this religion of culture must deify *labor* just as rationalism deifies reason. The Greeks deified wisdom under the guise of the pensive Apollo; so too, today labor is personified into the hammering, smithing god Vulcan. According to W. James the world will be precisely what we make it by our labor. And Stanley Hall calls out to us enthusiastically that the twilight, in which we now live, is by no means a parting glow of evening, but rather the prophetic dawn of a new sun. This indestructible optimism brings joy to our hearts, because it strikes Christian notes. Its error consists only in its one-sided exaggeration of the concept of labor, which rushes on to palpable inconsistencies.

The adorers of culture have been sobered by the horrible world war. What has adored culture and the labor wasted on it really achieved? What has it created that is really great and beautiful? During the world war the entire labor of culture consisted in discovering weapons of murder contrary to the laws of nations, poisonous gases, murderous tanks and all those other atrocities, which one can describe only with a shudder. Yes, even peaceful peoples were disturbed by bombs from air-planes and an awful hunger blockade was imposed upon them. Thus has the much vaunted culture destroyed its own culture and dug its own grave. Millions of

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<sup>40)</sup> Pohle, *ibid.* I, pp. 456, 457.

soldiers are resting in cool graves in distant countries, — the victims of so-called "culture".

The step from the sublime to the ridiculous has already been made in England. Thus according to H. D. Loyd<sup>47)</sup> labor is true creation, the laborer is not a creature, but a creator and a redeemer of himself and of society; nay more, man is a potential god. To the members of the Socialist Party the exaltation from pauperism to divinity must indeed sound tempting, but in reality it reminds one of the whisperings of the serpent: „You shall be like gods"! But the reaction is bound to come today just as surely as it came in Paradise. For if God and revelation are permanently ruled out, if one is to fathom the "meaning of life", surely it is first of all necessary to settle the preliminary questions: "What is the meaning of cultural effort? Whither is culture leading? Why does the earthly man toil and moil?" In addition to the many shining lights which our modern culture shows there are also many threatening phenomena of decadence apparent. It has brought forth atheism, anarchism, social democracy, divorces, prostitution, neo-paganism. If religious and moral culture has not yet gone to pieces, it is due to the fact that the strong Christian culture as yet prevents the threatening ruin and wordly ethics, still quite virile, is being unconsciously gauged by the great precepts of the Gospel. Surely, the so-called "cultured" man must feel in the end, that his soul cannot live solely from worldly cultural ideals, that it, like the prodigal son among strangers, is nourishing itself with husks, that it is actually fallen into beggary. Many advocates of culture have experienced that there is no other way to extricate oneself from this slough of despair and poverty save by a return to the house of their father. Thus the majority of modern converts, *e. g.*, Brunetière, Bourget, Coppée, Jörgensen, were led back to Holy Church, not indeed by cold syllogism, but by the deep homesickness for a higher religious culture.<sup>48)</sup>

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<sup>47)</sup> *Man the Social Creator*. London. 1908, pp. 3, 25. Similar ideas are expressed by Ellen Key, *Das Jahrhundert des Kindes*. Berlin. 1902.

<sup>48)</sup> Pohle, *ibid.* I, pp. 457—459.

c) The psychological method is also most efficacious for arousing extreme *Individualism*, with its aversion for tradition and authority, to a consciousness of its own inner emptiness and helplessness as well as of the value of revealed religion. The pregnant example of Fr. Nietzsche, "the type of the modern man",<sup>49)</sup> shows us the goal at which the individualist must finally end. During the world war we have seen this "Übermensch" (Superman) in action and we see him also in the aftermath of the world war. The extreme Individualist acknowledges no morality and authority; he acknowledges himself alone — he is a god unto himself. The lust for money is his only passion, even though thousands of poor men perish miserably because of his intrigues. Just as formerly under Moses the Jews danced around the golden calf, so now these Supermen dance around the money-god, which seems to be their favorite idol. If we inquire into the causes of the many revolutions, the nihilistic upheavals, the breaking up of society, the anarchy of thought and of action, we shall find them rooted in extreme Individualism. Mankind cannot live without authority. Unlimited, individual liberty is not only spiritual disorder, but it is also a sin against one's own nature. Personal freedom of thought must also be freedom for the truth, not liberty from or against the truth.<sup>50)</sup> Out of the depths of one's own helplessness there springs forth spontaneously the longing for an infallible authority in religious and moral questions, likewise the virtue of *humility* which the distinguished convert von Ruville tries to show is the characteristic mark of true religion and of the true Church.<sup>51)</sup>

The extreme  
Individual-  
lists.

d) The most recent type of the modern soul appears in *Modernism*, which has endeavored to reconcile Catholic Christianity with modern philosophy and culture. Since it is difficult to approach it with logical reasoning, it is advisable to begin by trying to understand and to treat it psychologi-

The Moder-  
nists.

<sup>49)</sup> cf. E. Pfenningsdorf, *Persönlichkeit, Christliche Lebensphilosophie*. 1908 (5. ed.), pp. 13 sq.

<sup>50)</sup> cf. Jos. Donat, S. J.; *The Freedom of Science*. English transl. N. Y. 1914, *passim*.

<sup>51)</sup> Pohle, *ibid.* I, pp. 459, 460; cf. Albert von Ruville, *Back to Holy Church*. English Translation by G. Schoetensack. London & N. Y. 1910.



cally. That is the purpose and the task of the so-called "Apologetics of Immanence" of the Frenchmen (Brunetière, Fongrave Olle-Laprune, Blondel etc.). However, this *method* of Immanence must not be confounded with the *doctrine* of Immanence. Without surrendering objective religion and supernatural revelation the apologist may take his stand provisionally on the common ground of Immanence, in order from this coin of vantage to show the insufficiency of Immanentism by means of a psychological analysis of the inner life of the soul. Whoever has learned by earnest self-inspection that the heart's longing is directed towards something higher than merely towards one's own interior life, will all the more readily stretch forth the tentacles from the snail's shell in which he has encased himself, in order that he may feel about for a firm hold and support. A psychological law states: The need is within, but *the means of satisfying it are without!* The feeling of hunger impels one to seek for nourishment; a burning thirst cannot quench itself by itself. The sentiment of love urges one to seek an external object of love. Nowhere and at no time is man self-sufficient. As Pascal once emphasized: *L'action de l'homme passe l'homme.* Neither can the religious life exhaust itself in and by itself. The end of man lies outside of himself: therefore he must come out of himself. Self-isolation means death, not life. Not even egotism is an exception; for it is the conscious subjugation of foreign interests to its own desires. By egotism man does not free himself from the social center, but makes himself the center.<sup>52)</sup> Moreover, man must receive light and strength from without, in order to be able to live his religious and moral life. Thus his own inner need directs him to an external revelation, which alone is able to appease his every desire. However, the proper manipulation of the immanentistic method requires much tact and prudence, if it is not to deteriorate into the doctrine of Immanence, as was the case with Le Roy, so that the last things become worse than the first.<sup>53)</sup>

<sup>52)</sup> cf. Michelet, *Dieu et l'Agnosticisme moderne*. Paris. 1909, pp. 40 sq.

<sup>53)</sup> Pohle, *ibid.* I, pp. 460, 461.

After this preparatory consideration we shall pass on to the argument from *history*.

## II. Historical Argument.

Strictly speaking, human nature possesses the physical ability to ascertain the truths of natural religion and ethics.<sup>54</sup>) But does human nature, as it appears in the midst of the obstacles of paganism, really know these truths in a manner that befits human dignity? The answer to this question can be found in the *history* of the pagan peoples, who have lived or are now living outside the pale of the Old and New Testament revelations. If in the course of so many centuries the pagans have, in point of fact, never actually attained to a relatively perfect and certain knowledge of the truths of natural religion and morality, which is required for the proper and fitting ordering of human life, we may validly conclude to the moral impossibility of acquiring such a knowledge by their own native powers. To this moral impotence there corresponds a moral necessity of some divine supernatural intervention.<sup>55</sup>)

It is a notorious fact that all peoples, both primitive and the most highly cultured, that have lived or are now living outside the sphere of a divinely revealed religion, have for thousands of years been ignorant of the principal truths of natural religion and ethics, or have enjoyed only a more or less conjectural knowledge of these truths, which was, moreover, often vitiated by the grossest errors, and that in spite of the most serious and diligent inquiry into those truths on the part of many. Indeed, in point of fact, natural religion was never fully and purely realized in paganism. Now this constant and universal fact bears witness to the moral impotence of the human race to arrive at a relatively perfect and certain knowledge of natural religious truths save by a special divine supernatural assistance. Therefore if mankind is to acquire a knowledge of natural religion and ethics, which befits human nature, some special divine assistance is morally necessary; and since, in point of fact, God has not granted any other help except a divine supernatural revelation, we may

General  
Argument.

<sup>54</sup>) cf. Chastel, S. J; *De la Valeur de la Raison Humaine*. Paris 1854; O. Willmann, *Geschichte des Idealismus*. Braunschweig. 1908 (2. ed.), III, pp. 811 sq.

<sup>55</sup>) Felder, O. M. Cap; *ibid.* I, p. 49; cf. Ottiger, S. J; *ibid.* I, pp. 98—107.

rightly conclude that a divine supernatural revelation is a moral necessity for mankind in the circumstances described.<sup>56)</sup>

The *minor* of the syllogism is evident. For a thing is said to be morally necessary "when a certain end could, absolutely speaking, be reached without it, but cannot actually and properly be reached without it, under existing conditions".<sup>57)</sup> Now this is precisely the case in respect to a relatively perfect and certain knowledge of natural religion and morality on the part of pagan peoples. For even though all men have a certain innate desire for that knowledge, only a few have actually succeeded in acquiring that knowledge; and that knowledge was disfigured by many errors and by continual doubts, despite the fact that these few individuals have applied themselves most seriously and diligently in the pursuit of that knowledge. The difficulties which they encountered were insurmountable. Therefore it is morally impossible for mankind to acquire that knowledge, if left to its own natural resources. And since "morally impossible" and "morally necessary" are correlative concepts, a special divine supernatural assistance is a moral necessity.<sup>58)</sup>

The *major* of the argument involves two assertions: 1) the *universal and constant fact* of the religious aberration and of the moral lapse of paganism and 2) the *impotence* of paganism, by its own unaided efforts, to return to a purer religious and moral knowledge. We must inquire, therefore, as to "whether unaided reason has, as a fact, ever attained that knowledge of moral and religious truth which is needed to give purpose and stability to human life. If it has never done so, the failure must be due to the fact that such a task is beyond the natural capacity of man as he is, for a power or faculty that can never be exercised in act, is at least morally impotent, or for practical purposes does not exist".<sup>59)</sup>

To establish the former of these two claims we shall invoke the testimony of the *history* of pagan religions. And in the matter under consideration it is obvious, that if mankind is to lead a life befitting human nature, three factors are indisputably necessary: a) a true *theodicy*, b) a sound *ethics* and c) a proper *divine worship*, as we have already stated above. Hence it suffices to examine these three factors of natural religion among the peoples deprived of a divine supernatural revelation, to evaluate the religious and moral status of paganism. For clarity sake we shall treat first of the so-called "*primitive*" peoples (pp. 144—150) and then of the more highly "*cultured*" peoples (pp. 150—230).

But the more important task of the apologist does not consist so much in establishing the historical fact of the deplorable religious

<sup>56)</sup> Dorsch, S. J; *ibid.* I, p. 346.

<sup>57)</sup> Geo. M. Sauvage, art. "*Necessity*", in CE, X, p. 733.

<sup>58)</sup> Dorsch, S. J; *ibid.* I, p. 346; Brunsmann, S. V. D; *ibid.* I. p. 141.

<sup>59)</sup> Hettinger-Bowden, *ibid.* pp. 47, 48.



and moral corruption of heathen peoples, as rather in demonstrating that mankind, if left to its own native powers, is *impotent morally* to extricate itself from this slough of religious and moral degradation. Therefore we shall consider, secondly, the natural means and aids, which could have led to a better religious and ethical condition, if that were at all possible, but which, in point of fact, are seen to be insufficient to produce the desired results<sup>60</sup>) (pp. 231—240).

We shall deal with these two assertions in the order specified.

### I. The Historical Facts.

The history of religions bears undeniable witness to the fact that the human race, when it migrated from the original spot where it first appeared, at a period which science is powerless to determine in a precise manner, had been put in possession of a "fund of religious and moral truths, with the elements of a worship".<sup>61</sup>) The whole of this deposit "was rooted in the very nature of man, and there conserved along with the family, developing with society. Each race according to its particular mentalities, its intellectual tendency, and the special conditions of its life, gradually established those superficially varied but fundamentally identical forms that we call religions".<sup>62</sup>) The religious element appears in greater purity and proportionately less corrupt in the most primitive stages of the human race. Specific evidence has been gathered in abundance by Monsignor Alex. Le Roy in regard to the Bantus, who occupy the greater part of inhabited Africa on both sides of the Equator, from the Atlantic Ocean to the Indian Ocean, and from the basin of the Chad to the Orange River. The same might be repeated of races still lower, namely the Pygmies or African Negrillos, the Sâns or Bushmen

All religions show a higher religious element and a lower mythological element.

<sup>60</sup>) Gutberlet, *ibid.* II, p. 44.

<sup>61</sup>) For a summary of beliefs, practises, moral obligations, and institutions which may be reasonably considered as the primary and fundamental elements of all religion cf. Alex. Le Roy, *The Religion of the Primitives*. Transl. from the French (*La Religion des Primitifs*. Paris 1909) by Rev. Newton Thompson. N. Y. 1922, pp. 306, 307.

<sup>62</sup>) Le Roy, *ibid.* p. 319. — For a discussion of the relation of the higher religious element to primitive revelation cf. P. W. Schmidt, S. V. D.; *Der Ursprung der Gottesidee*. Münster i. W., 1912, Part I, pp. 149—154.

in Southern Africa, and the Negrittos that are represented by more or less mixed groups in the Andaman Islands, the Malacca Peninsula, and the Philippines, besides other traces of them in India, Ceylon, Beluchistan, and elsewhere.<sup>63)</sup> However, everywhere and from the very beginning the higher religious element was burdened "with adventitious creations, legends, myths, superstitions, and magical practises, in which we recognize the work of the human imagination, sometimes guided perhaps by those occult powers in which these earlier men believed and which form the various states of naturism, animism, fetishism, and shaminism of the savage populations".<sup>64)</sup> In like manner "at the different epochs when the ancient civilizations flourished on the banks of the Tigris and the Euphrates, the Nile, the Ganges, the Blue River, or the Tiber, at the basis are found the same traditions, but they are now covered over with new elements the more complicated as the imagination of the people was more highly cultivated and more active".<sup>65)</sup> This lower mythological element fastened itself like a parasite on the higher religious element, vitiating and disfiguring it and turning it from its object.

We shall now present the more specific evidence for these conclusions.

### A. Primitive Peoples.

We begin with the so-called "*primitive*" peoples<sup>66)</sup>, that have inhabited or are now inhabiting the greater part of Africa, and portions of Asia and of Europe, of America, of Australia and of Oceanica. Everywhere we can, indeed, discern traces or echoes

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<sup>63)</sup> Le Roy, *ibid.* pp. 242—281; cf. also Schmidt, *ibid.* I, pp. 113—135; 173—411. <sup>64)</sup> *Ibid.* p. 325. <sup>65)</sup> *Ibid.* p. 325.

<sup>66)</sup> By the term "*primitive*" in this connection we mean to express what is thought to be "the most elementary condition, the most undeveloped state, and the nearest to pre-historic humanity". This term is a fair description of races inferior in point of civilization, at any rate until a better one can be found". (*The Religions of Primitive Races*. From the French of Mgr. A. Le Roy, in LHR. V, pp. 1, 2.) We say that the primitive peoples are poor in culture, because among them the higher and nobler facilities in the arts, the sciences and literature are either not developed at all, or only imperfectly. "The difference between the cultured and the primitive peoples is, therefore, a difference of degree only, and not of essence". (V. Cathrein, S. J.; *Die Einheit des sittlichen Bewußtseins der Menschheit*. Freiburg i. B. 1914, I, p. 21),

of a monotheistic belief<sup>67)</sup> and "it is certainly striking that the most primitive tribes have a notion of God which is the more precise according as they are more uncivilized. Such are the Negrillos of Africa, the Sâns, the Andamans, the Australians". At the same time, however, mythology, magic and superstition have formed about the higher religious element, "a sort of parasitic growth under which it almost disappears, stifled and dishonored".<sup>68)</sup>

"The Divine appears in the form of a multiplicity of finite individual entities of Nature".<sup>69)</sup> Now the natural physical side of the cosmic phenomena is stressed and religion degenerates into *fetishism*; again the psychic spiritual aspect of Nature is made the proximate object of religious worship and the resultant is *animism*. This latter disfigurement of religion manifests itself in *manism* (ancestor-worship), *demon-cult* (worship paid to spirits inimical to man), and in *shaminism* (savage magic or science, by which physical Nature is believed to be brought under the control of man). A concomitant phenomenon of animism is *totemism*, "an institution consisting essentially of a magical pact, representing and forming a relationship of a mystical and supernatural order, by which, under the visible form of an animal and, by exception, of a vegetable, mineral, or astral body, an invisible spirit is associated with an individual, a family, a clan, a tribe, a secret society, in view of a reciprocity of services".<sup>70)</sup>

Religious  
deformities.

This does not mean, however, that all these extraneous elements of religion are to be found among every primitive people; much less that they constitute the whole of their religion. It is indeed difficult to find a term that characterizes the religious beliefs and practises of the primitives and, in the interests of truth, it is necessary to guard against hasty generalizations. For instance, among the tribes of the western coast of Africa, "from the Niger to the Angola, and from the coast almost to the great lakes, *i. e.*, all the zone covered by the forest, we meet classical fetishism, with its diverse figures, statuettes, and material representations, often publicly exposed in real sanctuaries and still more often hidden in huts or concealed in out-of-the-way places. On the eastern coast and to the south of the vast country occupied by the Bantus, these statue fetishes disappear or at least they are rare".<sup>71)</sup> On the other hand, among the most primitive savages, the Sâns, the Negrillos, and the Negritos we do not find any fetishes. Thus fetishism is only an element of religion among some of the primitive peoples. Moreover, "in the mind of the

Fetishism.

<sup>67)</sup> cf. Cathrein, S. J. *ibid.* I, pp. 197—687; II & III, *passim*; also A. Seitz, *Natürliche Religionsbegründung*. Regensburg. 1914, pp. 544—566; Gutberlet, *ibid.* I, pp. 109—126 for specific data.

<sup>68)</sup> A. Le Roy, *The Religion of the Primitives*, p. 216.

<sup>69)</sup> Hettlinger-Weber, *ibid.* p. 368.

<sup>70)</sup> Le Roy, *ibid.* p. 87; cf. also John T. Driscoll, arts. "*Animism*", "*Fetishism*", "*Shaminism*", "*Totemism*", in CE. I, pp. 526 sq; VI, pp. 52 sq; XIII, pp. 750 sq; XIV, pp. 789 sq. <sup>71)</sup> Le Roy, *ibid.* pp. 180 sq.



natives, these (fetishes) are not at all portraits, such as would constitute images properly so-called; they are figures emblematic of such and such spirits who are called to exercise their influence in a well-determined sense".<sup>72)</sup> The Blacks are not idolaters in the strict sense of the term, that is, adorers of images considered as the representation of a divinity. We detect idolatry "only later on among nations already cultured, with dispositions more or less artistic, that seem to have been led little by little to confound spirit with matter, the element with its symbol, the god with his image". But we do find in Africa "a worship of images or fetishes where it is thought spirits or genii dwell or exercise their influence". God "remains, so to speak, beyond the world accessible to man. He is not absent; his presence, on the contrary, dominates everything and his name is often on the lips of the Black. But, save in certain circumstances, there is not definite, public worship in his honor".<sup>73)</sup> In most cases, the worship of God is thrust into the background, if not entirely obliterated by the worship of spirits. Hence the Blacks cannot be accused of a denial of God; but rather of an alienation from God. Their thoughts of God are worthier than their conduct towards Him.<sup>74)</sup>

#### Animism.

For unknown reasons the Blacks imagine that "God has left His work exposed to many harmful influences of elements, of animals, of men, of sorcerers, of ghosts, of spirits. And, since man cannot get to where He is, and can do nothing against His activity or His inactivity, he is led to placate or to neutralize such influences as can be reached among the thousands that everywhere reveal themselves".<sup>75)</sup> Thus the primitive peoples turn to animism, which is based on the distinction between matter and spirit and may be defined as "the belief in beings which have no affinity to any special thing in nature, but are endowed with a higher power; to whom a certain worship is paid, yet who are incapable of being represented in a visible form. Taken in this very vague and general sense, it may be said that animism is the religion of a great part of Africa".<sup>76)</sup> This characterization may be repeated also in respect to other primitive peoples outside of the dark continent. According to the animistic or spiritualistic conception of the Blacks the invisible world is arranged on three different planes: that of the manes of ancestors (manism), with which the living should remain in contact; that of the spirits, genii, or demons, who enter into the life of the living and are capable of good and evil — of evil rather than good — and over whom the living happily still have control; lastly, that of God who, from the depth of the universal scheme, rules over all, and men are not able to

<sup>72)</sup> Ibid. p. 178.      <sup>73)</sup> Ibid. pp. 143, 299.

<sup>74)</sup> W. Schneider, *Die Religion der afrikanischen Naturvölker*, in DRG. V/VI, pp. 98, 100.      <sup>75)</sup> A. Le Roy, art. "Africa", in CE. I, p. 184.

<sup>76)</sup> Ibid. in CE. I, p. 184.

do anything for or against Him.<sup>77)</sup> The Blacks are animists, "but in a certain way and in a special sense of the term. The worship paid the ancestral manes is one thing, that to the spirits is another. And how many kinds of manes are there and how many kinds of spirits"! The real cult of the Bantus is the family and tribal worship of the ancestral manes. Hence the expression manism or supernaturalism seems more appropriate to characterize their religion than any of the terms — fetishism, animism, or naturism.<sup>78)</sup> On the other hand, nature-animism properly so-called, is only sparingly developed in southern Australia; manism is absent; prayers are not directed to the deceased ancestors and sacrifices are not offered to the manes.<sup>79)</sup>

Traces of totemism have been observed in Africa and in Oceanica and survivals of this institution have been found in Asia and Europe, but "America has been the scene of its greatest development, or at least has best preserved it highly developed".<sup>80)</sup>

Thus in varying degrees foreign elements, very complex and frequently hard to distinguish, so intricately are they mixed with the strictly religious, have vitiated and corrupted the religion of primitive peoples.

Under these circumstances it is not at all surprising that magic, that is, "the art of making use of the forces of nature by certain occult observances that have a religious appearance, or of courting the influences of the invisible world"<sup>81)</sup>, should make up a very great part of the religious life of our primitives. And in point of fact, magic "is every where practised openly, has its specialists, ceremonies, and initiations. Its practises enrobe religion with numerous superstitions, as in dark climates the moss covers aged trees . . . The primitive's lack of a critical spirit, his credulity, his more or less animistic feeling, and an irresistible desire to satisfy his passions (which he shares with all humanity), have turned him into the false paths of magic. Once started on that road, it is not easy for him to turn back. Here is the source of all amulets, talismans, philters, auguries, omens, the art of divination, not to speak of numerous sacred prohibitions or taboos".<sup>82)</sup> Sacrifice is also the rite around which magic centers, or rather to which magic leads among the primitive races. Ritualistic murders, frequently also followed by disgusting anthropophagy, are by no means uncommon. Thus among the Bohdjos of Ubanghi anthropophagy is "openly and commonly practised until it has become habitual and almost without any ceremonial".<sup>83)</sup>

The *practical and social effects* of this tyranny of magic are the forgetfulness and corruption of religion along with the degra-

Totemism.

Magic.

<sup>77)</sup> Le Roy, *The Religion of the Primitives*, p. 131.

<sup>78)</sup> Ibid. p. 181.

<sup>79)</sup> Schmidt, S. V. D.; *Der Ursprung der Gottesidee*, p. 117.

<sup>80)</sup> Le Roy, *ibid.* p. 267. <sup>81)</sup> Ibid. p. 218. <sup>82)</sup> Ibid. p. 218.

<sup>83)</sup> Ibid. pp. 231, 232; cf. Schneider, *ibid.* pp. 118—122.

dation of morality and depopulation. "In the black continent fetishism has slain more victims than wars, disease, or slavery. It is the Moloch whose appetite is never sated. Human sacrifices at the death of great chiefs, as formerly in Uganda, the states of the Upper Congo, the valley of the Ubanghi, the Shanti country, and Dahomey, the accusations of sorcery, more or less ritualistic poisonings, and judicial ordeals, have done to death thousands of men, women, and children, and still continue doing so".<sup>84)</sup> Moreover, "along with depopulation, the tyranny of the secret societies exercises a lamentable influence on the African population. No class of natives, no sex escapes. That tyranny strikingly develops a tendency to dissimulation, suspicion, accusations and oppression to which the nature of the Black is generally already too much inclined. These secret societies are undoubtedly to be classed among Africa's plagues". In consequence of this lack of confidence the natural affection and duties of our most cherished human relations are perverted; "an equality in misery and barbarity has been maintained in Africa during the ages".<sup>85)</sup>

Morality.

All primitive peoples have undoubtedly a *morality* whose basis is fundamentally the same as that acknowledged by the conscience of the whole human species, whatsoever race, country, or period of its development be considered, as Cathrein<sup>86)</sup> has shown in his monumental work on the unity of the moral consciousness of mankind. The fundamental and primary idea that inspires in the primitives respect for laws and customs, restrictions on the absolute use of nature's gifts, is an innate and instinctive sentiment of justice joined to a certain impulse for good and an aversion for evil. But the practical applications which the primitive man makes of it are often deplorably erroneous. For instance, there are American savages that murder their aged parents; in Africa many tribes practise infanticide; everywhere in Africa slavery is not regarded as something forbidden; it is the only form of domestic service known; everywhere among the black populations polygamy prevails, although promiscuity is a condition altogether exceptional and abnormal; marriage is generally unstable.<sup>87)</sup>

If we define morality as the rule of our free actions in relation to our last end, everything will, of course, depend on the idea which man has of that last end. Here again the defectiveness of the morality of our primitives becomes at once apparent. For the Black does not put to himself the question as to the relation of his acts to his last end. „Like a traveller who has unconsciously lost his directions, he keeps moving and, while he waits

<sup>84)</sup> Ibid. p. 235. <sup>85)</sup> Ibid. pp. 236, 237; cf. Schneider, *ibid.* pp. 117 sq.

<sup>86)</sup> *Die Einheit des sittlichen Bewußtseins der Menschheit*; cf. especially Cathrein's conclusions, III, pp. 563 sq.

<sup>87)</sup> Le Roy, *ibid.* pp. 136, 138, 153, 254.



to cross the mysterious bridge of death, seems to have no other care than to draw from life whatever it can furnish him and to avoid whatever can bring him harm. From this present tense and practical point of view, the primitive directs his acts and fulfils what he believes to be his duty. As he has no precise symbol of doctrine, he has no clearly established moral code: customs make up his practise, handed down from his ancestors, carefully preserved, undisputed, generally observed, and nearly always enforced by the fear of punishments".<sup>88)</sup> The first law or positive custom imposed on our primitives is the obligation of observing certain religious practises; "this constitutes their worship in regard to the supernatural world they feel surrounds them, penetrates them, and dominates them: the world of manes, tutelary spirits, genii, and the world of God", as Le Roy has shown in regard to the Negrillos and Bantus.<sup>89)</sup> Thus religion and morality go hand in hand even among the so-called primitive races. However, "although religion presents itself to the mind of the Black as an obligation, it is but just to add that neither god nor the guardian spirits nor the manes are considered as examples of moral perfection".<sup>90)</sup> On the other hand, just as the savage is not free in relation to the invisible world, so neither is he entirely free as regards the world of external nature, because in his thought it does not belong to him, and in order to live, he feels obliged to ask permission of its Master. This is the sacred interdict or taboo, that is at the basis of all primitive societies and is no other than the moral law based on religious faith. The taboo may not be infringed without danger, pollution, or sin. Every violation of a taboo, whether willed or not, is bad and punishable; but the penalties may be averted by various expiatory practises.<sup>91)</sup>

"Magic morality, if one may use the term, is purely and often brutally utilitarian. That is good which is serviceable and pleasant. Everything is sacrificed to personal interest; in that contaminated atmosphere, egoism reigns supreme, as a tyrannical master. *Vae victis!* The vanquished are the weak, the slaves, the women, the children. This is the barbarous morality, which too often conceals and stifles true morality in the black country".<sup>92)</sup> The same verdict might be truly repeated in respect to other primitive races.

Finally, it is difficult to answer with precision whether in addition to faults, offences, or crimes condemned by justice, and in addition to prescriptions and prohibitions enacted by civil and religious authorities relating to the family and society in general, there is any recognition of "sins" in which one commits evil only against oneself. For instance, whether it is a moral fault to be wanting in temperance, to be slothful, jealous, proud, to be a liar, to give way to anger, avarice, luxury. "In fact, we can scarcely detect that the primitive cares either little or much for his moral

<sup>88)</sup> Ibid. p. 142.<sup>89)</sup> Ibid. p. 143.<sup>90)</sup> Ibid. p. 144.<sup>91)</sup> Ibid. pp. 144 sq.<sup>92)</sup> Ibid. p. 233.

perfection. He is what he is and remains so, although he avoids the discredit of faults that are too unpleasant, or shocking, that would bring reproach, alienate him from his friends and their gatherings, that would create a difficult situation among his relatives. But on the other hand, all these faults or habits are infamous, and individual conscience in the depth of these dense natures certainly does awake at times to condemn".<sup>93)</sup>

Conclusion.

For obvious reasons we have restricted our consideration to the primitives of Africa, for a complete exposition would require volumes. Hence for a more detailed account of the religious and moral beliefs and practises of the primitives we must refer the student to special monographs.<sup>94)</sup> However, from the above survey the deplorable religious and moral status of the so-called „primitive“ races is amply apparent.

We shall now turn our attention to the "cultured" nations of paganism.

### B. Cultured Peoples.

The picture is not a whit more pleasant, if we consider the great *cultured* peoples of the ancient Orient, that are now more intimately known to us by reason of the recent discovery and deciphering of their native monuments and sacred writings. Everywhere the history of these peoples, despite unmistakable elements and testimonies of a primitive pure religion, shows a continuous decay in respect to the knowledge of God and a corruption of religious worship through human passion and malice that is truly appalling.<sup>95)</sup>

#### I. Egyptians.

The Egyptians occupied a central position in the life of the peoples of the ancient world as the intermediaries between the portions of the then known world. Their history reaches back to the fifth millenium before Christ and already about the year 3000 B. C. they possessed a highly developed culture. But their religion, as it appears in the monuments and writings, presents such a great indefiniteness and fluidity, that it is extremely difficult to determine exactly its essential content.<sup>96)</sup> The opinions of Egyptologists differ sharply from one another; some describe its essential

<sup>93)</sup> Ibid. p. 233.

<sup>94)</sup> In addition to the works of Le Roy and Cathrein already cited, cf. the bibliography attached to the article "*The Religions of Primitive Races*", in LHR, V, pp. 31, 32; the copious bibliography prefixed to P. W. Schmidt's, S. V. D.; *Der Ursprung der Gottesidee*; also bibliography prefixed to Prof. Dr. B. Ankermann's article, "*Die Religion der Naturvölker*", in LRG, I, pp. 131 sq.

<sup>95)</sup> Schill-Straubinger, *ibid.* p. 191.

<sup>96)</sup> Ibid. pp. 160, 161.

features as monotheism, others as henotheism, polytheism, pantheism (monism), Sabaism (sun-cult), naturism, animism, fetishism, or totemism.<sup>97)</sup> Most of the more recent investigators are unwilling to deduce the religious development of Egypt from any one single source. In fact, all of these elements are united in Egypt's religion. Hence much that we shall present below in regard to the popular religion and theology of Egypt must unavoidably be hypothetical. Indeed the greatest part can only be given in general outlines; many questions must remain unanswered according to the present status of scientific investigation.

Naturism.

First and foremost Egypt's religion "was a religion of Nature, and primarily of the Sun: not indeed that the Egyptians adored the sun or moon, heaven or earth, or their great river the Nile; but if we set aside its abstract notions, all that their religion contained of symbols, of emblems, of figures and images, was borrowed from the visible Egyptian world".<sup>98)</sup> The gods were conceived as personal, but in the closest union with the phenomena of Nature, particularly with the heavens, the sun, the moon, the water, the Nile and the earth, and seemed to reveal or rather to visualize their characteristic essence and activity especially in definite animals.<sup>99)</sup> This does not mean, however, that Egyptian Religion was pure Animal Worship or zoolotry. "In the last period, *i. e.* from the 7th century B. C. onward, there was indeed a certain animal cult, as we shall refer to it below; but previously nothing similar can be detected". Certain animals, for instance the bull Apis at Memphis, were, after all "honored only for the

<sup>97)</sup> Evolutionists, *e. g.*, Pietschmann, Thiele, Ed. Meyer, Adolf Erman, assume a gradual evolution from animistic-polytheistic primary forms to a monotheism and monism. Others, *e. g.*, Pierret, de Rougé, H. Burgsch, maintain that monotheism is the primitive religion under the apparent guise of polytheism, or more exactly Sabaism (sun-cult). Wallis Budge, O. Lange, favor a primitive monotheism; K. v. Orelli admits that originally the divinity was conceived as a unity and that only gradually was it split up; he insists, however, that a proper qualification is not monotheism, but rather henotheism. A. Seitz (*Natürliche Religionsbegründung*, p. 596) characterizes the primitive Egyptian religion according to its external form as a spiritual polytheism, but as a differentiated monotheism according to its inmost essence, which because of its total submersion in naturism no longer finds its way back to monotheism, but in the end is resolved into magical, mystic monism and the decadence of materialism. H. Hyvernât (art. "*Egypt*", in CE. V, p. 344) sees two prominent features in the Egyptian religion: "First, animal fetishism from beginning to end in a more or less mitigated form; secondly, superimposition, during the early Memphite dynasties, of the sun-worship, the sun being considered not as creator, but as organizer of the world, from an eternally pre-existing matter, perhaps the forerunner of the demiurge of the Alexandrine School". — cf. art. "*Die Ägypter*" by Dr. H. O. Lange, with most recent bibliography, in LHR. I, pp. 423 sq.

<sup>98)</sup> *The Religion of Egypt*. From the French of Alex. Mallon, in LHR, I, p. 2.

<sup>99)</sup> Schill-Straubinger, *ibid.* p. 161.



intimate relations which, it was believed, they enjoyed with a deity distinct from themselves".<sup>100)</sup>

Mixture  
of different  
systems.

"Another essential feature in this religion is that it was a mixture of different systems; it has not unity in the strict sense of the word, especially at first. About 4000 B. C., before the first king, Menes, had established the political unity of Egypt, each tribe was independent, and had its own gods and temples, priests and rites, and beliefs".<sup>101)</sup> Each province (nome) had its god with wife and child and honored the god under a definite name. Hence the deity was represented as a unity, although there was no conscious exclusion of multiplicity. When the individual nomes were united under a political hegemony, the gods, which originally were only different names for the same being, were likewise united. However, in the consciousness of the people the local deities continued to co-exist and were incorporated with and subordinated under the superior chief god, generally the god of the city, whose ruler or priesthood possessed the greatest political influence.<sup>102)</sup> The local deities were incorporated with the superior chief god in a progressive schematism: a) in groups of three (triads) or of nine gods (enneads) after the model of the human family consisting essentially of three members: father, mother and child; b) in the cycle of the chief god of Thebes, the sun, with its threefold phase: the setting sun (Amon = the hidden), the sun in the height of the heavens (Ra or Re) and the rising sun (Horus = the growing child); c) in the unified sun-system of the abstract monistic speculation of the priests with the absorption of all the individual local deities by the theological school of On or Heliopolis. After the subjugation of Egypt by the Persians, Greeks and Romans pantheistic (monistic) mysticism and syncretism preponderate. Finally, materialism in its crassest form appears in the period of decadence, as we shall indicate below.<sup>103)</sup>

Polytheism.

While there can be no doubt that hints of monotheism abound in the Egyptian religion, still "at first glance, and considered as a whole, Egyptian religion is at all epochs alike purely polytheistic, with a marked inclination, in fact, towards idolatry. The plurality of gods is a fact which stares one in the face: it is everywhere, on all the monuments, in all the texts, in all the temples and the records, over all the face of Egypt. Not a single expression could we find", so Mallon states, "of condemnation, of rejection; or of clear affirmation of the duty of believing on one only god or faintest praise for one who should so believe. Polytheism reigned supreme over ancient Egypt, as over Assyria and Chaldea".<sup>104)</sup>

<sup>100)</sup> Mallon, *ibid.* p. 11.

<sup>101)</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 2, 3.

<sup>102)</sup> Schill-Straubinger, *ibid.* p. 161.

<sup>103)</sup> Seitz, *ibid.* pp. 590, 591; cf. Hyvernât, *ibid.* in CE. V, pp. 344, 345.

<sup>104)</sup> Mallon, *ibid.* pp. 12, 13; cf. Lange, *ibid.* I, pp. 447—465.

Such was the general aspect of Egyptian Religion during many centuries.

"Six or seven hundred years before our era it embarked on a career of decadence. Then begins, to last until the introduction of Christianity, that unchecked cult of animals, which Herodotus described to us. These animals, which the ancients had in some sense mingled with their worship as symbols of the deity, now ascended the altars in their own persons, and, if they do not actually evict the gods, at least they relegate them to the second rank. Serpents, crocodiles, birds, cats, rams, are treated as sacred objects, and are revered as much, as, or more than, the statues of Amon-Ra and Osiris, are embalmed, mummified, and buried with divine honors. Incalculable is the number of the sacred animals which modern discoveries have brought back to light, buried with all the flattery and luxury which in the old days only the rich and powerful could afford. . . It really seems as if the men of those generations, victims of some extraordinary mental aberration, lavished more care on the sepulture of a cat than on that of their father or mother. . . Under the Ptolemies (c. 300—30 B. C.) decadence moves headlong, in spite of the exterior pomp and circumstance of the religious ceremonies . . . the people set no bounds to their veneration for these worthy successors of the Pharaohs; the priests decreed divine honors for them in the days of Rameses and Thotmes . . . The whole of Egypt sank deeper and deeper in the slough of animal worship. The roles were reversed: man is no longer the lord of the animals, but they become his master". Such was the religion of the people. The higher classes, especially in the towns where the Greek language was dominant, gradually detached themselves from the old beliefs, or rather modernized them. Thus "in the first Christian century Egyptian Religion was but a hotch-potch of Greek and Egyptian elements".<sup>105)</sup>

End of Egyptian religion.  
Animalcult.

The land of the Pharaohs was the classic primitive holt of *superstition* and *magic*. Indeed the old Egyptian divinations and magic papyri constitute the pattern for the superstitious generations of all times, not only of the Middle Ages but likewise of modern times. Thus the sacred book of the Mormons is but an imitation of the Egyptian hypokephal, that is, the support made up of pieces of linen upon which were written magical sayings and which was placed under the head of the deceased.<sup>106)</sup>

Magic.

We shall pass over the belief in another life, in a judgment and a retribution, which are well established points in Egyptian Religion,<sup>107)</sup> and add a few words regarding the *morality* of this

Morality.

<sup>105)</sup> Mallon *ibid.* pp. 25—29; cf. J. I. Döllinger, *The Gentile and the Jew in the Courts of the Temple of Christ*. Transl. from the German by N. Darnell. London. 1906 (2. ed.), I, pp. 482—488.

<sup>106)</sup> Seitz, *ibid.* p. 540; Döllinger-Darnell, *ibid.* I, pp. 511 sq.

<sup>107)</sup> Hyvernath, *ibid.* pp. 346 sq.

ancient people. The old Egyptians possessed a high grade of ethical knowledge. Indeed with the exception of the Israelites there probably is no purer and nobler ethical doctrine among the ancient cultured peoples than that of the Egyptians.<sup>108)</sup> But one may not overlook the fact, that the knowledge of ethical duties and the practical exercise of that knowledge did not always go hand in hand. Practise oftentimes lagged far behind theory in the life of the Egyptians. For instance, with the worship of beasts were connected immoralities of the worst kind. At Mendes and Thmuis women actually prostituted themselves to the he-goat worshipped there with divine honors.<sup>109)</sup> The degrading phallus worship, and the obscene language used in the Osiris festival are further blots on Egyptian morality.<sup>110)</sup> The priests were limited to one wife, but polygamy was allowed to others although it may not have been very common.<sup>111)</sup> Divorce, at least in later times, seems to have been the order of the day; even trial-marriages appear to have been in vogue.<sup>112)</sup> There were Hierodouloi, young maidens who were sacred to Ammon, who before their marriage prostituted themselves to as many men as they chose.<sup>113)</sup>

## II. Semites.

Passing from the Nile Valley we now direct our attention to the peoples of the Near East. Let us consider, in the first place, the great cultured peoples on the Euphrates and the Tigris, namely the Babylonians and Assyrians, who from the viewpoint of culture are so closely united with each other that we may regard them as one people.<sup>114)</sup> They belong to the *Semitic* peoples, who from the philological viewpoint are distinguished into four chief groups: Babylonian-Assyrian Semites (East Semites), Chanaanitic Semites (West Semites), Aramaic Semites (North Semites) and Arabian Semites (South Semites).<sup>115)</sup>

### 1. Babylonians and Assyrians.

"At the dawn of history in the middle of the fifth millenium before Christ we find in the Euphrates Valley a number of city-states, or rather city-monarchies, in rivalry with one another and in such a condition of culture and progress, that this valley has been called the cradle of civilization, not only of the Semitic

<sup>108)</sup> Cathrein, S. J; *ibid.* I, pp. 37—39.

<sup>109)</sup> Döllinger-Darnell, *ibid.* I, p. 486 with references.

<sup>110)</sup> *Ibid.* I, pp. 511 sq.

<sup>111)</sup> *Ibid.* I, p. 502; cf. Lange, *ibid.* in LRG. I, p. 491.

<sup>112)</sup> Cathrein, S. J; *ibid.* I, p. 39; cf. *Zeitschrift für ägyptische Sprache und Altertumskunde*, Leipzig. 1910, XLVI, pp. 112 sq.

<sup>113)</sup> Döllinger-Darnell *ibid.* I, p. 503.

<sup>114)</sup> Cathrein, S. J; *ibid.* I, p. 40; cf. Fr. Jeremias, *Semitische Völker in Vorderasien*, with bibliography of recent publications, in LRG, I, pp. 496 sq.

<sup>115)</sup> F. Schühlein, art. "*Semites*", in CE, XIII, p. 707.



world, but most likely also of Egypt. The people dwelling in this valley were certainly not all of one race; they differed in type and language".<sup>116)</sup> When the *Babylonians* entered into the plain of the two rivers, they found the country already occupied by two older peoples: in the north by the Accadians and in the south by the Sumerians. The latter especially seem to have attained a high degree of culture. From them the Babylonians received the cuneiform script and probably also their religion, which later on they handed over to the *Assyrians*.<sup>117)</sup>

"Babylon was not, in those distant ages, a united and homogeneous kingdom; it was divided into a number of little independent states formed by each several city. Each of these cities was consecrated to a god, who was regarded as its real sovereign, and in whose name a king or *patesi* ruled".<sup>118)</sup> "A large company of gods were members of his household and ministered to his wants or served him as officers of state. Thus it was the privilege of special deities to act as his cup-bearer, the keeper of his harim, or the driver of his chariot; others were musicians and singers; others again were shepherds, land stewards, architects, or inspectors of fishing and irrigation; while more important deities were his counsellors of state, or the generals who planned his campaigns and looked to the defence of his city. When it is recalled that even in the earliest historical periods many other deities were worshipped in most of the cities in addition to the city-god, and that each of these had his own household and divine attendants, one reason will be apparent for the large number of gods whose names were known to the later Babylonians and Assyrians, even if their origin and functions were often obscure".<sup>119)</sup> There were certain sanctuaries which enjoyed a peculiar celebrity: in the south, those of En-ki (later known as Ea) at Eridu, of Nannar (Sin) at Ur, of Babbar (Shamash) at Larsa, of Anu and Innina (Ishtar) at Uruk, of En-lil (Bel) at Nappur; in the north, the shrines of Shamash at Sippar, or Nergal at Kutha.<sup>120)</sup> "The Babylonian Pantheon arose out of a gradual amalgamation of the local deities of the early city states of Sumer and Akkad. And Babylonian mythology is mainly the projection into the heavenly sphere of the earthly fortunes of the early centers of civilization in the Euphrates valley. Babylonian religion, therefore, is largely a Sumerian, *i. e.*, Mongolian product, no doubt modified by a Semitic influence, yet to the last bearing the mark

Babylonian  
and Assyrian  
Pantheon.

<sup>116)</sup> J. P. Arendzen, art. "Babylonia", in CE. II, p. 180.

<sup>117)</sup> Cathrein, S. J; *ibid.* I. p. 40; cf. also Gabriel Oussani, art. "Assyria", in CE. II, pp. 7—17.

<sup>118)</sup> *The Religion of Babylonia and Assyria*. From the French of A. Condamin, S. J., in LHR, I, pp. 2, 3.

<sup>119)</sup> L. W. King, *Cuneiform Texts from Babylonian Tablets, etc. in the British Museum*, part. xxiv, 1908, p. 5 cited by Condamin, S. J., *ibid.* p. 3.

<sup>120)</sup> Condamin, S. J., *ibid.* p. 3.

of its Mongolian origin in the very names of its gods and in the sacred dead languages in which they were addressed. The tutelary spirit of a locality extended his power with the political power of his adherents; when the citizens of one city entered into political relations with the citizens of another, popular imagination soon created the relation of father and son, brother and sister, or man and wife, between their respective gods... With the rise of Babylon and the political unification of the whole country under this metropolis, the city-god Marduk, whose name does not occur on any inscription previous to Hammurabi, leaps to the foreground. The Babylonian theologians not only gave him a place in the Pantheon, but in the Epos 'Enuma Elish' it is related how, as reward for overcoming the Dragon of Chaos, the great gods, his fathers, bestowed upon Marduk their own names and titles. Marduk gradually so outshone the other deities that these were looked upon as mere manifestations of Marduk, whose name became almost a synonym for God... Unlike the Assyrians, the Babylonians never possessed a female deity of such standing in the Pantheon as Ishtar of Ninive or Arbela. In the Second Empire, Nebo, the city-god of Borsippa, over against Babylon, rises into prominence and wins honors almost equal to those of Marduk and the twin cities have two almost inseparable gods".<sup>121)</sup>

Pantheism or  
monotheism?

It has been frequently asserted that the religion of Old Babylon evolved from polytheism or even animistic-polydemonism to monotheism, so that by the time of Hammurabi (about 2000 B. C.) Babylonia had reached a certain monotheism. Hence instead of corruption we find rather progress and evolution to higher forms of religion. Thus the Berlin professor Friedrich Delitzsch defended the monotheistic coloring of Babylon's religion on the presupposition, that composite proper names, e. g., Yauva-El or Jahum-Ilu, contain an allusion to the primitive Semitic veneration of the one true God with the double name Jhw, Hebrew-Jahwe and El or Ilu.<sup>122)</sup> — However, a) Hammurabi himself pays homage to the national gods of old Babylonia, to whom also the names of the immediate members of his family point; b) the sign of God is lacking before the names of God, which appear on the three clay tablets dating certainly from Hammurabi's time; c) the composition of these names "with God or Jahwe" is, moreover, disputed by the majority of Assyriologists; some even considering it to be the third person; d) at most, there might be question of a union of a primitive Elamitic god with the general title of a deity; that is, it might express his selection as a special tutelary god; e) from the viewpoint of the philosophy of religion the occurrence of proper names, whose component elements coincide with the monotheistic god of Babel, prove just as little a hereditary monotheism of Babylon as, for instance, the name "Theophilus"

<sup>121)</sup> Arendzen, *ibid.* p. 187; cf. Jeremias, *ibid.* I, pp. 540—569.

<sup>122)</sup> Seitz, *ibid.* pp. 579, 580.

demonstrates monotheism among the Indo-Germanic peoples or, vice versa, the Jewish name "Mardochaeus" the Marduk-cult in Israel.<sup>123)</sup> G. Hoberg<sup>124)</sup>, analyzing the monistic occult speculation of the Babylonian priestly school, shows that originally the World-All in its universality was looked upon by the Babylonians as a manifestation of one single god, who, to be sure, no longer exists outside the world, but is conceived as identical with it. Furthermore, the naturalistic viewpoint of paganism, in contrast with the supernaturalistic conception of the Israelitic primitive revelation, is evident especially from the sexual conception of the Olympus of Babylonia.

Hence we may conclude, that not monotheism, but rather polytheism, fundamentally monistic (pantheistic) and naturalistic, with a monarchical head characterizes the priestly religion of old Babylon. The evolution is not from polytheism or animistic-polydemonism to monotheism; on the contrary, there is a corruption from a monotheism, that closely approximates polytheism with a monarchical head, to crassest polytheism against which there is a transient reaction in the form of henotheism in the neo-Babylonian kingdom in the sixth century before Christ.<sup>125)</sup>

In the religious life of the Babylonians and Assyrians *magic, witchcraft* and *incantations* played a large part. "Sickness and disasters were not regarded as effects of merely natural causes, but as punishments for offences against a god and were attributed to maleficent demons. Wizards, and especially witches, were very powerful in drawing down these evils upon men. They can confound nature, change the destinies of men, influence the decisions of the great gods, impress a whole army of evil genii against a miserable mortal. Charms, magic potions, mysterious operations, or simply the 'evil eye', the whispering of a few ill-omened words, suffice to effect these prodigies. Against this malevolent power exorcist-priests fought by means of incantations".

Magic,  
witchcraft,  
incantations.

"*Extispicium*, i. e., the examination of the liver and entrails of animals, was, in fact, an ordinary method of divination. The bârû, or diviner-priest, practised also cup-divination . . . Other prognostications were drawn from the flight of birds, births, or certain abnormal or monstrous phenomena . . . Above all, the future was told from the movements of the stars and atmospheric phenomena".<sup>126)</sup>

Divination  
and oracle.

While *prayer* is very frequent among the Babylonians and Assyrians, still, as Prof. Jastrow assures us, "Babylonians and

Prayers.

<sup>123)</sup> Ibid. pp. 580—583 with references.

<sup>124)</sup> *Babel oder Bibel? Randglossen zu den beiden Vorträgen Friedr. Delitzsch's.* 1904; cf. also IDEM, *Bibel oder Babel?* in Heft XV of the series "*Glaube und Wissen*". München. 1907, pp. 50—60.

<sup>125)</sup> Seitz, *ibid.* pp. 579, 583, 584.

<sup>126)</sup> Condamin, S. J; *ibid.* pp. 12, 13; Jeremias, *ibid.* I, pp. 570 sq.



Assyrians alike only turned to the gods when they wanted to obtain something — patronage or cure, deliverance from ill, or favour. The pure praise of the gods without secondary pre-occupations does not exist in the Assyrio-Babylonian cultus".<sup>127)</sup>

Morality.

"The *moral* sense of these pagans was not wholly perverted; indeed in some points they manifested a certain delicacy of conscience. Yet, in spite of the assertions of Friedrich Delitzsch in his *Babel und Bibel*, the Babylonians and Assyrians were far from having as profound a conception of the nature of sin as what we find among the Israelites. 'The grace of the merciful god', F. Jeremías justly notes, 'the result sought and hoped for through prayer, is but the deliverance from sickness. That is the meaning of *remission of sins*. Forgiveness and cure are synonyms. This must be our starting-point would we estimate their notions of fault and sin, of mercy and of pardon'".<sup>128)</sup> "The love of one's neighbor appears nowhere in the cuneiform texts; it is noticeably lacking in the code of Hammurabi, which inflicts the death penalty on any one who helps a slave to escape, or who shelters a runaway slave. Hammurabi never legislates from the moral point of view; 'he never seeks a religious motive for his interdiction of unrighteousness. But further, he not only does not ban covetousness, or evil desires, but actually authorizes certain immoral practises such as ritual prostitution'".<sup>129)</sup>

## 2. Ancient Syrians.

Let us now consider the religion of *Ancient Syria*, which from the viewpoint of Biblical and classical geography comprises that portion of Western Asia, "that is bounded on the north and north west by the Taurus and Asia Minor, on the south by Palestine, on the east by the Euphrates, the Syro-Arabian desert, and Mesopotamia, and on the west by the Mediterranean".<sup>130)</sup> Syria "was the road for the religion, trade, war, art, and letters between the empire on the Nile and that on the Euphrates and Tigris".<sup>131)</sup> "Laid open by its position to so many influences, and divided by the form of its surface into so many small states, Syria became a series of crucibles, where many elements combined in various proportions".<sup>132)</sup> In the north were the *Mongolian Hittites*, who coming down the Taurus passes in the north had taken Carchemish on the Euphrates and Kadesh on the Orontes. There also were the *Semite Aramaeans*, who had founded the cities of Damascus, Hamath, and Zobah. The *Semite Phoenicians* occupied about 200 miles of the northern coast, and

<sup>127)</sup> Ibid. p. 19.      <sup>128)</sup> Ibid. pp. 21, 22 (italics ours).

<sup>129)</sup> Ibid. p. 26; cf. Döllinger-Darnell *ibid.* I, pp. 447, 448.

<sup>130)</sup> Gabriel Oussani, art. "*Syria*", in CE. XIV, p. 399.

<sup>131)</sup> G. S. Hitchcock, *The Religion of Ancient Syria*, in LHR. I, p. 2.

<sup>132)</sup> Ibid. I, p. 4.

established the cities and league of Arvad, Sidon, Tyre, Beyrût, Simyra, Gebal, and Akko. The south coast of Syria was occupied by the uncircumcised *Philistines*, probably an Aryan people, who marched into Syria not long before the arrival of the Israelites from Egypt and formed a confederacy of the five cities Gaza, Ashkelon, Ashdod, Ekron, and Gath. They surrendered, none the less, to Canaanite religion and civilization. East of them lay *Israel* and *Judah* with their chief cities, Samaria and Jerusalem. Still farther eastward, and beyond the Jordan and the Dead Sea, were the kingdoms of *Ammon* and *Moab*. South of Moab, and in the valley by Mount Seir, lived the *Edomites*, who had dispossessed the Norites, that is, the cave-dwellers.<sup>133</sup>) We shall eliminate from our study the Israelites, since they were blessed with a divine revelation.

Polytheism.

Traces of an original monotheism appear indeed in the religion of the ancient Syrians in the divine name El (the Mighty One), as well as in the applicability of the name "Baal" (Lord, Owner), to all the Phoenician gods. Gradually, however, monotheism was obliged to give way to naturalistic *polytheism*. About fifty names of the Syrian gods are known from the Phoenician inscriptions, although this does not help us to determine the character of the object worshipped.<sup>134</sup>) Each tribe seems to have had its own god, but contact with other tribes led to an acquaintance with strange gods. Henceforth the tribal god is no longer the only god, although he continues to be the highest and mightiest god. Or the qualities of god were personified and conceived as independent deities. Oftentimes in religious worship these secondary deities came to the fore, since they were nearer to man than the primitive chief god.<sup>135</sup>) The male deities of Ancient Syria were named or described by the term Baal with an epithet denoting a natural phenomenon or a place: thus they are only qualitative or local distinctions of the *one* god.<sup>136</sup>) "The ordinary rural worship was of Baalim or Baals, rather than of Baal, though land watered neither by rain nor by artificial irrigation, but by a stream, was said to be watered by Baal, the local god . . . The god of a city became its Milk or king, but naturally continued to be its Baal, and would have some distinctive character. So Baal-zebub, 'the Baal of the fly', whose name was afterwards used to designate the chief of the evil spirits, was worshipped at Ekron . . . The sun, too, was a Baal, and as such has a temple at Beth-shemesh, 'the house of the sun' . . . Of special importance was the Baal of Tyre (the Baal-Sur)", who bore the name Melkarth, or rather Milk-garth, "the

<sup>133</sup>) Ibid. I, pp. 2, 3 (italics ours).

<sup>134</sup>) Ibid. I, pp. 6, 7; cf. Brunsmann, S. V. D. *ibid.* I, pp. 93, 94. A more detailed account of the religion of Ancient Syria is to be found in Jeremias, *ibid.* I, pp. 607—647 with recent bibliography.

<sup>135</sup>) Schill-Straubinger, *ibid.* p. 160.

<sup>136</sup>) Ibid. p. 159.

king of the city".<sup>137)</sup> Melkarth is one of the numerous forms, in which the divine name Melek (identical with the Biblical Moloch) occurs in conjunction with the other names of a place, a god, or of persons.<sup>138)</sup> "Each city and each district paid homage to several idols. There was no exclusiveness in these pagan cults, for none of their gods has said, 'Thou shalt not have other gods beside My face'".<sup>139)</sup>

The counterpart of the male Baal was the female Astarte (the Babylonian Ishtar, the Astarte of the Greeks). Indeed, both Greeks and Phoenicians assert the identity of this goddess with the Greek goddess of animal passion.<sup>140)</sup> Later on with the cult of Astarte were joined the orgies of the Adonis-cult which were celebrated in honor of Adonis, the god of the vernal spring.<sup>141)</sup>

"The Syrian gods, then, represent powers of nature, and as such are double, male and female". A distinctive feature of their history is the combination of the two in one, the identification of two gods, or the endowing one with the attributes of another in addition to its own (e. g., the Phoenician Milk-Ashtart).<sup>142)</sup>

Morality  
and worship.

The cult of the Ancient Syrians lacks the ethical conception of the relation between the deity and man and is characterized by coarse sensuality and cruelty. The kindly and beneficent activity of the deity was, indeed, honored by festivals of joy, but, as a rule, they were linked with immorality; nay more, immorality itself was held to be an act of religion. To placate the deity men, preferably children, were sacrificed.<sup>143)</sup> The image of the Canaanitish Moloch was of metal and was made "glowing hot by a fire kindled within it, and the children, laid in its arms, rolled from thence into the fiery lap below . . . Such sacrifices took place either annually on an appointed day, or before great enterprises, or on the occasion of a public calamity, to appease the wrath of the god".<sup>144)</sup> Frenzy played no small part in the worship of the Syrian gods. "Lucian, in his *Syrian Goddess*, tells us that the spring-time festival, known as the 'feast of the torches', was celebrated not only by the burning of trees laden with offerings, and by the flinging of children from the temple roof, but also by the madness of those who gashed their arms, till the excitement produced by such example incited others to imitate them in the mutilation of their bodies". Rawlinson points out in his *Phoenicia* that this mutilation was for the purpose of sterility and male harlotry. "Speaking of the various Ashtarts, Maspero says in his *Struggle of the Nations*, p. 161, 'Around the majority of these

<sup>137)</sup> Hitchcock, *ibid.* pp. 8, 9.

<sup>138)</sup> Jeremias, *ibid.* I, p. 637.

<sup>139)</sup> Hitchcock, *ibid.* p. 11.

<sup>140)</sup> *Ibid.* p. 13; cf. Jeremias, *ibid.* I, pp. 642—644.

<sup>141)</sup> Jeremias, *ibid.* I, p. 626.

<sup>142)</sup> Hitchcock, *ibid.* pp. 14, 15.

<sup>143)</sup> Schill-Straubinger, *ibid.* p. 159.

<sup>144)</sup> Döllinger-Darnell, *ibid.* I, pp. 452, 453.



goddesses was gathered an infamous troupe of profligates (kedeshim), 'dogs of love' (kelabim), and courtesans (kedeshôt)'''.<sup>145)</sup>

### 3. Arabs.

We shall add a brief word concerning the South Semites. The *Arabs*, the most powerful branch of the Semitic group of peoples, are indigenous to Central and Northern Arabia. Originally monotheism obtained among them, as is evident from the formation of proper names with *Ilū*, or *Ilī*, my God. However, in the course of time monotheism yielded to siderial *polytheism*.<sup>146)</sup> Their chief deities were Alilat or Allat, "who appears to have been principally a goddess of the moon", Al'Uzza, the Venus of the Arabians, Manat, the goddess of destiny, and Dusares, "to whom human sacrifices were offered."<sup>147)</sup> But the highest of the gods was Allah (a compound word from the article, '*al*', and *ilah*, divinity, signifying "the god", *par excellence*),<sup>148)</sup> the all ruling god before whom all the other gods and goddesses retreated into the background.<sup>149)</sup> In general, the local and household gods were no great factors in the public life, and no enthusiasm was enkindled for them. Indeed, no verse among the thousands that are preserved to us, bespeaks their praise. Their names were uttered in solemn asseveration, it is true, and their memory was handed down from generation to generation in personal names, which were to a large extent mutilated. Traditional sacrifices of the fruits of the field and of the surplus of the flock were offered to them as oblations and, above all, their places of worship were visited at definite times and ceremonies performed, which had long since become unintelligible.<sup>150)</sup> "In the great national sanctuary at Mecca, in the Caaba, founded about the beginning of the first century before Christ, three hundred and sixty idols of all the Arabian tribes were set up. The principal deity of the temple of the Coreishites was Hubal, who was represented holding seven arrows in his hand, and lots were drawn before him with arrows".

Polytheism.

"The earlier and cherished objects of an Arab's devotion were stones and trees, in which, as also in idols shaped like men, they saw and adored not mere symbols of deity, but instruments and channels of divine power and operation".<sup>151)</sup> Thus polytheism gradually became fetishism (e. g., the black stone at Mecca).

Fetishism.

<sup>145)</sup> Hitchcock, *ibid.* pp. 22, 23; cf. Döllinger-Darnell, *ibid.* I, pp. 454 sq.

<sup>146)</sup> Schill-Straubinger, *ibid.* p. 160; cf. Prof. Dr. C. Snouck-Hurgronje, *Der Islam*, in LRG. I, pp. 648—655 with recent literature.

<sup>147)</sup> Döllinger-Darnell, *ibid.* I, pp. 454 sq.

<sup>148)</sup> R. Butin, art. "*Allah*", in CE. I, p. 316.

<sup>149)</sup> Snouck-Hurgronje, *ibid.* I, p. 652.

<sup>150)</sup> H. Grimme, *Mohammed, I. Teil: Das Leben*, in DRG. VII, p. 6.

<sup>151)</sup> Döllinger-Darnell, *ibid.* I, p. 462.

Later on, however, particularly under the influence of Judaism and Christianity, a reaction set in. The Hanifes, the precursors of Mohammedanism, were strict monotheists. Finally, thanks to the influence of the revealed religion of the Old and New Testaments, Mohammed succeeded in raising Allah to the dignity of the one God of the Arabs.<sup>152)</sup>

### III. Mongolians.

We shall now turn our attention to the *Mongolian*, or *Turanian* group or race, "to which belong all the inhabitants of the whole of Northern Asia and as far south as the plains bordering the Caspian Sea, including China, Tibet, the Indo-Malayan peninsula, Japan, Korea, and the Archipelago making by far the largest part of the population of Asia".<sup>153)</sup> In order not to expand this study beyond due proportions we will restrict our inquiry to the religion of the Chinese and Japanese. For the religious and moral status of the other peoples of this group we must refer the student to special treatises.<sup>154)</sup>

#### 1. Chinese.

"The three state religions of China (*San-kiao*, or three doctrines) are Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism".<sup>155)</sup> Not unfrequently Confucianism is called the religion of China; but this is an abuse of terms. The religion of China dates from the origin of China. But Confucianism is "the complex system of moral, social, political, and religious teaching *built up by Confucius on the ancient Chinese traditions*, and perpetuated as the State religion down to the present day".<sup>156)</sup> He is the great *reformer* rather than the founder of the Chinese religion. Moreover, the doctrines of Confucius have been greatly modified in the course of time, particularly by the philosopher Chu-si and his disciples (Neo-Confucianism).

We shall consider in order, first, the *primitive* religion of China; then, we shall treat of *Confucianism*, *Taoism* and *Buddhism*.

1. "At their entry into history, towards the year 2698, the Chinese appear as a people distinct, relatively not numerous, possessed of its own customs, and established in small groups among the aborigines of manners differing from their own. The Chinese venerated Heaven and the Manes or Spirits of the Dead, while the aborigines were fetishists. This is all that we know of Chinese origins. From the historical period which extends from the twenty-fourth to the twelfth century before Christ", the primitive religion of the Chinese was monotheism, as is apparent

<sup>152)</sup> Schill-Straubinger, *ibid.* p. 160.

<sup>153)</sup> Gabriel Oussani, art. "*Asia*", in CE. I, p. 778.

<sup>154)</sup> cf. Cathrein, S. J; *ibid.* I, pp. 105—111 with literature.

<sup>155)</sup> Henri Cordier, art. "*China*", in CE. III, p. 668.

<sup>156)</sup> Chas. Aiken, art. "*Confucianism*", in CE. IV, p. 223 (*italics ours*).

from the Odes (Shi-ching) and the Annals (Shu-Ching), the sole existing documents.<sup>157)</sup> "The primitive worship was addressed to the Lord of the World, to the Judge of men, to God", who was called the Sublime Heaven, Heaven (T'ien), the Sublime Ruler, the Ruler. "These four terms of the ancient texts are, by the consent of all commentators, strictly and perfectly synonymous... The Emperor is His mandatory on earth, and Heaven predestines him from afar, preparing beforehand through long ages its elect one". In view of the attributes predicated of Heaven "it is impossible to admit that the ancient Chinese considered Heaven as a material vault, and the Sublime Ruler as an ancient hero. This interpretation would be irreconcilable with the texts, their commentators, and all tradition".<sup>158)</sup>

"From the same epoch certain transcendent beings were the objects of a secondary worship. The texts enumerate the Shen of Heaven, and the Ch'i of earth, especially those of mountains and rivers, the patrons of lands and those of harvests, etc. They were the Manes of illustrious men, ancient benefactors honoured as protectors — a particular case of the general worship paid by the ancient Chinese to the souls of the dead... This cult of the dead was the great business concern which claimed the living's every care". It is indeed true, that the cult of the dead was not superstitious in its origin, but on account of its exaggerated realism "it was fatally sure to conduce to superstition before long, which failed not to happen".<sup>159)</sup>

Worship.

"From the beginning the higher cults were a government monopoly. The Emperor alone communicated with the Sublime Ruler, and the functionaries venerated the transcendent beings in their own districts. The proper religion of private persons was the worship of their living parents and of their dead ancestors. For them to attempt to communicate with Heaven was a criminal usurpation, and was punished as such. It was enough that the Emperor prayed for his people".<sup>160)</sup> Heaven's pleasure or displeasure was made manifest by divination particularly by the examination of atmospheric phenomena and the celestial bodies, by the scorching and interpretation of tortoise-shells, etc. "The worship rendered to Heaven, to the Sublime Ruler, was simple and expressive".<sup>161)</sup>

Morality.

Characteristic traits of the ancient Chinese religion were "the vagueness of its moral teaching and the fact that morality descended from parents and governors rather than from the Supreme Being. Man must do what is right for the sake of pleasing his parents, for the sake of appearing well in the eyes of the authorities. He must avoid evil to save his parents from

<sup>157)</sup> *The Religion of China*. From the French of L. Wieger, S. J.; in LHR. I, pp. 1, 2; cf. O. Franke, *Die Chinesen*, in LRG. I, pp. 193 sq. with recent literature.

<sup>158)</sup> Ibid. pp. 4, 2.

<sup>159)</sup> Ibid. pp. 3, 5.

<sup>160)</sup> Ibid. pp. 4, 5.

<sup>161)</sup> Ibid. pp. 2, 3.



affliction, and himself from chastisements. Without doubt the ancient texts say that the Sublime Ruler sees and judges, that the good shall be happy, the evil unhappy. But they do not define what is good and evil, nor do they say anything clear of the Divinity's judgments, or of the nature of the final sanction".<sup>162)</sup>

Decadence.

"In 1122 the Shan-Yin dynasty was overthrown by the Chou, who occupied the imperial throne for more than eight centuries. The texts of the Odes and of the Annals, texts both numerous and clear, show that during the first half of this period beliefs remained the same as in the preceding ages. Some innovations and alterations, however, which were made at this epoch, had grave consequences later". The chief germs of decadence were the following: "Two new systems of divination, one by number, the other by diagrams, were introduced at the beginning of the dynasty", and later on degenerated into superstitions. "Official astrology and meteorology, considerably developed at the same epoch, also degenerated afterwards into superstitious practise". Moreover, contamination of the Chinese theists by the aboriginal fetishists, whom the Chinese absorbed in great numbers during this period led to further corruptions. From them came sorcery, "the official existence of which can be established from the Chou-li ritual of this dynasty... Then came the importation of Avestic and Brahminic ideas, which corrupted the primitive monotheism and simple cosmogony of the ancients. To the Sublime Ruler were given different names after the different regions of space; and of what was at first a mere matter of names, a distinction of the reason, the sect of the Taoists will, in the sequel, be bent upon making a real distinction, thus multiplying the Supreme Being. A dualistic system (two principles or alternate stadia of matter, *yin* and *yang*, repose and action) was invoked to explain the genesis of the universe — a purely philosophical explanation from which the Taoist sect will derive later on its pantheistic system".<sup>163)</sup> "During the period named Ch'un Ch'in, the eighth to the fifth century before Christ, the decadence was accentuated. Monotheism always remained, but the divinity put on forms more and more anthropomorphic. The old transcendent beings, too, and the noble Manes get more and more vulgar. They eat and drink; they even put on animal forms. Their category is enlarged to receive mischievous beings of foreign extraction — undines, dryads, and others, who are remarkably like Indian Nagas. The primitive notion of the ordinary Manes is also changed. Survival is believed more strongly than ever, and the dead appear, admonish, bless, and curse. But they, too, have learned to eat and drink, and that so well that if they be not nourished they suffer from hunger, steal food, and avenge themselves on their negligent offspring. The other world also comes more and more to be figured as

<sup>162)</sup> Wiegner S. J; *ibid.* p. 5; cf. Cathrein, S. J; *ibid.* I, pp. 92 sq.

<sup>163)</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 5—7.

similar to this one, as peopled by rich and poor, and above all by miserable starvelings identical with the Pretas of India. The people see phantoms everywhere. Hunger after death is the great fear. In 678 and 589 appeared certain cases of Sutteeism — men, women, horses and chariots sent into the other world with their dead master (Iso-chuan). The thing will subsequently become customary; thus, when some good or bad fortune occurs to a great family, a faithful servant commits suicide to carry the news to the ancestors in Hades".<sup>164</sup>) The theory of the *soul*, invented by the philosopher Iso-chuan, distinguished between the inferior soul, *p'ai*, and the superior soul, *hun*. This philosopher and his disciples endeavored to reduce the higher soul to the same ephemeral survival as that of the lower soul, but the Chinese people never adopted this system of materialism. "It still believes in two souls, one of which is extinguished in the tomb by degrees, while the other and higher soul becomes reincarnate — a Buddhist addition to the ancient dogma".<sup>165</sup>)

2. "At the beginning of the sixth century B. C. two men appeared whose names have dominated Chinese thought ever since. These were Lao-tzu and Confucius . . . Lao-tzu was finishing his life at the time of Confucius' début. They saw and did not understand one another. It could not have been otherwise, for their views were diametrically opposed. Modern Chinese critics have summed them up wonderfully in these few words: 'Towards the end of the Chou dynasty the ancient beliefs and institutions were no better than a ruin. Lao-tzu wished to clear them all away, and then to build up something completely new. Confucius wanted to restore, piously and scrupulously, the antique edifice. Lao-tzu, the theorist, soared in the clouds: Confucius, the practical, clung to earth'".

Lao-tze and  
K'ung-fu-tze.

a) "Lao-tzu was a philosopher. His system was a kind of pantheism. Everything is composed of two elements: *tao*, the primordial principle, the All, Unity, the Force, which evolves in two principles, *yin* and *yang*, progression and retrogression; and *ch'i*, the primordial breath or subtle matter, the substratum of the evolutions, of the progressions and retrogressions. The Principle had no principal. It was always, and of itself. It was before the Sublime Ruler, the God of that primitive religion, which is here rejected *en bloc* in favor of this unique dogma. *Tao* produced every being by its action on breath, and then beings appear, move about a little on the world scene, and then retire to hide in the mysterious sidescene, and there to rest. Life is nothing; what follows is everything. To await in peace the everlasting repose beyond the tombs is wisdom; to spend life in toil for anything is folly. From these theoretical principles spring, as practical application, quietude and abstention. . . . Every law and rule shackles Nature; but to follow innate instinct,

Taoism.

<sup>164</sup>) Wieger S. J; *ibid.* pp. 7, 8.

<sup>165</sup>) *Ibid.* pp. 8, 9.

that is the right way. Governments should apply these principles to their people. Isolating their subjects, they should keep them in the most absolute ignorance and so quench in them all ambition and desire". It is most important that the people be kept in ignorance and be well fed. "Lao-tzu also cursed war with his utmost energy. The sum of these principles, which is contained in the Tao-tei-ching, has had a prodigious influence in China. . . . To it is due the administrative system of abstention and expectation which has been in force until our own times, which gives to everything a free course, interferes only under necessity, and then reluctantly, and, so far as possible, puts never a finger into the gear of natural causation from fear of deranging the works. Lastly, from it comes the horror of war and the contempt for the military profession".<sup>166</sup>) In regard to the *human soul* and its survival Lao-tzu teaches that "'man is able to reach that perfection which was contained by the vital principle in the seed which gave him birth, and which survives its separation from the body. By feeding the vital principle on air, by means of peaceful and regular respiration, he can conceive in himself the embryo of its future state, as the hen conceives its egg. The embryo is represented as a small babe nimbed by a glory. To become viable, it should reach the weight of seven ounces when it exteriorates itself by meditation and dreams. After death it transmigrates into the other world: the corpse which remains is a worn-out garment, a cast-off habit . . . Here we have the origin of the Taoist alchemy, and also of the respiratory gymnastic, — practices intended to nourish the vital principle (Tao-tei-ching)".<sup>167</sup>)

Decadence.

Taoism in its primitive form, especially in its theology, is far superior to the teaching of Confucius. Indeed *Dvorák* claims that Lao-tzu in his theology has attained the highest that not only China, but the whole educated pre-Christian world, both in the Orient and in the Occident, Israel of course excepted, has to show.<sup>168</sup>) And yet, Lao-tzu's doctrine did not exert any lasting influence and was despised by the educated classes.<sup>169</sup>) "Already in the third century B. C. sorcerers and neocromancers were the most influential personages in the Taoist temples. A copious system of gods developed for the most varied needs of life. Many stars were divinely honored," and the universal presence of spirits was commonly believed in.<sup>170</sup>) "A number of personages were

<sup>166</sup>) Wieger S. J; *ibid.* pp. 9—11. For a good presentation of Lao-tzu's doctrines cf. especially R. Dvorák, *Chinas Religionen*, in DRG, XV, Part. II, pp. 23—130; also Franke, *ibid.* I, pp. 202 sq.

<sup>167</sup>) *Ibid.* p. 11; cf. Henri Cordier, art. "*Taoism*", in CE. XIV, pp. 447, 448.

<sup>168</sup>) *Chinas Religionen*, Part. II, p. 141.

<sup>169</sup>) Schill-Straubinger, *ibid.* p. 149.

<sup>170</sup>) Brunsmann, S. V. D; *ibid.* I, pp. 97, 98; cf. Franke, *ibid.* I, p. 205.



worshipped under the name of *tsu*, patriarchs. Confucius himself has a place assigned him among the deities of this religion," while "some men have been worshipped as gods after their death: Kwan-ti, the god of war, Hu-tsu, a physician" etc. "The pure, abstract doctrine of Lao-tzu was turned into a medley of alchemical researches, a practise of witchcraft, with the addition of Buddhist superstitions, which constitute today what is called *Tao-kiao*, the religion of the teaching of Tao". This was the work of a legendary being, Chang-Tao-ling.<sup>171)</sup>

b) K'ung-tze, or K'ung-fu-tze (latinized by the early Jesuit missionaries into *Confucius*), "was a politician, who speculated on nothing, and even reproved all abstract speculation, all transcendental research. He did not even admit an abstract morality. For him everything is concrete, everything looks to the formation of a practical governing and a submissive governed class . . . He thought with the ancients and believed as they did; for proof is the fact that it is he who has, by compiling the Odes and the Annals, saved for us all that remains of them. Like the ancients again he believed in Heaven, in the Sublime Ruler, in a Providence, and he proved his faith by word and deed. Confucius was with the ancient also in his belief in divination; to know the Ways of Heaven he cultivated the 'Changes'. He firmly believed with the ancient in the survival of the human soul, but remained absolutely dumb in regard to the other-worldly sanctions. He believed with his ancestors in the transcendent beings, and preached their omnipresence to the end that men might behave well at all times and in all places. He believed in the Manes and energetically insisted on their cult, which he interpreted reasonably. But reacting directly against the new superstitious beliefs and practises, he wished the cult rendered to Heaven, the Transcendent Beings and the Manes, to be strictly limited to the ancient practises, to be sober, and rather respectful than tender, since respect, a thing of the intellect, is less exposed to error than sentiment, a thing of the heart. If he made no frontal attack on the dualism of Lao-tze it was because he was too little of a philosopher to be able to refute it, but he repelled or diminished its practical conclusions".<sup>172)</sup> Consequently while Confucius refrained from speaking in detail about God and Heaven, he was not for that reason an atheist. "He was religious after the religious men of his age and land".<sup>173)</sup> Nevertheless, by making human reason the highest principle for knowledge and action, he promoted unbelief in a personal God in the interests of a purely ethical culture — a precursor of Kant in the Orient.<sup>174)</sup>

Confucianism.

Confucius "laid chief stress on the love of virtue for its own sake. The principles of morality and their concrete application

Morality.

<sup>171)</sup> Cordier, *ibid.* XIV, p. 448. <sup>172)</sup> Wieger, S. J; *ibid.* pp. 11, 12.

<sup>173)</sup> Aiken, *ibid.* in CE. IV, p. 224; cf. Dvorák, *ibid.* Part I, pp. 217—227.

<sup>174)</sup> Seitz, *ibid.* p. 603.

to the varied relations of life were embodied in the sacred texts, which in turn represented the teachings of the great sages of the past raised up by Heaven to instruct mankind. These teachings were not inspired, nor were they revealed, yet they were infallible. The sages were born with wisdom meant by Heaven to enlighten the children of men. It was thus a wisdom that was providential, rather than supernatural... To follow the path of duty as laid down in the authoritative rules of conduct was within the reach of all men, provided that their nature, good at birth, was not hopelessly spoiled by vicious influences... Nor is there any mention (in his teachings) of Divine grace to strengthen the will and enlighten the mind in the struggle with evil. There are one or two allusions to prayer, but nothing to show that daily prayer was recommended to the aspirant after perfection". The helps to the cultivation of virtue are natural and providential, nothing more. "Like Socrates, Confucius taught that vice sprang from ignorance and that knowledge led unfailingly to virtue... Another factor on which he laid great stress was the influence of good example". Daily examination of conscience was also inculcated and a certain amount of selfdiscipline.<sup>175)</sup>

Sincerity,  
benevolence,  
filial piety,  
propriety.

"As the foundation for the life of perfect goodness, Confucius insisted chiefly on the four cardinal virtues of sincerity, benevolence, filial piety, and propriety. Sincerity was with him a cardinal virtue. As used by him it meant more than a mere social relation. To be truthful and straightforward in speech, faithful to one's promises, conscientious in the discharge of one's duties to others — this was included in sincerity and something more. The sincere man in Confucius's eyes was the man whose conduct was always based on the love of virtue, and who in consequence sought to observe the rules of right conduct in his heart as well as in outward actions, when alone as well as in the presence of others. Benevolence, showing itself in a kindly regard for the welfare of others and in a readiness to help them in times of need, was also a fundamental element in Confucius's teaching. It was viewed as the characteristic trait of a good man... The third fundamental virtue in the Confucian system is filial piety... To the Chinese then as now, filial piety prompted the son to love and respect his parents, contribute to their comfort, bring happiness and honour to their name. But at the same time it carried that devotion to a degree that was excessive and faulty... Filial piety included the obligation of sons to live after marriage under the same roof with the father and to give him a childlike obedience as long as he lived. The will of the parents was declared to be supreme even to the extent that if the son's wife failed to please them he was obliged to divorce her, though it cut him to the heart. If a dutiful son found himself compelled to admonish a wayward father he was taught to give the correction

<sup>175)</sup> Aiken, *ibid.* pp. 225, 226.

with the utmost meekness; though the parent might beat him till the blood flowed he was not to show any resentment. The father did not forfeit his right to filial respect, no matter how great his wickedness. Another virtue of primary importance in the Confucian system is 'propriety'. It embraces the whole sphere of human conduct, prompting the superior man always to do the right thing in the right place. It finds expression in the so-called rules of ceremony, which are not confined to religious rites and rules of moral conduct, but extend to the bewildering mass of conventional customs and usages by which Chinese etiquette is regulated. They were distinguished even in Confucius's day by the three hundred greater, and the three thousand lesser, rules of ceremony, all of which had to be carefully learned as a guide of right conduct... To neglect or deviate from them was equivalent to an act of impiety".<sup>176)</sup>

Besides these moral doctrines the "Family Constitution" according to which the principality, the empire, and the world, were to live and function after the pattern of a family under the government of the father, and "Opportunism from day to day" are characteristic notes of Confucianism. The latter inculcated "an inert and apathetic opportunism which has no place for the ideal, for patriotism, plan, programme or politics, for love or hatred. Its message is rather 'Dip when the wave comes, breathe again when it has passed, and so on forever'". It has made Confucian China the China of the literati.<sup>177)</sup>

Family Constitution and Opportunism.

Under a slow and laborious process the literati, with the aid of the various emperors, succeeded in hoisting their idol, Confucius, to the position it occupies today. "In 1907 the Manchu Government put him on the same rank as Heaven. At present (1914), in the schools and universally, his cult is insisted in more than ever, and this not at all from devotion, but as a convenient engine of war".<sup>178)</sup>

The disciples of Confucius and Lao-tze "developed the principles of the two masters, and in this way grew up Taoism and Confucianism, bodies of doctrines to which we must studiously refuse the name of religion, seeing that they were political systems based on a little natural philosophy, one of which denied God theoretically, while the other prescinded from Him in practise".<sup>179)</sup>

Taoism and Confucianism not religions, in the strict sense.

3. In the year 213 B. C. the Emperor Shi-huang had all the ancient books of Confucius destroyed, and "abandoned himself to the Taoists. The emperors of the two dynasties Han (B. C. 202—A. D. 220) were also Taoists in the main. One of them, in A. D. 65, introduced into China the Buddhism of India, which at first met with no success in its propaganda, and for several centuries remained a mere curiosity". However, "by the

Buddhism.

<sup>176)</sup> Aiken, *ibid.* p. 226.

<sup>177)</sup> Wieger, S. J; *ibid.* p. 13.

<sup>178)</sup> *Ibid.* p. 24.

<sup>179)</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 13, 14.



beginning of the sixth century the whole of China was officially Buddhist, while Taoism was prohibited on account of the revolutionary tendencies of its votaries, and Confucianism was forgotten because of the dryness of its doctrine".<sup>180)</sup> *Buddhism* or *Fo-kiao*, the religion of Fo (Buddha), was considerably modified in the Chinese environment. Characteristic of this mutation is the doctrine of a future retribution, according to which the good will be rewarded in Paradise, and the evil punished in Hell.<sup>181)</sup> "Private religion China never possessed, and it was this which made the success of Buddhism for a thousand years. The Chinese learned from Buddhism a sound morality and the use of prayer. With its eminent good sense and practicality, the people fused into one the old theistic doctrine of their nation and the moral teaching of India, addressing the prayers to the God of conscience, Lao-t'ien-ye, the venerable Lord of Heaven, He who sees and judges, punishes and rewards. But it has never been able to rid itself of a thousand and one little superstitions".<sup>182)</sup> Today "Buddhism, with its numerous monks, is the most popular religion of China, though a member of one sect often borrows practises from the other cults and, if an official, will invariably perform the ceremonies of the three religions" (namely, Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism).<sup>183)</sup> On the other hand, "the educated Chinese despises both Buddhist and Taoist superstitions".<sup>184)</sup>

Other cults.

4. Under the T'ang dynasty (seventh to tenth centuries A. D.) "who played a most interesting game of political seesaw between the different doctrines, Buddhists and Taoists, who were still at heart attached to their old patrons, were treated as subjects. Mazdeism from Persia was favored. Manicheism from Turkestan was tolerated. Muhamedanism was introduced, and Indian Jews settled at the ports open to foreign commerce. The celebrated T'ai-tsung, a typical T'ang emperor, patronized each of the cults and practised none of them. The capital of the T'ang was an international bazaar of religion". The reign of the Sung dynasty (960—1295 A. D.) is "famous for the invention of two systems — new forms of Taoism and Confucianism which exist to our own day. These are Chinese Shinto and the Neo-Confucianism of Chu-hsi".<sup>185)</sup>

Chinese Shinto.

a) "In the preceding ages the Chinese had given Confucianism and Buddhism to the Japanese: now Japan repaid China" by giving Shintoism. "Shinto is an ensemble of fables which credited the imperial and noble families with a descent from ancient divinized heroes". In 1015 the Emperor Chen-tsung declared by decree that the Pure August One was the ancestor

<sup>180)</sup> Wieger, S. J; *ibid.* p. 14.

<sup>181)</sup> Schill-Straubinger, *ibid.* p. 149.

<sup>182)</sup> Wieger, S. J; *ibid.* p. 23.

<sup>183)</sup> Cordier, art. „China“, in CE. III, p. 668.

<sup>184)</sup> Aiken, *ibid.* p. 227.

<sup>185)</sup> Wieger, S. J; *ibid.* p. 15.

of his family. "The Emperor was, therefore, Son of God like the Mikado. A crowd of ancient personages composed the court of the Pure August One. The Taoists became priests and preachers of the new State religion, and Buddhists were summoned to enter into the bosom of the new Church. The Imperial Court became a fairyland. Ministers, officers, ladies of the harem, were there no longer: all were descendents or reincarnations of genii of either sex. The invasion of the Chin Tunguzes, who by a surprise attack conquered all northern China, put an end to their follies, but the system lived on in modern Taoism, called Heroic Taoism or Chinese Shinto",<sup>186)</sup>

b) "Driven southward of the Blue River, the Sung meditated on Confucianism, which for some thousands of years had been forgotten. The meditations that they made on this venerable subject produced, not peace, but yet another war . . . The desire for a criticism and a systematization of the doctrines which were called Confucian, grew in many souls, and several persons set themselves to the task. But their action determined a reaction, and Confucianists split into two camps, Reactionaries and Progressists, who waged a bitter war upon one another throughout the twelfth century. The reactionaries demanded a return, pure and simple, to the letter of the ancient text, which, they said, had falsified the Master's teaching. The Progressists, on the contrary, imbued with Indian Philosophy, were for adding new commentaries by which the propositions scattered through the text might be systematized into an accessible body of doctrine. The standard-bearer of the Progressists was the too famous Chu-hsi". In 1178 the Emperor Hsiao-Tsung favored by a decree the exclusive teaching of the Reactionaries, and Chu-hsi, dishonored and disgraced, died in 1200. But in 1227, the Emperor Li-tsung honored Chu-hsi's teachings and gave him the diploma of Grand Master, Authentic Exegete and Ideal Classic. Thus the system of Chu-hsi became and remained "the official philosophy in China to our own days". Modern critics indeed praise Chu-hsi, but an exhaustive examination of his definitions compels us to fasten upon him the guilt of "high treason against humanity". For this unhappy man endeavored to destroy his country's faith in God and the survival of the soul, and proposed to an immense people the doctrine of an absolute atheism and a materialistic monism just tinged with dynamism. He "does not deserve the thanks of his country". The system of Chu-hsi is inferior to pantheism. In its composition of force and matter it is analogous, if not identical with Haeckel's system of 'Kraft und Stoff' (Force and Matter)".<sup>187)</sup> "Hostility to Christianity is, as it were, the characteristic note of up-to-date Confucianism, which is not surprising, for between a materialism and spiritual system there is indeed a contradiction . . . The question as put today is 'Christ

Neo-Con-  
fucianism.

<sup>186)</sup> Wiegner, S.J; *ibid.* pp. 15, 16.

<sup>187)</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 16—21.

or Confucius', but the formula is not absolutely correct, for Confucianism of Confucius is not essentially opposed to Christianity. Quite different is the case of Neo-Confucianism of Chu-hsi. With him all conciliation is impossible as it is between light and darkness, spirit and matter... The true antithesis is Jesus or Chu-hsi, Christian or literati, salvation by humility or perdition by pride".<sup>188)</sup>

Conclusion.

Therefore in China we see the same process in the evolution or rather decadence of the religious consciousness as in the other great cultured peoples of paganism. The purity of China's primitive religion has inevitably given way to the germs of corruption, in spite of the influence of Lao-tze, K'ung-fu-tze and Buddha.<sup>189)</sup>

## 2. Japanese.

Japan appeared in the history of religions only at a relatively late period and then in dependence upon China; hence it does not have to be taken into account when there is question of the oldest religions of cultured peoples. Its history generally reaches back only to about 600 after Christ.<sup>190)</sup> Its "most ancient religious tradition is based on two historical works dating back as far as the eighth century after Christ, if we may call a work historical which is so largely intermingled with myth. These are Kojiki, and Nihongi, written a few years later. In these writings, historical reminiscences and mythological fictions are so confused as to be absolutely inextricable".<sup>191)</sup>

Syncretism.

Japan's national religious tradition "is summed up in the word Shinto, 'The Way of the Gods'. The word is of Chinese origin, the old Japanese faith having had no special name until Buddhism was introduced from China. Shinto was then used to designate the popular belief in native gods, as distinguished from that belief in Buddha which had been imported from another country. Shinto, 'The Way of the Gods', and Butsido, 'The Way of Buddha', contain in themselves the whole religious tradition of Japan. To these must be added the ethical system of the doctrines of Confucius on the State and society. Shinto and Buddhism, though having separate temples and distinctly different rites, are so firmly blended as a religious conviction in the Japanese mind, that it is impossible to divide the population into Buddhists or Shintoists in the way that our own statistics tabulate Catholics and Protestants. Shinto is the primitive religion of ancient Japan. But Buddhism has become so incorporated in the very life of the people, that most of them may be called as much Buddhist as Shintoist. It is true that there are priests of Shinto

<sup>188)</sup> Wieger, S. J; *ibid.* pp. 22, 25.

<sup>190)</sup> Seitz, *ibid.* p. 596, foot-note 2.

<sup>189)</sup> Gutberlet, *ibid.* I, p. 103.

<sup>191)</sup> *The Religions of Japan*. Transl. from the German of J. Dahlmann, S. J., in LHR. V, pp. 3, 4. cf. Prof. Dr. K. Florénz, *Die Japaner*, in LRG, I, pp. 262 sq. with recent literature.



and priests of Buddha, but there is no exclusive sect of the votaries of either. A Japanese will alternately worship in the ceremonial of either . . . In Buddhism as in Shinto, membership in the community means no more than the external participation in rites performed in a Buddhist or a Shinto pagoda respectively".<sup>192</sup>) We shall deal first with *Shinto* and then with *Buddhism*.

Shinto.

1. "Unlike Buddhism, Shinto in its beginning was an original creation of the mind of the Japanese people. It has passed through many changes under the influence of Buddhism and Confucianism. Three periods of development may be noted". *First*, during the period, which extends to about the year 550 after Christ, "worship of the gods, that is to say of the spirits of the Imperial ancestry, was a custom, founded on the same motives as those which dictated blind obedience to the living Mikado, himself an object of profound veneration. In addition to these practises were various prayers to the gods of wind and fire, and to the goddesses of food, cookery, etc. There also existed certain settled customs of purification, which, however, referred much more to bodily pollution than to moral guilt. The cycle of ideas was entirely confined to the coarsest and grossest materialism. The faith of the people taught neither hell nor heaven. It made no clear distinctions between gods and men . . . The *second* period of Shinto begins with Buddhism. During this period the ancient Japanese faith fell entirely under the influence of the new religion . . . The Shinto gods were transformed into incarnations of Buddha . . . The worship of Buddha took the highest rank in the temple of the Sun-goddess, and made its influence felt in all that concerned the building and arranging of temples, vestments, and ceremonies . . . This period of religious fusion (called Ryobu-Shinto) extends from the year 550 to 1700 after Christ, thus occupying the greater part of Japanese civilization and history. This explains the inferior idea of religion in Japan. Shinto, which from the beginning was so abjectly feeble, sank, during this second period, into complete degeneration. It was broken up into various small sects, which eked out their remnant of vitality, by assimilating the basest forms of Buddhist superstition, and those savage and licentious doctrines of Taoistic occultism and sorcery which had been imported from China at the same time. The *third* period in the history of Shinto begins towards 1700 and still exists. It is known as 'The Renaissance of Pure Shinto'. 'Pure Shinto' stands for the national faith of the Japanese people as it existed before the introduction of Buddhism and the philosophy of Confucius . . . The Shinto religion was restored to its primitive 'purity' by the elimination of all dogma and moral law . . . The result of this renaissance was to lower the standard of religious thought still more. The elimination of foreign elements left the want of definite faith and strict moral law more apparent than ever".<sup>193</sup>)

<sup>192</sup>) Dahlmann, S. J; *ibid.* pp. 2, 3.      <sup>193</sup>) *Ibid.* pp. 5—9 (italics ours).

Shinto gods.

"The Shintoist prides himself chiefly on his innumerable quantities of *Kami* or gods. But these myriads of deities are apparently unable to keep Shinto worship from degenerating... Among these *Kami* we find two categories: 'Gods of Nature' and 'God-men'. Although in course of time they have become blended together, their origin was quite separate. The gods of nature are personifications of such natural forces as light, fire, and wind; and material objects as mountains, rivers, seas, etc. Highest of all is the Sun-goddess, Amaterasu. The god-men are deified celebrities, especially family ancestors and heroes of legendary days. Highest of these is Jimmu Tennô, the founder of the Imperial dynasty... The deification of ancestors spread so much during the course of centuries that it became the most distinctive feature of the Shinto religion... Shinto gods are anything but noble or righteous personages. They have all the feelings and failings of men, and the myth which tells of their glorious deeds is often of a repulsive and even obscene character. The two classes, gods of nature and god-men, have a marked tendency to intrude on each other's sphere of action, and to combine".<sup>194)</sup>

Shinto  
worship.

"The 'Halls of the Gods' called *Miya*, are used as temples... A *miya* is very simple in its primitive form. It is a little temple containing no idol; in the principal hall the only things considered really 'sacred' are symbolical objects placed on an unpolished table which serves as the altar. These are: a metal mirror, symbolical of the divine light of the Sun-goddess; the *gohei*, a kind of upright wand from which fall strips of scalloped paper used instead of offerings of textile materials; and thirdly, a ball of rock-crystal, representing the power and purity of the gods... Few of the temples have kept to this primitive decoration... The presence of the gods is evoked by clapping of hands, beating of drums, and ringing of bells. All that amuses and entertains mankind is supposed to amuse and entertain the gods... Of all the ritual prayers (*Noritô*) recited as the offertory occurs, the 'Prayer of Great Purification' (*Ohoharahi*) is the most solemn... This prayer shows that the idea of moral purification from sin is not quite unknown in Shinto-worship. In the other ceremonies of purification it is solely a question of cleansing material stains, due to contact with unclean objects. But even in the *Ohoharahi* the idea of moral expiation is very vague. The faithful Shinto-worshipper is expected to attach more importance to bodily cleanliness than to purity of heart... Besides these religious customs, which are common to all, there exist certain special forms of worship only open to the initiated; these are comprised in Esoteric Shinto. Prophecy, ecstasy, possession, and its exorcism are its principal elements. But as Shinto has no definite dogmas

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<sup>194)</sup> Dahlmann, S. J; *ibid.* pp. 5—11; cf. Justin Balette, art. "*Japan*", in CE. VIII, p. 304.

or moral code, this occultism only serves to kill whatever religion there is in it".<sup>195)</sup>

2. "Until the present time the great mass of the Japanese people have had, practically speaking, no religion but Buddhism. The greater part of the nation finds a much deeper satisfaction for its religious cravings in Buddhism than in the Shinto-worship of gods and spirits.<sup>196)</sup> The "conversion" of the Japanese nation to Buddhism took place, roughly speaking, between 552 and 621 after Christ. "Thenceforward Japanese civilization began to develop on parallel lines with that of India and China, but was subordinate to both those countries".<sup>197)</sup> "The life and teaching of *Shaka* (Buddha Sakyamūni) was soon popularized by pictures, and his worship carried on with a magnificent ritual surpassing anything hitherto known in Japan. The literature of Mahāyāna offered the greatest contrast to Shinto, being full of everything calculated to stimulate the mind, feed the imagination, and sustain the religious sense... The fundamental theory was the doctrine of deliverance from recurrent transmigrations of the soul. But this deliverance, or freeing of the soul, did not mean its absorption into nothing, as in the original Buddhism. Nirvāna (which the Japanese call *Nehan*) is understood in a definite sense, and means that the high rank of Buddha was attained by a series of successive victories over the six worlds — hell (*Jigoku*), the animal world (*Chihusho*), the world of unsatiated passions (*Gahi*), the world of brute force (*Shūra*), the world of men (*Jin*), and heaven (*Ten*). The land of happiness open to Buddha through his high rank, is described as a paradise, peopled with innumerable generations of former Buddhas".<sup>198)</sup>

Buddhism.

"What the old national religion had lacked most had been a code of moral commandments... Buddhism met this want, and its ethics were further strengthened by the philosophy of Confucius. Japanese Buddhism builds its whole moral law upon the duties of man towards four principal objects: relatives, humanity in general, the sovereign, and religion. A man must respect his parents, obey and support them (materially). His duties towards his fellow-men are summed up in these four words: —

Ethics.

- 1) *Fuse* (abstain from selfishness);
- 2) *Aigo* (speak kindly);
- 3) *Rigyo* (give succor);
- 4) *Doji* (be just).

To his sovereign the subject owes submission and service in everything which concerns the State and the community, in gratitude for benefits received. The religious obligation is to worship Buddha. These four principal duties are explained in detail in a table of ten commandments: —

<sup>195)</sup> Dahlmann, S. J; *ibid.* pp. 11—13; cf. Florenz, *ibid.* I, pp. 264—348.

<sup>196)</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 13, 14.

<sup>197)</sup> *Ibid.* p. 5.

<sup>198)</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 15, 16.



- 1) Against killing;
- 2) " theft;
- 3) " adultery;
- 4) " lying;
- 5) " mockery;
- 6) " detraction;
- 7) " calumny;
- 8) " selfishness;
- 9) " anger;
- 10) " evil thoughts.

The observation of this decalogue was the object of six cardinal virtues: mercy, probity, patience, energy, reflection, wisdom.

This moral code is completed by the teaching of *Confucius* (called by the Chinese *Koshi*) . . . It may be summed up in the pious respect for parents and loyalty to the Emperor. This political morality was thoroughly acceptable to the *Samurai* or upper classes, and was as much in character with the feudal constitutions of Japan as it was with the national tradition of ancestor-worship . . . And thus Confucius came to be as much venerated in Japan as in China".<sup>199)</sup>

Buddhist gods.

"Idol-worship was one of the great means employed by Buddhist propagandists . . . The efforts of the priests to make themselves understood by the common people resulted in a multitude of new divinities, great and small, peopling the Buddhist Pantheon . . . All kinds of Shinto deities were introduced amongst the five hundred Rakan, or personal disciples of Buddha. There is one general symbol of femal face for all Buddhas alike. They are represented seated upon the open petals of a lotus. This mixture of Buddhist and Shinto gods was the final triumph of Buddhism".<sup>200)</sup> Buddhism split up into many sects. At present there are twelve principal sects and thirty-nine branches.<sup>201)</sup> "The religious and moral level is generally a very low one, few bonzes knowing the history and dogmas of their own schools . . . The common people are still intensely ignorant and superstitious and quite satisfied with the external magnificence of the ceremonies they see. This brilliant ritual has kept alive to the present day the influence of Japanese Buddhism (in itself a most feeble conception) to such an extent that Buddhism is the real religion of modern Japan. The masses practise the grossest idolatry, accompanied with every form of superstition. It appears equally impossible to reform Buddhism or to revive Shinto".<sup>202)</sup>

#### IV. Indo-Germans.

We shall now turn our attention to the *Indo-Germanic* or *Aryan* family of peoples, which embraces the Indian (Hindu),

<sup>199)</sup> Dahlmann, S. J; *ibid.* pp. 16, 17.      <sup>200)</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 18—20.

<sup>201)</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 2—30; cf. Balette, *ibid.* p. 305.      <sup>202)</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 30, 31.

Iranian (Persian), Teutonic, Celtic, Greek, Romanic, Lettic (Lithuanian), Slavic, etc., branches.<sup>203</sup>) Their solidarity is apparent particularly from their languages, which point to a primitive language, the Aryan. From the viewpoint of the history of religions, however, the sameness of the name for the Deity and the highest god merits special attention.<sup>204</sup>) The common verbal stem for all the divine names current among the Aryan nations is found in the Sanskrit root *dyu* (*div*), to *shine*, to shed lustre (applied to the firmament). "Max Müller refers to the discovery of the etymological equation (sanskrit) *Dius-Pitar* == (Greek) *Ζεύς-πατήρ* == (Latin) *Jupiter* == (Old Nordic) *Tyr*, as 'the most important discovery of the nineteenth century', inasmuch as it proves not only that our own ancestors and the ancestors of Homer and Cicero spoke the same tongue as the nations of India, but also that they all at one time had the same faith and for a while adored the same deity under exactly the same name — 'Father of Heaven'".<sup>205</sup>) Hence the Indo-Germanic peoples before their separation had a single or, at least, one supreme god.<sup>206</sup>) In the course of time, however, they lapsed from monotheism into polytheism and kindred corruptions of the religious consciousness, as will be evident from the following historical data.

### 1. Indians or Hindus.

"Down to some unascertainable date (probably 1500 B. C.) India was inhabited by the various aboriginal peoples (Kolarians, etc.), whose remnants are still found surviving in the country, and partly by the Dravidian immigrants who had superseded these aborigines at some very early period. About that time the great Aryan family divided into two sections, one passing southwards into India. This Aryan race in part held aloof from the people they subjugated, whom they regarded with contempt. But in some degree mixture was inevitable; and thus a large number of local tribes, some pure Aryan, some aboriginal, others mixed, came into existence".<sup>207</sup>) Both these previous populations, namely the Kolarians and Dravidians, "had their own distinct forms of religion; and (though it would require much detailed study to be definite) it is certain that they contributed many of the grosser elements which afterwards went to make up the congeries of later Hinduism — animistic beliefs, fetish, stone, image, and demon worship, and a multiplicity of local deities of low type".<sup>208</sup>)

<sup>203</sup>) cf. CE. XII, p. 626.

<sup>204</sup>) Schill-Straubinger, *ibid.* p. 150.

<sup>205</sup>) Max Müller, *Anthropological Religion*. London. 1892, p. 82, cited by Pohle-Preuss, *God: His Knowability, Essence and Attributes*. St. Louis Mo. 1914, (2. ed.), pp. 141, 142; cf. also Max Müller, *Essays*, IV, p. 444; J. T. Driscoll, *Christian Philosophy*, *God*. N. Y. 1904, (2. ed.), pp. 42 sq.

<sup>206</sup>) Gutberlet, *ibid.* I, p. 85.

<sup>207</sup>) Ernest R. Hull, S. J., art. "India", in CE. VII, p. 724.

<sup>208</sup>) Ernest R. Hull, S. J., *Hinduism*, in LHR. I, p. 2.

The earlier period in the religious development of India, which extends from about 1500 B. C. to the rise of Buddhism, is generally designated as the "*Vedic-Brahmanistic Period*". It was followed by the periods of *Buddhism* and *modern Hinduism*. We shall deal with these three stages in order.

Vedic-  
Brahmanistic  
Period.

1. "Our sole knowledge of the early Aryan worship is derived from the sacred books called the Vedas" (*veda* means wisdom).<sup>209</sup>) "First and oldest comes the *Rig Veda* (compiled somewhere between 1500 and 1000 B. C.), a collection of religious hymns, which on the one hand embody the conception of one sublime deity, and on the other hand so personificate the powers of nature as to make them seem separate gods . . . making in all a total of thirty-three — eleven in heaven, eleven on earth, and eleven in mid-air. Each of these objects was separately worshipped as supreme by prostrations, oblations, sacrifices of the goat, cow, horse, and even man. It is difficult to judge how far they were regarded polytheistically as distinct divinities, or monotheistically as various aspects of one and the same all-pervading power. Enough to say that a noble and elevated tone pervades the hymns throughout, far different from that of most later literature". And still, "even the *Rig Veda* itself seems already to mark a downward departure from a more primitive belief in one God".<sup>210</sup>)

"In certain social points, too, now identified religiously with Hinduism, the same evidence appears. In the *Rig-vedic* times caste was unknown. Even the priest-class were men of the world, and in no way an exclusive racial clique . . . The chief aim of worship was indeed to secure prosperity in this world, but conceptions of sin and forgiveness were not wanting. The people believed in the happiness of a future state, and the doctrine of transmigration was unknown. Neither (except in a few hymns of undoubtedly late origin) is there any suggestion of the pantheism of a later age, nor of any official intermingling of magic with religion".<sup>211</sup>)

The second period extends from 1000 to 800 B. C. It was the period when the three other Vedas were composed: "1) *The Same Veda*, a collection of sacrificial chants, taken from the *Rig Veda* and arranged for solemn recitation or singing to music; 2) *The Yagur Veda*, a collection of sacrificial formulas; 3) *The Atharva Veda*, including a few late hymns from *Rig Veda*, but consisting chiefly of 'mantras' — spells against evil, incantations against diseases, imprecations against demons, sorcerers, and enemies, and charms for securing prosperity and success. This

<sup>209</sup>) cf. Arthur F. J. Remy, art. "*Vedas*", in CE. XV, pp. 318 sq.

<sup>210</sup>) Hull, S. J; *Hinduism*, pp. 2, 3; cf. Chas. Aiken, art. "*Brahminism*", in CE. II, pp. 730, 731. — For a splendid presentation of the Vedic-Brahministic Period cf. Edmund Hardy, *Die Vedisch-brahmanische Periode der Keutigion des alten Indiens*, in DRG. IX/X; also Prof. Dr. Sten Konow, *Die Inder*, in LRG, II, pp. 12—100 with recent literature.

<sup>211</sup>) Hull, S. J; *ibid.* pp. 3, 4.



document may not indicate the *origin* of magic, but certainly reveals its gradual incorporation with religion, thus marking a clear stage of degradation".<sup>212)</sup>

"Subsequently to the foregoing Vedas, and now at least regarded also as Vedas, came a series of commentaries called *Brahmanas*. They deal with the procedure of sacrifice, but are chiefly full of theological and mystical speculations, with citations from earlier authors now otherwise lost. They mark a time when the simple and natural worship of Rig Veda had expanded into a totally artificial system, and presuppose as already accomplished the transformation which they represent. Following on the *Brahmanas* came the *Aranyakas* or 'forest lectures', to be read by the Brahmins during their ascetical probations; and secondly the *Upanishads*, which show the beginnings of intellectual speculation in theology — not claiming at the time to be divine revelations, but 'guesses at the truth', and attempts to penetrate into the problems of the soul, the universe, and the Supreme Being. In some of these works there appears a strong tinge of pantheistic speculation, which was afterwards developed into a system". At the same time social changes of great import were taking place. "The original divisions into four classes — if not indeed a pure myth from beginning to end — had been established, viz. the priests, warriors, and agriculturists, with the Sudras or incorporated aborigines added as a fourth. It was only afterwards that caste developed into an iron-bound system of social division, and came to be identified with religion as it now is".<sup>213)</sup>

"Following on this comes the *Sutra* or so-called rationalistic period, which may be placed between 800 and 500 B. C. It is named from the appearance of the *Sutras* — treatises of theology, philosophy, law and domestic rites. Among these *Sutras*, must be included the six *Darsanas*, *Shastras*, or systems of philosophy as follows: 1) *Nyaya*, mainly a system of logic, and atheistic in character; 2) *Vaisesika*, a system of atoms and eternal matter, which under criticism adopted the idea of God, but made souls eternal before and after, and independent of Him; 3) *Sankhya* (the classical system) originally atheistic, but modified so as to include God; 4) *Yoga*, atheistic adaptation of the *Sankhya*; 5) *Purva Mimansa*, exegesis of the Vedas; 6) *Uttara Mimansa* (also called *Vedanta*), divided into two systems — *a*) the unqualified or extreme, which teaches pure idealism: 'There is One, and no second'; the world is an unreal delusion of Maya; *b*) the qualified *Vedanta*, which makes the world and souls realities, but still only forms of the One. Among these treatises the most celebrated is the *Vedanta* group, the contents of which is undoubtedly pantheistic. For . . . the Vedantic philosophy is generally understood in such a way as to make the name 'Vedantist' identical with 'Emanative Pantheist'. This group marks the climax

<sup>212)</sup> Hull, S. J; *ibid.* p. 4.

<sup>213)</sup> *Ibid.* p. 5.

of theological development in ancient literature — later writers having done nothing but evolve the teaching here contained into a more explicit and methodic form",<sup>214)</sup>

"At the same time the old religion had in practise reached its most formalized condition; though, even so, there were yet no temples, no images, and no fantastic mythology of gods and goddesses such as constitutes the entire make-up of later Hinduism. No doubt the growth of the six Shastras or philosophies had already given rise to the distinction between 'esoteric' and 'exoteric' Hinduism; philosophical pantheism prevailed among the select circle of the priestly caste, while the multifarious ceremonial cult of the people was connived at, fostered, and encouraged by them as the only form of religion suited to their lower capacities".<sup>215)</sup>

Buddhist  
Period.

2. "The speculations of the Vedanta school of religious thought, in the eighth and following centuries, B. C., gave rise to several rival schemes of salvation. These movements started with the same morbid view that conscious life is a burden and not worth the living, and that true happiness is to be had only in a state like dreamless sleep, free from all desires, free from conscious action. They took for granted the Upanishad doctrine of the endless chain of births, but they differed from pantheistic Brahminism both in their attitude towards the Vedas and in their plan for securing freedom from rebirth and from conscious existence. In their absolute rejection of Vedic rites, they stamped themselves as heresies. Of these the one destined to win greatest renown was *Buddhism*".<sup>216)</sup>

"Gautama Buddha, founder of Buddhism in the sixth century B. C., who came with an answer to a growing aspiration after a purer and nobler form of faith, found all the materials out of which to select his theology in the literature around him. The conception of Brahma as the unconscious All, producing souls and matter identical with himself by means of *Maya*, or the principle of delusion; the eternity of the universe, souls, and matter before and after; the union of souls and matter, affording the condition for consciousness, desire, and action; karma, or the good and evil consequences of action; the transmigrations of souls through an indefinite series of lives; release from the series by uprightness of life; the attainment of the goal of human destiny by absorption into the All — these ideas are found already, some of them first hinted at in the Upanishads, and all of them expanded and systematized by the six systems of the Shastras, the latest dating a century or two before Buddha's time. What Buddha really did was this. First, he preached the unreality of the ritual

<sup>214)</sup> Hull S. J; *ibid.* pp. 5, 6.

<sup>215)</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 6, 7; cf. Aiken art. "*Brahminism*", in CE. II, p. 731.

<sup>216)</sup> Chas. Aiken, art. "*Buddhism*", in CE. III, p. 28; cf. Dr. Sten Konow, *ibid.* II, pp. 100 sq. with recent literature.

worship prevalent among the people and the impotence of priestly ministrations; secondly, he set about popularizing selected portions of the esoteric Vedānta — in the light of which he substituted contemplation and self-restraint for ceremonial observances as the means of sanctification and salvation. In short, the original Buddhism seems to have been little more than the logical and practical (though eclectic) use of intellectual Hinduism as a solvent to popular Hinduism. That Buddhism was merely a practical outcome of a pre-existing theology is perhaps shown from the fact that just before Buddha's time there had started quite independently a parallel movement on very similar lines, now known and still surviving under the name of Jainism".<sup>217)</sup>

Most of the features of ancient Buddhist thought and organization may be grouped into coherent forms under the following heads. 1) There is the *notion of Act*. "Buddhists believe in survival, transmigration, and retribution of man's actions in this life or in a future life which shall be celestial, human, or infernal". But "when the Buddha says 'act', or 'action', he means essentially the act which is *Thought*". "The 'action', which the Buddha has in view is pre-eminently the *moral act*". While anathematizing those who deny the benefits accruing from sacrifice, he holds the mere ritual action of sacrifice as far inferior. The Brahmins continued believing sacrifices, whether to the Gods or to the Fathers, to be absolutely indispensable. The Buddhists, on the other hand, "almost entirely rationalized all ethics, and, by disentangling morality from religious and superstitious notions, and by connecting it with a vigorous conception of retribution", gave to some of its precepts — those that forbade Theft, Murder, Adultery, Alcohol (the so-called Pentalogue) — "a singularly powerful sanction". "The gods, according to the Brahmins of certain schools at any rate and at certain periods, had acquired their godhead by sacrifices, penances, and other virtuous acts: they are not eternal: not only, indeed, at the end of the cosmic period, all will return into aboriginal chaos, but a god can come into existence in the midst of the onflow of time." "In Buddhism, this theory (or god-making on a basis of merit) is everywhere present and recognized, whence comes a progressive degradation in the view taken of the gods, who are inferior not merely to a Buddha, but even to a truly virtuous and wise Buddhist. Finally, neither Brahmins nor Buddhists are perfectly consistent in the dogmatic system built up of fate, for the influence of ancestors, for the infectious character of sin, for the graces of a god or a Buddha".<sup>218)</sup>

Doctrine  
of Act.

2) "The Brahmins admitted as valuable, and even at times held as necessary, to achieve immortality (in Brahmā), the life of

Marriage  
and Caste.

<sup>217)</sup> Hull, S. J; *Hinduism*, pp. 7, 8.

<sup>218)</sup> *Buddhism*. From the French of Prof. L. de La Vallée-Poussin in LHR. I, pp. 7—9.



religious, mendicant, or anchoret; but this road to salvation lay open only to members of the higher castes, and of these, only to those who had fulfilled the obligations of ordinary life; sacrifices, that is, and marriage. These two laws, however, admitted of exceptions . . . Buddhists condemned the whole theory of marriage, though its lay-followers could at least accumulate, as a rule, by non-sin and giving alms to monks, such merits as should obtain for them a happy reincarnation in which they would have opportunities of becoming monks. Buddhism also infused a freer spirit into the question of caste. But in practise, of these two points, marriage and caste, only the first proved important".<sup>219)</sup>

Monasticism.

3) "Before Buddha, many heads of Orders had organized religious life on the Brahminist model, in imitation of the rules of the life of a Brahmin student, intermingling with this, however, many Hindu practises. Most of these Orders gave an important, indeed predominant, place to penance. The Buddha is held to have created an intermediate way of life between the sensuality of ordinary life in the world, and the exaggerated asceticism of the naked ascetics and their like. But, as a matter of fact, Buddhism included two sorts of religious: 'sedantary' or 'conventual' monks, who took too much of nothing, but suffered themselves to lack nothing; and the 'foresters', who were penitents in the strict sense, and slept at the foot of a tree, without shelter or fire. The former class is by far the more important, and we can but admire the arrangements . . . which the Buddhist confraternities made to ensure morality and an exalted spiritual life in these mendicant brothers. Noviciate; fortnightly reunion for the reading of the Book of rules and for confession; precepts bearing on the work of asking alms, on meals, on life within the convent during the rainy season, on clothes, on the way of travelling during the fine season, — all this and more was in practise. Nor must it be forgotten that the 'foresters' may in no way mutilate their bodies, nor adopt any of the morbid exaggerations of Hindu asceticism; even nudity, as practised by the Jainas, is forbidden them, as also the vow of silence; and, *a fortiori*, thaumaturgy, at least in theory. The life of the Buddhist religious does not entail any law of obedience, but expects obedience to the law, *i. e.*, chastity, concord, frugality: abstinence from flesh meat is not enjoined upon him, nor is there any law of work; indeed, work is prohibited: nor is there any law of poverty in regard of the Order as a whole. As for the individual monk, his material living is, in practise, ensured to him by the alms which, at least from time to time, he must go and collect, by the offerings to and reserve funds of the convent, and by charitable hosts who may ask him to dine. His intellectual life includes much meditation, hypnotic and even ecstatic

<sup>219)</sup> L. de La Vallée-Poussin, *ibid.* p. 9; cf. Aiken, *ibid.* pp. 30, 31.

exercises, which are indeed common property to all the sects and some of them of immemorial antiquity".<sup>220)</sup>

4) The object of this monastic life is, in one word, *Immortality*. "The good folk who observe the Pentalogue and give food to the monks, obtain thus the certainty of not going to expiate their sins in hell, and even of reincarnation in fortunate — indeed, it may be divine — conditions. These are advantages by no means to be ignored. But by this worldly road alone they can never pass beyond the cycle of transmigrations. The Brahmins believed exactly the same in regard to the fruit of good works and sacrifices. Clearly it was perishable; according to them, only they who adored the Brahma 'in truth' were to reach eternal salvation. Similarly, those alone who have learnt from the Buddha the truth about salvation, and who, under his direction, practise the 'renunciation', 'continence', the so-called *Brahmacarya*, that is to say, only the monks, enter upon the road which leads to deliverance".<sup>221)</sup>

Immortality-  
Nirvana.

"But as to the metaphysical account of 'Brahma', a pantheist God, or an All-God, or Supreme God, the Buddhists do not feel satisfied". "Less even than the Brahmins do Buddhists hold to Personality. Immortality, or emancipation from Transmigration, is called Refreshment, *Nirvana*. It is *not* annihilation. But it is not known or imaginable form of existence. We must force ourselves to accept our data such as they are: Nirvana is *not* annihilation, but even less is it beatific *existence*. Evidently we are here face to face with a notion which, for us, will ever remain fundamentally alien and incomprehensible. In Brahmin philosophy we can, after all, understand that the return to, nay, *into* the Supreme Being, is absolute bliss, even though personality lose itself therein like a drop of water losing itself in the ocean. But the Buddhists deny this Supreme Being; their Nirvana is neither a place, nor a state; they heap argument on argument to prove that Nirvana is a pure emptiness, the end of the activity of thought. From the standpoint of our logic, and according to any rigorous scheme of deduction such as ours, this would mean sheer nothingness. And yet, so to translate the word *Nirvana* would be, according to the opinion of many competent Indianist scholars, a blunder which would vitiate our whole interpretation of Buddhism. Let us loyally recognize that the Hindu mind possesses a 'category' — a form of thought — which in ours is lacking. The *Nirvana*, then, or Immortality, or the Further Shore, or Home Unshaken, or Island, or Deliverance from pain, is the *raison d'être* of the whole Buddhist way of life. It is to reach Nirvana that a man becomes a monk".<sup>222)</sup>

<sup>220)</sup> L. de La Vallée-Poussin, *ibid.* pp. 9, 10; cf. Aiken, *ibid.* p. 30.

<sup>221)</sup> *Ibid.* p. 11.

<sup>222)</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 11, 12; cf. Aiken, *ibid.* pp. 29, 30; Cathrein, S. J; *ibid.* I, pp. 78, 79.

Way to reach  
Nirvana.

5) The way, or path, or "vehicle" for reaching the Nirvana is: *Absence of Desire*. "Buddhists prove that everything which happens to us is the necessary result of our former actions performed in some past life: by a legitimate induction, they argue that all the acts of *this* life must therefore reach maturity and bear fruit in a future yet to be. Now, whatever be this life — even divine — we must shun it: for the gods themselves are unhappy, foreseeing their imminent fall. To avoid new birth, a man must refrain from action; or rather from the act which proceeds from or leads to Desire . . . The Buddha therefore traced laws which should enclose the life of his monks in a fine net-work of moderate mortifications, of tranquillizing, almost soporific meditations, eminently favorable to peace, renunciation, and absence of desire".<sup>223)</sup>

Metaphysical  
and psycho-  
logical view-  
points.

6) "But Buddhists are far from simply holding that life is not worth living, . . . in a word, that all is vanity, and that a man must renounce himself: they transport all these negations from the moral sphere, where it may well be they first arose (Senart), into the realm of metaphysics and psychology. On the one hand, they brand as heretics all who teach annihilation after death; . . . on the other hand, they hold as indispensable for successful meditation the recognition of the non-existence of what can be called the Ego" . . . The Brahmins were not of one mind on this Ego. "The Buddhists on the other hand, or at least the great majority, taught that sensations, acts, and thoughts, etc., are all self-existent, while there is no *being* existing which thinks, feels, and acts. Convinced partisans, as they are, of Transmigration, they stoutly deny the existence of any being which transmigrates. They are never wearied of denouncing the folly of those who, while still believing in a Self, hope ever to achieve deliverance. 'It is even more foolish to consider Thought as the Self than to call the body a Self. For, after all, the body can live to a hundred years old, while the thought perishes from moment to moment'. 'While we believe in the Self, we love the Self, we hate the enemies of the Self, we muse on the past and the future of the Self; clearly we cannot eradicate Desire as long as we believe in the substantial existence of the Self; and nothing is less reasonable than so to believe therein'".<sup>224)</sup>

Other contra-  
dictions.

7) "To this contradictory doctrine of the non-existent yet transmigratory Self must be added another, still more disconcerting. *Nirvana* is said to be a return into Brahma from which Brahma has been eliminated, and is described in terms which are familiar to the Brahmins in their account of man's last end and

<sup>223)</sup> L. de La Vallée-Poussin, *ibid.* pp. 12, 13.

<sup>224)</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 13, 14; cf. *Catholic Missionaries and the Theology of the Hindu*. By a Jesuit missionary, who has lived and labored for many years in the Indian missionary fields; in AER. LXXIV. No. 3 (March 1926), pp. 271—284.



deliverance from suffering". Yet a great number of texts exist which lead us to conceive of the *Nirvana* not as an indescribable Beyond, but as the calm of the monk, exempt from all desire, peacefully awaiting death. Of the serenity of a monk who has arrived at this high degree of 'ataraxia', or of quietism, and to whom is given the name *arhat*, we might say that he has the Nirvana-on-earth, the foretaste and sure pledge of the true *Nirvana*: for the *arhat*, once dead, will never live again: and further, that his is the '*Nirvana* (or refreshment) from the fire of passion', as opposed to the *Nirvana* of after-death, 'refreshment from the fire of existence'. But we have here more than a mere paradox or metaphor: complete detachment from all earthly things in the midst of all the special advantages of a monastic life, and fragrant, as it were, with ecstasies, appears to the Buddhist (according to many documents at any rate) as the Good-in-Itself: and it is difficult — desirous as one may be to avoid this conclusion — to refrain from recognizing in Buddhism a school highly disdainful of metaphysics and highly sceptical as to any future life, the value of Action, Transmigration, or of the final End. We must give up all hopes of understanding Buddhists if we do not diagnose in them what Barth has frankly called a 'cerebral paralysis': this alone can explain their contradictions".<sup>225</sup>)

8) "Though they deny God, Buddhists cling to the gods. To a metaphysic which could give points to those of our best equipped of sceptics, they ally a mythology not much better than those of savages, such as is, in fact, that of the ordinary Hindu. Gnomes, nymphs, vampires, demons, moral and kindly gods, beings malignant to those who do not win their favour by gifts, or have no talisman to counteract their illwill — nothing of this is excluded. The monks saw to that — partly for their own sakes, far more for that of their clients. For lay-folk and ordinary Buddhists, the important thing in life is to live it out comfortably; the gods help one here not a little; and also to win a new birth in some paradise (*svarga*) of 'moderately quint-essential joys'. The Buddha insists often and much on the joys of heaven, the pains of hell, and exact retribution. He condemns the Hindu gods who reject his Pentologue; he and his successors have certainly adopted measures well suited to keep superstition at a fairly low state of thought and emotion, at least in the Order of the monks".<sup>226</sup>)

Mythology.

9) "In later Buddhism, just before or contemporaneously with the beginning of our era, the personality of the Buddha himself came to dominate the whole scheme of Buddhist dogma and piety".<sup>227</sup>) It is true, that "the lack of all religious rites in Buddhism was not keenly felt during the lifetime of its founder.

Cult of  
Buddha.

<sup>225</sup>) L. de La Vallée-Poussin, *ibid.* pp. 14, 15. For various theories as to how these contradictions may be harmonized cf. *IDEM*, *ibid.* pp. 16—21.

<sup>226</sup>) *Ibid.* p. 21.

<sup>227</sup>) *Ibid.* pp. 21, 22.

Personal devotion to him took the place of religious fervor. But he was not long dead when this very devotion to him began to assume the form of religious worship". Since, however, "Buddha had entered into Nirvana and could not be sensible of these religious honors, the need was felt of a living personality to whom the people could pray".<sup>228</sup>) "Sakyamuni was magnified, deified; sublime beings were invented, in the past and in the present, themselves Buddhas, and constituting a peculiar sort of polytheism. Simple folk hoped for a new birth in some Paradise (e. g., *Sukhavati*, or Happy World) where quasi-eternal Buddhas (e. g., *Amitabha*, 'infinite light'; by another name *Amitayus*, 'infinite life'; the *Amito* of the Chinese, and a center in China of a practically monotheistic cult) sit on thrones, and whither devotees are carried by the grace of great saints, Buddhas-to-be, e. g., *Avalokiteśvara*, the Chinese *Kwan-Yin*; sages and spiritual folk proposed to become Buddhas themselves throughout endless series of lives of charity and meditation". Very early "certain sects believed Sakyamuni to be a magical apparition of a true Sakyamuni who had never left his heaven, where he reigned in a profound and serene meditation — the destiny of all perfect beings in possession of true knowledge". Then too, "the oldest layers of Buddhist literature, the Pali texts, consider Sakyamuni now as a man, a doctor of philosophy, a preacher of parables, and now as supernatural in essence, and relate his anterior existences". "From the very outset a cult of the relics of Sakyamuni was instituted, though the monks held themselves at first aloof from this".<sup>229</sup>)

Thus "the Buddha's converts — pious women, ascetics, fire-worshippers, etc. — brought into the confraternity pious cravings, mythologies, speculations of all sorts, to which the strict doctrine had no answer to make, though it did not forbid them". To the lay-devotees doubtless "was due the master's apotheosis and the mythological guise in which his legend, probably soon enough, decked itself out. For many Hindus, some time or other, the Buddha became a great god; the greatest of all, for the Buddhists. To the relic-cult was added that of symbols representing him, noticeably solar in character; last of all came image-cult... Just as the picturesque legend of the Buddha, his pre-existence (*jatakas*), so often seen in sculptures, and his final phase of life, had perhaps contributed more than anything else to the spread of his cult beyond the limits of the confraternity, so the rich statuary of North-West India, confirmed by the latest layers of the literature, proves that the peoples there adored, in the Buddhas, essentially benevolent, nay, merciful and loving gods, highly moral and by no means jealous. Popular Buddhism has always been strongly tinged with superstition. — Among the Buddhas we must mention *Amitabha*, thoroughly solar

<sup>228</sup>) Aiken, *ibid.* p. 31.

<sup>229</sup>) L. de La Vallée-Poussin, *ibid.* p. 22.

in character, and king of a realm situated near the sun-set; elsewhere the sun himself is but a Buddha, burning, for the salvation of creatures, his body destined, phoenix-like to rebirth".<sup>230)</sup>

"Patronized in the land of its birth (Magadha-Patna) by King Asoka (third century B. C.), propagated by him throughout Hindustan, and in Ceylon, Buddhism ultimately converted the semi-Turkish Kanishka (first century A. D.?) and thus entered Upper Asia".<sup>231)</sup> "Northern Buddhism became the very opposite of what Buddha taught to men, and in spreading to foreign lands accomodated itself to the degrading superstitions of the people it sought to win. It is only the Southern Buddhists of Ceylon, Burma, and Siam who deserve to be identified with the order founded by Buddha".<sup>232)</sup> The knowledge of the Buddha made its way into China in the first century of the Christian Era. Northern Buddhism or the Mahayana (or Great Vehicle) prevailed in China. "As excessive devotion to statues and relics, the employment of magic arts to keep off evil spirits, and the observance of many of the gross superstitions of Taoism, complete the picture of Buddhism in China, a sorry representation of what Buddha made known to men. Chinese Buddhism was introduced into Korea in the fourth century, and there taken to Japan two centuries later. The Buddhism of these countries is in the main that of China, with the addition of a number of local superstitions". "Buddhism was first introduced into Tibet in the latter part of the seventh century (A. D.), but it did not begin to thrive till the ninth century. In 1260, the Buddhist conqueror of Tibet, Kublai Khan, raised the head lama, a monk of the great Sakja monastery, to the position of spiritual and temporal ruler. His modern successors have the title of Dalai Lama. Lamaism is based on the Northern Buddhism of India, after it had become saturated with the disgusting elements of Siva worship. Its deities are innumerable, its idolatry unlimited. It is also much given to the use of magic formulas and to the endless repetition of sacred names. Its favorite formula is, *Om mani padme hum* (O jewel in the lotus, Amen), which written on streamers exposed to the wind, and multiplied on paper slips turned by hand, or wind, or water, in the so-called prayer-wheels, is thought to secure for the agent unspeakable merit. The Dalai Lama, residing in the great monastery at Lhasa, passes for the incarnation of Amitabha, the Buddha of the Sukhavati paradise. Nine months after his death, a newly born babe is selected by divination as the reincarnate Buddha".<sup>233)</sup>

Spread of  
Buddhism.

From the above presentation it is evident that the fundamental tenets of Buddhism are marked by grave defects that betray its inadequacy to become a religion of enlightened

Criticism.

<sup>230)</sup> L. de La Vallée-Poussin, *ibid.* pp. 23, 24; cf. Gutberlet, *ibid.* II, p. 22. <sup>231)</sup> *ibid.* p. 24; cf. Dr. Sten Konow, *ibid.* II, pp. 130—138.

<sup>232)</sup> Aiken, *ibid.* p. 32.

<sup>233)</sup> Aiken, *ibid.* pp. 31, 32.



humanity. "The very foundation on which Buddhism rests — the doctrine of *karma* with its implied transmigrations — is gratuitous and false. This pretended law of nature . . . is a huge superstition in flat contradiction to the recognized laws of nature, and hence ignored by men of science. Another basic defect in primitive Buddhism is its failure to recognize man's dependence on a supreme God. By ignoring God and by making salvation rest solely on personal effort, Buddha substituted for the Brahmin religion a cold and colourless system of philosophy. It is entirely lacking in those powerful motives to right conduct, particularly the motive of love, that spring from the sense of dependence on a personal all-loving God. Hence it is that Buddhist morality is in the last analysis a selfish utilitarianism . . . Nirvana is based wholly on the motive of self-love . . . Another fatal defect of Buddhism is its false pessimism. A strong and healthy mind revolts against the morbid view that life is not worth living, that every form of conscious existence is an evil. Buddhism stands condemned by the voice of nature, the dominant tone of which is hope and joy. It is a protest against nature for possessing the perfection of rational life".<sup>234)</sup> Even Edward v. Hartmann, who has labored in vain to set Buddhism on as high a pedestal as Christianity, must concede that "it has devoured the spiritual marrow of millions".<sup>235)</sup> "One of its most attractive features, which, unfortunately, has become well nigh obsolete, was its practise of benevolence towards the sick and needy". But "asylums and hospitals in the Christian sense are unknown to Buddhism. The consecration of religious men and women to the life-long service of afflicted humanity is foreign to dreamy Buddhist monasticism".<sup>236)</sup> "Buddha's compassion for human suffering is at best cold and icy".<sup>237)</sup> Finally, "wherever the religion of Buddha has prevailed, it has proved singularly inefficient to lift society to a high standard of morality. It has not weaned the people of Tibet and Mongolia from the custom of abandoning the aged, nor the Chinese from the practise of infanticide. Outside the established order of nuns, it has done next to nothing to raise woman from her state of degradation in Oriental lands. It has shown itself utterly helpless to cope with the moral plagues of humanity . . . In short, Buddhism is all but dead. In its huge organism the faint pulsations of life are still discernible, but its power of activity is gone. The spread of European civilization will inevitably bring about its extinction".<sup>238)</sup>

Puranic  
Hinduism.

3. The next period in the history of India's religion extends from 500 to 1000 A. D. and may be termed the Puranic Period. "Brahminism, though much weakened for a time, was by no

<sup>234)</sup> Aiken, *ibid.* p. 33.

<sup>235)</sup> *Das religiöse Bewusstsein der Menschheit*, p. 361, cited by Gutberlet, *ibid.* II, p. 70.

<sup>236)</sup> Aiken, *ibid.* pp. 33, 34.

<sup>237)</sup> Schanz, *ibid.* II, p. 50.

<sup>238)</sup> Aiken, *ibid.* p. 34.

means universally superseded (by Buddhism), and gradually reasserted itself among the masses of the people — not indeed in the *Vedic* form existing prior to Buddhism, but in the *Puranic*, which was itself even a greater transformation from Vedic Brahminism than Vedic Brahmanism had been from pure Rig-Vedism. The later or Puranic religion, the staple of modern Hinduism, embodied the full apparatus of a fanciful mythology, a large pantheon of gods and goddesses, very human and super-human and preterhuman, with spirits good and evil, represented by fantastic image-forms, and worshipped with manifold rites. Every action in life and after life, great and small, was brought under the good and evil influences of these deities, and prosperity and adversity in life were made to depend upon ceremonial observances of a more or less magical character connected with their worship". "Buddhism, with its exacting moral code resting on transcendental ideas, could not possibly hold its own among the masses of the people, especially when placed in rivalry with the attractive concreteness of the growing Puranic Brahmanism. And so Buddhism was gradually drawn down to the level of its environment". "By the twelfth century A. D., Buddhism was practically obsolete in India, though it survived and still flourished in Ceylon, Burma, Tibet, and elsewhere. Jainism, which went through a similar popularizing process, managed to survive in certain parts such as Gujerat, Rajputana, etc.; but for the rest, from this time forward the new or Puranic Brahmanism prevailed throughout the length and breadth of India, and prevails still — being adopted not only by the Aryans, but also by the Dravidians of the south, and by such portions of the Kolarian tribes as had been drawn into connection with the Aryan race".<sup>239</sup>)

"We have now reached that traditional deposit of religion which is meant by Hinduism in the ordinary acceptance of the term. In point of contents it is extremely heterogeneous and complex, and in various degrees participated in piecemeal by different sections of the people; it permeates, however, the community as a whole, so that there is a remarkable uniformity of spirit and practise prevailing throughout the country... To put it philosophically, Hinduism, if taken analytically, divided up into an amazing complexity of diverse parts which it would take a volume to enumerate; but when looked at synthetically, it is the same one thing in its essential ideas wherever found. There are thousands of castes, each with its own distinctive religious practises, and there are scores of 'sects' or different religious allegiances; and yet all share promiscuously in each other's practises, the Vishnavite mingling with the Sivaite, and the worshipper of Ganesh making no distinction when he comes in

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<sup>239</sup>) E. R. Hull, S. J; *Hinduism*, in LHR. I, pp. 8, 9; cf. Prof. Dr. Sten Konow, *ibid.* II, pp. 138 sq. with recent literature.

front of a shrine of Vittoba. The primary instinct to worship *something* is so strong that it issues in the worship of *anything*", not excluding Our Lady in the more famous Catholic Shrines.<sup>240)</sup>

Method of  
Synthesis.

The systematization of later Hinduism was the work of the Brahmins, who used every form of belief and practise already prevailing among the people as a means of securing their desired object. In justification of this "accommodation" they had the magnificent instrument of the pantheistic philosophy of the Vedanta at their disposal. "According to this speculation, the whole universe is nothing but a kind of shadowy reflection of the One Infinite Supreme, being really identical with Him, and only by a delusive limitation of the mind conceived as distinct. It thus becomes not only possible but inevitable to regard the whole world, and whatever is in it, not only as a manifestation of God, but as actually divine, and so capable of receiving divine worship. If, therefore, the people were found worshipping forces of nature, spirits, demons, animals, and even curiously shaped stones, there was no necessity to convert them from their errors. Once recognize the all-pervading divinity, and the worship can be sanctioned as legitimate and embodied into orthodox Hinduism without essential alteration".<sup>241)</sup>

Pantheon  
of Hindus.  
Vishnu and  
Siva.

Of the deities of Vedic times several have survived, *e. g.*; Saraswati, Savitri, *Vishnu*, and *Siva*, the two latter of whom had by the decline of the Buddhist period assumed such importance as to eclipse all the rest. Since the worship of Vishnu and Siva are almost the two substantial halves of popular Hinduism, it will be helpful to present here a summary of the leading differences between them.

#### "Siva.

1) Originally the vedic god Rudra, father of the storm gods, who gradually gained popularity. The cult was especially propagated by Sancaracharya in the eighth century.

2) A stern and exacting deity, standing aloof from men, who must raise themselves towards him by painful efforts.

3) He is worshipped by ascetical practises — 'the way of works' — and propitiated by sacrifices of blood.

#### Vishnu.

1) Originally a minor sungod of Vedic times, who gradually gained popularity. The cult was especially propagated by Ramanuja in the eleventh and Chaitanya in the fourteenth century A. D.

2) A bright and comfortable deity, who condescendingly comes down to the level of men by avatars or manifestations.

3) He is worshipped with festal praise as a king by his courtiers in 'the way of devotion' and not of works.

<sup>240)</sup> Hull, S. J; *ibid.* pp. 9, 10.

<sup>241)</sup> *Ibid.* p. 11.



4) His clients are distinguished by horizontal paint-marks on the brow.

5) The theology is pantheistic, and maintains the law of salvation by works as a means of final absorption into the divine.

6) The worship gives rise to numerous Jogis, and tends to acts of excessive penance, fanaticism, secret sects, and pious frauds.

7) The worship of the *linga* or generative power is characteristic, as well as animal sacrifice. The objects worshipped are not regarded as avatars of the divinity, but as symbols of his attributes and powers.

4) His clients are distinguished by the use of vertical paint-marks on the brow.

5) The theology tends to theism by emphasizing personal manifestations of the divinity. Salvation is a free gift of grace.

6) The worship tends to degenerate into licentiousness sanctified by religion (prostitution in temples, etc.).

7) The principle of avatars favours polytheism and fetish by incorporating the worship of the fish, tortoise, boar, etc., and also of the deified heroes as avatars of Vishnu".<sup>242)</sup>

"Besides these Vedic gods there were many others of local origin to be synthesized. Among them, in the first place, were the five brothers Pandavas, possibly historical persons, celebrated by the old epic called Mahabharata (500 to 200 B. C.), and afterwards deified and worshipped collectively under the material form of five round stones grouped together... Another was Rama, also a deified hero, celebrated in the epic called the Ramayana (similar date). In connection with him comes Hanuman, a warlike general having the form of a monkey, who was instrumental in the recovery of Rama's wife, Sita, and who is still worshipped in many temples as the 'Monkey-god'. Then comes Krishna, the most popular of all, celebrated in several of the Puranas; probably also a historical personage of great prowess, afterwards deified and made the subject of a vast amount of mythology, and then the revealer of a religious philosophy. Among the rest may be mentioned Ganesh or Ganpati, a mythological youth whose head was cut off by his own father Siva, and replaced by that of an elephant, since when he has become the god of the domestic hearth and the pattern of successful enterprise. These and a multitude of decidedly local gods, to say nothing of goddesses (Kali, or Durga, Parvati, Mahaluxmi, etc. etc.), all found a place in the pantheon under the general category of manifestations or avatars. Even Buddha was adopted as one among the avatars of Vishnu".<sup>243)</sup>

Other deities.

A word must be added concerning the doctrine of avatars. "The word Avatar means 'descent'". Avatars are not incarnations in the sense of adopting or assuming a finite object into union with the godhead, but rather theophanies, or God-made-

Avatars.

<sup>242)</sup> Hull, S. J; *ibid.* pp. 12, 13.

<sup>243)</sup> *Ibid.* p. 12; cf. Sten Konow, *ibid.* II, pp. 150 sq.

manifest under the appearance of finite forms. "Different degrees of avatar are specified according to the proportion of divinity contained in the object, thus: 1) the full divinity, as Krishna; 2) half the divinity, as Rama; 3) quarter divinity, as Bharata; 4) one eighth divinity, as Lakshmana and Satrugna; and 5) a mere influence of divine powers and qualities into men, animals, plants, or even stones".<sup>244)</sup> There are said to be ten avatars of Vishnu. "In the early ones he takes an animal form; in the sixth he is Rama; in the eighth Krishna, in the ninth Buddha. The tenth (Kali) is still to come",<sup>245)</sup> "at the close of the fourth — the present — 'kali' or iron age, riding on a white horse, and restoring the first or golden age once more. Hence the many votive images of horses ranged round the temples of southern India, in the hope of hastening his looked-for advent".<sup>246)</sup>

Hindu Trinity.

"The cults of Vishnu and Siva were at first developed separately among the different sections of the people. When the two forms of worship came face to face with each other, their votaries maintained a sharp opposition between them as between two rival gods. But efforts were made by the Brahmins to bring the two into harmony. This they did by putting forward Brahma, Vishnu and Siva together as three different aspects of the one Supreme Being, viz. as Creator, Preserver, and Destroyer respectively. More philosophically speaking, Brahma represents the principle of origination, Vishnu the principle of continuation, and Siva the principle of mutation — the destruction of one thing with the emergence of another. By this means was constructed the Hindu Trimurthi or Trinity, which came to be represented in concrete form by a three-headed and six-armed human figure. The two ways of devotion and of works were also synthesized into one called 'the way of knowledge', and the Bhagavat Purana was written to express this combination. The scheme was successful. The two sects continued to exist distinct, but in peace and mutual tolerance, and the two worships soon came to be practised promiscuously by both parties alike".<sup>247)</sup>

Goddess  
Worship.

The goddesses of Hinduism are almost invariably represented as the wives of the gods. Philosophically the idea of a female principle in the divinity seems to express no more than the principle of fecundity, or the *terminus a quo* of production. "That the female principle is really identified with the male is shown from the fact that, nowadays at least, the wives of the gods are not supposed to be worshipped apart from, but rather in conjunction with their husbands, though the unreflecting masses may not always discriminate... Practically, however, the idea of the female principle did at one time develop into a distinct cult — and both professedly licentious and deeply superstitious — under the name of Saktism, or, from the writings which embodied it, Tantrism... It included at once the most debased use of magic,

<sup>244)</sup> Hull, S. J; *ibid.* p. 15.

<sup>246)</sup> Hull, S. J; *ibid.* p. 15.

<sup>245)</sup> Schanz, *ibid.* II, p. 54.

<sup>247)</sup> *Ibid.* p. 15, 16.

and the practise of promiscuous intercourse in the temple precincts". In the twelfth century A. D., Saktism is said to have been prevalent throughout India, "though at the present time it seems to survive only in a few parts, of which Bengal is one". In modern times "sanctified licentiousness is not attached to the worship of Siva and the linga, but to that of Vishnu", especially in connection with the worship of Kirshna. However, this immoral view "cannot be imputed to Hindus in general, especially the educated ones, and at most it exists only among the professedly Vishnuite section".<sup>248)</sup>

We have already outlined sufficiently the total severance as regards the objects of worship between the later Puranic and the earlier Vedic Hinduism. "Another difference is the introduction of images or idol worship in the later religion; the building of numberless temples, pilgrimages to famous shrines, the upgrowth of many fantastic rites, including bathing in sacred rivers for the instantaneous washing away of sins, etc." Also "the observance of signs and omens, and the magical use of incantations in connection with every important incident of daily life, and an elaborate code of caste and social ceremonies regarded as of vital importance and as integral to religion — so much so that it has been said that in India caste is religion, and religion is caste". Moreover "the essentials of worship are strictly domestic". There is "nothing in Hinduism analogous to collective worship, or our system of preaching sermons or giving public instructions. The management of the domestic observances is in the hands of the family priest (always a Brahmin)".<sup>249)</sup> As regards *Idol-worship* the Hindus do not, of course, really worship material objects, viewing them at the same time simply as such. Idol-worship is either *animistic* in its lower forms or *symbolic* or representative in its higher.<sup>250)</sup>

Worship.

In conclusion we might briefly sum up the chief blots of the social-religious system of the Hindus as follows:

Criticism.

- 1) The iron-bound system of caste, which stands in the way of all social expansion and development, and especially of anything like racial or national unification.
- 2) The inability of the higher castes to touch food, unless prepared by one of a caste equal to or superior to their own.
- 3) The practise of infant marriage, and, above all, the prohibition of those thus married in infancy to marry anyone else in case their tiny husband dies.
- 4) The supreme emphasis laid on formal observances, which puts the importance of a virtuous life in the background.
- 5) The mortal dread of misfortune if the ceremonial observances of religion are even for any excusable motive omitted.

<sup>248)</sup> Hull, S. J; *ibid.* pp. 17—19.

<sup>249)</sup> *Ibid.* p. 20.

<sup>250)</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 21, 22.



6) The total stoppage of the most important business enterprises at a critical moment simply because an unlucky omen has been observed.

7) The supremacy of the Brahmin and the Jogi, involving as it does a cruel incubus on the people, and encouragement of professional vagabondage and roguery.

8) Other blots are of a more local character, and would be repudiated by the better kind of Hindus as outside of the range of true orthodoxy. For instance, Thuggee, of course, or the religious sanctification of murder, now extinct; dacoity, or highway-robbery similarly sanctified (both peculiar only to a few tribes; Sati, or the burning of the widow beside the pyre of the husband (now made penal by English law, but occasionally occurring on the sly); the use of obscene language on certain festival occasions; prostitution in temples under the cloak of 'espousals to the gods', etc.<sup>251)</sup>

Conclusion.

It is obvious, therefore, that the religion of the Hindus, which in the beginning was so close to monotheism, in the course of the centuries has sunk ever more deeply into corruption and decadence.

## 2. *Iranians.*

Let us now consider the religion of old *Persia*. "The name Iran is a convenient term employed by modern scholars to designate the various lands of Central Asia, which at one time or another formed part of the great Persian Empire of antiquity. It is in reality the modern Persian name for modern Persia itself: in fact, it represents the Zend name *Airyana*, or Land of the Aryans, a title which the Old Persic peoples, as well as the ancient Indians, were proud to bear. Similarly the various kindred races, Medes, Persians, Bactrians, Parthians, etc., who belong to these lands, are conveniently included under the term 'Iranians', by way of distinction from their sister race, the Indians, with whom they had a common origin, a common primitive religion, and at their beginnings a common speech". "The Iranians have played a conspicuous and glorious part in the history of the world during the six centuries before Christ and the six centuries after Christ. They contributed, according to the common calculation, two, if not three, to the great empires of antiquity".<sup>252)</sup>

Monotheism.

"Speaking generally, we can say without hesitation that the ancient Iranians during their historic career possessed the most perfect religious system of all the nations known to us outside of the revealed religion of the Old and New Testaments — a religion practically monotheistic in a broad sense, with doctrines concerning the Deity and His relations to His creation scarcely

<sup>251)</sup> Hull, S. J; *ibid.* pp. 23—26.

<sup>252)</sup> Rt. Rev. Dr. L. C. Casartelli, *The Religion of the Great Kings*, in LHR. II, pp. 1. 2; cf. Gabriel Oussani, art. "*Persia*", in CE. X, pp. 712 sq.

differing from our own, with a complete moral code of great reasonableness and undoubted elevation, and a spirituality that avoids the excesses of many Eastern mysticisms, and has much affinity with the Christian. Secondly, we can also say that this religious system may be correctly designated by the term Mazdeism, or the cult of the One Supreme Being, God and Creator, known as Mazda, or Ahura Mazda, or Auramazda — forms represented by the Greek and later, name Ormazd".<sup>253)</sup>

"Of this Mazdean religious system we possess two entirely distinct presentments — distinct in form, in character, probably also in date; and our great difficulty — a difficulty which, so far, no scholar has solved — is to correlate these two presentments". On the one hand, there is the presentment of the Mazdeism of the cuneiform Inscriptions of the "Great Kings" of ancient Persia (of the Archaemenid dynasty, namely Cyrus, Darius, Artaxerxes, etc.). These inscriptions, cut in the solid rocks, are strictly contemporary and original documents, incapable of alteration or corruption by copyists like ordinary MSS. Their language is known as Old Persian, and is very closely akin to the Sanskrit of India. "On the other hand, we have a whole literature, consisting of a sacred book, or collection of books (the Avesta), something like our Bible, in a language closely akin to, but differing sensibly from, that of the royal inscriptions (incorrectly but conveniently called Zend), and also of a very considerable body of later literature, mostly made up of translations of the aforesaid Scriptures and of works explanatory of or based on them, in a much later language, known as Pahlavi. This literature also embodies a presentment of Mazdeism, and is indeed exclusively occupied with it. But the difficulty is in this, that it is impossible to identify absolutely the Mazdeism of the Avesta with the Mazdeism of the Inscriptions".<sup>254)</sup> We shall treat first, of the *Mazdeism of the royal Inscriptions* and then, of the *Mazdeism of the Avesta*.

Two presentments of Mazdeism.

1. "The 'Great Kings' of Persia, that is to say, those of the Archaemenid dynasty, founded by Cyrus the Great, and lasting from B. C. 558 to B. C. 330, are well known to us from the Greek historians, and also from the Old Testament" (cf. Is. xlv, 1 and xlv, 28). The Greek writers, especially Herodotus, and later Xenophon and Strabo, have preserved to us a certain meager amount of information concerning the religion professed by these Persian kings.<sup>255)</sup> But the great discoveries of the nineteenth century by Rawlinson and Grotefend, the former of whom copied the cuneiform inscriptions of the "Great Kings" and the latter who first discovered the key to their interpretation, have put us in possession of a far ampler knowledge of the ancient Persian

Religion of the "Great Kings".

<sup>253)</sup> Casartelli, *ibid.* pp. 2, 3; cf. especially Prof. Dr. Ed. Lehmann, *Die Perser*, in LRG, II, pp. 199 sq. with recent literature.

<sup>254)</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 3, 4; for specific differences cf. *ibid.* pp. 4—8.

<sup>255)</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 8, 9.

God and His  
attributes.

religion.<sup>256</sup>) Small and monotonous as is the "literature", it evidences a burning faith and a sincere piety "to the 'great God', the one God of the king and his people. No question can be raised as to the religion professed by these kings, at least Darius and his successors".<sup>257</sup>) "The generic name used to signify God is *baga*, a term commonly to be found in all languages of Aryan origin... On the other hand, the specific name of the Supreme God is *Auramazda*, the divine name which we find that the 'Great Kings' are fond of repeating in their inscriptions... This name is nothing less than that of the God of the Avesta, viz., Ahura Mazda".<sup>258</sup>) *Auramazda* is said to be the great God, the greatest of the gods; all powerful by His will or grace; by His will, or divine grace, kings are allowed to reign; by this same will the nations are made subject to Him; it is He who gives to kings all their power; a true Lord of hosts, it is He that gives victory in battle; in a word, everything depends absolutely on the divine will; He is omniscient; He sees that all takes place on earth and provides for all.<sup>259</sup>)

Other gods.

However, we find inferior deities side by side with *Auramazda*; "for we have already seen that *Auramazda* was 'the greatest of all the gods'". These gods were nothing else than "the special gods of the different clans (*Vith*) of the Persian people", indicating "probably a prudent policy on the part of the Great King in reconciling certain of the subject tribes to his religious reform by taking over, in the capacity of inferior deities, their local gods". "But, besides these anonymous clan-gods, there occur in the inscriptions the names of two quasi-divine beings whose presense is still more significant; these are Mithra and Anāhata (or Anāhita)". They "are prominent characters in the Avesta, the latter a female spirit more commonly known under the name *Ardvi Sura*. These are but two among numerous spirits or angels of the Zoroastrian celestial system which abound in the Avesta, and which are all demonstrably modifications of the old nature divinities, of the old polytheistic religious system of the original Iranians", which preceded Mazdeism.<sup>260</sup>)

Worship.

"There can be no doubt that the Supreme God *Auramazda* is the Creator of all things, for nearly every line of the inscriptions is a signal witness to this very fact".<sup>261</sup>) Man is dependent upon the will or grace of *Auramazda*. Hence "man on his part offers his humble prayers to this God", both for himself and for (and even against) other men.<sup>262</sup>) Not much is known of *divine worship* from the inscriptions. However, "the sculptured work which surrounds the inscriptions gives us representations of what appears to be altars, and even firealtars, similar to those in the Avestic worship".<sup>263</sup>)

<sup>256</sup>) Casartelli, *ibid.* p. 9.

<sup>257</sup>) *Ibid.* p. 11.

<sup>258</sup>) *Ibid.* pp. 12, 13.

<sup>259</sup>) *Ibid.* pp. 13—15.

<sup>260</sup>) *Ibid.* pp. 15—18.

<sup>261</sup>) *Ibid.* p. 18.

<sup>262</sup>) *Ibid.* pp. 19, 20.

<sup>263</sup>) *Ibid.* pp. 20, 21.



Morality.

"Coming now to morality, it is important to note that the very foundations of morality are to be found in the accomplishment of the divine will, and in obedience to the commands of God... Of all the sins condemned by the morality of the Archaemenids the most serious is undoubtedly the lie (*drauga*)... All evils are attributed to lying... The other sins condemned by the kings are, on the one hand, rebellion of the subject against authority, on the other, despotism or cruelty on the part of the ruler".<sup>264)</sup>

The royal inscriptions are absolutely silent "in regard to many of the characteristic doctrines of Zoroastrian religion — for instance, with respect to dualism and to the opposition existing between the Spirit of good and the Spirit of evil. Neither do the inscriptions contain the faintest reference to the great prophet Zarathushtra, the apostle of the sectaries of the Avesta".<sup>265)</sup> However, it is dangerous to rely too much on arguments drawn *a silentio*, which must be made use of with the greatest care.

The religion of the Avesta.

2. "Many writers, both Greek and Latin, mention Zoroaster, and afford us passing glimpses of the doctrines regarded by the Persians as originated by him". However, "in reality the religion of Zoroaster can only be studied in the *Avesta* itself, and in the vast literature of commentaries and religious writings to which the Avesta later on gave birth in Persia".<sup>266)</sup> "The most divergent opinions are current among specialists as to the composition of this Iranian Bible, and especially as to the date of its compilation. The dominant view, however, modified of course in each several case by the personal contributions of individual scholars, is that put forward by Professor Geldner, which keeps as close as possible to Mazdean tradition. In this view, the older portions of the Avesta are held to go back to Zoroaster himself, and are put at some time within the sixth century B. C.". <sup>267)</sup> At any rate, "what is certain is, that the book contains parts of very different age, of which there are some which may well be extremely ancient, and others which may be relatively modern". The same uncertainty upon the birthplace of Zoroastrianism obtains as upon the date and the origin of the Avesta. "The prevalent opinion is that the movement of reform undoubtedly originated in the West (Media?), but developed primarily in the North (Bactria?), because the geography of the North is the best known to the Avesta, and where a social and political state may be described more conformable to what is revealed by the Gâthâs than to what we have reason to believe existed in Media and Persia properly so called".<sup>268)</sup>

Religion of the Gâthâs.

a) We shall now present a general view of what we may reasonably believe to be the *oldest* and *purest* phase of the

<sup>264)</sup> Casartelli, *ibid.* pp. 21—23.

<sup>265)</sup> *Ibid.* p. 23.

<sup>266)</sup> *The Religion of the Avesta*. From the French of Prof. A. Carnoy, in LHR. II, pp. 1, 2. For a presentation of the Avesta and other Sacred Iranian literature cf. IDEM, pp. 3—7; also Arthur F. J. Remy, art. "*Avesta*", in CE. II, pp. 151 sq.

<sup>267)</sup> Carnoy, *ibid.* p. 7.

<sup>268)</sup> *Ibid.* p. 13.

religion of Zoroaster, namely the *religion of the Gâthâs*. Then we shall consider Mazdeism matured. The Gâthâs are a series of hymns, or, more exactly of sermons in verse, "which have a more archaic flavour than the other parts of the Avesta, both linguistically, and from the character of the ideas they express. They profess to be the actual words of Zoroaster. The religious notions here expressed form a fairly definite religious system".<sup>269</sup>) The Gâthâs are "constant in their attacks upon the priests of another cult, the *Kavay* and *Karpan*; they inveigh against nomadic life, brigandage, and the sacrifice of animals. The prophet laments his helplessness, and sighs over the persecutions which he suffers. He invokes as protectors *Vishtâspa*, *Frashaoshtra*, *Jâmâspa*, etc. The whole of this literature bears the stamp of sincerity, and good faith... The ideas which are expressed in it survive, no doubt, in the Mazdeism of the Younger Avesta (that is the rest of the Avesta as contrasted with the Gâthâs), but in the Gâthâs they are found at an earlier stage of development, and, in this simpler form, certain features of the later religion are completely lacking. What is particularly striking from this point of view is the fact that the secondary divinities of Iran, even the most popular, are not mentioned at all; *Mithra* and *Anâhita* are absent, and the sacrifice of the *haôma* appears not to be held in esteem".

## Dualism.

"The theory of Dualism is exposed in the third Gâthâ (Yasna 30). There were at the beginning of things twin spirits, those of Good and Evil in thought, word, and deed. Of these, the wise man must choose the good, that of the faithful followers of the *Asha* — righteousness, truth, morality. Such persons will reach a supremely happy existence, while the most terrible of destinies awaits the clients of the spirit of falsehood, *drug*. The universe is divided into the world of the *Asha* and the world of the *Drug*". In the latter world are included "the evil spirit, *Anrô-Mainyav*; the *daêvas*, devils; their priests, *Kavay*, *Karpan*, etc., and all wicked men, *dregvant*. They constantly persecute the faithful, *ashvan*, and seek to seduce them from their allegiance to good. A continual war rages between the two parties, and it is a work of merit whether a man do harm to the *dregvants* or whether he convert them. On their side the faithful are supported by the army of good, that is, by *Mazdâh Ahura* surrounded by his heavenly court. This court is composed of abstract entities representing divine attributes. Their original meaning is still everywhere felt in the Gâthâs, and their personality is fairly fluid. Their number is not yet defined... These beings serve in some measure as intermediaries between God and man; it is by them that man approaches *Mazdâh*, and through them that He communicates with man, granting him instruction, benefits, and final recompense. This ultimate recompense is represented as a world of prosperity and well-being", often enough portrayed under a material form which could be suitable only to this life — blessings,

<sup>269</sup>) Carnoy, *ibid.* p. 3.

for instance, upon family, lands, and possessions; but frequently, at the same time, figured as promised only in the next life.<sup>270</sup>)

In respect to the *moral life* the Gâthâs say, that "animated by the Good Spirit (*Vohu-Manah*), the true disciple of Zoroaster takes his stand against the Spirit of Ignorance and Falsehood (*drug*), its satellites (*daeva*), its priests (*kavay*, *karpan*, etc.), its pomps (sacrifices of living creatures, and possibly of the haôma), and against the works which put a man in its power — brigandage, lies, insolence; and he chooses with wise prudence (*ârmatay*) the service of the God of Knowledge (*Mazdâh*), who is also the Spirit of Good (*Spenta Mainyav*). His thoughts, words, and actions must be conformed to the moral law, the law of truth (*asha*), and to submission to God (*sraosha*). He will be guided by a spiritual patron (*rata*), and will lead the life of a peaceable citizen, devoted to agriculture, and full of respect for the creatures of Mazdâh, and in particular for the ox, in which animal are as it were concentrated the temporal benefits of God", thus obtaining the recompense (*âdâ*, *ashay*), which he hopes for in this life and in the next.<sup>271</sup>)

Morality.

b) After this general view of the Gâthâs, or oldest and purest phase of the Avesta religion, we shall now describe briefly "what is generally understood by the name of *Mazdeism*, that is to say, the religion which is revealed to us in the Avesta taken as a whole, the religion, namely, which became that of all Persia under the Sassanids".<sup>272</sup>) Here we must take into account the Pahlavi literature, the literary form in which Persia existed during the first centuries of the Christian era.<sup>273</sup>)

Mazdeism  
Matured.

"The Gâthâs have already presented us with all the essentials of a complete dualistic system. This system, in the Mazdean religious philosophy, crystallizes into a 'doctrine of two principles, independent, hostile, and essentially opposed to one another', the Spirit of Good, and the Spirit of Evil. Each is a Creator, the one of the good spirits, *Ameshas-Spentas*, *Yazatas*, and of all the good and pure existences; the other of demons, *daévas*, *drugs*, and of all that is bad, whether in the material or in the spiritual sense of the word. The creation of the second is produced explicitly to oppose that of the former, and struggles against it, and modifies it. The fight between the two principles is constant, and shall not cease till the end of time, when the Spirit of Good shall conquer, and shall annihilate his adversary, who, in the older system was co-eternal with himself".<sup>274</sup>)

Dualism.

"Ahura-Mazdâh — 'the God who sees all, remembers all — is omniscient, omnipotent, supreme, sovereign, good, beneficent, merciful'!"<sup>275</sup>) He is Creator (*dâtâr*) of the *Ameshas-Spentas* (Immortal Holy Ones), six principal individualities, among whom

Ahura-Mazdah  
and the Good  
Spirits.

<sup>270</sup>) Carnoy, *ibid.* pp. 14—16. <sup>271</sup>) *Ibid.* p. 17. <sup>272</sup>) *Ibid.* p. 17.

<sup>273</sup>) *Ibid.* p. 5. <sup>274</sup>) *Ibid.* p. 18.

<sup>275</sup>) *Ibid.* p. 19; cf. Casartelli, *La philosophie du Mazdeisme sous les Sassanides*, pp. 44 sq.



the government of the whole material world was apportioned; of the Yazatas, "for the most part, ancient Aryan divinities reduced, in the Avestic system, to the rank of auxiliary angels". Next to these divinities come *Mithra*, *Srosha*, *Rashnu* who preside at the judgment of the dead. *Mithra* is the most important of these, the God of contracts, hence of military honor, and "this explains his popularity among victorious armies and the enormous diffusion of his cult — strongly modified, no doubt, by alien influences — among the Roman legions in the imperial era of Roman history".<sup>276)</sup> *Ahura-Mazdâh* is Creator also of *Paradise*, of the vault of the sky, of the blazing sun etc. "From His creatures He expects honour, gratitude, and prayer".<sup>277)</sup> The *Fravashis* "are closely analogous to the Roman Genii and to our guardian angels. They are attached to a specified human person, though they exist before his birth. After death they unite themselves to the soul of the dead man, and may indeed have been originally a sort of *Dii Manes*. Gods no less than men have their *Fravashis*; and these spirits, who are the source for their protégé of a thousand benefits, receive a special cultus in return". Even the ox has its *Fravashi*, the *Geush urvan*, "the soul of the ox", the deified soul of the primordial ox, which lived three thousand years before the first man and was the progenitor of all oxen, and indeed of all the other good things of earth, of which he was the symbol.<sup>278)</sup>

Anrô-Mainyav  
and the Evil  
Spirits.

*Anrô-Mainyav* is the evil counter-part of the *Ahura-Mazdâh*. He is a wicked being, ignorant, afraid of *Mazdâh*, lives in the darkness and the abyss, longing to enslave creatures by causing them to commit sin. He inflicted on humanity no less than 4333 sorts of illness. Under him are marshalled the *daevas*, "demons", and among these, six stand out prominent, of whom a group has been formed explicitly antithetic to the *Ameshas-Spentas*.<sup>279)</sup>

Origin  
of the world  
and of man.

"Before Creation, nothing existed save Infinite Time, *svan akarana*. With the creation begins a long period of 12,000 years. During 3000 years, *Ahura-Mazdâh* kept his creation within the limits of the spiritual and immaterial. The *fravashis* of creatures yet to be, alone existed. This space of years concludes with the awakening of *A'nrô-Mainyav*, who till then had lain as it were in a torpor and inactive. *Ahura-Mazdâh* offers him peace, but he refuses it, and war is declared between them for the remaining 9000 years. *Mazdâh* strikes his adversary with the omnipotent prayer of the *Ahuna-Vairya* and stuns him. The next 3000 years are occupied with the production, in their material form of these creatures whose spiritual prototypes had already existed during the first era. At the beginning of the seventh millenium *A'nrô-Mainyav* reappears on the stage and profoundly injures all creation. To start with, he slays the primordial bull and the first man. From their dead bodies proceed respectively animals and men. A sort of golden age succeeds, over which an ancient king, *Yima*, is held

<sup>276)</sup> Carnoy, *ibid.* pp. 20, 21.

<sup>277)</sup> *Ibid.* p. 19.

<sup>278)</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 21, 22.

<sup>279)</sup> *Ibid.* p. 22.

to have presided. The golden age lasts for a thousand years, and comes to an end owing to a sin committed by the king, who, as a chastisement, is dethroned by the dragon *Azhi Dahâka*. This Yima is an Indo-Iranian character. He corresponds to the *Yama* of the Hindus, who was the first man, and also king of the infernal regions . . . The concluding 3000 years open with the revelation made to Zoroaster, and the conversion of the king *Vishtaspa*. There follows the appearance of a series of prophets. . . . At the conclusion of the twelve thousand years shall come a general resurrection, the victory of Mazdâh over his enemy, and the initiation of a new period of Infinite Time".<sup>280)</sup>

"Mankind finds himself at the center of the world, and in him focuses the battle between the two spirits. But by the practise of virtue he can place himself on the side of Mazdâh and contribute to the victory of good over evil. By sin, he makes himself the prey of evil spirits, a *dregvant*. The duties of the *ashavan*, or righteous, are the up-keep of the worship of Ahura-Mazdâh and of the good spirits, the preservation of the sacred fire, and the veneration of the dead. Of personal virtues, it is honesty and straightforwardness, that are most highly valued. But of the Zoroastrian is demanded the observation of scrupulous purity, and this consists not only in abstinence from adultery, rape, unnatural vice, and the like, but also in all manner of ritual performances, often grotesque enough, especially corpses. Charity towards the poor, hospitality towards the stranger, are likewise preached as virtues, the duty of the tillage of the soil is exalted to the rank of a primary virtue. To cut a tree becomes a sin. The tenderest care surrounds the ox and the dog. This lofty moral code offers no ground for reproach at all, save the rather galling and childish character of some of those minute observances on which with exaggerated solemnity, it insists. . . . Thus it is as grave an offence, for instance, to refuse its food to a dog as to allow a priest to die of starvation. Moreover, the code is disfigured for a Western conscience by the canonization as a virtue in the Pahlavi books of the *Khvaêthvâdâtha* (Pahlavé, *Kvetukh-dâh*), for this is merely incestuous marriage. This curious aberration appears due to a desire to flatter royalty and the nobles who did actually practise these marriages to preserve untainted the purity of their blood and breeding. Parsis today, however, deny that the word in question is to be translated in this way at all. The Penances imposed for the expiation of sins are manifold: death is the penalty for merely touching a corpse; other sins involve the recitation of the *paitita*, a sort of Confiteor; or a public sacrifice, an aspersion, a sort of retreat lasting nine days, or blows with an ox-goad. In our day—and doubtless this is no recent innovation—these have been replaced by penances and offerings made to priests on a similar scale of more or less. Certain crimes, however, for instance cremation and sins against nature, cannot be expiated,

Moral system.

<sup>280)</sup> Carnoy, *ibid.* p. 23, 24.

and make the guilty man *peshô-tanû*, 'lost body', that is to say, irretrievably the prey of the Drug".<sup>281)</sup>

Worship.

"The Zoroastrian temples — at first of the simplest possible description — contain the urn in which the holy fire burns. Over it perfumes are from time to time sprinkled and no one approaches it save having veiled his face with the *paitidâna*, lest his breath pollute the pure flame. Each Zoroastrian has, moreover, a sacred fire in his own house. The liturgy includes the daily recitation of a few verses of the Avesta. . . . While he recites the prayers, the priest holds in his hands the *baresman*, or bundle of twigs. Each month and each day has its patron. . . . The sacrifice consists of an oblation of bread and of *myazda*. This last term signifies *meat*, but has come to be applied to milk. Besides this, there was the sacrifice of the *haôma* (the Hindu, *soma*), an intoxicating plant, of which the stems were crushed in a mortar and the juice strained off; this was presented before the fire and drunk by the officiating priest (Avestic, *zaotar*; Persian, *zôt*) and his acolytes (*raspi*). The priests are called *môbeds*, which is the Avestic *mogupaiti*, 'Chief of the Magi'".

The ceremony of the presentation of the girdle (*kushti*), which lasts nine days, make a child, between the ages of 12 and 15 years, a full Zoroastrian. "Marriage is a duty for the Zoroastrian, and its ritual, as celebrated today, is borrowed from Hindu customs. When a Zoroastrian is about to die, a dog is brought to his side, of which the glance is to keep at bay, for a while, the attack of the savage Drug *Nasav*. Directly the soul has left the body, Nasu seizes the corpse, which forthwith becomes impure. To elude the Drug, and to avoid contracting the worst of all defilements, the assistants lay out the corpse, their hands covered with sacking. The dead man is then carried to the *dakhma*, or Tower of Silence, and there becomes the prey of impure animals. Neither water, nor earth, nor fire, may be polluted by contact with a corpse".<sup>282)</sup> For Iranian Eschatology we must refer the student to other sources.<sup>283)</sup>

Criticism.

In spite of the fact that the Mazdean system, taken as a whole, has a strong claim to our admiration, still the foundations of its religion are erroneous. The first great lie of Mazdeism is that its Sacred Book, the Avesta, has been *revealed* to Zoroaster by Ormuzd. Thereby all the teachings of its religion, which cannot be known by reason, but are of a positive nature, as for example, the entire doctrine of angels and demons, of sacrifice, purifications, rituals of prayer, rewards and punishments, are so many lies. There is, indeed, a strong monotheistic tendency evident in the inferiority of Ahriman as compared with the almighty Armuzd, but this is obliterated by the conception of malignant beings, that have been created by the wicked Spirit. By the distinction of

<sup>281)</sup> Carnoy, *ibid.* pp. 24, 25.

<sup>282)</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 25—27.

<sup>283)</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 27, 28; Schanz, *ibid.* II, p. 63; Lehmann, *ibid.* II, pp. 248 sq.



naturally good and wicked creatures, there is introduced a very questionable dualism, which is likewise incorporated with the Divine by the fact, that Ahriman is held to be wicked not indeed by reason of personal wicked will, but by his very nature.<sup>284</sup>) Moreover, "Ahura-Mazdâh could not be considered *Infinite*, since His existence is necessarily limited by that of Anrô-Mainyav (Parsi, *Ahriman*)".<sup>285</sup>) If the sun, moon, and stars are designated uncreated lights, it was only a step to polytheism; the veneration of the sun-god Mithra and the worship of fire are the immediate consequences of this doctrine.<sup>286</sup>) We have already noted above certain defects in the highly lauded features of Avestic morality, as well as certain absurd ritual observances. Parsism could not save the world from religious impotency, but shared in the fate of all pagan religions — unavoidable decay.<sup>287</sup>) The purer views of the present day Parsees are doubtless due to the influence of Christianity in the same way that the monotheistic ideas of the present day Hindus arise from contact with Europeans.<sup>288</sup>)

Owing to the paucity of testimony, which has come down to us, not much is known with certitude concerning the religion of the ancient *Germans*, *Celts* and *Slavs*. But even here we note an undeniable decadence from purer primitive forms. Let us now briefly consider the religion and ethics of these peoples in the order specified.

### 3. *Germans*.

Tacitus has presented us with a beautiful testimony in regard to the purity of the religion and of the idea of God among the ancient Germans. For them God is a mysterious something, which is seen only in religious faith — *secretum illud quod sola reverentia videt*.<sup>289</sup>) Their earliest and only God is *Tyr* in the runic writings. The sacredness of his name appears from its use as a sacred rune; for his name had to uttered twice while it was being scratched upon the sword.<sup>290</sup>) The Norse *Tyr* is equivalent to the old German *Zio*, the Anglo-Saxon *Tiw*, the Gothic *Tius*, and is identical with the Sanscrit *Dyu*. Hence the name points to a stadium of religion, when all the Indo-Germans were still united religiously and adored the one Father of Heaven.

The religion of the ancient Germans, as described by Tacitus, and handed down in the North-Germans sagas, "has more affinity with the purer Oriental nature-religion than with the religion of ancient Greece and Rome. The religion of the Germans was also a religion of nature. Light, fire and earth, groves and forests were the objects they worshipped. The German worshipped his god in

Mythology.

<sup>284</sup>) Gutberlet, *ibid.* II, p. 43.

<sup>285</sup>) Carnoy, *ibid.* p. 18.

<sup>286</sup>) Gutberlet, *ibid.* II, p. 43.

<sup>287</sup>) E. R. Hull, S. J.; art. "*Parsis*", in CE. XI, pp. 508 sq.

<sup>288</sup>) Gutberlet, *ibid.* II, pp. 43, 44; Schanz, *ibid.* II, pp. 63, 64.

<sup>289</sup>) *Germania*, 3.

<sup>290</sup>) J. Grimm, *Deutsche Mythologie*, besorgt von Meyer, Gütersloh 1875, I<sup>a</sup>, p. 166.

groves, and under the vault of heaven".<sup>291</sup>) But in the developed Germanic *mythology*, in the Edda<sup>292</sup>), we discern a decadence of the religious consciousness. Wuotan (Norse, Odin) is now the highest of the gods. He possesses creating, formative, all-permeating power, gives to the fields fertility, to all things form and beauty and bestows the highest goods and gifts.<sup>293</sup>) He is all-knowing, for he sees and hears all things from heaven among the children of men<sup>294</sup>) and is looked upon as the law giver and protector of the moral order.<sup>295</sup>) Tyr is now degraded into a god of battle; in many parts of the Edda he is even called the son of Odin. In some respects, however, both gods are on a par, for to the one as well as to the other are ascribed protection in battle and the bestowal of victory. Even in the extremely wild mythology, replete with gods, the consciousness of the unity of God among the ancient Germans did not perish utterly, for Wuotan is not only the highest god, but, as stated above, attributes are predicated of Him, which belong only to the one true God.<sup>296</sup>) With Wuotan are associated Donar (or Thorr, the god of thunder), and Tyr, who together form a trinity of supreme deities. Other gods and goddesses are Baldur, the god of light, Hel, the goddess of death, Narthus, the goddess of earth; the divine woman, Freija, originally the All-Mother Earth.<sup>297</sup>)

Sacrifices.  
Magic.

Sacrifices were offered to the gods, sometimes even human sacrifices (captives, criminals, slaves).<sup>298</sup>) Magic was very commonly in vogue. Later development, of course, anthropomorphized the gods and degraded them into sinners.<sup>299</sup>)

Moral life.

The old Germans "had low ideas of a future life, but pure notions of morality. Tacitus, in his *Germania*, in a manner held up the German morals as a model, perhaps for the sake of offering a sharp contrast to Roman immorality. Anyhow, from the facts therein stated, it is clear that their chaste, although not sober, life, the high position of woman, the fidelity and courage of the men, won the admiration of the proud foe of Germany".<sup>300</sup>) The similarity between the philosophy of life of the ancient Germans and that of the Persians appears especially from the fact,

<sup>291</sup>) Schanz, *ibid.* II, p. 81.

<sup>292</sup>) cf. Arthur F. J. Remy, art. "*Edda*", in *CE.* V, pp. 280 sq. We can point to Norse sources, because the views of the Germans in the north and the south were essentially similar.

<sup>293</sup>) Grimm, *ibid.* I, p. 110.

<sup>294</sup>) *Ibid.* I, p. 112.

<sup>295</sup>) cf. Chr. Pesch, *Der Gottesbegriff in den heidnischen Religionen des Altertums.* Freiburg i. B. 1885, p. 74.

<sup>296</sup>) Gutberlet, *ibid.* I, pp. 97, 98.

<sup>297</sup>) Weber, *ibid.* p. 34. cf. especially Prof. Dr. Wilhelm Grönbech, *Die Germanen*, in *LRG.* II, pp. 540 sq. with recent literature.

<sup>298</sup>) Cathrein, S. J; *ibid.* I, p. 129.

<sup>299</sup>) Weber, *ibid.* p. 34.

<sup>300</sup>) Schanz, *ibid.* I, p. 82; cf. also Julius Caesar, *De bello gallico*, 1. 6, c. 21; other testimonies in Cathrein, S. J; *ibid.* I, p. 129.

that according to both conceptions of the world process there is a struggle between life and death, light and darkness, good and evil, into which the gods themselves are drawn.<sup>301)</sup> In the legend of the tragic "*Götterdämmerung*" (Ragnarök) there is announced the fall of all the gods in battle with their enemies, who, however, also perish with them. Then comes the universal world-conflagration. A new earth will appear and a new generation. The progeny of the gods will live in peace under Baldur.<sup>302)</sup>

#### 4. Celts.

"The Celts, a branch of the great Indo-European linguistic stock, are first known to history as the chief people of Central Europe. Their country was the high middle region whence issue the Danube, the Rhone, the Rhine, and the Elbe". They extended their power in various directions. About six hundred B. C. "they crossed the Alps southward and occupied the fertile valley of the Po, tell then under Etruscan domination... It was probably at the same period that they extended their power and their settlements northward among the Teutonic peoples as far as the Baltic. About 500 B. C. they crossed the Rhone, and, pressing onward into Spain, became the dominant people of the Peninsula... The remainder of Gaul was seized by successive migrations... Following the established trade routes, the Celts poured across the seas into Britain and Ireland... About 400 B. C. a fresh swarm from the populous Celtic hive swept over northern Italy. In 390 B. C. they captured and burned the city of Rome... In the third century B. C. the Celts overran the Balkan peninsula and established a powerful republic in Asia Minor. They also settled in Illyria, Thrace, and Macedonia... The growing strength of the Germanic peoples — now, too, armed with iron — contributed no doubt to the Celtic dispersion... On the continent they showed a strong tendency towards republican forms of government, but the insular Celts adhered to kingly rule" "What did the Celts think about things divine, about the spiritual world, the soul of man, the life to come? From three sources chiefly we must expect the answer — from the extant remains of ancient Celtic religion, from the testimony of Greek and Roman writers of antiquity, and from the recorded traditions embedded in the rich mine of early Irish literature".<sup>303)</sup>

"In common with the other branches of the Indo-European stock, the Celts believed in a plurality of gods. Of the principal deities of the Gauls, Caesar has left us a brief account... The Gauls, under Roman rule, called their chief gods by the name of Roman gods, sometime preserving the national tradition by tacking on Celtic names or titles of the god to the Roman name. As a consequence, there is much difficulty in fixing the true

Polytheism.

<sup>301)</sup> Schill-Straubinger, *ibid.* p. 156.

<sup>302)</sup> Hettinger-Weber, *ibid.* p. 396.

<sup>303)</sup> John Mac Neill, *Celtic Religion*, in LHR. I, pp. 1—4.



identity of the Gaulish divinities, and still more difficulty in ascertaining their distinctive features and characters . . . The ancient Irish traditions contemplate a divine race which, in the fulness, variety, and realism of its attributes, and in the wealth of legend and poetry that celebrates it, resembles the dwellers in the Greek Olympus far more closely than it resembles the meagre and formal, almost lifeless, godfolk of the Roman worship. But just as the continental tradition of the Celts has lost its substance by being forced through the Roman calender, so the insular tradition has been varied and confused by having to live through several centuries of Christianity before it is expressed in writing by Irish authors, themselves Christian, and often on guard lest they appear to claim credibility for Pagan beliefs". Hence it is extremely difficult "to set forth a descriptive list of the principal deities of ancient Gaul, Britain, and Ireland, and to attempt the reconstruction of their attributes and divine role. It must suffice to say that we have proofs in plenty that the ancient Celts, insular and continental, as one might expect, resembled the Greeks, Latins, Germans, Hindus, and other peoples of the Indo-European family in the worship of a plurality of gods and goddesses".<sup>304)</sup>

Worship.

"Of the manner of this worship we know almost nothing. Sacrifice was, of course, a part of it, and the victims were sometimes human. It was not until after a century of Roman rule that human sacrifices were abolished throughout Gaul by a decree of the Emperor Claudius. Of such cruel rites in Pagan Ireland we have no trustworthy tradition. There is indeed a mediaeval poem which says that the Irish used to meet in the center of the island and to offer their own children in sacrifice to a great monolith named Cromm Cruach. But the period assigned is one of shadowy remoteness. The Gauls sacrificed, not their children, but slaves and prisoners of war . . . Temples, images of the gods, and a priesthood seem to have been alike foreign to the national religion of the Celts. In Ireland the early Christians found neither temple, idol, nor priest. The Gauls, however, where they came into contact with the Greeks, and later on with the Romans, adopted these features of southern and oriental worship . . . It is probable that Celtic worship remained in the patriarchal stage, and that sacrifice was offered by the heads of families, of tribes, and of states".<sup>305)</sup>

Nature-worship.

"The Celtic gods, represented no ethical ideas of excellence. At all events, the traits of conduct ascribed to the gods in Greek poetry and legend are abundantly reflected in Irish mythological tradition . . . In the hero rather than the god, the Celt, like the Greek, looked for the embodiment of the natural virtues . . . The Celts paid religious honour to the forces of nature, not only as personified in certain deities, but also expressly and directly . . .

<sup>304)</sup> Mac Neill, *ibid.* pp. 4, 5; cf. Cathrein, S. J; *ibid.* I, p. 126; Dr. J. A. Mac-Culloch, *Die Kelten*, in LRG. II, pp. 601 sq. with recent literature.

<sup>305)</sup> Mac Neill, *ibid.* pp. 5, 6.

Trees, fountains, or their abiding spirits, were worshipped by both island and mainland Celts . . . River-deities were a common feature of Celtic belief in Ireland, Britain, and Gaul. Weapons and implements, too, had their indwelling or tutelary spirits".<sup>306</sup>) The Pagan Irish, in common with other peoples of the ancient "Aryan" stock, "claimed divine descent, and several gods figure prominently in the ancient geneological literature. One of these is Nuadu, whose name is the 'Middle Irish' equivalent of Nodons, 'deus Nodons', to whom several dedicatory inscriptions of the Roman period have been found in Britain . . . Lugh, god of light, of the day dawn, of fire, of arts and sciences — the Celtic Phoebus, one might say — comes into the pedigree of many Irish septs. Another ancestor-god is Oirbsiu Mor, better known as Mananan Lir, 'son of the Sea', for he is the sea-god".<sup>307</sup>)

"The individual Celtic gods we can no longer visualize as they appeared to the mind of our Pagan forefathers. They are wearing Greek or Roman masks, and are appointed to regulated places in a procession of which some broken glimpses are allowed us. Or they move about full of life, indeed, but at such a distance and in such a mist of faerie, that, if their names were not cried out to us, we should scarcely be able to tell one from the other".<sup>308</sup>)

Innumerable tales describe the *Celtic Otherworld* in which the gods had their home. Its most striking feature and one that distinguished it from the homes of immortality described in other ancient literatures, is its localization. "Instead of being placed in some remote and wholly separate region of the universe, it is represented as coexistent in locality with the world of human and mortal life". "If any mortal obtained access to the Land of the Living, it was during his lifetime, for this was not the home of the dead. While he remained there he suffered neither age nor pain nor decay. Time, as known to mortals, did not exist there . . . If the once mortal visitant returned to earth, but did not set foot thereon, he retained his immortality; but if he touched the earth, the lapse of worldly time took effect; he might become at once decrepit and withered with age, might even turn to dust, as though his time of death were already long past. The world of the gods was a place of rural happiness; in it the pleasures of mortal life were idealized . . . There was no evil doing, we are told, but this must be interpreted according to Celtic Pagan ideas of good and evil. The gods and their human favorites were not the only inhabitants . . . The rulers of the god-world were the gods, so that besides these there were inhabitants of lower rank; in this respect, also, the world of the immortals corresponded to the world of men. We read often of battles in the Otherworld, and of many slain, an inconsistency which does not seem to have troubled the minds of ancient writers".

"There is no comparable account of the world of malevolent gods, the Fomorians, gods of darkness and monstrosity. They

Celtic  
Otherworld.

<sup>306</sup>) Mac Neill, *ibid.* pp. 6, 7, 8. <sup>307</sup>) *Ibid.* pp. 8, 9. <sup>308</sup>) *Ibid.* pp. 9, 10.

seem to have dwelt in the northern ocean . . . A variety of minor spirits of evil enter into Celtic tradition, ancient and modern". But no traditional description of the dwellingplace of the hostile gods has been preserved.<sup>309)</sup>

The Celts like the other people of antiquity believed in the *immortality of the soul*, or at least in a life prolonged after death,<sup>310)</sup> although we can only conjecture as to where the vast multitude of the dead find a home after death.<sup>311)</sup>

Druidism.

*Druidism*, known as an institution peculiar to the Pagan Celts, is shrouded in obscurity and is still an open question among scholars. It "was not a common feature of Celtic civilization. There seems to be no evidence that, as a substantial element of Celtic life, it existed anywhere on the Continent but in Trans-alpine Gaul . . . Ireland was almost certainly the chief abode of the cult and its place of origin". "The Gaulish and Irish Druids have often been spoken of as a caste or order of priests", but improperly so. A Druid, etymologically, was a man of thorough knowledge, a philosopher. Druidism was an order, not a caste. "As its end was knowledge, its beginning was instruction . . . The Druids regarded themselves and were regarded by the people as experts in every branch of Celtic learning". They seem to have been the preachers especially of immortality and of transmigration of souls. In modern Irish tradition, the Druid, draoi, is remembered only as a wizard. "It has been suggested that the Celts, perhaps in Ireland, becoming mingled with the primitive aboriginal stock, adopted from these their magical experts, and having adopted them, developed and transformed them into the Druids of history".<sup>312)</sup>

Ethics.

"Celtic society, like that of other Indo-European peoples, had a monogamous basis; but the Irish sagas, which contain the fullest tradition of Celtic Paganism, bear evidence of no very strict regard for the marital tie or for continence as a virtue. The high standard of sexual conduct which is characteristic of the modern Catholic Celt reaches no great antiquity. On the other hand, even the crudest remains of ancient Celtic literature are notably free from the spirit of deliberate grossness and wantonness. Courage, truth, pity, generosity, courtesy, justice are the virtues held up for admiration. Humility, meekness, self-mortification had naturally no place on the list. An intense pride of person, or kindred, and of race, is among the leading characteristics of the ancient Celts, but did not amount among them to a disdain for labor . . . Homicide, and injuries to person, property, honour, or character, were regarded among the Celts and other northern races as offences less against what we should call a moral code than against the legal rights of the individual or of his kindred, and could be atoned for by a legal compensation".<sup>313)</sup>

<sup>309)</sup> Mac Neill, *ibid.* pp. 11—15. <sup>310)</sup> *Ibid.* p. 17. <sup>311)</sup> *Ibid.* p. 16.

<sup>312)</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 17—24; cf. Jos. Dunn, art. "*Duidism*", in *CE.* V, pp. 162 sq; Cathrein, S. J; *ibid.* I, pp. 124 sq. <sup>313)</sup> MacNeill, *ibid.* p. 28.



Ideas of luck and Fate are widely distributed over the Celtic peoples, and received in ancient Celtic tradition "a peculiarly concrete expression", and "was able to exercise a correspondingly definite influence on conduct. One of the most prominent features of early Irish legend is the *geis* (plural *gesa*, *geasa*)". "A *geis* was a law of conduct which required an individual or a class of persons to do or to refrain from doing some action or class of actions. The breaking of the law entailed tragic consequences. On the other hand, when the *geis* was observed, sometimes greater happiness might be expected, but in general the outcome was merely an escape from evils". "On the whole, the *geis* may be regarded as special concretions of the luck notion".<sup>314)</sup>

### 5. Slavs.

Nature-  
worship.

Not much is known with certainty concerning the religion of the ancient Slavs (Russians, Poles, Bohemian-Slovaks, Slovenes, Serbs, Croats, Bulgarians)<sup>315)</sup>, owing to the great paucity of the sources. They adored the old Aryan god of Heaven, *deivos*, although that name was lost and its place taken by the Aryan name (*bhogos*), *bog*, gift, giver, which in Persian means especially "god". Perhaps *bog* signified among the Slavs merely "possession, riches", *Dazbog* the god, the sun, that gave riches, and from this name, by abbreviation, *bog* may be derived as the invocation of god.<sup>316)</sup> The old Aryan god was worshipped as the god of thunder, to whom the oak was sacred. The Slavs believed that he dwelt therein and accordingly called him *Perkunos*, "at the oak", Lat. *quercus*. Later on this name was considerably modified among the various Slavic peoples. The Lithuanians, who lived many hundreds of years beside the Slavs and separated definitely from them long before our era (perhaps about 1000 B. C.) and went their own way, were the only ones to retain the old divine name unchanged: *perkunas*, "thunder" in all dialects. The Slavs modified it to *Per-un*, "thunder" (today known only to the Poles). Linguistically there is another similarity between the ancient Slavs and Lithuanians. It has reference to the cult of the spirits. The Lithuanian *velės* signifies "the ghostlike forms of the dead"; *velionis* "the dead", *velinas* "devil"; but *velės* in old Bohemian is "the devil"; in Russian "heathen god". The *velinas* and *velės* were the lords or leaders of the departed spirits. Thus the linguistic similarity of the *Perkunas* and spirit cults discloses also two chief points of the ancient faith of the Slavs and the Lithuanians.<sup>317)</sup> The Slavs worshipped a multiplicity of gods (national, tribal, domestic), built small temples to them, raised sacred images, arranged a priesthood and offered sacrifices to them. The

<sup>314)</sup> Mac Neill, *ibid.* pp. 29—31.

<sup>315)</sup> cf. Leopold Lénard, art. "Slavs" in CE. XIV, pp. 42 sq.

<sup>316)</sup> Prof. Dr. A. Brückner, *Slaven und Litauer*, in LRG. II, p. 514 with recent literature. <sup>317)</sup> *Ibid.* II, p. 506.

latter were performed mostly in sacred groves and consisted of animals, sometimes also of captives.<sup>318)</sup> In short, the Slavic cult of the gods advanced beyond mere manism and animism and anthropomorphized nature's phenomena. The "powers of nature" were separated from their element and assumed other, proper names, so that it is impossible to conclude anything from the mere name as such. In this they differed from the Lithuanians.<sup>319)</sup> Per-un gave way to Svarog, the god of earthly fire, whereas Dažbog is the god of heavenly fire, or the sun. The ethical element is lacking in the Slavic cult of the gods, as also among the Lithuanians. There seems to be no special god that rules over right and morality. The relation of the faithful Slav to his gods and particularly to the spirits rests upon a materialistic basis. Slavic faith is built upon the principle of "do ut des".<sup>320)</sup>

The practise of *magic* and of *oracles* (e. g., the oracles of the horse and of lots) is richly developed. The Slavic conceptions of the other life and of the institution of religion generally corresponds largely with that of the tribes of middle and northern Asia.<sup>321)</sup>

Morality.

In their attitude towards woman the Slavs are far inferior to the old Germans. Marriage was polygamous; a man could have as many wives as he chose. But *one* woman was the mistress of the home. Children showed great care and fidelity towards their parents. But a multiplicity of daughters was looked upon as a burden to a mother, who not infrequently put the newly born girl to death.<sup>322)</sup>

## 6. Greeks.

The ancient Greek religion "was not a doctrine or a collection of rites, crystallized by the course of time into a fixed system. If identical features reappear in different periods, the variations too are profound. To get an exact idea of the whole, with its elements of change and permanence, we must trace out its historic development. Six principal periods may be distinguished: 1) *The origins*. 2) *Homer*. 3) *Hesiod*. 4) *From the seventh to the end of the fifth century B. C.* 5) *Beginning of decadence*. 6) *End of the Greek religion*".<sup>323)</sup> We shall treat of each of these periods in the order named.

Origins.

1) "It is only within the last fifty years that the pre-Homeric age has been opened out to historical research. Prior to that time, the mere possibility of such a field for investigation would

<sup>318)</sup> Cathrein, S. J; *ibid.* I, pp. 136, 137.

<sup>319)</sup> Brückner, *ibid.* II, pp. 519 sq.

<sup>320)</sup> *Ibid.* II, pp. 509 sq.

<sup>321)</sup> Schill-Straubinger, *ibid.* p. 157; cf. Brückner, *ibid.* II, pp. 516 sq. for details. Cf. Fried. S. Kraus, *Volks Glaube und religiöser Brauch der Südslaven*, in DRG. II, for the religion of the South Slavs.

<sup>322)</sup> Cathrein, S. J; *ibid.* I, p. 139.

<sup>323)</sup> *The Religion of Ancient Greece*. From the French of J. Huby, S. J., in LHR II, p. 1; cf. Prof. Dr. Martin P. Nilsson, *Die Griechen*, in LRG. II, pp. 281—306 with recent literature.

have been scouted by the scholars to whom the *Illiad* and the *Odessey* represented the simple life of man in the very dawn of history. Now, however, thanks to antiquarian enterprise, we are enabled to see, in and behind the Greece of Homer, the existence of a brilliant Mycenaean civilization (about 1500—1100 B. C.). The archeological discoveries of Schliemann at Hissarlik — the ancient Troy or Ilios (1871), at Mycenae (1874—76), at Tiryns (1884—85) — have unveiled this remoter past. At other points, too, analogous investigations have been undertaken", particularly by Dr. Arthur Evans. "Still, it must be recognized that the determination of the primitive elements of Greek religion is still in a tentative stage... Though it is a somewhat difficult task to trace out the main lines of a primitive Greek religion as far as history reveals it, still some attempt may be made. Without trying to solve the complicated problems of the early migrations of the Greeks, our study will begin after their settlement on the European continent".<sup>324)</sup>

Nature-  
worship.

Primitive Greek religion was markedly naturalistic. The *worship of stones* was very ancient. "Some of these sacred stones were reputed to have fallen from heaven, and the tradition of this ancient cult lasted very long in Greece... The aerolite was supposed to be animated by some supernatural spirit, and whosoever possessed it had a sure talisman against rain, storm, or sickness".<sup>325)</sup> The worship of sacred *trees* is also very ancient. "Not to speak of those which were specially sacred to particular divinities — as the oak to Zeus, the olive to Athené — others were venerated as the abode of gods. The Hamadryads dwelt in oaks, the Meliae in ashtrees. According to the more general conception, they were incorporated with the tree and lived in, and died in it". The worship of trees may be explained perhaps "by the tendency to personify and deify the productive forces of nature, a tendency extraordinarily pronounced among the Greeks".<sup>326)</sup> "Certain *animals*, too, were regarded as sacred by the Greeks, as is evidenced by survivals of this cult down to historic times. Serpents stand out specially as objects of worship. Such, for instance, was the *oichouros ophis* of the Acropolis at Athens, to which an offering of honey-cakes was made each month... The eagle is the bird of Zeus, the owl of Athené, and the dove is sacred to Aphrodité. In representations, the god and the animal sacred to him were often placed side by side. Some Athenian coins display Athené on one side, and an owl on the other. At times we find a single monstrous figure of Horus or Isis of Egypt". Whether these are survivals of animal fetishism (totemism) or whether these totems are merely *symbolic* animals, "crests", cannot be asserted with certitude, although here again it seems that the "Greek anthropomorphizing tendency is visible".<sup>327)</sup> Then too, "even in the earliest strata we find the cult of the *dead*... The corpses were generally buried without

<sup>324)</sup> Huby, S. J; *ibid.* pp. 1—3.

<sup>325)</sup> *Ibid.* p. 3.

<sup>326)</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 3, 4.

<sup>327)</sup> *Ibid.* p. 5.



embalming, and, contrary to the Homeric custom, without cremation. The Greeks believed in an at least partial survival of their dead, and they honored them by numerous offerings. The bones and horns of bulls, found either inside or at the entrance to tombs, can only be the remains of holocausts. In the vestibules of the rocktombs of Mycenae, even human bones are found in such quantities that Perrot supposes sacrifices of captives or slaves... The cult had a family character... It seems fair to see in these funeral rites the germ of that hero-worship which was to develop so largely from the seventh century onwards".<sup>328</sup>)

It seems certain that "the Greeks had begun, before Homer's time, to clothe their divinities in human forms". It is furthermore certain that "prior to Homer, the Greeks made no distinction between the gods of Olympus and the *chthonian* or earth-gods. These last seem to have been specially honored by the Boetian and Doric groups. In Homer, who represents first and foremost the Ionian civilization, the Olympian deities plainly assert their supremacy, and the earth-gods are relegated to the background. This, however, was only a temporary effacement. Worship paid to divinities of the earth and of vegetation was to persist in the popular religion of the agricultural classes till the time when the 'Mysteries' should breathe new life into it". We may conclude this sketch by asserting that "neither archeological nor linguistic evidence points to any gradual evolution of the Greek religion, as passing from lower forms of fetishism to a loftier conception. At the earliest period of which we have any knowledge the gods adored are celestial and immortal beings"<sup>329</sup>)

Homer.

2) The religion of Homer (between the end of the ninth and the first half of the eighth century B. C.) "is, so to speak, the full bloom of anthropomorphism... The gods of Homer are, then, idealized men. They are simply 'glorified' mortals, with human form, countenance, and limbs; while in their veins flows a mysterious fluid that renders them deathless. More powerful than heroes, and swifter in their movements, they can at will become visible or invisible. They live undying lives in heaven, in the palace built for them by Hephaistos — splendid abodes where they pass a delightful existence in an eternal springtime. But great though these gods be, none the less they are imperfect beings. They had a beginning in time, and their life is subject to the succession of days, months, and years. They need food to live, nectar and ambrosia. Though secure from death, they are liable to wounds and to suffering. The divine limitations are no less apparent when we turn to the moral shortcomings of the gods. They have their passions, their amours, their local patriotism. All engage ardently in human struggles, and the qualities attributed to them by Homer are not always to their credit. Apollo kills Patroklos by treachery, Athéné meanly deceives Hektor. In the heat of combat Apollo hurls at Arês the epithets.

<sup>328</sup>) Huby, S. J; *ibid.* pp. 6, 7.      <sup>329</sup>) *Ibid.* p. 8.

'Bane of men, foul murderer, highway robber!' Helen might have urged, as some excuse for her adultery, the story of Arês and Aphrodité, a narrative so popular that the poet tells it twice."

"Homer's Olympus is organized as a monarchy. At the head reigns Zeus, the sovereign god, whose nod shakes the world. Below him are ranged in order the other gods and goddesses — Hera, wife of Zeus; Athené, his favourite daughter; Arês, the god of war; Phoibos Apollo; Hermes; Hephaistos, the handy, halting blacksmith; the golden Aphrodité. Besides Zeus, there are two other sons of Kronos, Poseidon and Hadês, who holds sway, the one over the Sea, the other over the Lower World, but subject alike to the sovereignty of Zeus."

Olympus.

"Another power mentioned by Homer, closely bound up and interwoven with that of the gods, is the power of Destiny (*Moir*a or *Ais*a)". "Moir

a appears to be that power which settles the destiny of all beings, especially the destiny of each man, and, more particularly, the time and manner of his death. Hence the frequent association of *Moir*a and *Thanatos* (Death). In some places the former word stands simply for the concrete, particular idea of inevitable death". The question of the relation supposed to exist between Zeus and Destiny has received contradictory answers. The more probable solution seems to be that in the mind of Homer, or the Homeric writers, there were "two conflicting ideas — on the one hand a kind of fatalism, derived probably from a popular belief, and on the other, a confused idea of divine Providence".<sup>330)</sup>

"The Greeks of this epoch imagined the soul to be a material principle, a subtle vapour, united with the body till, at the moment of death, it stole away, retaining the shape and image of the dead person, but a pale and bloodless wraith intangible to the living. This phantom betakes itself to the domain of Hadês, to which, however, admission is gained only on condition of the body having been buried". Nothing can give a clearer idea of the condition of the souls in the subterranean Erebos than the lament of dead Achillês to Odysseus (Odyssey xi, 489). Of what was once a man there remains but a shade, dragging out a meaningless existence, without memory or reason. If a gleam of intelligence ever stirs in that pallid countenance, it is gained only by devouring the raw flesh or drinking the blood of black cattle. Whatever may have been a man's life on earth, Hadês has for him neither reward nor yet a personal chastisement. Only three criminals are described as subject to tortures beyond what were the common lot, and all these probably for outrages against the gods. "Of a happy future existence we have but one instance (*Od.* iv, 561—568)". In the latest parts of Homer, there is "a spirit of frivolous scepticism" discernible, introduced by a luxurious and worldly school of Ionian poets."<sup>331)</sup>

The soul.

<sup>330)</sup> Huby, S. J; *ibid.* pp. 8—12.      <sup>331)</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 12, 13.

Hesiod (between 800 and 700 B. C.).

3) "After Homer, the epic poets strove to fix the floating legends of heroes found throughout the Greek world, and to present to their countrymen the complete cycle of these marvellous tales. Hesiod's *Theogony* is a response to these scientific aspirations after order and arrangement: it is an attempt to synthesize the legends of the gods. In a work that is didactic in character, the author draws up the geneologies of the gods from the beginning of things down to the actual reign of Zeus . . . It had, for the Greeks, at least the merit of giving a geneological unity to their bewildering host of divinities, and of being a convenient and handy table or reference".<sup>332)</sup>

From 600—300 B. C.

4) "The pronounced anthropomorphism of Homer, together with the ascendancy of the 'Olympian' over the 'Earth' gods, were two characteristics to which the classical literature and art of succeeding times gave a stereotyped permanence. The artistic influence issued in a general official mythology on comprehensively Hellenic grounds. This 'All-Greek' Pantheon was not constituted without some 'give and take' between the great Olympian gods and the local 'Earth' gods. Often enough, the Olympians are found with elements originally not theirs, but borrowed from the gods whom they displaced. Thus Hera, who in Homer is a celestial divinity, was adored at Olympia as an 'Earth' goddess. The Greeks were not much concerned to eliminate all inconsistency from this medley of diverse elements, or to harmonize discordant legends. There was no authority to impose a uniform profession of faith, no 'ministry', to teach an exact theology. Hence much fluctuation in ideas, and great freedom left to the individual or national fancy. Titles of a single divinity would vary so that the Greeks themselves became confused . . . Legends are freely altered in obedience to the vanity of aristocrats, the fancy of the artist, or the speculation of the philosopher. In one respect, however, the Greeks were resolutely conservative, and that was in the observance of traditional rites. To practise these rites according to ancestral usage was to be religious; to seek to change or destroy them left a man exposed to the charge of impiety, and the 'rigour of the law'".<sup>333)</sup>

Worship of heroes.

"The history of the seventh and sixth centuries displays a widespread worship of 'heroes'. The epic had magnified and idealized these personages and the practise of worshipping the dead had brought about a special veneration of more illustrious ancestors. From this it was but a step, not long in being taken, to make gods of them. Political events favored these apotheoses".<sup>334)</sup>

Mysteries.

"Finally, the sixth century witnessed the development, side by side with the national and public religion, of secret religions, practised by the initiated alone. The Greek mind, on awakening to the problems of philosophy and science, became dissatisfied with the answers given by the traditional mythology. Orphism

<sup>332)</sup> Huby, S. J; *ibid.* pp. 13, 14.      <sup>333)</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 14, 15.

<sup>334)</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 19, 20.



and the Mysteries appeared in response to the new intellectual curiosity and religious aspiration. The most celebrated of the Greek Mysteries were those of Eleusis . . . Besides the Eleusinia, there were other Mysteries known to the Greeks — the Orphic Mysteries, the Dionysiac Mysteries, the Cabeiria, and the Mysteries of Sabazios. The generally essential elements of each were purifications, sacrifices, revelations of sacred formulas, and rites that varied with the different Mysteries. One of the most notable of these was the Orphic rite of Omophagia; the initiated cut pieces off a living bull and devoured them, thinking thus to attain to a closer union with their god, Dionysios Zagreus".<sup>335)</sup>

5) The golden age of religious art among the Greeks was "coincident with a decided decadence in the traditional mythology (about the middle of the fifth century B. C.) . . . The first adversaries of mythology were the philosophers",<sup>336)</sup> *Philosophy* took scandal at the popular conceptions of the gods, but it was impotent to replace this faith by something better, as we shall show below. "Such thinkers as refrained from attacking it held themselves completely aloof from it; and religion, from lack of some quickening principle, necessarily became a dry formalism, a mere collection of rites, void of meaning. As Cumot well expresses it 'Never had so cultured a people so childish a religion',"<sup>337)</sup> Under the influence of the Sophists "there spread in the upper circles of Athens, among the *jeunesse dorée* of the time, a rather crude scepticism, which could not fail to have its effect on religion. Protagoras openly taught agnosticism",<sup>338)</sup> *Poetry* became in Euripidès the handmaid of sophistry. "At times the legends of the gods or heroes are attacked by the poet, when they appear to him to contradict good sense or morals; at other times a vague scepticism is made to pervade the whole scheme of religion". A few, like Pindar, Aeschylus, Sophocles retained their attachment to the traditional mythology. But there appears to be in the minds of the two former writers "a strong current setting in the direction of a naturalistic pantheism, or a Stoic monism",<sup>339)</sup>

Beginning of  
decadence.

"*Worship* continued to be the main strength of Greek religion, and one of the essential signs of loyalty to the state; by its rites and ceremonies it embraced the entire individual life . . . Honour to the gods took the forms of prayers, of various offerings, precious and otherwise, according to each worshipper's trade or occupation — his pipes, his pencil, his net; works of art, too, and animals; and Aphrodité actually had her clientèle of courtesans . . . Human sacrifices of an expiatory character were also in use among the Greeks in early times", mention being made of them among the Ionians of the sixth century.<sup>340)</sup>

Worship.

<sup>335)</sup> Huby, S. J; *ibid.* pp. 21—24; cf. Döllinger-Darnell, *ibid.* I, pp. 131—214.

<sup>336)</sup> *Ibid.* p. 24; cf. Döllinger-Darnell, *ibid.* I, pp. 260—396.

<sup>337)</sup> *Ibid.* p. 25; Schill-Straubinger, *ibid.* p. 155.

<sup>338)</sup> *Ibid.* p. 25. <sup>339)</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 25, 26.

<sup>340)</sup> *Ibid.* p. 27; cf. Döllinger-Darnell, *ibid.* I, pp. 214—260; Nilsson, *ibid.* II, pp. 352 sq.

End of the  
Greek religion.

(6) "Eventually Greece came under foreign influences. Egyptian deities ... gained many new worshippers in the Greek world ... Less popularity attended other Eastern cults, 'owing to the fact that the Greek *Mysteries*, especially those of Eleusis, taught analogous doctrines and sufficiently satisfied the religious need!' ... The Syrian goddess Atar-gatis had devout worshippers only among the merchants of Delos".<sup>341</sup>) Thus "in the fusion of ideas and races which was characteristic of 'Hellenism', a change came over Greek mythology". *Syncretism* reigned supreme. "There was a loss of definiteness in the features of the gods, a fusion of outlines, a capricious interchange of attributes from one god to another".<sup>342</sup>)

"The Roman period brings us to the threshold of Christianity. With Augustus, *Caesar worship*, was introduced into Greece and Asia Minor, and accepted with servile submissiveness. From this period the history of Greek religion is one with that of paganism in the Roman Empire, and shares its struggles with Christianity, and its final overthrow".<sup>343</sup>)

Morality.

A brief word concerning *morality*. The Greek conceives of religion from its joyous side and venerates a gladsome enjoyment of life, without bothering himself much about the other life. Consequently, his religion has the predominant character of the esthetic. And yet, even though religion, science and art are concentrated predominantly in the cult of the Human, still this people has never attained, in its noblest representatives, to the full consciousness of the *dignity of man*; this is especially evident from its contempt for the stranger and woman, from the onesided emphasis on the interests of the state at the expense of the individual and from slavery. The moral condition was a very low one ever since the Persian wars (*paiderastia*).<sup>344</sup>) Indeed, "the keener the Greek's intellect, the more fatal his lack of moral stamina. 'The Greeks are always children', said the grave old Egyptian priest ... For even when the Greek was not frivolous, cheerfully denying, or as cheerfully practising, the rituals to which he attributed no real meaning, he was strangely and disastrously able to see the good, the true, and the real, and yet, not wish to grasp it. Theory and practise lay for him apart ... This violation of eternal sanctities, and the prostitution of his noblest gifts, brought the Greek down, and were far worse than mere crassness of moral vision and lack of spiritual sensitiveness. In the florid, yet flaccid, outlines of later Greek art, in the pretentious unoriginality of the later literature, we trace the rapid development of the neurotic and the inert which alternate in degenerate organisms ... The Greek beauty-cult flowed away into an immoral sentimentality which itself evaporated. It is a sad but a most valuable lesson that

<sup>341</sup>) Huby, S. J; *ibid.* pp. 28, 29; cf. Cumont, *Les religions orientales dans le paganisme romain*, p. 261. <sup>342</sup>) *Ibid.* p. 29. <sup>343</sup>) *Ibid.* pp. 29, 30.

<sup>344</sup>) Schill-Straubinger, *ibid.* p. 155; cf. especially Döllinger-Darnell, *ibid.* II, pp. 251—261 for an detailed account of Greek morality.

the human qualities which can carry a man and a nation so high, can carry him no higher; and can, deserting him, leave him to fall into a corruption the more hideous for his glorious past".<sup>345)</sup>

Criticism.

It is obvious, therefore, that the Greek religion "had neither unity, so far as it belonged to the different states which made up the Greek-speaking world, nor coherence within the cults which belonged even to one canton". Then too, "by its ready acceptance of any foreign cult, however disreputable, which excited the imagination without offending the artistic sense", it had no chance of permanence. In spite of its philosophies, as we shall show below, the Greek religion "had, and could have, no consistent explanation of the world, its origin and destiny; no worthy or justifiable account of the existence and nature of God capable of assimilation by the people; no authoritative code of morals. Grossly coarse nature-myths disfigured their earlier mythology; identically the same imaginative and dramatic spirit which raised the art and drama of Greece to so sudden and almost miraculous a perfection in the hands of her noblest poets and sculptors, reduced her religion, by the means of inferior exponents, to a convention whereby gods and goddesses survived only to serve as ideally beautiful subjects for a group of statuary or a painted vase, or as the traditionally sublime touch in a tragedy, or as the useful means of solving a tangled plot. In the public life alone the splendid civic festivals, which centred in the city's chief deity had a certain moral value; they lifted patriotism to a higher plane, and men felt themselves more truly brothers under the high celestial patronage. But, in general, folk prayed for help to the thousand minor deities and heroes beloved of local piety; and superstition ran riot among the uneducated".<sup>346)</sup>

## 7. Romans.

Turning now to the Romans we shall describe the development and decay of the Roman Religion from a twofold viewpoint: 1) we shall treat of the religion of the Romans *from the earliest times to 27 B. C.*, the birth year of the Roman Empire; and 2) we shall trace briefly the course of Roman Religion *from 27 B. C. to the year 312 A. D.*, when Constantine formally adopted the Christianity which from his time became the official religion of the Empire.

Origins.

1. The ancient authorities for the earliest periods of Roman Religion are "few and fragmentary".<sup>347)</sup> "The Latins, originally a nomad, pastoral people, very gradually settled into agricultural life, and formed, first, village communities, then the city of Rome. The development of their religion kept pace with that of their social and political conditions, and in time — especially during the Etruscan dynasty, which so strongly influenced the whole people

<sup>345)</sup> Huby, S. J; *ibid.* pp. 31, 32.

<sup>346)</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 30, 31.

<sup>347)</sup> C. C. Martindale, S. J; *The Religion of Early Rome*, in LHR. II, pp. 1, 2; cf. Prof. Dr. Ludwig Deubner, *Die Römer*, in LRG. II, pp. 418 sq. with recent literature.



towards the close of the monarchy, c. 500 B. C. — it became overlaid with many Greek names and customs, beneath which we must get if we want to understand the genuine Roman Religion, which never quite disappeared".

Nature-  
worship.

"Worship was first evoked in the Latins by their consciousness of the Powers of Nature". Such were *e. g.*, the Sun, the Springs, the hard Earth, certain animals, immemorial trees, even the inert boundary-stone. "To the very end, such stones and special trees were regarded as sacred: the *oak* became attached to Jupiter: the *woodpecker* and *wolf* belonged to Mars. But to say that the Latins, or anyone else, first consciously worshipped the stone itself, and afterwards a Power *in* the stone, and afterwards merely honoured the stone for the sake of the spiritual Power, is to saddle the primitive mind with definite philosophical notions which it certainly did not possess. The Romans (so to call the people who afterwards built Rome) took up an attitude towards these Forces, which was determined by their own *Character* and *Circumstances*. The Roman *character* was simple, robust, practical, unimaginative, 'uncanny', profoundly impressed with the idea of contract, whether in Law or Business. In consequence, the Roman invented no *mythology*: he did not imagine his gods in human shape, much less write stories about them... Hence, too, he had no religious *art*... Till he crossed with the Greeks, he had no images of his divinities: to the end the old cults of Vesta focussed in an imageless shrine. Finally, he had no *philosophy*: he speculated not at all on the nature of God, or the origin and destiny of the universe and the soul. He wanted to use the world, not to think about it".<sup>348)</sup>

Numina.

"The old Roman then worshipped *powers, numina*, rather than gods conceived anthropomorphically, *i. e.*, humanwise. They were often sexless, shapeless, named only by their function — what they *did*, not what they *were*, was important. Their names reflect therefore, the occasions on which human need asks for or fears spiritual influences, and are grouped round the scenes of eternal human interests — the nursery, the kitchen, and the fields. Cunina watched the baby's cradle (*cunae*); Statana taught him to *stand*; Levana *lifted* him if he fell; generation, conception, birth, and childhood were surrounded with deities, each with its special function; for this you invoked it; its work done, you invoked it no more... Later, the priests marshalled these tiny gods into a sort of litany; they were called *di indigites* or *indigitamenta*, the gods whose *action (ago)* lay *within (endo, in)* a definite sphere. These extraordinary lists, the product of a cut-and-dried, legal-minded age, have been called the solitary religious innovation of Rome. Notice that the shapes of their names are often *adjectival*; they represent ways of acting, not definite personalities: *divus pater Vaticanus* (divine Speech-father) was the full title of the god in his work of teaching a baby how to speak. Sometimes these spiritual

<sup>348)</sup> Martindale, S. J; *ibid.* pp. 2—4.

influences fall into groups; the open country was full of strange sounds, and the *Fauni* (*fari*, to speak), spirits of voices, were evolved. The Semones, Karmentes, etc. were other such conceptions, with no more individuality than our 'brownies' or 'pixies'".<sup>349)</sup>

"The *Circumstances* of the Roman People, pastoral, then agricultural, then political, and the eternal interests of birth and family life and funeral, originated FEASTS, where the character of their Religion is admirably revealed... The early Feasts are never commemorations of definite *personalities*, like our Saints' days, or of 'historical' events like Easter or Pentecost, but are neuter plural names, like the early Greek Festivals, denoting a special piece of ritual performed for a special purpose... Thus, to avert red blight (*robigo*) from your crops, you performed the *Robigalia* — the Blight-service; you made a procession, sacrificed red puppies ('sympathetic' magic this), and attached to the god, vaguely, the title Robogus, the object with which in this particular instance he was concerned".<sup>350)</sup> Much might be said of the pastoral and agricultural, the domestic and social Festivals; but we must refer the student to special treatises, lest we unduly prolong this account.<sup>351)</sup>

Evolution  
of Roman  
Feasts.

The Romans, like the other Aryan peoples, never thought "that death ended *all* life. The phantom of the dead man was supposed to go on living, in some vague way, in the tomb where the corpse was buried: hence food, or whatever had occupied him in life... were buried with him. Hence the sacrifice of wife or slave on the tomb of husband and master. Their souls would pass straight down to him in the earth, and give him the desired attendance. But in the earlier stages of society, the dead were thought to have ill-will to the living; to be harmful and jealous spirits, ready to plunder earthly food, to drink human blood to re-inforce their pale face, could they once escape into the light. Hence the Roman celebration of the LEMURIA, on May 9th, 11th, and 13th".<sup>352)</sup> However, as civilization advanced, the dead were no longer regarded as hostile spirits, but rather "as still members of the family, living in the family tomb, in the 'necropolis', the City of the Dead, outside that of the Living. The relatives had a duty towards them; the *Jus Manium*, the Right of the Departed, was a regulated code". By the institution of the Parentalia, "the state did what the family did privately for its own dead upon their anniversaries".<sup>353)</sup>

Attitude  
towards the  
dead.

"*Jupiter* (*i. e.*, Diovis pitar, father Diovis = Greek Zeus for *Dieus*; Sanscrit *Dyaus*) is the aboriginal Aryan god of the *bright* sky, common to all the Latin communities... When his worship, as normally happened, was taken over by the state, he tended to

Gods.

<sup>349)</sup> Martindale, S. J; *ibid.* pp. 4, 5.      <sup>350)</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 5, 6.

<sup>351)</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 6—13; cf. Döllinger-Darnell, *ibid.* II, pp. 98—104.

<sup>352)</sup> *Ibid.* p. 13; cf. Cathrein, S. J; *ibid.* I, p. 119.

<sup>353)</sup> *Ibid.* p. 14.

interest himself evermore closely in state-concerns, and to stand as the primary bond of unity among the Latins"<sup>354</sup>) He possessed a multitude of cult-titles. With him was associated Juno, the Genius of woman, who later became the Queen (*Juno Regina*), the city's Saviour (*Sospita*). "Mars, the favorite Roman god, starting . . . as *numen* of vegetation in the old agricultural days, took on an increasing *military* character as the circumstances of the people changed". "Quirinus was the god of the Colline community, joined to Jupiter and Mars in special worship as Rome expanded. Their *flamens*, or special priests, were the greatest: their triad maintained prime importance till the Etruscan trinity of Jupiter, Juno, and Minerva eclipsed it. Of his cult and character we know little. There were other deities who afterwards in Graeco-Etruscan times attained pre-eminence — Minerva, for instance; a goddess, it would seem, of craftsmen, and hence assimilated to Athene. But into no Greek mould did so many primitive Latin notions flow as into that of Herakles, the strong and beneficent Greek hero, called in Latin Hercules"<sup>355</sup>)

Religious  
spirit of the  
Romans.

The system of religious worship, which we have thus far described in outline, was recognized by the Romans themselves as primitive and uncontaminated by other ingredients. It was called the 'religion of Numa', the early king to whom its regulations were mythically assigned". Let us now briefly examine the nature of this religious spirit, the *feeling* of the Roman for the Divine in that early period. "It was, as has been already suggested, that of the practical man whose ideal is prosperous family life on a farm gradually evolving towards prosperous life as a citizen. All his religion is therefore one of things *to be done*. 'Our ancestors', says Servius, on Vergil's picture of a shepherd idly praying without working (G. iii, 456), 'put the whole of religion in *doing things (in experientia collocabant)*'. Man's proper attitude to the gods was "*pietas*, dutiful respect: the god showed the same towards his client. To neglect your part of the contract was *impietas*; to *over-step* it was *super-stitio*, an exaggeration. Hence *devotion*, as we call it, was no Roman ideal: mystical enthusiasm was a scandal to him. Private pieties were discouraged. . . . It was the master who was *ex officio* priest for his own *familia*, 'household'. He offered sacrifice in the name of all. Hence the concentration of public worship in the hands of the state officials and magistrates; there was no clerical caste. On the other hand, the exact performance of the contract was necessary, even as its terms were exactly stated beforehand. The god was given all his titles, to make sure of hitting on the right one. . . . Cicero defines *pietas* as 'justice towards the gods'; sanctity, as 'the science of Ritual'. To ensure exact performance, the Pontifex stood beside the sacrificing magistrate and dictated the words of offering to him, which he repeated precisely, though

<sup>354</sup>) Martindale, S. J; *ibid.* p. 15.

<sup>355</sup>) *Ibid.* pp. 15, 16; cf. Döllinger-Darnell, *ibid.* II, pp. 39—67.



in certain cases neither had the least idea what the obsolete Latin meant. All this argued a certain *fear* of the gods, and indeed due *awe* was a virtue which the old Roman prized... But we cannot say that the normal Roman Religion, in any sense darkened the lives of its adherents, though it attended their every action and was always in the background... The ideal state is *the extension of the terms of united family life to the gods*. The household Lares and Penates were always treated with a sort of genial, affectionate respect".<sup>356)</sup>

We shall now study "the development of the religion of Numa under the later monarchy and the Republic". A change took place, but it "was not universal, nor immediate, nor due to a single cause; but rather an infiltration of *Greek* ideas, stories, and practises came from several points at once, and these modified what they found." A process of degeneration set in. "The development is in the anthropomorphic direction: the gods and goddesses, more clearly pictured, need temples (of which the oldest cult has nothing to tell us) in which to live. Statues henceforth make the gods frankly human in appearance, each with his own attributes. Jupiter, Juno, and Minerva, the Etruscan triad, invade the Capitol" (*Epulum Jovis*). "Alien cults prosper, as that of Fortuna, introduced, so it was said, by Servius Tullius". "This period — *i. e.*, to c. 200 B. C. — marks a steady Graecizing of the old Roman worship, at any rate in official circles. That of Hercules was, perhaps, the only foreign cult, which attained high popular favour". Then too, there was an intensification of the tendency of "idealizing the favorite virtues of the Romans, and erecting temples in their honour — Good Faith, Honour, and Valour, Concord, *Mens* (Mind; almost = Inspiration); even Fear (= Awe) and Pallor".<sup>357)</sup> Another factor in the decadence was the alienation of the Common People from the national religion, due to the fact that "the public officers of religion were the magistrates", who were *patricians*; "and even while the lowest classes gathered power and became more conscious of themselves and their rights, more numerous and rich, better educated and more efficient, yet the high religious offices were kept as long as possible in the hand of the patricians".<sup>358)</sup> Furthermore, the influx of the Greek spirit was a corrupting influence among the high and the low. "It reached the people, not only by a constant infiltration of Greek notions, of the amusing and the lascivious stories which the irreverent and picturesque Greek mind constantly invented, and which in the formless, unhuman Roman worship found little if any mythology to supplant, but by way of the comic poets, of whom Plautus (died about 184 B. C.) and Terence (159 B. C.) are the best known to us, and who translated into Latin, and

Degeneration.

<sup>356)</sup> Martindale. *ibid.* pp. 17—20; cf. Döllingler-Darnell, *ibid.* II, pp. 67—80.

<sup>357)</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 20, 21; cf. Döllinger-Darnell. *ibid.* II, pp. 90 sq.

<sup>358)</sup> *Ibid.* p. 21; cf. Döllinger-Darnell, *ibid.* II, pp. 23—26.

everywhere acted, Greek comedies where the gods were treated in a spirit of broad farce, and the holiest rites burlesqued". Thus "under the combined influence then, of social disaffection from the guardians of the once prevalent and still official cult, and of a popularized and somewhat licentious rationalism, the bulk of the people was absolutely alienated from the practise of religion, except indeed in such social layers or such individuals as lived wholly apart from the current of the age". A universal formalism arose, "which at once provoked and concealed the death of all true religious worship". This appears especially from the practise of *auguries* and *auspices* with their ridiculous incidents, which prove the total failure of belief in any reality expressed in the ritual.<sup>359)</sup>

We shall treat of the political attempts at reformation, when we consider the Roman philosophers below. These endeavors proved a failure. "In one point only the popular religion seems never to have failed, and that is, the tendance of the dead".<sup>360)</sup>

At the close of the Republic and the beginning of the Empire, it has become a commonplace "to lament that all religion is dead. Temples were in ruins: feasts and religious brotherhoods had lapsed: Crassus laments in Cicero (*de Or.* iii, 33) that the study of the *jus Pontificium*, priest-law, was abandoned: poets like Horace and Propertius tell how cob-webs veiled the altars; how the sacred images are smoke-begrimmed in crumbling shrines. Central temples, each once a focus of religious life, were tottering; Jupiter Feretrius was unroofed; Juno Sospita filthy and deserted".<sup>361)</sup>

Criticism.

By way of evaluation we might say that there is, indeed, much in the Roman Religion just described worthy of our sincere admiration.<sup>362)</sup> Yet, we can see clearly "how inadequate a system it was... Men grew to love it because it clustered round what they *already* loved; they did not love their home better, because they supremely loved religion and that religion consecrated their home, but *vice versa*. The great state which had created the religion which held it together was *eo ipso* greater than its creature; you loved the religious forms for the sake of their connection with the paramountly adored *Urbs Roma*... In short, the Roman first shaped the religion which shaped him; it was not a Power put into him, lifting him to something to which, without it, he never could have reached". Moreover, the Roman religion was, as the Roman character, *one-sided*. For instance, it did nothing for a man's intellect: directly he applied rational tests to his ritual action, its *raison d'être* largely disappeared: all reflection was for him a solvent, and must have continued so to be... For the hundred questions that even a moderate curiosity puts to itself, it had no answer. *Whence? wither? and why?* were met by it with silence. *Man* remained inexplicable to the human soul, and

<sup>359)</sup> Martindale, S. J; *ibid.* pp. 22—26; cf. Döllinger-Darnell, *ibid.* II, pp. 125 sq; 106—115.

<sup>360)</sup> *Ibid.* p. 26 sq.

<sup>361)</sup> *Ibid.* p. 21.

<sup>362)</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 28, 29.

God unintelligible... While, too, it had no definite moral goal (save as to the very simplest social and political relations) on which a man might lean in an hour of abandonment by right instincts, so, to the mystic aspirations which God has implanted in the heart of man, it had nothing to give: in this life its ideals centered; brave resignation is the natural attitude at death; hopes for the dying and the mourner had to be sought in alien faiths... And, in fine, though sense of guilt, of faults of omission and commission, is witnessed to by a hundred purificatory ceremonies and prayers, yet precisely here the *legal* aspect of the situation soon dominated; the sense of sin evaporated, if ever it existed; a husk of ritual remained".<sup>363</sup>)

2. Let us now turn to the Roman Religion *from 27 B. C. to the year 312 A. D.*, when Constantine formally adopted Christianity which now became the official religion of the Empire.

Religion  
of Imperial  
Rome.

Under Octavius, grand-nephew and adopted son of Julius Caesar, there was a great *religious revival*. "At the very outset the Emperor assumed the name *Augustus*. In old Latin, what was 'consecrated' to divine service was 'august'. The Emperor was to be, for Rome, the vehicle and the representative of the divine... So we see Augustus ordering the nobles to restore their family chapels: he expends 100 million sesterces in decorating temples: at Rome alone, in a single year, he restores eighty-two shrines... He restored, too, ceremonies which indifference had allowed to lapse, or the wars interrupted... In fact, he gradually surrounded himself with a religious aureole".<sup>364</sup>)

Religious  
revival.

The supreme religious and political powers were concentrated in his hands. Feasts connected with the Emperor soon developed. "The name of Augustus was inserted in the oldest litanies, in every public and family feast his health was drunk with words which were half prayer. Little by little, his house took on the air and decorations of a temple; myths made a halo round his birth and boyhood". *Emperor-worship* set in.<sup>365</sup>) If we inquire into the significance of this cult, we shall see that "in life the Divinity more than 'hedged' a king; it dwelt in him; and after death he naturally passed into yet closer communion with it".<sup>366</sup>) In the case of Julius Caesar "even in his lifetime his name was given a month; his statue set among those of the gods: games were celebrated in his honour, sacrifices offered by special priests. A temple was decreed to Jupiter Julius... In his own case, Octavius moved prudently. He only allowed temples to be dedicated to him, if the *Goddess Rome* were joined in the

Emperor-  
worship.

<sup>363</sup>) Martindale, S. J.; *ibid.* pp. 30, 31.

<sup>364</sup>) C. C. Martindale, S. J; *The Religion of Imperial Rome*, in LHR. II, pp. 1—4; cf. Döllinger-Darnell, *ibid.* II, pp. 175—179; also Prof. Dr. Ludwig Deubner, *Die Römer*, in LRG. II, pp. 466 sq. with recent literature.

<sup>365</sup>) *Ibid.* pp. 3, 4. For an account of the historical antecedents of Emperor-worship cf. C. Lattey, S. J; *Ancient King-Worship*, in LHR. II.

<sup>366</sup>) *Ibid.* p. 4.



worship. They arose at first only in the provinces; the fanatic East built them earliest; they creep towards and finally enter Italy, but Rome never. There, however, the old Roman *virtutes* (always worshipped, so to speak, in the Head of the State) were celebrated with the title *August* added; the *Virtutes Augustae* were a near approach to the deification of the Augustus... After death 'heaven' was 'decreed' to him by the senate (Tacitus, *Annals*, i, 73). A special priesthood was founded for him; feasts multiplied. The cult developed with but few eccentricities. The mad Caligula, no doubt, called himself Brother of Jove. Nero pronounced the apotheosis of his baby daughter and of his wife Poppaea, whom, if the story be true, he killed with a kick. Domitian habitually had himself addressed as Our Lord God. But the bad Emperors, Tiberius, Nero, Domitian, had no apotheosis: a parody was written by Seneca, a mock god-making of poor laughed-at Claudius. In the provinces, however, all social and religious life had for focus the cult of 'the Augusti and the City Rome': their temple was the meeting-place of the provincial councils; their feasts and games were the great popular reunions... How far the Emperors themselves believed in their own divinity is hard to judge".<sup>367</sup>)

New religious  
influences.

But other forces besides the religious influences of the Emperors were necessary in order to revive the dead spirituality of the Romans. Augustus "directed his court poets to do their best to rekindle the fallen flame. Genial Horace wrote noble odes on this theme... Even the licentious versifier Ovid wrote the religious *Fasti* (Calendar)". But the *Fasti* were corrupt and Horace was hardly a power. Vergil "did more perhaps by his passionately and yet gravely beautiful poetry on Italy and Rome (the *Georgics* and *Aeneid*) than any man of his time to awaken the religious sense".<sup>368</sup>) Moreover, *Greek ascetical and mystical doctrines*, responding to the restless craving now aroused, and to which the Roman worship, even in this revival, had nothing adequate to give, were influential forces over the masses and the cultured alike.<sup>369</sup>) Thus "it was the doctrines of Orpheus and Pythagoras that Vergil worked into his poem (the *Aeneid*); chiefly, no doubt, in connection with the other world. But they presupposed much. Hitherto the whole ideal had been a prosperous life, on good terms with the gods here on the earth. Religious duty had practically meant the right performance of ritual. The new philosophies taught not only the ideas of *sin*, purity of *conscience* — symbolized, no doubt, by much exterior ritual, repentance, and indeed penance; but that the chief and enduring results of all this came after death, *thus setting the whole of human life to revolve round a new axis*. Incurable sinfulness meant eternal, unthinkable torture; lesser degrees of impurity involved, in one shape or another, a process of painful purification, till, in the end, perfect and eternal happiness is attained. And in all

<sup>367</sup>) Martindale, S. J; *ibid.* pp. 4—6. <sup>368</sup>) *Ibid.* p. 7. <sup>369</sup>) *Ibid.* p. 8.

manner of ways — some noble (as by chastity), some neutral (as by fasting from flesh meat), some ignoble (as by venal 'absolutions', hawked by itinerant priests in favour of individuals or whole towns, of past sins or future) — this *post-mortem* punishment might be mitigated".<sup>370)</sup>

Another religious force of mighty influence was the invasion of Rome by exotic cults. "It would be hopeless to try even to outline the various foreign cults which now ran riot at Rome. 'Dignus Roma locus quo deus omnis eat', says Ovid. 'Rome is a fit goal for any and every god'. But they agree on the following points: the inculcation of the sense of sin, and the necessity of purification — usually by way of physical penance; the immediate bearing of this on the future life; a wholly un-Roman emotionalism; an immense preponderance of the *feminine* element among their adepts; the rise of a priestly *caste*, men set apart to preach their special deity, and to act in all things as necessary mediator between God and worshipper".<sup>371)</sup>

Foreign  
Cults.

It is true that Rome had hated such foreign cults. But now the foreigners arrived in irresistible force. The religion of *Isis* came from Egypt. In her character as mother of the divine child Horus, she "was especially attractive to women, who flocked to her shrines, and in whom superstition found its best subjects. Especially frequent was the practise of sleeping in her temples, to obtain dreams or special communications from the goddess. This gave rise to untold abuses: the shrines became mere places of assignations. Juvenal furiously calls the goddess the *Isiac* procuress. For philosopher, however, and ascetic, the cult was irresistible".<sup>372)</sup> "The other foreign cults had all the sordid, and few the noble, features of the *Isiac*. The Cappadocian goddess *Mâ*, assimilated to the Mazdean *Anâhita* and the Italian war-goddess *Bellona*, was worshipped by bands of self-styled 'fanatics', robed in black, with high caps. Twisting like dervishes, they shrieked through the streets with drums and trumpets, hacking their arms and shoulders with knives, drinking their own blood and sprinkling the passers-by. They prophesied the future, and the hysterical crowd rained money and even food upon them. The *Dea Syra*, or Syrian goddess worshipped especially at Byblus — the *Astarte* of the Old Testament — had but a less vogue in the Roman Empire. Her great devotee was Nero, who scorned all other cults, in theory, save his own". More popular was "the Great Mother, *Cybele*, from Phrygia. Her cult was, paradoxically, authorized by the conservative Emperor Claudius, who instituted her yearly feast from the 15th to the 27th of March. His predecessor Caligula had officially recognized *Isis* and the flood could not now be resisted. *Cybele*, too, is connected with a fertility-god, the beautiful young *Attis*, whose symbol, the Pine-tree, was carried by the college of *Dendrophori* (*Tree-carriers*) to his temple

<sup>370)</sup> Martindale, S. J; *ibid.* pp. 8, 9.

<sup>371)</sup> *Ibid.* p. 9.

<sup>372)</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 10, 11; cf. Döllinger-Darnell, *ibid.* II, pp. 186 sq.

on March 23rd. All March 24th, which was called the Day of Blood, devotees mourned this image of the dead god: blood libations were poured out to him; neophytes, by hysterical mutilation, made to him the supreme sacrifice of their manhood. During the night they were held to be identified with the god Attis and mystically united to the goddess. Next day was the festival of Exultation: the god rose from his sleep of death; the maddest orgies succeeded to penance no less mad".<sup>373)</sup> "Not only these festivals, but daily in some part or other, the processions of Oriental begging priests, dressed in white and violet with saffron shoes, were seen. They bore a shrine veiled with crimson silk, which, swinging apart, revealed the sacred image. When popular enthusiasm was slow to appear, a priest would wildly confess some supposed sin, strip, and scourge himself to blood. Then the frightened crowd heaped presents upon him... The rite of *Taurobolium* came to be closely connected with Cybele. The goddess would declare that certain individuals, or a community, or town, needed purification; or men, conscious of guilt, might offer themselves for this rite. A platform would be raised, pierced like a sieve; the suppliant would stand beneath it; bulls would be led on to it, and their arteries severed over the sieve-like holes. The blood poured in streams over the devotee, who rubbed it into every part of his body — his very hair and eyes, and would even swallow it. He issued forth scarlet, and, as Prudentius says, 'horrible to see' — *renatus in aeternum*, 'reborn for eternity'; so the formula ran. The first example of this sacrifice is found at Naples in 133 A. D., under Hadrian; all over the Empire it spread".<sup>374)</sup>

Final phase.

"From 194—235 A. D. the Severi held power, and under them religion underwent the last modification from foreign influences. Already the millions of Syrian slaves, and the constant commercial connection with Syria, had familiarized the Roman world with Syrian cults. But the family connections now set up with the Princesses Julia, Domna, Maesa, Soaemis, and Mamaea, all Syrians, ladies who achieved an amazing social and even political power in this century, did more than anything to Syrianize popular worship. Of Atargatis, the 'Syrian goddess' we have already spoken. The various local Baals ('lords'), all baptized Jupiter by the Romans, with their local appellations added, followed her. That of Damascus was early famous. Antoninus Pius had already restored the temple of him of Baal-bek into one of the wonders of the world... The attempt of that monstrosity of mad vice, Elagabalus, from his infancy priest of the Baal of Emesa, to impose on the Empire the paramount worship of his patron the Unconquered Sun Elgabalus, with its attendant ceremonies of ritual debauchery and even human sacrifice (since these obtained widely in Syria), created such a violent revolt

<sup>373)</sup> Martindale, S. J; *ibid.* pp. 12—14.

<sup>374)</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 14, 15; cf. Döllinger-Darnell, *ibid.* II, pp. 189—191.



against the promiscuous Syrian cults, that practically nothing survived of them save the all-important solar-worship, which now bade fair to become universal. Everywhere cosmopolitan conditions, the break-up of old barriers, were issuing in a philosophy by no means esoteric, which proclaimed the worship of One God under an infinite variety of forms. Every nation, every age, gave Him names and worship suitable to its genius. No religion was therefore untrue, no ritual meaningless. The priest of Isis could be priest too of Cybele. The initiate of Mithra might learn the mysteries of Eleusis. Alexander Severus placed the statues of Christ and Abraham between those of Orpheus and the Lares in his private oratory. And under the figure of the Sun — unique giver of all life, immortal, all-seeing — this god was worshipped... Under Aurelian (A.D. 290—295) the *Sol Invictus* triumphed".<sup>375</sup>)

Religious  
Philosophy.

In addition to the religious influence of the Emperors, of literature, of Greek ascetic and mystical doctrines, and of foreign cults, which we have just considered, *religious philosophy* (especially Stoicism) was a power in the religious and ethical life of Imperial Rome. It is indeed true, that "all 'sects' proclaimed their doctrines; but chiefly did the ascetic Stoic and the mystic Pythagorean become popular. Both agreed in relentless denunciation of the prevalent luxury, and in exaltation of personal abstinence, coupled with social reverence for one's fellow-men".<sup>376</sup>) The nobler characters like Seneca, Apollonius of Tyana, Maximus of Tyre, and Dion Chrysostom, appalled at the crying need of humanity, at "the helplessness of man both to *know* and to *will*", preached to the people, denounced popular vices, and composed religious treatises. But, at the same time, charlatan philosophers "attracting attention by their austerities, gained attention and even amassed a fortune, on which they retired. Frequently, too, their public mortifications masked private libertinism, and they were constantly banished from Rome. Such were the Cynics, with whom Lucian has no patience, and who are denounced by the other reputable members of their own sect, such as Dion". On the other hand, St. Augustine, Maximus, an Egyptian of the fourth century, and St. John Chrysostom praise this sect. "In short, there can be no doubt at all, that during the first two centuries of our era, alongside of the great invasion of Asiatic, Syrian, and Egyptian cults, with their emotional appeal to conscience, the sense of sin, the value of purity and penance, came a tremendous moral revival, active in every class of society from the imperial palace to the mob in the market-place. And while the Eastern cults carried emotional mysticism to the sublimest pitch it well may reach, and the new religious philosophy scaled the heights which have led men to see in it a rival of the

<sup>375</sup>) Martindale, S. J., *ibid.* pp. 28, 29. For the sake of completeness we must also mention the cult of *Mithra*, which exercised such a profound influence particularly over the Roman soldiery. But not to unduly prolong this treatise we must refer the student to special monographs, *e. g.*, C. Martindale, S. J; *Mithra*, in LHR. II. <sup>376</sup>) *Ibid.* p. 20.

doctrine of the gospels and of the *Imitation of Christ*, yet it is true that nothing prevented the one from running into a general license of manners, and the other into an appalling intellectual superstition".<sup>377)</sup>

Superstition  
and Piety.

"Superstition was never altogether absent, whether in Augustus' days — he begged at his door one day yearly to avert ill-luck attendant upon too much prosperity — or in Nero's day, or Domitian's, when women dipped thrice in frozen Tiber, 'expiating a whole year at a time', or crawled with torn knees over the stones of the Campus Martius; or when unbelieving Tiberius kept his private soothsayer ever at his side; yet in the second Christian century it reached, perhaps, its apogee. The astrology and magic and fairy-tales of the East excited men's imagination as never before. Edict after edict had banished the Astrologers; they always returned".<sup>378)</sup> "And when all means failed to win the favour of the gods, or obtain the desired end, the same superstition manifested itself in acts of puerile and petulant vindictiveness. Thus, after a naval defeat, Augustus punished Neptune by ordering the removal of his statue. At the death of Germanicus, the images of the gods were broken, as an act of retribution, in many cities of Italy".<sup>379)</sup> Even graver and learned men, like Aristides (born 117 A. D. in Mysia), Artemidorus of Daldis (died about 200), and Alexander of Abonoteichos, took up the cudgels on behalf of the most fantastic imaginings.<sup>380)</sup>

"All this time, in the quiet country places of Italy, the old cults continued", particularly in the popular guilds and associations. "Religion, however, sat lightly on the members and was coupled with natural pleasures". "At the other extreme of society the Antonine Emperors, Antoninus Pius and Marcus Aurelius (ruled 138—180), set an example of very remarkable and wise philanthropy". Their correspondence "is full of habitual and natural references to prayer and trust in Providence". But their noble outbursts were "but few in the long writings of Stoic submission — a 'stunned acquiescence' in Nature and Universal Law, rather than the 'enthusiastic acceptance' of a Master personally known and loved and followed. The soul which was ultimately to be reabsorbed into the whole could not do better than annihilate, in so far as might be, its selfhood at the outset".<sup>381)</sup>

Morality.

Finally, a brief word concerning Roman *morality*, although in the light of the description of belief and worship given above any further account seems superfluous. For the basic religious truths concerning God and man and the future life were almost wholly obscured in the Roman religion by the addition of false and superstitious fables; the highest spiritual ideas were represented by gods and goddesses whose imaginary lives were stained

<sup>377)</sup> Martindale, S. J; *ibid.* pp. 22, 23.

<sup>378)</sup> *Ibid.* p. 24; cf. Döllinger-Darnell, *ibid.* II, pp. 209—228.

<sup>379)</sup> Hettinger-Bowden, *ibid.* p. 53.

<sup>380)</sup> Martindale, S. J; *ibid.* pp. 24—26.

<sup>381)</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 26, 27.

by monstrous vice. Moreover, sacrifice was too often "of human flesh and blood, its concomitant ceremonial merely an incentive to lust, its deities were idols of man's own make". Surely, a religion founded on such teachings could not possibly elevate or improve the masses, who were its principal adherents. Then too, the people, as a whole, had no more instruction in morals than in dogma.<sup>382</sup>) "The Pagan divinities", says St. Augustine, "wholly neglected the lives and morals of the cities and nations who worshipped them, and by no dreaded prohibition hindered their becoming utterly corrupt, nor preserved them from those terrible and detestable evils which visit not harvests and vintages, not house and possessions, not the body which is subject to the soul, but the soul itself, the spirit that rules the whole man. If such prohibition exists, produce it, prove it! Purity and probity, they say, were inculcated upon the initiated, and secret incitements to virtue were whispered in their ear; but this is an idle boast. Let them show or name to us the places where, instead of the obscene songs and licentious plays, the celebration of those most filthy and shameless Fugalia (well called Fugalia, since they banish modesty and right feeling), the people were commanded in the name of the gods to restrain avarice, bridle impurity, and conquer ambition. Let them name to us the places where such instructions were wont to be communicated from the gods, and where the people who worshipped them were accustomed to resort to hear them, as we can point to our churches built for this purpose in every land where the Christian religion is received".<sup>383</sup>) As a matter of fact, "in all countries speaking Greek, and at Rome as well, the worship of Aphrodite was characterized by a shameless impurity, and a studied excitement of gross lust, surpassing all that earlier times had seen up to Alexander ... The solemnities of the Aphrodisia, usually kept up for three days and nights consecutively were ... accompanied by prayers to the goddess, amid a tumult of inebriety and lust. This was the Pannychis or Pervigilium of Venus ... In Rome there was now a Venus Drusilla in the temple of Venus Genitrix. Here was the worship of a goddess proving an ever-open school of vice, and gulf of corruption yawning for successive generations of youths and maidens". The *myths* or sagas of the gods, "possessing wholly the imagination and conscience of men who fed on them from youth upwards, exercised a most pernicious influence on their morale; gods were taken as patterns of behaviour, and their example pleaded in excuse for all misdeeds". These myths were also "represented to the life in public spectacles, and the most voluptuous ones the most frequently ... These mimic entertainments had become so frequent in Rome by the time of the emperors, that the whole year was filled up with them, except the winter months ... These games themselves were regarded

<sup>382</sup>) Hettinger-Bowden, *ibid.* pp. 48—50.

<sup>383</sup>) *De Civ. Dei*, ii, 6 quoted by Hettinger-Bowden, *ibid.* p. 50 sq.



and conducted as religious acts . . . People really thought the gods themselves commanded these shows, or extolled them as if by threats". "What mimic art produced in the theater, was reproduced in paintings on the walls of temples and houses . . . As impurity formed a part of religion, people had no scruple in using the temple and its adjoining buildings for the satisfaction of their lust".<sup>384)</sup>

In regard to the *family* the father in the older days of Roman religion had full disposal of the children: he could expose them, sell and kill them; likewise he had unlimited disposal of wife and slaves. Marriage always took place with religious ceremonies (the most solemn marriage being the *confarreatio*). Originally marriage was indissoluble in Rome; the position of woman honorable; adultery was almost unknown.<sup>385)</sup> But later on, especially during the period of the Empire, with the lapse of religion went hand in hand a terrible decadence in morals; marriages were dissolved at the least pretext and many preferred the unfettered life of celibacy, through which every kind of impurity and licentiousness was being multiplied in either sex alike.<sup>386)</sup> "Slavery in Rome, as well as in Greece, was one of the main causes of the prevailing moral corruption, and of a progressive decay . . . If the masters ruined their slaves, the slaves, on their part, were the most influential agents in the moral corruption of their masters . . . Being composed of variety of nations, eastern and western, they formed a company to which each member contributed, as it were, the failings and vices of his own country and race, as to a huge capital of human depravity, each imparting to the other the species of debauchery to which he was as yet a stranger".<sup>387)</sup> Much might be said of the crimes of abortion, *paunderastia* etc. Indeed "in the debauchery, which the Romans carried out to a greater extent than any other people, the woman would not be in arrear of the men".<sup>388)</sup> But this sad picture is enough.

Synthesis.

We have arrived at the end of our historical survey. The picture of the religious and moral status of paganism is lamentable in the extreme. Nowhere do we find a *pure monotheism*, that permeates and dominates the masses. We do, indeed, discern traces and vestiges of a primitive belief in one God everywhere. They appear clearly among the ancient cultured peoples, the Indo-Germans, the Semites, the

<sup>384)</sup> Döllinger-Darnell, *ibid.* II, pp. 202—209.

<sup>385)</sup> *Ibid.* II, pp. 261—269; cf. Cathrein, S. J.; *ibid.* I, pp. 122, 123.

<sup>386)</sup> *Ibid.* II, pp. 269—273.

<sup>387)</sup> *Ibid.* II, p. 282; cf. pp. 273—285.

<sup>388)</sup> *Ibid.* II, pp. 285—292. For further information in regard to morality among the Greek and Roman pagans cf. first chap. of St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans (21 sq.) and the writings of the early Christian apologists.

Chinese; more clearly even among the so-called primitive peoples of the present. But the idea of *one* God had lost its influence upon the religious and ethical life of all these heathens. Primitive monotheism was entirely relegated into the background and was visible only in indistinct outlines. In its stead appear polytheism, pantheism, and dualism. To the individual deities are ascribed almost universally human weaknesses and failings; not infrequently the worst things are narrated of them. The *worship* of God corresponded to this belief. By human sacrifices, puerile ceremonials, impurity and intemperance, the unfortunate peoples sought to assure themselves of the good will of the gods or to placate their ill-will. *Morality* went hand in hand with this decay in the religious sphere. The example of the deities offered the best incitement thereto. And these conditions were not merely tolerated in public; they were under the protection of the State and its laws. The civil authorities, the priests, and the philosophers, were the most zealous promoters of this deplorable perversion.<sup>389</sup>) Therefore there can be no reasonable doubt as to the *historical fact* of the universal religious and ethical degradation of the peoples of the past and the present, who were placed outside the pale of a divine supernatural revelation.

We shall now proceed to demonstrate the *second* assertion contained in the major of our general argument.

## II. The Moral Impotence of Mankind.

As stated above, the chief difficulty for our thesis does not consist so much in establishing the historical fact of the awful status of paganism, religiously and morally, as rather in showing that mankind, if left to its natural resources, could never have extricated itself from this deplorable condition and arrived at a fitting knowledge of natural religion and ethics. To present this proof we can point, in the first place, to the *universality* of the fact.

1. It is morally certain, that what has been done by all peoples for thousands of years, will continue to be done for all future time, given the same conditions and circumstances. Now the universality of the corruption and error of peoples

Universality  
of the fact.

<sup>389</sup>) Brunsmann, S. V. D; *ibid.* I, pp. 105, 106, 141, 142; cf. Ottiger, S. J; *ibid.* I, pp. 116 sq.

deprived of a divine supernatural revelation is beyond all question, as we have just demonstrated. The time, too, was sufficiently long to effect an improvement, if that were possible: but instead of betterment we note deterioration everywhere. Likewise the circumstances favorable or unfavorable to a reformation could not become different; at any rate, no improvement could result from a re-grouping of the circumstances in question.

For the obstacles to an amelioration of religious and moral conditions, namely, human passions, corrupted morals, prejudices of education, and bad example, carelessness in regard to religious investigation, and the difficulty of acquiring supersensible knowledge, will always remain the same or will even increase from day to day with the advance of the decadence.

On the other hand, education, science, particularly philosophy, which ought to have promoted a betterment, have really done their utmost, but were powerless to create a remedy for the sad moral and religious status of paganism. For during the pre-Christian period, these spiritual forces have risen to such heights, that a subsequent purely natural evolution could hardly have outstripped them. And yet, precisely during the efflorescence of art, of science, and of political life, deplorable ignorance and corruption in respect to religion and morality go hand in hand in paganism. But if these favorable circumstances could not effect a betterment in the past, they could produce a reformation just as little, yes even less, later on, when the combination of these circumstances was hardly more favorable, indeed rather less propitious if anything.

Döllinger characterizes the result of his research in that monumental work, which we have often cited above and which evidences a tremendous diligence and painstaking energy, as follows: "The genius of antiquity essayed, exhausted, and used up, so to say, every combination possible of the principles once entrusted and handed down to her, the entire plastic power that dwelt within her. It was only after she had become completely incorporated, after each one of her doctrines, forms, and institutions, her sum of vital power, had



been sifted — and consumed, that . . . a leaf in the history of the human mind was turned over"<sup>390)</sup>

2. Free beings can indeed by reason of their liberty change at any moment from that which is worse to that which is better, and in their moral and religious disposition they also possess a perennial tendency thereto. Nevertheless, it is possible, even in the sphere of life subject to free will, to establish by an inductive proof universal laws, which have, it is true, no physical necessity and universality like the laws of nature, but which are arrived at inductively and possess morally universal and necessary validity. This is quite obvious from the vulgar observation by which, for instance, we may assert with all certainty that 'he who exposes himself to danger, will perish therein', or that he who, by long habit, is chained to sin, cannot extricate himself therefrom save by extraordinary efforts. *Moral statistics* show even more plainly this regularity of free activity.<sup>391)</sup> Indeed this regularity is so strong, that one might feel tempted to surrender the truth that human actions are free. One may not, of course, go to such extremes; for from the fact that a great many free agents act, under definite circumstances, for the most part in the same way, one may validly conclude that our freedom of action is not without law; is not independent of motives; but it does not follow that the individual, on that account, is necessarily compelled by these motives.<sup>392)</sup>

Law of  
induction.

We can judge with all the greater certainty concerning the constancy or permanence of a condition, of a manner of action on the part of free agents, the greater the number of persons is, to whom the observation extends, the longer the condition has obtained, the more varied the circumstances under which the condition appears, and the more lasting the circumstances themselves are.<sup>393)</sup>

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<sup>390)</sup> Gutberlet, *ibid.* II, pp. 45, 46; Döllinger-Darnell, *ibid.* I, Preface, pp. vi, vii.

<sup>391)</sup> Gutberlet, *ibid.* II, pp. 45, 46; cf. IDEM, *Moralstatistik*, in *Natur u. Offenbarung*, vol. 32.

<sup>392)</sup> cf. Baschab, pp. 224—228, or any good text-book on the nature of the proof from induction.

<sup>393)</sup> Gutberlet, *ibid.* II, p. 46.

Now the religious and moral helplessness of paganism extends not only to one or the other state and to a few decades, as statistical data, but to all mankind and to thousands of years. At the same time the peoples in question have lived in all possible circumstances, which could promote or hinder religious knowledge; under all imaginable forms of government and law, in all imaginable grades of culture, under all possible forms of philosophical investigation and public morality, etc. Therefore, humanly speaking, one may not expect an essentially new combination of circumstances, which in opposition to all former ones, might effect a religious and moral betterment.<sup>394)</sup>

Consequently, in the circumstances described, it was morally impossible for the peoples of paganism to arrive at a clear conception of the truths of natural religion and morality.

Confirmatory  
proofs.

3. There are two ways which might have led the pagans to the possession of a relatively perfect knowledge of natural religion and ethics. They are: 1) *their own investigation*, and 2) *external instruction*, especially *enlightenment on the part of philosophy*. Now we assert that neither of these was suitable and efficacious.

Personal in-  
quiry ineffi-  
cacious.

I. A clear and certain knowledge of the natural truths of religion is not very easy attainable. It presupposes much knowledge and investigation. For religious truths can only be proved and understood philosophically, after many other studies have been completed; hence in the schools the philosophy of religion is not taught until all the other philosophical studies have been completed. Moreover, "very many are hindered from gathering the fruit of diligent inquiry, which is the discovery of truth", because they have not the *natural disposition* of mind to know the truths of religion by means of logical deduction; very many are prevented from making a study of religion because of the *cares* and the necessary *tasks of life*; for many such a mental labor is too *irksome*, whereas to others it appears *hardly worthy of the efforts* it necessarily entails. To all this must be added the aggravating circum-

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<sup>394)</sup> Gutberlet, *ibid.* II, p. 46.

stance, that the already present, erroneous, pagan views, would interfere with a clear and certain knowledge of these matters. Thus only a *few* of the totality of men would be able to occupy themselves with these things. And these few would be able to conclude their inquiry only after a *long time*. Finally, "much falsehood is mingled with the investigation of human reason, on account of the weakness of our intellect in forming its judgments, and by reason of the admixture of phantasms". Hence many *errors* would vitiate the truth. — Consequently only a *few* would arrive at a relatively certain and clear knowledge of the natural truths of religion and that only after a long time. For an entire people, and particularly for the totality of mankind, it would always remain morally, and partly even physically, impossible. Therefore personal investigation is unsuitable and inefficacious for this purpose.<sup>395)</sup>

External instruction inefficacious.

II. Neither could the desired end have been attained by means of *external instruction*, particularly by the aid of *philosophy*. It is indeed true, that philosophy has set itself the task of ascertaining religious truths by rational inquiry and that it has actually discovered many truths by this means or, at least, shed a clearer light upon them. Hence one might be led to conclude that philosophy ought to have been able to exert an influence, at least by way of a reformation, upon the popular religion of paganism, thereby freeing it from the dross adhering to it. However, as a matter of fact, philosophy has accomplished *nothing* in this regard; it has remained absolutely impotent in respect to reforming the religious consciousness of the pagan peoples.<sup>396)</sup> For, in the first place, it owes its origin, to a great degree, precisely to religion.<sup>397)</sup> But instead of strengthening the foundations of religion, philosophy has rather sapped them. It did, indeed, dispel unworthy conceptions of the Deity, to a large extent, but it thereby weakened the ancient faith in the gods; it did not replace that faith by anything positive. The net results were

<sup>395)</sup> Brunsmann, S. V. D; *ibid.* I, p. 142; cf. St. Thomas, *SCG.* I, I, c. iv. <sup>396)</sup> Stöckl, *ibid.* Part II, p. 13.

<sup>397)</sup> Schill-Straubinger, *ibid.* p. 191; cf. M. De Wulf, art. "*Philosophy*", in CE. XII, p. 36.



rather infidelity and religious indifferentism. As a constructive factor in religion, therefore, philosophy is of little account. In point of fact, no religious movement worthy of the name ever proceeded from philosophy.<sup>398</sup>) On the contrary, "philosophy itself was yearning for a teacher of truth and a redeemer from sin. It sketched an ideal, but was powerless to galvanize it into life".<sup>399</sup>)

First of all, philosophy was really *unwilling* to become the teacher of the masses in a religious and moral respect; and even though it had striven to accomplish this task, it would have been *unable* to effect it; for it lacked certain and sufficient knowledge; unity and harmony among its proponents; authority in respect to the masses and a sufficient sanction for its commands.<sup>400</sup>)

a) Even the best among the philosophers did not venture to proceed against the current popular religion. Socrates himself, who cared little for popular favour, was no exception. On the contrary, the philosophers expressly taught that a person ought to accommodate himself to the prevailing religion of the gods.<sup>401</sup>) The pagan religion was so intimately bound up with the entire pagan system of State polity, that whoever laid hands upon religion necessarily jeopardized the whole pagan State system. The State was supreme in the conception also of the philosophers. Hence it never entered their minds to reform the popular religion.<sup>402</sup>)

Moreover, their philosophy was destined for the school and for a narrow circle of pupils rather than for the common people; it was more or less esoteric in character and, at any

<sup>398</sup>) Schill-Straubinger, *ibid.* p. 191.

<sup>399</sup>) Schanz, *ibid.* II, p. 276 with sources cited.

<sup>400</sup>) Hettinger-Weber, *ibid.* p. 155.

<sup>401</sup>) St. Augustine, *De Civ. Dei*, 8, 12: "Sed hi omnes (i. e., the philosophers from Plato to Plotinus, Porphyrius and Apulejus) et ceteri ejusmodi et ipse Plato diis plurimis esse sacra facienda putaverunt". Of Seneca he says (*ibid.* 6, 10): "Colebat quod reprehendebat, agebat, quod arguebat, quod culpabat, adorabat". According to Cicero (*De leg.* 2, 10, 12) nothing that the priests and auguries have introduced should be altered. The foundation of the Platonic State is the Hellenic cult of the gods (*De Republ.* 4, ed. Steph. p. 427; 5, p. 461; 8, pp. 560). Socrates also honours the gods according to the laws of the State (Xenophon, *Memorab.* 1. 3 4; 4, 16; *Apologia*, c. 24, ed. Steph. p. 35; cf. Döllinger-Darnell, *ibid.* I, pp. 291 sq. <sup>402</sup>) Stöckl, *ibid.* Part II, p. 15.

rate, its obscurity and abstract form placed it above the comprehension of the ordinary populace.<sup>403</sup>) A praise-worthy exception is the philosophy of Socrates, who addressed himself to the masses in a form that could be easily understood. But his philosophy is merely a doctrine of ethics; in a religious respect, therefore as regards the foundation of true morality, Socrates left things just as they were.<sup>404</sup>

b) Philosophy *could not* effect a change in the religious and ethical status of paganism. For in the first place, the philosophers themselves erred or were, at least, uncertain as to the fundamental truths of religion, namely the personality of God, the creation of the world, especially of matter, the divine freedom and providence, the immortality of the soul, the full personality of slaves, of unborn or newly born children, and of women, the sanctity of marriage, of life, etc.<sup>405</sup>)

Philosophy  
was unable.

Secondly, the proofs which the philosophers presented for their doctrines, were very weak and likewise unintelligible to the masses.<sup>406</sup>) Cicero, who had the results of all Greek philosophy before him, after recounting all the mutual contradictory opinions concerning immortality, was compelled to admit that only God knows which is the true meaning.<sup>407</sup>)

Thirdly, the disagreement among the philosophers, which was an open secret and according to Cicero even proverbial in antiquity, deterred men from placing confidence in their

<sup>403</sup>) Thus in our own day Schelling (*Vorlesungen über die Methode des akademischen Studiums*, p. 111) took for his motto the "Odi profanum vulgus et arceo" of Horace.

<sup>404</sup>) Gutberlet, *ibid.* II, p. 15; cf. Döllinger-Darnell, *ibid.* I, p. 289 sq.

<sup>405</sup>) cf. *Ibid.* II, pp. 49—68 for a summary of the teachings of Aristotle, Plato, Seneca, Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius, etc.; also Döllinger-Darnell, *ibid.* I, pp. 259—394; Henry Browne, S. J.; *The Religion of the Athenian Philosophers*, in LHR. II.

<sup>406</sup>) Thus Plato (*Timaeus*, ed. Steph. p. 28) asserts that it is difficult to know the Creator of all, impossible to make Him known to all. "Plato makes Socrates say that unless a God, through the mediation of the *λόγος τῆς Θεῆς* point out the beginning and the type of true righteousness, no improvement in the world's condition is possible. Socrates thinks it the best policy to wait calmly till there come one to teach man how to comport himself towards God. Aristotle says that human reason stands in the same relation to the knowledge of divine things, as the eye of the owl to the clear daylight. In his view, the wise are as little versed in divine things as the ignorant". (Schanz, *ibid.* II, p. 276).

<sup>407</sup>) *Quaest. Tuscul.* I, 11.

statements. And yet, the masses, which were incapable of critically examining the reasons alleged by the philosophers, could derive benefit from these doctrines only through faith in them.<sup>408</sup>)

Fourthly, in respect to a religious and ethical reformation the *moral* character of the teacher is of the utmost importance. But the life of the philosophers of paganism ill accorded with their teachings; they were the slaves of the most shameful vices, even of the Greek national vice (*paiderastia*), so that the philosopher's mantle became the object of universal contempt. This disdain of the philosophers' guild naturally also affected the more innocent among them, so that the moral *authority* of the philosophers was almost nil. Indeed, this serious stricture was raised not only by Christian apologists, but likewise pagan writers, particularly Cicero, himself a philosopher, lament the fact that scarcely a single person lives according to the dictates of reason or of his own philosophical system; that all cultivate their science, either because of frivolous ostentation, or for the sake of monetary considerations; that they are slaves to the most abominable vices, and that there is generally a very striking contradiction between their lives and their teachings.<sup>409</sup>)

Finally, the philosophers lacked every *sanction* which could make their moral teachings laws for the masses.<sup>410</sup>)

Later philosophers just as impotent.

c) Now if a Socrates, a Plato, an Aristotle, a Seneca, an Epictetus, a Marcus Aurelius, did not, in point of fact, give to paganism guidance and direction for religious betterment, if they were unable and unwilling to accomplish this end, we may safely conclude that absolutely nothing was to be hoped for from philosophy in this respect. We are not here concerned with the Neo-Platonists, for obviously they owe their

<sup>408</sup>) cf. Cicero, *De leg.* I, 20.

<sup>409</sup>) *Quaest. Tusc.* II, 4; I, 12; *De natura deor.* 1, 1; cf. also Lactantius, *Div. Institut.* 3, 15; Quintillius, *Institut. prooem.*; Aristides, *Opera*, ed. Jebb, 307, 314 etc.

<sup>410</sup>) cf. Lactantius, *Div. Institut.* 3, 27: "Nihil ponderis habent illa praecepta, quia sunt humana, et auctoritate majori, i. e. divina, carent. Nemo igitur credit, quia tam se hominem esse qui audit, quam sit ille, qui praecipit".



purser concepts of God to their contact and conflict with Christianity. The same holds good for all post-Christian philosophers, who, in so far as they do not take their stand upon the Christian coign of vantage, are guilty all in all, of even more serious errors than were the older philosophers. In our own day the assertion of Cicero, that there is nothing so absurd but that a philosopher has taught it, has an even deeper and more universal significance than in antiquity.<sup>411)</sup>

Indeed, the world of philosophical thought appears more divided today than ever before, and the battle still rages precisely about fundamental principles. By the separation of philosophy from faith there has come into being, on the one hand, sensualism and materialism (English Empiricists), on the other, the immoderate idealism of Descartes, which leads to subjectivism. Even in Leibnitz there are many grave errors, especially psychological determinism in respect to God and ourselves. With Kant we arrive at agnosticism, and with Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, we are projected into pantheistic evolutionism. At the same time, many philosophers are positivists, who deny the necessity of the first principles of reason, the knowability of God, the foundation of moral responsibility, acknowledging only an external obligation imposed by society itself for the common good. Thus the result is a practical materialism, according to which "authority is nothing else save numbers, and the sum-total of material forces".<sup>412)</sup>

We have already referred to the futile efforts of great *religious founders and reformers* (Buddha, Confucius, Laotze, Zoroaster) to effect a reformation religiously and ethically. Surely if human helplessness and intuition in respect to religion and morality is so incomprehensibly great, that millions of people blindly surrender themselves to a religion so plainly absurd, the necessity of a divine supernatural help appears all the more urgent.<sup>413)</sup>

Religious  
founders and  
reformers  
impotent.

<sup>411)</sup> Gutberlet, *ibid.* II, p. 49.

<sup>412)</sup> Garrigou-Lagrange, O. P.; *ibid.* I, pp. 413 sq.; cf. DB. n. 1760; DCD. p. 203; also Jos. Mausbach, *Die Entwicklung des Geisteslebens seit dem Mittelalter*, in RCK. I, pp. 12—27.

<sup>413)</sup> Gutberlet, *ibid.* II, pp. 68 sq.

Conclusion.

Therefore we may validly conclude, that if man is not to despair as regards a fitting knowledge of religious and moral truth, divine supernatural revelation must come to his aid. God Himself must give him enlightenment concerning the riddles of existence. He alone can lead man out of the night of doubt into the clarity of truth and certainty. Only a divine supernatural revelation can convince the poor of spirit. For they have little understanding for philosophical demonstration; they seek *authority*, which they can follow with a believing hope. In God they find an authority, which can be easily known as absolutely trustworthy.<sup>414)</sup>

Negative  
argument.  
Refutation of  
objections.

4. a) While it is true, that individual peoples are at a stand-still or have even gone backward in *cultural evolution*, still there can be no doubt that mankind, for the most part, has progressed in spiritual and material culture. May we not, therefore, reasonably suppose that, even without a divine supernatural revelation, at least one or the other people would have obtained a better religious knowledge by its own efforts and that, before this higher light, universal darkness would have been just as little able to hold its ground as savages are able permanently to withdraw themselves from the influences of civilization? —

We reply, that we leave the problem undecided as to whether spiritual and material culture would really have advanced or rather universal stagnation or degeneration would have resulted with the death of the cultured nations of antiquity, if a divine supernatural revelation had not intervened and, with its divine power, like a mighty ferment, permeated the world even against its will. Be that as it may, this much is certain: *Moral and religious culture do not keep pace with the progress of worldly culture.* For progress in art and science human interest, honour, riches, the desire for knowledge are efficacious factors. Religious education finds rather hindrances in these potent forces. Indeed, every one knows from experience, that we must freely determine ourselves to religious and moral activity, and that oftentimes we must decide that issue with struggle and effort; but the direct contrary takes place in secular endeavors, not merely in the sphere of the material but also of the spiritual. No wonder then, that secular education, taken all in all, always advances, whereas the spiritual recedes without a divine aid. Besides the greater inclination and capability of man for culture, many more helps come to the assistance of secular culture than for the acquirement of religious and moral knowledge. In the former case, it is not necessary first to raise oneself to the purely spiritual, as in the matter of religious and moral culture; we do not have to

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<sup>414)</sup> Sawicki, *ibid.* p. 254.

relinquish entirely the sensible and external world, which is the natural object of human knowledge and activity. The experiences, discoveries, instruments of art and science, do not have to be continually introduced anew; the later generations enjoy as their own possession the accomplishments of preceding generations. All these helps are wanting to a rational knowledge of religion and morality. Consequently from the possibility of universal progress in culture, strictly speaking, it does not follow that a religious reformation is possible. Furthermore, as we have shown above, such a reformation, in point of fact, would never have occurred, but rather, in all the possible stages of culture, the very same religious and moral decadence is plainly discernible.<sup>415</sup>

b) It is often claimed, that "*science corrects its own errors; evolution effects the domination of what is good; therefore there is no need of a direct supernatural revelation of God*". —

We reply, 1) that in the matter of the correction of errors by the progress of science this claim holds good only for natural science and for history and that, indeed, only in so far as both disciplines keep themselves free from the passions of the human heart and make use of the so-called method of exact investigation, which, unfortunately, is not at the disposal of all the sciences. If theodicy and metaphysics are, generally speaking, inaccessible to the exact method of mathematical demonstration because of the nature of their subject matter, it cannot be denied, that they, too, *per se*, have within themselves the power of overcoming all errors that might creep in, but not to the same degree as the strictly exact sciences. To deny to them this high privilege would be tantamount to a denial to human reason of the immanent faculty of arriving at a certain knowledge of God and of the world. But if we look at the cold facts, as the centuries disclose them, we shall see that religious errors, with a strange pertinacity, take their abode in and cling to the corrupted hearts of men, when left to their own natural resources, as the history of philosophy and pantheism demonstrates; we see that the systems of materialism and pantheism, in the various epochs of human history, recur like a law, again and again, in periodic cycles; that the victory which truth itself has gained over atheism and polytheism is never like a permanent and decisive victory, but rather only initiates an interim of short duration, which is again offset by a subsequent period of relapse into the old errors. If ever since the death of ancient pagan speculation, there is, nevertheless, a real advance for the better discernible, one is too easily liable to forget, that the entire post-Christian evolution of philosophical inquiry — beginning with the stoicism, neo-platonism and gnosticism of Christian antiquity and extending to the monism of the present age — took place in the full sunshine of Christianity and understood how to mitigate the innate harshness and untruthfulness of atheistic and pantheistic systems. The period lasting almost a thousand years, namely the

<sup>415</sup>) Gutberlet, *ibid.* II, pp. 84 sq.



believing Middle Ages, begotten by philosophical geniuses such as Thomas Aquinas and Scotus, was entirely under the domination of the Christian philosophy of life.<sup>410</sup>)

2) In regard to the objection, that the principle of *evolution* will, of itself, effect the victory of the good, we present the following answer. In the sphere of nature there is, indeed, in general the tendency manifest, that in the process of evolution everything hurtful and incapable of survival is uprooted in the struggle for existence and the powerful and strong types are helped to victory. But even here the weeds grow together with the wheat, yes, oftentimes even overrun the field, unless the constant and caretaking hand of the husbandman continually tears up the noxious cockle. Moreover, good and bad, useful and harmful, are only relative concepts in natural science, and make no claim to absolute value in the sphere of nature. But the matter is entirely different as regards evolution in the realm of the spirit. The spiritual evolution of the human race has, indeed, in the course of time, promoted much that is good and beautiful and, generally speaking, has advanced in an ascending scale. But surely it is unpardonable optimism and, at the same time, a slap in the face of history, to overlook the fact that religious evolution towards the good and religious and moral progress are due almost exclusively to the illuminating, warming and fructifying sun-rays of a divinely revealed supernatural religion.

In truth, the pure concept of God is to be found in its permanence only in the cultural spheres of ancient Israel and of Christianity. Outside these realms darkest paganism reigns. If pre-Christian paganism, in its primitive beginnings, as for instance in the oldest forms of Persism and Sinism, knew monotheism and cultivated it, still, from the viewpoint of the history of religions it is certain, that there followed only too soon such a great and universal defection from the one true God, that the nations outside the light of divine supernatural revelation, despite their high culture (e. g., the old Mexicans, the Chinese and Japanese), have never been able, up to the present time, to raise themselves, by their own unaided efforts, to the pristine heights and to purity of religious ideas. In this difficult task the Christian missionaries are obliged to come to their assistance. But in respect to those circles, which seek religious evolution in a direction that is consciously anti-Christian, one has only to page through the literature hostile to divine supernatural revelation, to note how here, too, the most insipid and unworthy conceptions of God and things divine are the order of the day, even though they be somewhat softened and pared down by reason of the high spiritual culture and the unconscious influence of Christian ideas.

Therefore, as a net-result of these considerations, it is evident that the much vaunted principle of evolution is unable permanently to effect the victory of the good in the religious and moral realms.

<sup>410</sup>) Pohle, *Natur u. Übernatur*, in RCK. I, pp. 463. 464.

Indeed, the evolution of the anti-Christian world is really nothing but "the cultural history of evil".<sup>417)</sup>

c) If divine supernatural revelation is so necessary for mankind, it must be *due* to human nature. But a divine supernatural revelation will never be due to human nature. Therefore it cannot be said to be necessary. —

We reply, that a divine supernatural revelation would be due to human nature, if it were *physically* necessary, so that without it mankind would be absolutely unable to attain its essential end. But a divine supernatural revelation is only *morally* necessary for mankind, that is to say, it is granted by God to enable all men to arrive at a more perfect and certain knowledge of natural religion and morality as befits human dignity. And in this respect a divine supernatural revelation is not absolutely (*i. e., in se*) necessary, but only *hypothetically* necessary, that is, God was not obliged to select this supernatural means, but in His bounteous liberality He freely chose this supernatural instead of a natural means.<sup>418)</sup> It must not be forgotten that we are speaking here of mankind *in its present condition* as history displays it (namely, *in statu naturae lapsae*, which is due to man's own fault), which is not identical with the state of pure nature (*status naturae purae*). For in the purely hypothetical state of pure nature, that is, prescinding from man's elevation to the supernatural order and from his lapse into sin, we may assume that God would have given to mankind a sufficient and fitting knowledge of natural religious truths, either through a means other than a divine revelation, or at least, if such a revelation were really necessary, it would not have been, as in the present status of mankind, above the exigencies of nature. Consequently it is illogical to assume that in the beginning God created human nature in an imperfect state, since He did not endow it with the means requisite to attain its natural end.<sup>419)</sup>

d) Another objection states, that if a divine supernatural revelation were so necessary, the religious and ethical delinquencies of mankind, resting as they do on moral impotency, would have to be said to be *non-imputable*. —

We reply, that it is indeed difficult to measure the guilt of the individual, but mankind in general can be held responsible for the sad condition in which it finds itself. Original sin, in itself, explains much, but much more is due to personal sins, which have led mankind from monotheism to idolatry. But likewise the descendants of the first idolaters, for whom it was indeed difficult to extricate themselves from perdition, cannot complain against God. For the wisest of reasons God set up the law of *solidarity* between parents and children; for the good of the children the parents are to make hereditary the reverence for God and for

<sup>417)</sup> Pohle, *Natur u. Übernatur*, in RCK. I, pp. 464—466.

<sup>418)</sup> Dorsch, S. J; *ibid.* I, p. 354.

<sup>419)</sup> J. MacGuinness, C. M; *Commentarii theologici*. Parisiis et Dublinii. MCMXIII (ed. altera), I, pp. 23, 24.

morality in the family. Is it the fault of God, if sin and error are made hereditary? According to wise disposition *habit* is to serve for the strengthening of what is good: is it the fault of this wisdom, if men are unable to free themselves from wicked habits? <sup>420)</sup>

e) If a divine supernatural revelation is so necessary, how is it that God *delayed* the bestowal of this help for such a long period? —

We reply, that God could freely choose the period for granting a supernatural revelation, because a divine supernatural revelation is a *free gift* of God. However, if looked at from a broader viewpoint, the delay offered the greatest advantage, since it gave to mankind the opportunity of becoming vividly conscious of its own misery and hence the necessity of ascribing its moral reformation, not indeed to its own efforts, but rather to God. Thereby the desire for a remedy became intensified, and salvation itself might be accepted with the evaluation that befits it. Even now unbelievers fondly strive to convince themselves, that mankind is able to help itself and that it really did so by its own unaided efforts. What would proud human reason say, if it did not have this great misery before its eyes for such a long time? if God had the sooner checked the natural course of this misery? <sup>421)</sup> However, apart from these considerations, we can simply deny the assumption; for God from the very beginning granted a sufficient revelation and enlightenment to our first parents, and then again to Noe. Therefore the whole human race could have provided for itself, for that revelation was to be handed down from generation to generation as a precious inheritance. If men, through their own fault, lost or corrupted that gift, this is due to their own fault, not to Divine Providence. <sup>422)</sup>

f) Finally, it is objected that if one were to sketch a detailed picture of the religious and ethical conditions of our own modern large cities, that picture would appear just as black, if not blacker, than the descriptions of the religious and moral status of paganism, which ancient authors have left us. Therefore, a divine supernatural revelation has really missed its goal, and if it was necessary in ancient times, it is again just as necessary now. —

We reply, that modern conditions, particularly in our large cities, are indeed deplorable in the extreme. But the reason for this is that many have, of their own free volition, turned away from the light of divine supernatural revelation. In the Church they have all the means necessary for arriving at a true and certain knowledge of God and morality. Of course, it is difficult for the Church, which must use human instruments and reckon with human conditions, to regain the masses that have turned away from the path of truth and righteousness, just as all the pagans themselves were not converted at once. But one many not assert the impossibility of such a reformation. Only gradually

<sup>420)</sup> Gutherlet, *ibid.* II, p. 86.

<sup>421)</sup> *Ibid.* II, p. 86.

<sup>422)</sup> Dorsch, S. J; *ibid.* I, p. 355.



and with extraordinary efforts is it possible and necessary to regain for religion what extraordinarily destructive conditions, such as political and social abuses, have estranged from her.<sup>423</sup>) A divine supernatural revelation does not put man into the actual possession of the end, since this end must be striven after in a moral way.<sup>424</sup>)

The question of the *subjective* necessity of revelation will be dealt with after we have shown the fact of such a revelation.

We shall now consider the *natural knowability* of a divine supernatural revelation.



## APPENDIX.

*Selected Readings on the THEORY OF RELIGION.*

Most of the German and French works cited in the preceding pages contain separate treatises, sometimes an entire volume, on the first general part of apologetics.

Besides the standard Latin writings of the Scholastics on Theodicy and Anthropology, particularly the *Summa contra Gentiles* of St. Thomas Aquinas, the student will find the following writings helpful:

C. Mazzella, *De religione et ecclesia*. Romae. 1896 (5. ed.), pp. 1—54; Guil. Wilmers, S. J., *De religione revelata*. Ratisbonae. 1897, n. 5—16; G. Lahousse, S. J., *De vera religione*. Lovanii. 1897, n. 5—11; G. Van Noort, *Tractatus de vera religione*. Amstelodami. 1907 (2. ed.); J. Muncunill, S. J., *Tractatus de vera religione*. Barcinone. 1909; J. Bainvel, *De vera religione et apologetica*. Parisiis. 1914; Aemil. Dorsch, S. J., *Institutiones theologiae fundamentalis*. Oeniponte. 1916, I, pp. 111—292; Ad. Tanquerey, *Synopsis theologiae dogmaticae*. Romae, Tornaci et Parisiis. 1922 (19. ed.), I, pp. 59—105; P. P. Minges, O. F. M., *Compendium theologiae generalis*. Ratisbonae. 1923 (2. ed.), pp. 11—12.

P. Schanz, *A Christian Apology*. Transl. by Mich. Glancey & Victor Schobel. N. Y. (4. ed.), I: "God and Nature"; W. Devivier, S. J., *Christian Apologetics*. Transl. from the Original French Work, ed. and augmented by Jos. C. Sasia, S. J., N. Y. 1924 (New, and extensively augmented edition), I, pp. 1—192; J. Ballerini, *A Short Defence of Religion*. Transl. from the Italian by Rev. Wm. McLoughlin. Dublin & Waterfort. 1910 (2. ed.), pp. 1—88; F. J. Koch, *A Manual of Apologetics*. Transl. and revised by Buchanan-Bruehl. N. Y. 1915, pp. 5—80; T. J. Walshe, *Principles of Christian Apologetics*. London & N. Y. (The Westminster Library), 1915, pp. 1—166; F. Hettinger, *Natural Religion*. From the "Apologie des Christentums". Edited by H. S. Bowden. N. Y. (4. ed.); L. v. Hammerstein, S. J., *Foundations of Faith*. Part I: "The Existence of God Demonstrated". From the German. London & N. Y. 1897; IDEM, *Edgar, or From Atheism to the Full Truth*. Transl. from the German. St. Louis, Mo. 1908, pp. 1—55; B. J. Otten, S. J., *The Reason Why*. St. Louis, Mo. 1912, pp. 3—95; M. J. Scott, S. J., *God and Myself*. N. Y. 1918; B. Boedder, S. J., *Natural Theology*. London & N. Y. 1891 and Mich. Maher, S. J., *Psychology*. London & N. Y. 1906 (6. ed., Stonyhurst Series); G. H. Joyce, S. J., *Principles of Natural Theology*. N. Y.; Owen

<sup>423</sup>) Gutberlet, *ibid.* II, pp. 87, 88.

<sup>424</sup>) Weber, *ibid.* p. 231.

A. Hill, S. J., *Psychology and Natural Theology*. N. Y.; Chas. R. Ba-schab, *A Manual of Neo-Scholastic Philosophy*. St. Louis, Mo. & London. 1924 (2. ed.) and Cardinal Mercier, *A Manual of Scholastic Philosophy*. Authorized transl. and eighth ed. by T. L. Parker & S. A. Parker. London & St. Louis, Mo. 1916 sq., especially the tractates on theodicy and anthropology; R. F. Clarke, S. J., *The Existence of God*. London. 1892; R. Kane, S. J., *God or Chaos*. London. 1912; T. J. Driscoll, *Christian Philosophy: God*. N.Y. 1904 (2. ed.); IDEM, *Christian Philosophy. A Treatise on the Human Soul*. N.Y. 1898; W. Humphrey, S. J., *His Divine Majesty or the Living God*. London. 1897; M. Ronayne, S. J., *God Knowable and Known*. N.Y. 1902 (2. ed.); T. J. Gerrard, *The Way-farer's Vision*. London 1909; F. J. Sheen, *God and Intelligence in Modern Philosophy*. London & N.Y. 1925; J. Thein, *Christian Anthropology*. N.Y. 1892; E. J. Lucas, *Agnosticism and Religion*. Baltimore. 1895; W. S. Lilly, *The Great Enigma*. N.Y. 1893 (2. ed.); L. A. Lambert, *Notes on Ingersoll*. Buffalo. 1883 (13. ed.); G. A. Ward, *Essays on the Philosophy of Theism*. London. 1884, 2 vols; Hubert Gruender, S. J., *Psychology without a Soul. A Criticism*. St. Louis, Mo. 1912; Geo. Fell, *The Immortality of the Human Soul*. St. Louis, Mo; Fell-Villing, *The Immortality of the Human Soul Philosophically Explained*. London. 1906; Elbé, *Future Life in the Light of Ancient and Modern Science*. London. 1907; F. C. Kempson, *The Future Life and Modern Difficulties*. London. 1907; Jos. Rickaby, S. J., *Free Will and Four English Philosophers*. London. 1906; A. B. Sharpe, *The Freedom of the Will*. London & St. Louis, Mo. 1906; W. Lescher, O. P., *The Evolution of the Human Body*. London. 1899 (2. ed.); H. Muckermann, S. J., *Attitude of Catholics Towards Darwinism and Evolution*. St. Louis, Mo. 1906; E. Wasmann, S. J., *Modern Biology and the Theory of Evolution*. London. 1910; IDEM, *The Berlin Discussion of the Problem of Evolution*. London. 1899 (2. ed.); J. McCosh, *The Religious Aspect of Evolution*. N.Y. 1890; G. K. Chesterton, *The Everlasting Man*. N. Y. 1925, especially Part I, pp. 1—197. pertinent articles in the CE.v. g., "God", P. J. Toner, VI, pp. 608—615; "Man", Francis Aveling, IX, pp. 580 sq; "Soul", Maher-Boland, XIV, pp. 153 sq; "Immortality", Mich. Maher, VII, pp. 687 sq; "Free Will", Mich. Maher, VI, pp. 259 sq; "Evolution", H. Muckermann, V, pp. 654 sq; "Religion", Chas. Aiken, XII, pp. 738 sq.

NON-CATHOLIC. Geo. Park Fisher, *The Grounds of Theistic and Christian Belief*. N. Y. 1922 (rev. ed.), pp. 1—89; A. E. Garvie, *A Handbook of Christian Apologetics*. N.Y. 1923, pp. 21—50; A. B. Bruce, *Apologetics*. N.Y. 1924 (International Theological Library), pp. 71—163; Stanley A. Cook, art. "Religion", in ERE. X, pp. 663—693 with bibliography.



### *Selected Readings on the THEORY OF REVELATION.*

In addition to the works already referred to in the preceding pages, the following will be found useful:

J. Martinez de Ripalda, *De ente supernaturali*. Bordeaux. 1634 (the "opus classicum" on the subject); I; D. Palmieri, *De ordine supernaturali et de lapsu angelorum*. Romae. 1910; Cl. Schrader, *De triplici ordine naturali, praeternaturali et supernaturali*. Vienna. 1864; Jos. Kleutgen, S. J., *Theologie der Vorzeit*. 1872<sup>2</sup>, II; Scheeben-Grabmann, *Natur und Gnade*. München. 1923; J. Bainvel, *Nature et Surnaturel*. Paris. 1905; H. Ligeard, *La théologie scolastique et la transcendance du surnaturel*. Paris. 1908; L. Gondal, *Le Surnaturel*. Paris. 1904, 1, III, c. 1; W. Humphrey, S. J., *His Divine Majesty or the Living God*. London. 1897, pp. 283 sq; P. J. Toner, art. "The Supernatural", in *The Irish Theological Quarterly*, 1912, Nos. 27, 28.

NON-CATHOLIC. R. R. Marett, art. "Supernaturalism" in *ERE*. XII, pp. 119 sq. with literature.


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